8 How are we to live The ultimate choice 9 our rivers and lakes. Others are tested by being put, in con- what do I think of as a good life, in the sense of that centrated form, into the eyes of conscious rabbits, held immo- term? This is an ultimate question. To as ask: what bilized in rows of restraining devices like medieval stocks kind of a life do I truly admire, and what kind of life do I There are alternatives to products that are environmentally hope to be able to look back on, when I am older and reflect damaging, or tested in such cruel ways. To find the alterna- on how I have lived? Will it be enough to say: 'It was fun? tives can, however, be time-consuming, and a nuisance. Will Will I even be able to say truthfully that it was fun? What- you take the trouble to find them? ever your position or status, you can ask what within the We face ethical choices constantly in our personal relation- limits of what is possible for you- you want to achieve with ships. We have opportunities to use people and discard them, or to remain loyal to them. We can stand up for what we es popular by the group does. Though the morality of personal relationships The Ring of Gyges is difficult to generalize about because every situation is dif- Two and a half thousand years ago, at the dawn of Western ferent, here too we often know what the right thing to do is philosophical thinking, Socrates had the reputation of being but are uncertain about what to do the wisest man in Greece. One day Glaucon, a well-to-do young There are, no doubt, some people who go through life Athenian, challenged him to answer a question about how we without considering the ethics of what they are doing. Some are to live. The challenge is a key element of Plato's Republic of these people are just indifferent to others; some are down- one of the foundational works in the history of Western ph right vicious. Yet genuine indifference to ethics of any sort is losophy. It is also a classic formulation of an ultimate choice rare. Mark Chopper Read, one of Australia's nastiest crimi- According to Plato, Glaucon begins by retelling the story nals, recently published(from prison)an horrific autobiogra- of a shepherd who served the reigning king of Lydia. The phy, replete with nauseating details of beatings and forms of shepherd was out with his flock one day when there was a torture he inflicted on his enemies before killing them storm and a chasm opened up in the ground. He went down Through all his relish for violence, however, the author shows into the chasm and there found a golden ring, which he put evident anxiety to assure his readers that his victims were all n his finger. A few days later, when sitting with some other in some way members of the criminal class who deserved what shepherds, he happened to fiddle with the ring, au we &ey got. He wants his readers to be clear that he has nothing amazement discovered that when he turned the ring a certain it contempt for an Australian mass murderer- now one of way, he became invisible to his companions. Once he had Reads fellow-prisoners- who opened up on passersby with made this discovery, he arranged to be one of the messengers an automatic rifle. The psychological need for ethical justifi by the shepherds to the king to report on the state of cation,no matter how weak that justification may be,is the flocks. Arriving at the palace, he promptly used the ring emarkab to seduce the queen, plotted with her against the king, killed We should each ask ourselves: what place does ethics have him. and so obtained the crown. in my daily life? In thinking about this question, ask yourself: Glaucon takes this story as encapsulating a common view
8 How are we to live ? our rivers and lakes. Others are tested by being put, in concentrated form, into the eyes of conscious rabbits, held immobilized in rows of restraining devices like medieval stocks. There are alternatives to products that are environmentally damaging, or tested in such cruel ways. To find the alternatives can, however, be time-consuming, and a nuisance. Will you take the trouble to find them? We face ethical choices constantly in our personal relationships. We have opportunities to use people and discard them, or to remain loyal to them. We can stand up for what we believe, or make ourselves popular by going along with what the group does. Though the morality of personal relationships is difficult to generalize about because every situation is different, here too we often know what the right thing to do is, but are uncertain about what to do. There are, no doubt, some people who go through life without considering the ethics of what they are doing. Some of these people are just indifferent to others; some are downright vicious. Yet genuine indifference to ethics of any sort is rare. Mark 'Chopper' Read, one of Australia's nastiest criminals, recently published (from prison) an horrific autobiography, replete with nauseating details of beatings and forms of torture he inflicted on his enemies before killing them. Through all his relish for violence, however, the author shows evident anxiety to assure his readers that his victims were all in some way members of the criminal class who deserved what they got. He wants his readers to be clear that he has nothing b'it contempt for an Australian mass murderer - now one of Read's fellow-prisoners - who opened up on passersby with an automatic rifle.4 The psychological need for ethical justification, no matter how weak that justification may be, is remarkably pervasive. We should each ask ourselves: what place does ethics have in my daily life? In thinking about this question, ask yourself: The ultimat e choic e 9 what do I think of as a good life, in the fullest sense of that term? This is an ultimate question. To ask it is to ask: what kind of a life do I truly admire, and what kind of life do I hope to be able to look back on, when I am older and reflect on how I have lived? Will it be enough to say: 'It was fun'? Will I even be able to say truthfully that it was fun? Whatever your position or status, you can ask what — within the limits of what is possible for you - you want to achieve with your life. The Ring of Gyges Two and a half thousand years ago, at the dawn of Western philosophical thinking, Socrates had the reputation of being the wisest man in Greece. One day Glaucon, a well-to-do young Athenian, challenged him to answer a question about how we are to live. The challenge is a key element of Plato's Republic, one of the foundational works in the history of Western philosophy. It is also a classic formulation of an ultimate choice. According to Plato, Glaucon begins by retelling the story of a shepherd who served the reigning king of Lydia. The shepherd was out with his flock one day when there was a storm and a chasm opened up in the ground. He went down into the chasm and there found a golden ring, which he put on his finger. A few days later, when sitting with some other shepherds, he happened to fiddle with the ring, and to his amazement discovered that when he turned the ring a certain way, he became invisible to his companions. Once he had made this discovery, he arranged to be one of the messengers sent by the shepherds to the king to report on the state of the flocks. Arriving at the palace, he promptly used the ring to seduce the queen, plotted with her against the king, killed him, and so obtained the crown. Glaucon takes this story as encapsulating a common view
10 How are we to live? he ultimate choice ll of ethics and human nature. The implication of the story is of ones nature, and being happy. It all seems too theoretical that anyone who had such a ring would abandon all ethical too contrived, and the dialogue becomes one-sided. There are standards. and what is more, would be quite rational to obvious objections that we would like to see put to Socrates, but after the initial presentation of the challenge, Glaucon's critical faculties seem to have deserted him, and he meekly one, it is thought, would be of such adamantine nature accepts every argument Socrates puts to him. to abide in justice and have the strength to abstain from van Boesky had, in the information he received from Dennis levine a kind of magic ring; something that could would be in his power to steal anything he wished from the make him as close to a king as one can get in the republican very marketplace with impunity, to enter men,'s houses and wealth-oriented United States. As it turned out, the ring had have intercourse with whom he would to kill or to set free whomsoever he pleased; in short, to walk among men as a god a flaw: Boesky was not invisible when he wanted to be. Bu was that Boesky's only mistake, the only reason why he should if any man who possessed this power we have described not have obtained and used Levines information? The chal should nevertheless refuse to do anything unjust or to rob his lenge that Boesky,s opportunity poses to us is a modern-day fellows. all who knew of his conduct would think him the most version of the challenge that Glaucon put to Socrates. Can we miserable and foolish of men, though they would praise him give a better answer? other,s faces, their fear of suffering injustice extorting that ne'answer' that is really no answer at all is to ignore the deceit from them challenge. Many people do. They live and die unreflectively without ever having asked themselves what their goals are Glaucon then challenges socrates to show that this com- and why they are doing what they do. If you are totally mon opinion of ethics is mistaken. Convince us, he and the satisfied with the life you are now living, and quite sure that other participants in the discussion say to Socrates, that there are sound reasons for doing what is right- not just reasons like the fear of getting caught, but reasons that would apply to yourselves the questions that Socrates faced, however, you en if we knew we would not be found out. show us that have not chosen how you liv wise person who found the ring would, unlike the shepherd, inue to do what is right That, at any rate, is how Plato described the scene. Accord- What in the hell are we doing this for? ing to Plato, Socrates convinced Glaucon and the other Today the question of how we are to live confronts us more Athenians present that, whatever profit injustice may seem to sharply than ever. We have emerged from the eighties bring, only those who act rightly are really happy. Unfortu decade that has become known as the decade of greed nately, few modern readers are persuaded by the long and ? but not yet determined the nature of the nineties. Boesky complicated account that Socrates gives of the links between himself helped to define the eighties by giving a commence- acting rightly, having a proper harmony between the elements ment address at the school of Business administration at th
10 How ar e we to live ? The ultimat e choic e II of ethics and human nature. The implication of the story is that anyone who had such a ring would abandon all ethical standards - and what is more, would be quite rational to do so: . . . no one, it is thought, would be of such adamantine nature as to abide in justice and have the strength to abstain from theft, and to keep his hands from the goods of others, when it would be in his power to steal anything he wished from the very marketplace with impunity, to enter men's houses and have intercourse with whom he would, to kill or to set free whomsoever he pleased; in short, to walk among men as a god . . . if any man who possessed this power we have described should nevertheless refuse to do anything unjust or to rob his fellows, all who knew of his conduct would think him the most miserable and foolish of men, though they would praise him to each other's faces, their fear of suffering injustice extorting that deceit from them.5 Glaucon then challenges Socrates to show that this common opinion of ethics is mistaken. Convince us, he and the other participants in the discussion say to Socrates, that there are sound reasons for doing what is right - not just reasons like the fear of getting caught, but reasons that would apply even if we knew we would not be found out. Show us that a wise person who found the ring would, unlike the shepherd, continue to do what is right. That, at any rate, is how Plato described the scene. According to Plato, Socrates convinced Glaucon and the other Athenians present that, whatever profit injustice may seem to bring, only those who act rightly are really happy. Unfortunately, few modern readers are persuaded by the long and ?i complicated account that Socrates gives of the links between acting rightly, having a proper harmony between the elements of one's nature, and being happy. It all seems too theoretical, too contrived, and the dialogue becomes one-sided. There are obvious objections that we would like to see put to Socrates, but after the initial presentation of the challenge, Glaucon's critical faculties seem to have deserted him, and he meekly accepts every argument Socrates puts to him. Ivan Boesky had, in the information he received from Dennis Levine, a kind of magic ring; something that could make him as close to a king as one can get in the republican, wealth-oriented United States. As it turned out, the ring had a flaw: Boesky was not invisible when he wanted to be. But was that Boesky's only mistake, the only reason why he should not have obtained and used Levine's information? The challenge that Boesky's opportunity poses to us is a modern-day version of the challenge that Glaucon put to Socrates. Can we give a better answer? One 'answer' that is really no answer at all is to ignore the challenge. Many people do. They live and die unreflectively, without ever having asked themselves what their goals are, and why they are doing what they do. If you are totally satisfied with the life you are now living, and quite sure that it is the life you want to lead, there is no need to read further. What is to come may only unsettle you. Until you have put to yourselves the questions that Socrates faced, however, you have not chosen how you live. 'What in the hell are we doing this for?' Today the question of how we are to live confronts us more sharply than ever. We have emerged from the eighties - the decade that has become known as The Decade of Greed' - but not yet determined the nature of the nineties. Boesky himself helped to define the eighties by giving a commencement address at the School of Business Administration at the
12 How are we to live? The ultimate choice 13 University of California, Berkeley, in which he told his audi- During the eighties Peter Lynch worked fourteen-hour days ence: 'Greed is all right... greed is healthy. You can be and built the Fidelity Magellan mutual fund into a s 13 bill greedy and still feel good about yourself. Twenty years afte giant among funds. But at the age of forty-six, when most the Free Speech Movement had made the campus the centre exec utives are still aiming higher, Lynch startled his col- f radical thought in America, Berkeley business students leagues by quitting. Why? Because he had asked himself. applauded this praise of greed. They were looking forward to What in the hell are we doing this for? And in answering earning money, lots of it, and soon. What was happening that question, he was moved by the thought that I don't was, as Michael Lewis put it in his popular Liar's Poker, 'a rare know anyone who wished on his deathbed that he had spent and amazing glitch in the fairly predictable history of getting more time at the office and spending. Smart bond traders like Lewis were earning a Symptomatic of the changing view was Oliver Stone's movie million dollars a year in salary and bonuses before they turned Wall Street, starring Michael Douglas as a convincingly twenty-five 'Never before, Lewis could truthfully assert, have unpleasant Gordon Gekko, a financial wheeler-dealer whose o many unskilled 25-year-olds made so much in so little time manner of operation resembles that of Boesky, with some s we did this decade in New York and London. Yet even elements of a corporate raider like Carl Icahn thrown in for that was peanuts compared to the sums made by the older good measure. Bud Fox, the ambitious young stockbroker heavyweights: corporate raiders like Carl Icahn, T. Boone played by Charlie Sheen, is for a time taken in by the prospect Pickens, or Henry Kravis, developers such as Donald Trump, of making it big, but when Gekko attempts his usual take- the junk bond financier Michael Milken, or Wall Street chiefs like Salomon Brothers' John Gutfreund Foxs father works as a mechanic, an angry Fox aslo.r which n the hothouse, money-directed United States of the ighties, these people were heroes, written up in magazines, Tell me, Gordon, when does it all end, huh? How many yachts can you water-ski behind? How much is enough? 0 talked about endlessly. Yet at the end, many were wondering what it was all for. Donald Trump confessed That question suggested something that the philosophers had always known, and the rich of the eighties were re- It,'s a rare person who can achieve a major goal in life and not discovering: affluence has no limits. More people were begi almost immediately start feeling sad, empty, and a little lost. ning to wonder what in the hell are we doing this for? Like f you look at the record- which in this case means ner Lynch, they were making decisions about the rest of their lives, instead of just continuing in the course that seemed to papers, magazines, and TV news- you'll see that an awful lot have been set for them by economic and social expectations. of people who achieve success, from Elvis Presley to Ivan They were beginning to live their lives with a purpose. Boesky, lose their direction or their ethic The recession that followed the boom has helped make Actually, I don't have to look at anyone else's life to know ople think again about the world they would like thats true. I'm as susceptible to that pitfall as anyone else erge when the economy picks up again. Though some may
1 2 Ho w ar e we t o live ? University of California, Berkeley, in which he told his audience: 'Greed is all right . . . greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself'.6 Twenty years after the Free Speech Movement had made the campus the centre of radical thought in America, Berkeley business students applauded this praise of greed. They were looking forward to earning money, lots of it, and soon. What was happening was, as Michael Lewis put it in his popular Liar's Poker, 'a rare and amazing glitch in the fairly predictable history of getting and spending'. Smart bond traders like Lewis were earning a million dollars a year in salary and bonuses before they turned twenty-five. 'Never before', Lewis could truthfully assert, 'have so many unskilled 25-year-olds made so much in so little time as we did this decade in New York and London'.7 Yet even that was peanuts compared to the sums made by the older heavyweights: corporate raiders like Carl Icahn, T. Boone Pickens, or Henry Kravis, developers such as Donald Trump, the junk bond financier Michael Milken, or Wall Street chiefs like Salomon Brothers' John Gutfreund. In the hothouse, money-directed United States of the eighties, these people were heroes, written up in magazines, talked about endlessly. Yet at the end, many were wondering what it was all for. Donald Trump confessed: It's a rare person who can achieve a major goal in life and not almost immediately start feeling sad, empty, and a little lost. If you look at the record - which in this case means newspapers, magazines, and TV news — you'll see that an awful lot of people who achieve success, from Elvis Presley to Ivan Boesky, lose their direction or their ethics. Actually, I don't have to look at anyone else's life to know that's true. I'm as susceptible to that pitfall as anyone else ... " The ultimat e choic e 13 During the eighties Peter Lynch worked fourteen-hour days and built the Fidelity Magellan mutual fund into a $ 13 billion giant among funds. But at the age of forty-six, when most executives are still aiming higher, Lynch startled his colleagues by quitting. Why? Because he had asked himself: 'What in the hell are we doing this for?' And in answering that question, he was moved by the thought that 'I don't know anyone who wished on his deathbed that he had spent more time at the office'.9 Symptomatic of the changing view was Oliver Stone's movie Wall Street, starring Michael Douglas as a convincingly unpleasant Gordon Gekko, a financial wheeler-dealer whose manner of operation resembles that of Boesky, with some elements of a corporate raider like Carl Icahn thrown in for good measure. Bud Fox, the ambitious young stockbroker played by Charlie Sheen, is for a time taken in by the prospect of making it big, but when Gekko attempts his usual takeover and asset-stripping procedure on the airline for which Fox's father works as a mechanic, an angry Fox asks: Tell me, Gordon, when does it all end, huh? How many yachts can you water-ski behind? How much is enough?10 That question suggested something that the philosophers had always known, and the rich of the eighties were rediscovering: affluence has no limits. More people were beginning to wonder 'what in the hell are we doing this for?' Like Lynch, they were making decisions about the rest of their lives, instead of just continuing in the course that seemed to have been set for them by economic and social expectations. They were beginning to live their lives with a purpose. The recession that followed the boom has helped make people think again about the world they would like to see emerge when the economy picks up again. Though some may
are we to live The ultimate choice 15 want to reinflate the balloons and resume the party, for many economic production is geared to satisfy the interests of a ill-lingering articular class, there is bound to be a conflict between indi- rer. In any case, in the nineties vidual self-interest and the interests of society as a whole. In Japan would dampen any celebrations in which those from that situation, the shepherd would be acting quite rationally other nations might be tempted to indulge. George Bushs if he used the magic ring to take what he pleased and kill 1992 visit to Tokyo was an extraordinary event. Here was the whom he wished to kill. Once the means of production are president of what still is, in military terms, indisputably the organized in the common interests of all, however, Marx would mightiest power on earth, begging the Prime Minister ofJapan say that human nature, which is not fixed but socially condi- for trade concessions so that united states manufacturers could tioned, would change with it. Greed and envy are not survive in the face of Japanese standards of excellence that had made Honda the number one selling car in the United grained forever in the character of human beings. Citizens of the new society, based on common ownership, would find States. Bush's visit made Westerners wonder. once more. what their own happiness in working for the good of all it was that made Japanese society so cohesive, harmonious For many critics of Marx it was clear from the start that orderly, and successful. A spate of books about Japan sought to analyze the nature of the Japanese difference. Do the Japa- this was a dream; but with the collapse of communist societies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the Utopian nese know more about how to live well together than we do? nature of Marxist thought has become apparent to all. For apan's success is another reason for the West's self-doubt. the first time, we are living in a world that has only one dominant social model for developed societies. The hope of resolving the conflict between individual self-interest and the The end of history or the beginning of good of all by building an alternative to the free market secular ethics conomy is now a self-confessed failure. Only a brave few The failure of the ideals of the west in the eighties is the cling to the socialist ideal, rejecting the distortions Lenin and short-term, immediate reason why the question: ' How are we Stalin wrought, and claiming that it has never had a proper to live?confronts us with more force than usual at this par- trial. lt seems that the individualist view of self-interest is the ticular moment. There is also. however. a more momentous only one that is still viable longer term picture that invests the question with peculiar So strongly does the liberal democratic free enterprise model arness, perhaps even with world-historical significance impose itself on our vision of the possibilities that Francis Communism, according to Marx, should have beenthe genu- Fukuyama, a former deputy director of policy planning at the ine resolution of the antagonism between man and nature and US State Department, has been given a respectful, and from between man and man: the true resolution of the conflict some quarters even enthusiastic, hearing for a bold, surpris- between individual and species. In other words, Marx ingly well-defended, but in the end scarcely plausible idea. would have answered Glaucon,s question by saying that it Fukuyama has revived Hegel's conception of history as ould have no satisfactory answer unless we change the nature process with a direction and an End. History has an End of society. As long as we are living in a society in whicl according to Hegel and Fukuyama, not so much in the sense
14 How are we to live ? The ultimat e choic e 15 want to reinflate the balloons and resume the party, for many people that idea just reminds them of the still-lingering hangover. In any case, in the nineties, the intimidating shadow of Japan would dampen any celebrations in which those from other nations might be tempted to indulge. George Bush's 1992 visit to Tokyo was an extraordinary event. Here was the president of what still is, in military terms, indisputably the mightiest power on earth, begging the Prime Minister of Japan for trade concessions so that United States manufacturers could survive in the face of Japanese standards of excellence that had made Honda the number one selling car in the United States. Bush's visit made Westerners wonder, once more, what it was that made Japanese society so cohesive, harmonious, orderly, and successful. A spate of books about Japan sought to analyze the nature of the Japanese difference. Do the Japanese know more about how to live well together than we do? Japan's success is another reason for the West's self-doubt. The end of history or the beginning of secular ethics? The failure of the ideals of the West in the eighties is the short-term, immediate reason why the question: 'How are we to live?' confronts us with more force than usual at this particular moment. There is also, however, a more momentous, longer term picture that invests the question with peculiar sharpness, perhaps even with world-historical significance. Communism, according to Marx, should have been 'the genuine resolution of the antagonism between man and nature and between man and man; the true resolution of the conflict between . . . individual and species'." In other words, Marx would have answered Glaucon's question by saying that it could have no satisfactory answer unless we change the nature of society. As long as we are living in a society in which economic production is geared to satisfy the interests of a particular class, there is bound to be a conflict between individual self-interest and the interests of society as a whole. In that situation, the shepherd would be acting quite rationally if he used the magic ring to take what he pleased and kill whom he wished to kill. Once the means of production are organized in the common interests of all, however, Marx would say that human nature, which is not fixed but socially conditioned, would change with it. Greed and envy are not engrained forever in the character of human beings. Citizens of the new society, based on common ownership, would find their own happiness in working for the good of all. For many critics of Marx it was clear from the start that this was a dream; but with the collapse of communist societies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the Utopian nature of Marxist thought has become apparent to all. For the first time, we are living in a world that has only one dominant social model for developed societies. The hope of resolving the conflict between individual self-interest and the good of all by building an alternative to the free market economy is now a self-confessed failure. Only a brave few cling to the socialist ideal, rejecting the distortions Lenin and Stalin wrought, and claiming that it has never had a proper trial. It seems that the individualist view of self-interest is the only one that is still viable. So strongly does the liberal democratic free enterprise model impose itself on our vision of the possibilities that Francis Fukuyama, a former deputy director of policy planning at the US State Department, has been given a respectful, and from some quarters even enthusiastic, hearing for a bold, surprisingly well-defended, but in the end scarcely plausible idea. Fukuyama has revived Hegel's conception of history as a process with a direction and an End. History has an End, according to Hegel and Fukuyama, not so much in the sense
H ow are we to Ii ve The ultimate choice 17 of coming to a full stop, but rather in the sense of a final goal towards an abyss. We cannot continue with business as usual. or destination. In The End of History and the Last Man We shall either change voluntarily, or the climate of our planet Fukuyama argues that this end is, precisely, the universal will change, and take entire nations with it. Nor are the acceptance of the liberal, democratic, free enterprise form of changes minor They involve the basic values and ethical society. Yet just when this model has taken so strong a hold outlook that underlie the free enterprise societies of the late on the minds of those who consider themselves politically twentieth century. Perhaps the liberal democratic free enter realistic, we are gradually becoming aware that we are nearing prise society will survive this challenge, and adapt to cop the end of an epoch. Like Daniel Bell, who predicted'the End with it; but if it does, it will be a significantly different form of Ideology shortly before the rise of the New Left and the of liberal democratic free enterprise society, and the people resurgence of radical ideologies in the sixties, Fukuyama may living in it will need to have very different values and ways have predicted the permanence of the liberal free enterprise of living. So the pressure to re-examine the ethical basis of system just when it is about to face its gravest crisis. our lives is upon us in a way that it has never been before There are two intriguing and very different counterweights The other intriguing line of thought to place against the to Fukuyama's vision of the End of History. One is summed idea that history has reached its end was put forward several up in the title of a book by Bill McKibben: our era is witness years ago by Derek Parfit, an Oxford philosopher unknown to, McKibben says, not the End of History, but rather The outside academic circles but esteemed by his colleagues for End of Nature. Living in the Adirondack Mountains of Ner seeing further into some of the most difficult problems of York State, McKibben is sharply aware of the fact that for ethical theory than anyone else had done before. At the con- the first time in the history of our species, there is no longer clusion of his major work, Reasons and Persons, after 450 a natural world unaffected by human beings Not in the pages of detailed, intricate argument, Parfit permits himself a Adirondacks. nor in the rainforests of the amazon not even glance at the broader question of whether there can be pro- on the Antarctic ice-cap, can one get away from the effects of gress in ethics. Against the claim that everything there is to human civilization. We have depleted the ozone layer that say in ethics has already been said, he argues that until quite shields our planet from solar radiation. We have added to the recently the study of ethics has very largely been carried out amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Thus the growth within a religious framework. The number of non-religious of plants, the chemical composition of the rain, and the very people who have made ethics their life work is remarkably forces that form the clouds, are, in part, our doing small(Parfit mentions among these few Buddha, Confucius, Throughout human history, we have been able freely to the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher David Hume, and use the oceans and the atmosphere as a vast sink for our the late Victorian utilitarian philosopher, Henry Sidgwic wastes. The liberal democratic free enterprise society that For much of the twentieth century, when for the first time the ultimate outcome of all history many professional moral philosophers were atheists, it was built on the idea that we can keep doing this forever. In unfashionable for philosophers to grapple with questions about contrast, responsible scientific opinion now tells us that we hat we ought to do. Instead, they studied the meanings of are passengers on a runaway train that is heading rapidly the moral terms and argued over whether ethics is subjectiv
16 H ow are we to I i ve ? of coming to a full stop, but rather in the sense of a final goal or destination. In The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama argues that this end is, precisely, the universal acceptance of the liberal, democratic, free enterprise form of society.12 Yet just when this model has taken so strong a hold on the minds of those who consider themselves politically realistic, we are gradually becoming aware that we are nearing the end of an epoch. Like Daniel Bell, who predicted 'the End of Ideology' shortly before the rise of the New Left and the resurgence of radical ideologies in the sixties,13 Fukuyama may have predicted the permanence of the liberal free enterprise system just when it is about to face its gravest crisis. There are two intriguing and very different counterweights to Fukuyama's vision of 'the End of History'. One is summed up in the title of a book by Bill McKibben: our era is witness to, McKibben says, not the End of History, but rather The End of Nature. Living in the Adirondack Mountains of New York State, McKibben is sharply aware of the fact that for the first time in the history of our species, there is no longer a natural world, unaffected by human beings.M Not in the Adirondacks, nor in the rainforests of the Amazon, not even on the Antarctic ice-cap, can one get away from the effects of human civilization. We have depleted the ozone layer that shields our planet from solar radiation. We have added to the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Thus the growth of plants, the chemical composition of the rain, and the very forces that form the clouds, are, in part, our doing. Throughout human history, we have been able freely to use the oceans and the atmosphere as a vast sink for our wastes. The liberal democratic free enterprise society that Fukuyama proposes as the ultimate outcome of all history is built on the idea that we can keep doing this forever. In contrast, responsible scientific opinion now tells us that we are passengers on a runaway train that is heading rapidly The ultimat e choic e 17 towards an abyss. We cannot continue with business as usual. We shall either change voluntarily, or the climate of our planet will change, and take entire nations with it. Nor are the changes minor ones. They involve the basic values and ethical outlook that underlie the free enterprise societies of the late twentieth century. Perhaps the liberal democratic free enterprise society will survive this challenge, and adapt to cope with it; but if it does, it will be a significantly different form of liberal democratic free enterprise society, and the people living in it will need to have very different values and ways of living. So the pressure to re-examine the ethical basis of our lives is upon us in a way that it has never been before. The other intriguing line of thought to place against the idea that history has reached its end was put forward several years ago by Derek Parfit, an Oxford philosopher unknown outside academic circles but esteemed by his colleagues for seeing further into some of the most difficult problems of ethical theory than anyone else had done before. At the conclusion of his major work, Reasons and Persons, after 450 pages of detailed, intricate argument, Parfit permits himself a glance at the broader question of whether there can be progress in ethics. Against the claim that everything there is to say in ethics has already been said, he argues that until quite recently the study of ethics has very largely been carried out within a religious framework. The number of non-religious people who have made ethics their life work is remarkably small. (Parfit mentions among these few Buddha, Confucius, the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher David Hume, and the late Victorian utilitarian philosopher, Henry Sidgwick.) For much of the twentieth century, when for the first time many professional moral philosophers were atheists, it was unfashionable for philosophers to grapple with questions about what we ought to do. Instead, they studied the meanings of the moral terms and argued over whether ethics is subjective