18 How are we to live? The ultimate choice 19 or objective. Thus it is only since about 1960 that many ground from the pretenders who occupied it when it was left people have systematically studied non-religious ethics; as a vacant by progressives who instead placed their faith in Marx result, it is, Parfit says, oungest and the least advance ist dreams of a transformed society in which all dilemmas of the sciences. So Parfit ends his book on a hopeful note would be resolved. The crucial moral questions of( not about homosexuality or abortion. Instead moralists should The Earth will remain inhabitable for at least another billion be asking: what are the obligations of all of us in the affluent years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we world when people are slowly starving in Somalia? What is to do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only be done about the racist hatred that prevents people living ny fraction of the whole of civilized human history together in Bosnia, in Azerbaijan, and in Los Angeles? Are we Belief in God, or in many gods, prevented the free develop- entitled to continue to confine billions of non-human animals ment of moral reasoning. Disbelief in god, openly admitted by in factory farms, treating them as mere things to serve the a majority, is a very recent event, not yet completed. Because pleasures of our palate? And how can we change our behav- this event is so recent, Non-religious Ethics is at a very early iour so as to preserve the ecological system on which the stage. We cannot yet predict whether, as in Mathematics entire planet depends? will all reach agreement. Since we cannot know how Ethics The more enlightened Christian readers have themselves will develop, it is not irrational to have high hopes. S now recognized that their Church,s preoccupation with sex has been a mistake: Dr George Carey, Archbishop of Canter- If Parfit is right, and the development of non-religious bury, has admitted that the church has been guilty of being ethical thinking is still in its infancy, it is clearly premature to say that history has reached its final destination. We are only caught up with the idea that sexual sins were"more signifi cant"than other sins and has said that instead we should now breaking with a past in which religion and ethics have hink more in terms of global problems such as world poverty been closely identified. It is too early to tell what changes In saying this, the Archbishop was belatedly preaching what may lie ahead, once we have a better understanding of the philosophers doing applied ethics have been saying since the nature of ethics, but they are likely to be profound seventies.Once it is generally understood that ethics has no <s Because people who are not religious have tended to extend necessary connection with the sexually-obsessed morality of eir scepticism about religion to ethics as well, they have conservative Christianity, a humane and positive ethic could be yielded the field of ethics to the religious right. This ha the basis for a renewal of our social, political and ecological life allowed the right to pre-empt 'morality' for crusades against he dominant political and economic model today allows abortion and homosexuality. Yet those who regard the inter indeed encourages, citizens to make the pursuit of their own ests of women as overriding the merely potential interests of interestsunderstood largely in terms of material wealth) the the fetus are taking their stand rally impregnable chief goal of their lives. We rarely reflect, either collectively position; and the moral case for acceptance of sexual rela- or as individuals, on whether this dominant conception is a tionships between consenting adults that do not harm others wise one. Does it truly offer the best lives for us all? Should is even more clear-cut. It is time to reclaim the moral high each one of us. in deciding how to live. assume that wealth is
18 How ar e we to live ? or objective. Thus it is only since about I960 that many people have systematically studied non-religious ethics; as a result, it is, Parfit says, 'the youngest and the least advanced" of the sciences. So Parfit ends his book on a hopeful note: The Earth will remain inhabitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history . . . Belief in God, or in many gods, prevented the free development of moral reasoning. Disbelief in god, openly admitted by a majority, is a very recent event, not yet completed. Because this event is so recent, Non-religious Ethics is at a very early stage. We cannot yet predict whether, as in Mathematics, we will all reach agreement. Since we cannot know how Ethics will develop, it is not irrational to have high hopes.15 If Parfit is right, and the development of non-religious ethical thinking is still in its infancy, it is clearly premature to say that history has reached its final destination. We are only now breaking with a past in which religion and ethics have been closely identified. It is too early to tell what changes may lie ahead, once we have a better understanding of the nature of ethics, but they are likely to be profound. Because people who are not religious have tended to extend their scepticism about religion to ethics as well, they have yielded the field of ethics to the religious right. This has allowed the right to pre-empt 'morality' for crusades against abortion and homosexuality. Yet those who regard the interests of women as overriding the merely potential interests of the fetus are taking their stand on a morally impregnable position;16 and the moral case for acceptance of sexual relationships between consenting adults that do not harm others is even more clear-cut. It is time to reclaim the moral high T h e ultimat e choic e 1 9 ground from the pretenders who occupied it when it was left vacant by progressives who instead placed their faith in Marxist dreams of a transformed society in which all dilemmas would be resolved. The crucial moral questions of our day are not about homosexuality or abortion. Instead moralists should be asking: what are the obligations of all of us in the affluent world when people are slowly starving in Somalia? What is to be done about the racist hatred that prevents people living together in Bosnia, in Azerbaijan, and in Los Angeles? Are we entitled to continue to confine billions of non-human animals in factory farms, treating them as mere things to serve the pleasures of our palate? And how can we change our behaviour so as to preserve the ecological system on which the entire planet depends? The more enlightened Christian readers have themselves now recognized that their Church's preoccupation with sex has been a mistake: Dr George Carey, Archbishop of Canterbury, has admitted that the church has been guilty of 'being caught up with the idea that sexual sins were "more significant" than other sins' and has said that instead we should think more in terms of global problems such as world poverty. In saying this, the Archbishop was belatedly preaching what philosophers doing applied ethics have been saying since the seventies.17 Once it is generally understood that ethics has no necessary connection with the sexually-obsessed morality of conservative Christianity, a humane and positive ethic could be the basis for a renewal of our social, political and ecological life. The dominant political and economic model today allows, indeed encourages, citizens to make the pursuit of their own interests (understood largely in terms of material wealth) the chief goal of their lives. We rarely reflect, either collectively or as individuals, on whether this dominant conception is a wise one. Does it truly offer the best lives for us all? Should each one of us, in deciding how to live, assume that wealth is
20 How are we to live? The ultimate choice 21 the thing to aim at? What is the place of ethics in such of the pla about global justice decisions? We must not make the error of assuming that the nly then can we hope to see a al of the will to deal failure of past Utopian ideals means that values should not h the root causes of poverty, crime, and the short-term play a central role in our lives. I share Parfit's view that in destruction of our planet 's resources. a politics based on ethics the advancement of ethics lies the possibility of a new and could be radical, in the original sense of the term: that is, it more hopeful turn in world history; but it must be an advance- could change things from the roots ment not only in ethical theory, but also in ethical practice. We need a new force for change. Changing the way which we see the role of ethics in our lives may seem like Ethics and self-interest omething that changes individual lives, but leaves the larger More personal doubts about ethics remain. To live ethically, society and the world of politics untouched. That appearance we assume, will be hard work, uncomfortable, self-sacrificing misleads. The early years of the nineties have made it clea and generally unrewarding. We see ethics as at odds with that the promotion of greed by proponents of the free market self-interest: we assume that those who make fortunes from has failed even to achieve the narrow economic goal of creat insider trading ignore ethics, but are successfully following ing a thriving economy. In broader social and environmental self-interest(as long as they don't get caught). We do the terms, too, this policy has been a disaster. It is time to try the same ourselves when we take a job that pays more than only alternative left If enough individuals disavow a another, even though it means that we are helping to manu- narrowly materialist idea of self-interest, it may be possible to facture or promote a product that does no good at all,or ebuild trust and to work together for larger, more important actually makes people sick. On the other hand, those who goals. Politicians would then learn that they can dare to pass up opportunities to rise in their career because of ethica espouse policies that do more than promise greater material ruples' about the nature of the work, or who give away prosperity to every voter. (In New Zealand, after a decade in eir wealth to good causes, are thought to be sacrificing their which the major parties have agreed on lowering income tax own interests in order to obey the dictates of ethics. Worse rates and cutting government spending, the newly formed still, we may regard them as suckers, missing out on all the Alliance Party has promised that, if elected, it will raise taxes fun they could be having, while others take advantage of their on the grounds that a good state system of health care, futile generosity social security and education is worth paying for. Opinion This current orthodoxy about self-interest and ethics paints olls suggest that the Alliance is doing well enough to pose a a picture of ethics as something external to us, even as hostile threat to the major parties. to our own interests. We picture ourselves as constantly torn a better life is open to us. in every sense of the term, between the drive to advance our self-interest. and the fear except the sense made dominant by a consumer society that of being caught doing something that others will condemn, promotes acquisition as the standard of what is good. Once d for which we will be punished. This picture has been we get rid of that dominant conception of the good life, we entrenched in many of the most influential ways of thinking can again bring to the centre of the stage questions about the culture. It is to be found
20 How are we to live ? the thing to aim at? What is the place of ethics in such decisions? We must not make the error of assuming that the failure of past Utopian ideals means that values should not play a central role in our lives. I share Parfit's view that in the advancement of ethics lies the possibility of a new and more hopeful turn in world history; but it must be an advancement not only in ethical theory, but also in ethical practice. We need a new force for change. Changing the way in which we see the role of ethics in our lives may seem like something that changes individual lives, but leaves the larger society and the world of politics untouched. That appearance misleads. The early years of the nineties have made it clear that the promotion of greed by proponents of the free market has failed even to achieve the narrow economic goal of creating a thriving economy. In broader social and environmental terms, too, this policy has been a disaster. It is time to try the only alternative left to us. If enough individuals disavow a narrowly materialist idea of self-interest, it may be possible to rebuild trust and to work together for larger, more important goals. Politicians would then learn that they can dare to espouse policies that do more than promise greater material prosperity to every voter. (In New Zealand, after a decade in which the major parties have agreed on lowering income tax rates and cutting government spending, the newly formed Alliance Party has promised that, if elected, it will raise taxes - on the grounds that a good state system of health care, social security and education is worth paying for. Opinion polls suggest that the Alliance is doing well enough to pose a threat to the major parties.) A better life is open to us - in every sense of the term, except the sense made dominant by a consumer society that promotes acquisition as the standard of what is good. Once we get rid of that dominant conception of the good life, we can again bring to the centre of the stage questions about the The ultimat e choic e 21 preservation of the planet's ecology, and about global justice. Only then can we hope to see a renewal of the will to deal with the root causes of poverty, crime, and the short-term destruction of our planet's resources. A politics based on ethics could be radical, in the original sense of the term: that is, it could change things from the roots. Ethics and self-interest More personal doubts about ethics remain. To live ethically, we assume, will be hard work, uncomfortable, self-sacrificing and generally unrewarding. We see ethics as at odds with self-interest: we assume that those who make fortunes from insider trading ignore ethics, but are successfully following self-interest (as long as they don't get caught). We do the same ourselves when we take a job that pays more than another, even though it means that we are helping to manufacture or promote a product that does no good at all, or actually makes people sick. On the other hand, those who pass up opportunities to rise in their career because of ethical 'scruples' about the nature of the work, or who give away their wealth to good causes, are thought to be sacrificing their own interests in order to obey the dictates of ethics. Worse still, we may regard them as suckers, missing out on all the fun they could be having, while others take advantage of their futile generosity. This current orthodoxy about self-interest and ethics paints a picture of ethics as something external to us, even as hostile to our own interests. We picture ourselves as constantly torn between the drive to advance our self-interest, and the fear of being caught doing something that others will condemn, and for which we will be punished. This picture has been entrenched in many of the most influential ways of thinking in our culture. It is to be found in traditional religious ideas
22 How are we to live The ultimate choice 23 that promise reward or threaten punishment for good and even when troubled they seem content with the existing insti- ad behaviour, but put this reward or punishment in another utional order. Personal ambition and consumerism are the driv. realm and so make it external to life in this world It is to be ing forces in their lives. The sumptuous and brightly lit settings of most series amount to advertisements for a consumption- mid-point between heaven and earth, sharing in the spiritual entred version of the good life nis doesnt even take into realm of the angels, but trapped also by our brutish bodily nsideration the incessant commercials, which convey the idea nature in this world of the beasts. The German philosopher hat human aspirations for liberty, pleasure, accomplishment, Immanuel Kant picked up the same idea when he portrayed and status can be fulfilled in the realm of consumpti us as moral beings only in so far as we subordinate our natura physical desires to the commands of universal reason that The message is coming over strongly, but something is erceive through our capacity for reason. It is wrong. Today the assertion that life is meaningless no longer ink between this idea and Freud's vision of our lives as rent comes from existentialist philosophers who treat it as a shock by the conflict between id and super-ego ing discovery; it comes from bored adolescents, for whom it The same assumption of conflict between ethics and self- a truism entral place of self-interest, and interest lies at the root of much modern economics. It is the way in which we conceive of our own interest, that is to ropagated in popular presentations of sociobiology applied blame here. The pursuit of self-interest, as standardly con- to human nature. Books like Robert J. Ringers Looking Out ceived, is a life without any meaning beyond our own pleasure for I, which was on the New York Times bestseller list or individual satisfaction. Such a life is often a self-defeating for an entire year and is still selling steadily, tell millions of enterprise. The ancients knew of the paradox of hedonism readers that to put the happiness of anyone else ahead of your according to which the more explicitly we pursue our desire own is 'to pervert the laws of Nature. S Television, both in easure the more elusive we will find its satisfaction its programs and its commercials, conveys materialist images There is no reason to believe that human nature has changed of success that lack ethical content. as todd gitlin wrote in so dramatically as to render this ancient wisdom inapplicable his study of American television, Inside Prime Time limited to the ancient answers. Though the study of ethics may not progress in the dramatic fashion of physics or genetics, prime time gives us people preoccupied with personal much has been learned in the past century. Progress not only ambition. If not utterly consumed by ambition and the fear of in philosophy, but also in the sciences, has contributed to our ending up as losers, these characters take both the ambition understanding of ethics. Evolutionary theory helps us to answer and the fear for granted. If not surrounded by middle-class ancient questions about the limits of altruism. ' Rational choice arrays of consumer goods, they themselves are glamorous theory-that is, the theory of what it is to choose rationally incarnations of desire, The happiness they long for is private, in complex situations involving uncertainties not public; they make few demands on society as a whole, and lighted a problem not discussed by ancient thinkers, called
2 2 How ar e we to live ? that promise reward or threaten punishment for good and bad behaviour, but put this reward or punishment in another realm and so make it external to life in this world. It is to be found, too, in the idea that human beings are situated at the mid-point between heaven and earth, sharing in the spiritual realm of the angels, but trapped also by our brutish bodily nature in this world of the beasts. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant picked up the same idea when he portrayed us as moral beings only in so far as we subordinate our natural physical desires to the commands of universal reason that we perceive through our capacity for reason. It is easy to see a link between this idea and Freud's vision of our lives as rent by the conflict between id and super-ego. The same assumption of conflict between ethics and selfinterest lies at the root of much modern economics. It is propagated in popular presentations of sociobiology applied to human nature. Books like Robert J. Ringer's Looking Out for # 1, which was on the New York Times bestseller list for an entire year and is still selling steadily, tell millions of readers that to put the happiness of anyone else ahead of your own is 'to pervert the laws of Nature'.18 Television, both in its programs and its commercials, conveys materialist images of success that lack ethical content. As Todd Gitlin wrote in his study of American television, Inside Prime Time'. . . . prime time gives us people preoccupied with personal ambition. If not utterly consumed by ambition and the fear of ending up as losers, these characters take both the ambition and the fear for granted. If not surrounded by middle-class arrays of consumer goods, they themselves are glamorous incarnations of desire. The happiness they long for is private, not public; they make few demands on society as a whole, and T h e ultimat e choic e 2 3 even when troubled they seem content with the existing institutional order. Personal ambition and consumerism are the driving forces in their lives. The sumptuous and brightly lit settings of most series amount to advertisements for a consumptioncentred version of the good life, and this doesn't even take into consideration the incessant commercials, which convey the idea that human aspirations for liberty, pleasure, accomplishment, and status can be fulfilled in the realm of consumption.19 The message is coming over strongly, but something is wrong. Today the assertion that life is meaningless no longer comes from existentialist philosophers who treat it as a shocking discovery; it comes from bored adolescents, for whom it is a truism. Perhaps it is the central place of self-interest, and the way in which we conceive of our own interest, that is to blame here. The pursuit of self-interest, as standardly conceived, is a life without any meaning beyond our own pleasure or individual satisfaction. Such a life is often a self-defeating enterprise. The ancients knew of the 'paradox of hedonism', according to which the more explicitly we pursue our desire for pleasure, the more elusive we will find its satisfaction. There is no reason to believe that human nature has changed so dramatically as to render this ancient wisdom inapplicable. The questions are ancient but the modern inquirer is not limited to the ancient answers. Though the study of ethics may not progress in the dramatic fashion of physics or genetics, much has been learned in the past century. Progress not only in philosophy, but also in the sciences, has contributed to our understanding of ethics. Evolutionary theory helps us to answer ancient questions about the limits of altruism. 'Rational choice theory' - that is, the theory of what it is to choose rationally in complex situations involving uncertainties - has highlighted a problem not discussed by ancient thinkers, called
24 How are we to live? The ultimate choice 25 the Prisoners Dilemma. The modern discussion of this prob- accepting this older view should be widely understood. To do lem suggests that when each of two or more people, acting so we must question the view of self-interest that has domi quite rationally, deliberately, and with the best possible infor nated Western society for a long time. Then, if there is a mation, independently pursue their own interests, they may viable alternative to this view, the ultimate choice may have both end up worse off than they would have been if they had a rational solution after all acted in a less rationally self-interested manner. Exploring this problem reveals ways in which human nature may have evolved to be capable of more than narrow self-interest. Mod- ern feminist thought, too, has forced us to reflect on whether previous thinking about ethics has been limited because it has been dominated by a male perspective on the world. The be true of ception of self-inte oner's dilemma, the paradox of hedonism, and feminist influ ences in ethical thinking are some of the threads to be drawn gether later in this book, in order to develop a new ar broader conception of self-interest. Here, ethics returns to complete our picture. An ethical life is one in which we identify ourselves with other, and larger, goals, thereby giving meaning to our lives. The view that the ethical life and the life of enlightened self-interest are one and cynical to believe in any such harmony. Cynicism about ethi- al idealism is an understandable reaction to much modern in which stic goals of Marx and his followers were twisted by the Russian communist leaders until they led, first, to the Stalinist terror, and then to the utterly corrupt dictatorship of the Brezhnev era. With such examples before us, it is no wonder that cynicism is more fashionable than hope for a better world But we may be able to learn from history. The ancient view was that an ethically good life is also a good life for the person leading it. Never has it been so urgent that the reasons for
24 How ar e we to live ? 'the Prisoner's Dilemma'. The modern discussion of this problem suggests that when each of two or more people, acting quite rationally, deliberately, and with the best possible information, independently pursue their own interests, they may both end up worse off than they would have been if they had acted in a less rationally self-interested manner. Exploring this problem reveals ways in which human nature may have evolved to be capable of more than narrow self-interest. Modern feminist thought, too, has forced us to reflect on whether previous thinking about ethics has been limited because it has been dominated by a male perspective on the world. The same may be true of our conception of self-interest. The prisoner's dilemma, the paradox of hedonism, and feminist influences in ethical thinking are some of the threads to be drawn together later in this book, in order to develop a new and broader conception of self-interest. Here, ethics returns to complete our picture. An ethical life is one in which we identify ourselves with other, and larger, goals, thereby giving meaning to our lives. The view that the ethical life and the life of enlightened self-interest are one and the same is an ancient one, now often scorned by those too cynical to believe in any such harmony. Cynicism about ethical idealism is an understandable reaction to much modern history - to, for example, the tragic way in which the idealistic goals of Marx and his followers were twisted by the Russian communist leaders until they led, first, to the Stalinist terror, and then to the utterly corrupt dictatorship of the Brezhnev era. With such examples before us, it is no wonder that cynicism is more fashionable than hope for a better world. But we may be able to learn from history. The ancient view was that an ethically good life is also a good life for the person leading it. Never has it been so urgent that the reasons for The ultimat e choic e 25 accepting this older view should be widely understood. To do so we must question the view of self-interest that has dominated Western society for a long time. Then, if there is a viable alternative to this view, the ultimate choice may have a rational solution after all
What's me?27 survey of New York City residents carried out in 1990 asked How frequently do you worry about crime? Only 13 percent CHAPTER 2 could answer 'rarely or never,, fully 60 percent said that they worried about crime all the time. or often. No wonder: in that year they opened their papers to read of such crimes as What,'s in it for me? the stabbing to death of 22-year-old Brian Watkins, on a ubway platform in midtown Manhattan. Watkins was on his way to dinner, part of a family group that included three men,when attacked by a gang of eight youths. According to Time, the gang was seeking money to finance an evening of The standard Western view of self-interest has led us to not clicking at Roseland, a nearby dance hall!. But such selfish one, but two distinct contemporary crises. The first, which I callous killings occur regularly in New York. Guns are now shall outline in this chapter, is a crisis of Western society as a the leading cause of death among teenagers in the United whole, epitomized by recent developments in the United States. In March 1992, the New York Times reported that in States. The second is a crisis that threatens the biosphere of the first half of the school year there had been fifty-six shoot- ings in and around the city s schools: sixteen pupils, two par- next chapter. Taken together, these two crises give rise to a ents and one policeman had been shot, six of the children compelling and potentially tragic irony about our present fatally. Twenty-one New York high schools were using metal conception of self-interest: if we continue to conceive of our detectors to check students for weapons as they came to own interests in materialist terms, then the collective impact each of us has in pursuing our individual self-interest will lew York is not a special case. Its homicide rate is below ensure the failure of all our attempts to advance those interests that of eight other American cities. In virtually every major American city the possibility of crime has poisoned everyday life. In 1973, after growing up in Australia and spending four A failing social experiment years in Oxford, I arrived in New York to begin a visiting America stands as a beacon, showing where a society based position in the Department of Philosophy at New York Uni- on individual self-interest is heading. There was a time. in the versity. As I walked in the front door of the university's mair development of this society, that gave such scope to the indi building on Washington Square, I was greeted by a shocking vidual, when the Statue of Liberty aptly summed up what the sight: university security guards with guns swinging on their society meant to the rest of the world; but in the early nine- hips. By the end of the year, I was taking for granted the les, the symbol of America became the smoke rising from the fires of the los angeles riots walk around, not through, Washington Square Park a o presence of lethal weapons in a university setting. I learned Crime in America is the most vivid indication of the returned to my Bleecker Street apartment after teaching a direction that a society of self-seeking individuals can take. A late class. If I was uptown after dark, I knew that it was
'What' s in it for me? ' 27 CHAPTE R 2 'What's in it for me?' The standard Western view of self-interest has led us to not one, but two distinct contemporary crises. The first, which I shall outline in this chapter, is a crisis of Western society as a whole, epitomized by recent developments in the United States. The second is a crisis that threatens the biosphere of our planet, on which all life depends. That is the topic of the next chapter. Taken together, these two crises give rise to a compelling and potentially tragic irony about our present conception of self-interest: if we continue to conceive of our own interests in materialist terms, then the collective impact each of us has in pursuing our individual self-interest will ensure the failure of all our attempts to advance those interests. A failing social experiment America stands as a beacon, showing where a society based on individual self-interest is heading. There was a time, in the development of this society, that gave such scope to the individual, when the Statue of Liberty aptly summed up what the society meant to the rest of the world; but in the early nineties, the symbol of America became the smoke rising from the fires of the Los Angeles riots. Crime in America is the most vivid indication of the direction that a society of self-seeking individuals can take. A survey of New York City residents carried out in 1990 asked: 'How frequently do you worry about crime?' Only 13 percent could answer 'rarely or never'; fully 60 percent said that they worried about crime all the time, or often. No wonder: in that year they opened their papers to read of such crimes as the stabbing to death of 22-year-old Brian Watkins, on a subway platform in midtown Manhattan. Watkins was on his way to dinner, part of a family group that included three men, when attacked by a gang of eight youths. According to Time, the gang was seeking money to finance 'an evening of frolicking at Roseland, a nearby dance hall'.1 But such selfish, callous killings occur regularly in New York. Guns are now the leading cause of death among teenagers in the United States. In March 1992, the New York Times reported that in the first half of the school year there had been fifty-six shootings in and around the city's schools: sixteen pupils, two parents and one policeman had been shot, six of the children fatally. Twenty-one New York high schools were using metaldetectors to check students for weapons as they came to school.2 New York is not a special case. Its homicide rate is below that of eight other American cities. In virtually every major American city the possibility of crime has poisoned everyday life. In 1973, after growing up in Australia and spending four years in Oxford, I arrived in New York to begin a visiting position in the Department of Philosophy at New York University. As I walked in the front door of the university's main building on Washington Square, I was greeted by a shocking sight: university security guards with guns swinging on their hips. By the end of the year, I was taking for granted the presence of lethal weapons in a university setting. I learned to walk around, not through, Washington Square Park as I returned to my Bleecker Street apartment after teaching a late class. If I was uptown after dark, I knew that it was