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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of Regionalization and Globalization）The Causes of Globalization

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Garrett CAUSES OF GLOBALIZATION 951 the spate of regionally and multilaterally coordinated efforts at trade liberal- ization in recent decades.But although customs unions like the EU impose common external trade barriers on nonmembers,the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT)-WTO regime continues to allow for more flexibil- ity.For example,data collected by Finger and his World Bank colleagues (Finger,Ingco,Reincke,1996,p.67)show that the standard deviation of national average applied Most Favored Nation tariff rates for a sample of 53 countries after the Uruguay Round was 9.2%(with a mean of 10.6%).8 Table 1 also examines market integration in countries at different levels of development (and in the case of high-income countries,distinguishing the stable industrial democracies of the OECD from other well-developed nations).Comparing the means for the OECD countries with those for the lowest income nations(1997 gross national product [GNP]per capita <$786, comprising almost all of Africa and the world's two most populous countries, China and India)provides simple and stark evidence that there are ins and outs in the purportedly global economy.Mean trade flows in the two groups were comparable(though the composition of these flows was clearly very different,with the poor category relying disproportionately on the export of natural resources).This probably reflects the fact that,as standard gravity models show,factors such as country size and proximity to neighbors(which have nothing to do with level of development)have marked bearing on trade volumes. The high-and low-income groups differed dramatically,however,on every other dimension of market integration.FDI flows were more than twice as large in the OECD as in the low-income group,international portfolio investment was almost 25 times as large,trade taxes were less than 1/25 as large a portion of trade volumes,and capital accounts were more than 10 times as likely to be open. Even within the OECD category,however,considerable differences in market integration remain.At one end of the spectrum,Belgium and the Netherlands are the OECD's most"globalized"economies.There are also numerous instances of relative nonintegration.The United States and Japan are very small traders (at least relative to the massive sizes of their econo- mies),and FDI flows are scant in Japan.Even after a decade of radical market opening in the 1980s,Australia,Canada,and New Zealand remain consider- ably more protectionist than the OECD norm (based on trade taxes on manu- factures);Greece and Spain only liberalized their capital accounts at the end of the 1990s. 8.Note also that for these countries,the correlation between applied tariff rates and the trade tax measure used here was high (r=0.75). Dowrloaded from http://cps.sagepub.com at CORNELL UNIV on February 11.2008 2000 SAGE Publications.All rights reserved.Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution

the spate of regionally and multilaterally coordinated efforts at trade liberalization in recent decades. But although customs unions like the EU impose common external trade barriers on nonmembers, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-WTO regime continues to allow for more flexibility. For example, data collected by Finger and his World Bank colleagues (Finger, Ingco, & Reincke, 1996, p. 67) show that the standard deviation of national average applied Most Favored Nation tariff rates for a sample of 53 countries after the Uruguay Round was 9.2% (with a mean of 10.6%).8 Table 1 also examines market integration in countries at different levels of development (and in the case of high-income countries, distinguishing the stable industrial democracies of the OECD from other well-developed nations). Comparing the means for the OECD countries with those for the lowest income nations (1997 gross national product [GNP] per capita < $786, comprising almost all of Africa and the world’s two most populous countries, China and India) provides simple and stark evidence that there are ins and outs in the purportedly global economy. Mean trade flows in the two groups were comparable (though the composition of these flows was clearly very different, with the poor category relying disproportionately on the export of natural resources). This probably reflects the fact that, as standard gravity models show, factors such as country size and proximity to neighbors (which have nothing to do with level of development) have marked bearing on trade volumes. The high- and low-income groups differed dramatically, however, on every other dimension of market integration. FDI flows were more than twice as large in the OECD as in the low-income group, international portfolio investment was almost 25 times as large, trade taxes were less than 1/25 as large a portion of trade volumes, and capital accounts were more than 10 times as likely to be open. Even within the OECD category, however, considerable differences in market integration remain. At one end of the spectrum, Belgium and the Netherlands are the OECD’s most “globalized” economies. There are also numerous instances of relative nonintegration. The United States and Japan are very small traders (at least relative to the massive sizes of their economies), and FDI flows are scant in Japan. Even after a decade of radical market opening in the 1980s, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand remain considerably more protectionist than the OECD norm (based on trade taxes on manufactures); Greece and Spain only liberalized their capital accounts at the end of the 1990s. Garrett / CAUSES OF GLOBALIZATION 951 8. Note also that for these countries, the correlation between applied tariff rates and the trade tax measure used here was high (r = 0.75). © 2000 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Downloaded from http://cps.sagepub.com at CORNELL UNIV on February 11, 2008

952 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES/August-September 2000 Table 2 Trade and Capital Flows in the 1990s Portfolio/ Trade Taxes/ Years With Open FDIGDP GDP Trade Capital Accounts Trade/GDP 0.40 0.15 0.16 0.22 FDI/GDP 0.27 0.12 0.09 Portfolio/GDP -0.08 0.02 Trade taxes/trade -0.33 Note:FDI=foreign direct investment,GDP=gross domestic product.Figures are correlations among countries based on data in the appendix. But soothsayers would probably want to highlight instances of high and growing market integration among the poorest countries as harbingers of the world of tomorrow.China,for example,was a major recipient of FDI inflows in the 1990s.Moreover,Indonesia resembled OECD norms on most of the basic indicators of globalization in the 1990s.But it would simply be inaccu- rate to portray these as more than isolated-though clearly important- exceptions to the rule that the world's poorest countries remain largely dis- connected from the international economy.For example,whereas popular commentary might lead one to believe that software engineers working for Microsoft and Sun Microsystems and telecommuting from Bangalore and Hyderabad to Seattle and Silicon Valley are the norm in the Indian economy, on most basic indicators the country remains an essentially closed economy. At the other end of the spectrum,Table 1 also highlights the distinctive- ness of the small,wealthy,non-OECD countries that are typically conduits for trade and international finance (Hong Kong and Singapore),small oil exporters(Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates),or tax havens(the Baha- mas and the Cayman Islands).Very high levels of trade and capital flows, higher indeed than even the most integrated OECD nations,characterize these countries.?Ohmae (1995)and Rosecrance (1999)believe that these region states"or"virtual states"are the wave of the future.But it is hard to see how Brazil or China could ever become Singapore or the Cayman Islands. Table 2 asks a different question about developments at the national level in the 1990s:Did different facets of market integration go together?There is some relatively weak evidence in the affirmative.As most modern econo- mists believe,it does appear that trade and FDI are complements rather than substitutes(the correlation between the two was a moderate 0.40).The corre- lation between FDI and international portfolio investment was weaker but 9.Note also that the tax havens make up for imposing no burdens on capital with very high trade taxes. Dowrloaded from http://cps.sagepub.com at CORNELL UNIV on February 11.2008 2000 SAGE Publications.All rights reserved.Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution

But soothsayers would probably want to highlight instances of high and growing market integration among the poorest countries as harbingers of the world of tomorrow. China, for example, was a major recipient of FDI inflows in the 1990s. Moreover, Indonesia resembled OECD norms on most of the basic indicators of globalization in the 1990s. But it would simply be inaccurate to portray these as more than isolated—though clearly important— exceptions to the rule that the world’s poorest countries remain largely disconnected from the international economy. For example, whereas popular commentary might lead one to believe that software engineers working for Microsoft and Sun Microsystems and telecommuting from Bangalore and Hyderabad to Seattle and Silicon Valley are the norm in the Indian economy, on most basic indicators the country remains an essentially closed economy. At the other end of the spectrum, Table 1 also highlights the distinctiveness of the small, wealthy, non-OECD countries that are typically conduits for trade and international finance (Hong Kong and Singapore), small oil exporters (Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates), or tax havens (the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands). Very high levels of trade and capital flows, higher indeed than even the most integrated OECD nations, characterize these countries.9 Ohmae (1995) and Rosecrance (1999) believe that these “region states” or “virtual states” are the wave of the future. But it is hard to see how Brazil or China could ever become Singapore or the Cayman Islands. Table 2 asks a different question about developments at the national level in the 1990s: Did different facets of market integration go together? There is some relatively weak evidence in the affirmative. As most modern economists believe, it does appear that trade and FDI are complements rather than substitutes (the correlation between the two was a moderate 0.40). The correlation between FDI and international portfolio investment was weaker but 952 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / August-September 2000 9. Note also that the tax havens make up for imposing no burdens on capital with very high trade taxes. Table 2 Trade and Capital Flows in the 1990s Portfolio/ Trade Taxes/ Years With Open FDI/GDP GDP Trade Capital Accounts Trade/GDP 0.40 0.15 0.16 0.22 FDI/GDP 0.27 0.12 0.09 Portfolio/GDP –0.08 0.02 Trade taxes/trade –0.33 Note: FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product. Figures are correlations among countries based on data in the appendix. © 2000 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Downloaded from http://cps.sagepub.com at CORNELL UNIV on February 11, 2008

Garrett CAUSES OF GLOBALIZATION 953 still positive(0.27).Countries that imposed fewer trade taxes also were some- what more likely to have open capital accounts (correlation =-0.33). But Table 2 also suggests that the policies governments pursued with respect to openness or closure to trade and international capital were essen- tially uncorrelated with international economic flows.One possible explana- tion for these weak flows-policies cross-national correlations(as opposed to the strong over time ones in Figures 2 and 3)is that policies affect flows only at the margins.For example,standard gravity models of trade demonstrate that smaller and wealthier countries tend to be bigger traders.To control for these effects,I estimated a simple regression equation that included these variables and trade taxes(TRTAX)as predictors of trade volumes(TRADE), TRADE 0.20TRTAX+32.75InGDPPC**-15.33InGDP**+158.09, (0.31) (5.74) (2.26) where GDPPC is GDP per capita and GDP is national GDP,both expressed as 1990-1997 averages in constant dollars (ordinary least squares [OLS]regres- sion with robust standard errors,R2=0.40,108 observations,and *is statis- tically significant at the .01 level). Surprisingly,the equation lends no more support to the view that countries that impose higher trade taxes tend to reduce trade flows.This is a strange finding because trade taxes must deter trade at the margins.It may well be the case that better econometric specifications (e.g.,the use of panel data and more control variables)would delineate this effect(Guisinger,2000). I also ran a similar regression for the partial correlation between capital account openness(OPENCA)and capital flows(CAPFLOWS),10 CAPFLOWS 2.65InGDPPC**-0.22InGDP +3.11OPENCA*-13.06, (0.49) (0.20) (1.61) which is more consistent with the proposition that capital account openness promotes international capital flows(OLS regression with robust standard errors,R2 =0.35,128 observations,is statistically significant at the.10 level,and *is statistically significant at the.01 level). Of course,at this point I should reiterate that the simple analyses pre- sented in this section are not intended to be definitive.They do serve the use- 10.The data do not allow me to conduct the same exercise on a global sample with respect to the partial correlation between capital account openness and capital market integration (using covered interest rate differentials or savings-investment correlations).For the OECD countries, however,Frankel and MacArthur (1988)demonstrated that even in the 1980s capital account openness was strongly positively correlated with greater capital mobility (measured in terms of smaller covered interest rate differentials). Dowrloaded from http://cps.sagepub.com at CORNELL UNIV on February 11.2008 2000 SAGE Publications.All rights reserved.Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution

still positive (0.27). Countries that imposed fewer trade taxes also were somewhat more likely to have open capital accounts (correlation = –0.33). But Table 2 also suggests that the policies governments pursued with respect to openness or closure to trade and international capital were essentially uncorrelated with international economic flows. One possible explanation for these weak flows-policies cross-national correlations (as opposed to the strong over time ones in Figures 2 and 3) is that policies affect flows only at the margins. For example, standard gravity models of trade demonstrate that smaller and wealthier countries tend to be bigger traders. To control for these effects, I estimated a simple regression equation that included these variables and trade taxes (TRTAX) as predictors of trade volumes (TRADE), TRADE = 0.20TRTAX + 32.75lnGDPPC** – 15.33lnGDP** + 158.09, (0.31) (5.74) (2.26) where GDPPC is GDP per capita and GDP is national GDP, both expressed as 1990-1997 averages in constant dollars (ordinary least squares [OLS] regression with robust standard errors, R2 = 0.40, 108 observations, and ** is statistically significant at the .01 level). Surprisingly, the equation lends no more support to the view that countries that impose higher trade taxes tend to reduce trade flows. This is a strange finding because trade taxes must deter trade at the margins. It may well be the case that better econometric specifications (e.g., the use of panel data and more control variables) would delineate this effect (Guisinger, 2000). I also ran a similar regression for the partial correlation between capital account openness (OPENCA) and capital flows (CAPFLOWS),10 CAPFLOWS = 2.65lnGDPPC** – 0.22lnGDP + 3.11OPENCA* – 13.06, (0.49) (0.20) (1.61) which is more consistent with the proposition that capital account openness promotes international capital flows (OLS regression with robust standard errors, R2 = 0.35, 128 observations, * is statistically significant at the .10 level, and ** is statistically significant at the .01 level). Of course, at this point I should reiterate that the simple analyses presented in this section are not intended to be definitive. They do serve the useGarrett / CAUSES OF GLOBALIZATION 953 10. The data do not allow me to conduct the same exercise on a global sample with respect to the partial correlation between capital account openness and capital market integration (using covered interest rate differentials or savings-investment correlations). For the OECD countries, however, Frankel and MacArthur (1988) demonstrated that even in the 1980s capital account openness was strongly positively correlated with greater capital mobility (measured in terms of smaller covered interest rate differentials). © 2000 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Downloaded from http://cps.sagepub.com at CORNELL UNIV on February 11, 2008

954 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES/August-September 2000 ful purpose,however,of highlighting two things.First,there is something behind all the globalization hoopla.The global trend toward international market integration and policy liberalization has been rapid in recent decades. Second,significant cross-national differences in integration remain,some of which may well be attributable to differences in foreign economic policy choices.Let me now explore the causes of these two phenomena,beginning with the secular global trend to more internationally integrated markets. THE UNIQUENESS OF CONTEMPORARY MARKET INTEGRATION Economic historians have been quick to point out that on many basic indi- cators the world economy is no more globalized today than it was 100 years ago.11 From this perspective,the big story of the 20th century was the dra- matic reduction of international economic activity in the middle decades. Obstfeld and Taylor's(1997)summary judgment is representative of the nascent conventional wisdom: The era of the classical gold standard,circa 1970 to 1914,is rightly regarded as a high-water mark in the free movement of capital,labor and commodities among nations.After World War I,the attempt to rebuild a world economy along pre-1914 lines was swallowed up in the Great Depression and in the new world war the Depression bred.Only in the 1990s has the world economy achieved a degree of economic integration that...rivals the coherence already attained a century earlier.(p.1) The staggering costs of the 1914-1945 period are certainly a central fact of the 20th century from which we no doubt still have much to learn.But is it appropriate to portray the contemporary era as merely a return to the preexist- ing"equilibrium"level of globalization?There is already a revisionist eco- nomic history claiming that,despite apparent similarities,international mar- ket integration today is qualitatively different than it was 100 years ago. According to Bordo,Eichengreen,and Irwin (1999),for example,"facile comparisons with the late 19th century notwithstanding,the international integration of capital and commercial markets goes further and runs deeper than ever before."12 11.Much of this work relies on and was inspired by the pathbreaking empirical research of Maddison (1995). 12.See also Baldwin and Martin (1999)for a similar argument. Dowrloaded from http://cps.sagepub.com at CORNELL UNIV on February 11.2008 2000 SAGE Publications.All rights reserved.Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution

ful purpose, however, of highlighting two things. First, there is something behind all the globalization hoopla. The global trend toward international market integration and policy liberalization has been rapid in recent decades. Second, significant cross-national differences in integration remain, some of which may well be attributable to differences in foreign economic policy choices. Let me now explore the causes of these two phenomena, beginning with the secular global trend to more internationally integrated markets. THE UNIQUENESS OF CONTEMPORARY MARKET INTEGRATION Economic historians have been quick to point out that on many basic indicators the world economy is no more globalized today than it was 100 years ago.11 From this perspective, the big story of the 20th century was the dramatic reduction of international economic activity in the middle decades. Obstfeld and Taylor’s (1997) summary judgment is representative of the nascent conventional wisdom: The era of the classical gold standard, circa 1970 to 1914, is rightly regarded as a high-water mark in the free movement of capital, labor and commodities among nations. After World War I, the attempt to rebuild a world economy along pre-1914 lines was swallowed up in the Great Depression and in the new world war the Depression bred. Only in the 1990s has the world economy achieved a degree of economic integration that . . . rivals the coherence already attained a century earlier. (p. 1) The staggering costs of the 1914-1945 period are certainly a central fact of the 20th century from which we no doubt still have much to learn. But is it appropriate to portray the contemporary era as merely a return to the preexisting “equilibrium” level of globalization? There is already a revisionist economic history claiming that, despite apparent similarities, international market integration today is qualitatively different than it was 100 years ago. According to Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin (1999), for example, “facile comparisons with the late 19th century notwithstanding, the international integration of capital and commercial markets goes further and runs deeper than ever before.”12 954 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / August-September 2000 11. Much of this work relies on and was inspired by the pathbreaking empirical research of Maddison (1995). 12. See also Baldwin and Martin (1999) for a similar argument. © 2000 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Downloaded from http://cps.sagepub.com at CORNELL UNIV on February 11, 2008

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