培训的作用 为什么要培训 中国现状要求企业“向素质要效益,向管理要利润”。 国家已经认识到培训工作的重要性,正通过政策压力迫使企业重视培训。1998年确定为“管理培训工程年”,任职资格考试、多种多样的上岗资格证书制度、再就业工程等都说明了政府的行动
文件格式: PDF大小: 153.63KB页数: 26
一、基本理论 二、工资决策 三、方案设计
文件格式: PDF大小: 493.54KB页数: 10
第1章 营销观念 第2章 市场需求分析 第3章 消费者购买行为分析 第4章 目标市场选择及定位 第5章 产品策略 第6章 定价策略 第7章 渠道策略 第8章 广告策略 第9章 公共关系 第10章 促销 第11章 组织市场营销
文件格式: PDF大小: 901.62KB页数: 52
1. Producer Theory 1. Technology yi =input of good i, y =output of good i, i= yi-yi=net output, y yn) is a production plan Production possibility set Y=technologically feasible production plans yE Rn) y E Y is technologically efficient if there is no yE Y s.t. y>y
文件格式: PDF大小: 155.84KB页数: 7
Corporate finance 1. Theoretical Approaches 1.1. Corporate Finance in Arrow-Debreu world Complete market, perfect market, perfect competition, symmetric information, private consumption Risk: risk sharing, risk pooling, technology shocks, individual vs aggregate shocks Lucas(1978): existence of equilibrium asset price Merton: continuous-time pricing model
文件格式: PDF大小: 32.68KB页数: 5
Problem set 3 Micro Susen Wang Try to do most problems in MWG(1995), Chapters 7-9 Question 3.1.(Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium). A principal hires an agent to perform some service at a price(which is supposed to equal the cost of the service The principal and the agent have initial
文件格式: PDF大小: 113.22KB页数: 8
Problem set 2 Micro Theory S. Wang Question 2. 1. You have just been asked to run a company that has two factories produc ing the same good and sells its output in a perfectly competitive market. The production
文件格式: PDF大小: 125.05KB页数: 9
Problem set 1 Micro Theory S. Wang Question1.1. Show that“f(X)=f(x),Vx∈R,A>1” implies“f(A)= Af(x),Vx∈R,A>0.” estion 1.2. Use a Lagrange function to solve c(w1, w2, y) for the following problem
文件格式: PDF大小: 139.96KB页数: 11
8.1. Independent Firms The downstream firm's problem is max(a-bxc-wT The upstream firm's problem is max(a-2b)3-cr The output is 8.2. Integrated Firm Suppose now that the two firms merge into one firm. This firms problem is max(a-by)y
文件格式: PDF大小: 126.62KB页数: 5
Then =1-91=1(3+:2)(3+2n 可=-1-3)=1(4-+2)(1-2+a With 1 0 O: Thus, in equilibrium, we must have ai=.2. In fact, the two firms must sit in the middle By Proposition 2.1, Pi=p?=c Discussion
文件格式: PDF大小: 120.61KB页数: 5
©2025 mall.hezhiquan.com 和泉文库
帮助反馈侵权