《性别、亲密关系与社会》课程教学资源（相亲角文献）INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY：Causes, Patterns, Trends

400 KALMIJN and the spending of leisure time,dissimilarity in taste would complicate these shared activities.More generally,people prefer to marry someone who has similar cultural resources because this enables them to develop a common life- style in marriage that produces social confirmation and affection. PREFERENCES AND HOMOGAMY Preferences for socioeconomic and cultural resources do not by themselves translate into homogamy and endogamy with respect to social characteristics.Some authors argue that social characteristics are correlated with such resources,and that homogamy or endogamy is the un- intended by-product of individual preferences for resources in a partner.This argument has often been made for educational homogamy,because education is not only strongly related to income and status,but also to taste,values,and lifestyles (Kalmijn 1991a).Similar arguments can be made for horizontally differentiated groups,such as ethnic groups,although in this case,endogamy is probably more the result of preferences for cultural similarity and not so much the result of competition for economically attractive spouses. Other authors argue that social characteristics are more than simply corre- lates of the resources partners bring to the marriage market.Characteristics 多 such as education,occupation,race,and ethnicity are also seen as badges that individuals wear to show others what kind of person they are.In this perspec- tive,spouse selection is regarded as a filter process.In the first step,people de- velop a network of friends,acquaintances,and possibly marriage candidates with whom they share some objective social characteristic.In the second step, people find their spouse by interacting within these homogeneous networks. The second step is also the phase in which psychological characteristics come into play,but at that time,homogamy with respect to objective social charac- teristics is already insured (Murstein 1976). Third Parties A second hypothesis about why people marry within their group focuses on 2 people who are not directly involved in the marriage.Because mixed mar- riages may threaten the internal cohesion and homogeneity of the group,"third 具量 parties"have an incentive to keep new generations from marrying exoga- mously.There are two ways in which third parties prevent exogamy:by group identification and by group sanctions. GROUP IDENTIFICATION Children are typically brought up with a sense of group identification.Identification either takes the form of an awareness of a common social history,what is sometimes called a "sense of peoplehood" (Gordon 1964),or it can take the form of a more psychological sense of being different from others.The stronger such feelings of group identification,the more people have internalized norms of endogamy,and the more likely it is that they marry homogamously or endogamously.The notion of group identi-

and the spending of leisure time, dissimilarity in taste would complicate these shared activities. More generally, people prefer to marry someone who has similar cultural resources because this enables them to develop a common life￾style in marriage that produces social confirmation and affection. PREFERENCES AND HOMOGAMY Preferences for socioeconomic and cultural resources do not by themselves translate into homogamy and endogamy with respect to social characteristics. Some authors argue that social characteristics are correlated with such resources, and that homogamy or endogamy is the un￾intended by-product of individual preferences for resources in a partner. This argument has often been made for educational homogamy, because education is not only strongly related to income and status, but also to taste, values, and lifestyles (Kalmijn 1991a). Similar arguments can be made for horizontally differentiated groups, such as ethnic groups, although in this case, endogamy is probably more the result of preferences for cultural similarity and not so much the result of competition for economically attractive spouses. Other authors argue that social characteristics are more than simply corre￾lates of the resources partners bring to the marriage market. Characteristics such as education, occupation, race, and ethnicity are also seen as badges that individuals wear to show others what kind of person they are. In this perspec￾tive, spouse selection is regarded as a filter process. In the first step, people de￾velop a network of friends, acquaintances, and possibly marriage candidates with whom they share some objective social characteristic. In the second step, people find their spouse by interacting within these homogeneous networks. The second step is also the phase in which psychological characteristics come into play, but at that time, homogamy with respect to objective social charac￾teristics is already insured (Murstein 1976). Third Parties A second hypothesis about why people marry within their group focuses on people who are not directly involved in the marriage. Because mixed mar￾riages may threaten the internal cohesion and homogeneity of the group, “third parties” have an incentive to keep new generations from marrying exoga￾mously. There are two ways in which third parties prevent exogamy: by group identification and by group sanctions. GROUP IDENTIFICATION Children are typically brought up with a sense of group identification. Identification either takes the form of an awareness of a common social history, what is sometimes called a “sense of peoplehood” (Gordon 1964), or it can take the form of a more psychological sense of being different from others. The stronger such feelings of group identification, the more people have internalized norms of endogamy, and the more likely it is that they marry homogamously or endogamously. The notion of group identi- 400 KALMIJN Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 401 fication has been especially important for racial and ethnic groups,where norms ofendogamy are believed to be firmly internalized(Merton 1941).Such norms,however,may also apply to other kinds of groups such as social classes and educational groups. How strongly younger generations identify themselves with the group de- pends to a great extent on the homogeneity of the networks in which they are em- bedded.When adolescents live in neighborhoods that are homogeneous with respect to the social and cultural characteristics of their parents,they are more likely to develop a sense of belonging to that group.While residential segrega- tion in urban areas hampers opportunities to intermarry directly,as is dis- cussed later,it also reduced exogamy by intensifying feelings of group solidar- ity.Identification with the origin group is believed to be weakened by higher education.Owing to the emphasis on individual achievement and universalis- tic principles in higher education,the college-educated may be less likely to 'MA wo poppouMo1-6:8661010S identify themselves with their social and cultural roots(Hwang et al 1995). GROUP SANCTIONS Even if people have not internalized norms of endog- amy,they may still refrain from marrying exogamously because of the sanc- tions third parties apply.The three most important examples of parties that sanction intermarriage are the family,the church,and the state.Although in Western societies parental control over children's marriage decisions is lim- ited,there are still ways in which parents can interfere.They set up meetings with potential spouses,they play the role of matchmaker,they give advice and opinions about the candidates,and they may withdraw support in the early years of the child's marriage.Nevertheless,they do not have strong sanctions when children decide against their will. reyaueys q pop Somewhat stronger sanctions are provided by the church.Both the Catholic church and various Protestant denominations have denounced interfaith mar- riages for centuries,although the nature and strength of their disapproval have 2 changed over time.Religious institutions attempt to control intermarriage in part because they are competing for members.Religious intermarriage entails 具量 the risk of losing members and may weaken church attachment in future gen- erations.If interfaith marriages occur anyway,it is not always in the interest of the church to apply sanctions because the competing church may accept the marriage and hence gain members.This helps explain why the Roman Catho- lic church,for example,has often accepted interfaith marriages on the condi- tion that the children be raised as Catholics.Because of competing pressures, however,spouses in interfaith marriages often decide not to raise their children in a religious fashion.If this occurs,both religious institutions stand to lose strength in society. The strongest sanctions against intermarriage have been provided by the state.Laws on racial intermarriage in the United States-abolished in

fication has been especially important for racial and ethnic groups, where norms of endogamy are believed to be firmly internalized (Merton 1941). Such norms, however, may also apply to other kinds of groups such as social classes and educational groups. How strongly younger generations identify themselves with the group de￾pends to a great extent on the homogeneity of the networks in which they are em￾bedded. When adolescents live in neighborhoods that are homogeneous with respect to the social and cultural characteristics of their parents, they are more likely to develop a sense of belonging to that group. While residential segrega￾tion in urban areas hampers opportunities to intermarry directly, as is dis￾cussed later, it also reduced exogamy by intensifying feelings of group solidar￾ity. Identification with the origin group is believed to be weakened by higher education. Owing to the emphasis on individual achievement and universalis￾tic principles in higher education, the college-educated may be less likely to identify themselves with their social and cultural roots (Hwang et al 1995). GROUP SANCTIONS Even if people have not internalized norms of endog￾amy, they may still refrain from marrying exogamously because of the sanc￾tions third parties apply. The three most important examples of parties that sanction intermarriage are the family, the church, and the state. Although in Western societies parental control over children’s marriage decisions is lim￾ited, there are still ways in which parents can interfere. They set up meetings with potential spouses, they play the role of matchmaker, they give advice and opinions about the candidates, and they may withdraw support in the early years of the child’s marriage. Nevertheless, they do not have strong sanctions when children decide against their will. Somewhat stronger sanctions are provided by the church. Both the Catholic church and various Protestant denominations have denounced interfaith mar￾riages for centuries, although the nature and strength of their disapproval have changed over time. Religious institutions attempt to control intermarriage in part because they are competing for members. Religious intermarriage entails the risk of losing members and may weaken church attachment in future gen￾erations. If interfaith marriages occur anyway, it is not always in the interest of the church to apply sanctions because the competing church may accept the marriage and hence gain members. This helps explain why the Roman Catho￾lic church, for example, has often accepted interfaith marriages on the condi￾tion that the children be raised as Catholics. Because of competing pressures, however, spouses in interfaith marriages often decide not to raise their children in a religious fashion. If this occurs, both religious institutions stand to lose strength in society. The strongest sanctions against intermarriage have been provided by the state. Laws on racial intermarriage in the United States—abolished in INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 401 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

402 KALMIJN 1967-are a well-known example(Davis 1991).When slavery was abolished, the gradual decline in formal inequality of blacks and whites went hand-in- hand with a growing anxiety about the social boundary between the races,and this anxiety was stronger when contacts were more intimate.Interracial dating and marriage were condemned with great vigor,and strong social norms emerged against interracial contacts with possible sexual undertones,such as interracial dancing and swimming.The emerging doctrine of no social equal- ity was formalized in legislation that segregated the races in public facilities (Jim Crow laws)and legislation that controlled their sexual and marital con- tacts (antimiscegenation laws). Marriage Markets Endogamy and homogamy are not only governed by individual-and group- 'MA wo poppouMo1-6:8661010S level factors,but also by structural arrangements.The chances to marry en- dogamously are higher the more often one meets people within the group and the more often one interacts with group members on a day-to-day basis.Con- tact opportunities are shaped by several structural arrangements.Some studies 多 focus on the demographic composition of the population as a whole,other studies examine regional distributions of groups,and yet other studies analyze smaller,functional settings,such as the school and the workplace. THE LOGIC OF NUMBERS When interaction occurs randomly,the chance that a woman in a certain group marries someone in her own group equals the pro- portion of men who are in that group.As a result,members of a small group will have lower chances of marrying endogamously than members of a larger group.The effect of group size implies that endogamy is negatively related to the degree of heterogeneity of a population(Blau Schwartz 1984).To ex- plain this,one can think of two populations,each consisting of two groups. One population is heterogeneous and has 50%in each group(e.g.100 in group A,100 in group B),while the other is homogeneous and has 90%in one group and 10%in the other (e.g.180 in group A,20 in group B).Both populations 具量 have equal numbers of males and females in each group.In the heterogeneous population,the number of women expected to marry within the group will be 0.5 x 50=25 for A and 0.5 x 50=25 for B,which boils down to 50%marrying within the group.In the homogeneous population,the number of women ex- pected to marry within the group will be 0.9 x 90=81 for A and 0.1 x 10=1 for B,which boils down to 82%.This shows that in a heterogeneous population, endogamy is lower than in a homogeneous population,provided that marriage is random. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GROUPS The chance to encounter a member of one's own group does not depend on group size alone but also on the way a group is

1967—are a well-known example (Davis 1991). When slavery was abolished, the gradual decline in formal inequality of blacks and whites went hand-in￾hand with a growing anxiety about the social boundary between the races, and this anxiety was stronger when contacts were more intimate. Interracial dating and marriage were condemned with great vigor, and strong social norms emerged against interracial contacts with possible sexual undertones, such as interracial dancing and swimming. The emerging doctrine of no social equal￾ity was formalized in legislation that segregated the races in public facilities (Jim Crow laws) and legislation that controlled their sexual and marital con￾tacts (antimiscegenation laws). Marriage Markets Endogamy and homogamy are not only governed by individual- and group￾level factors, but also by structural arrangements. The chances to marry en￾dogamously are higher the more often one meets people within the group and the more often one interacts with group members on a day-to-day basis. Con￾tact opportunities are shaped by several structural arrangements. Some studies focus on the demographic composition of the population as a whole, other studies examine regional distributions of groups, and yet other studies analyze smaller, functional settings, such as the school and the workplace. THE LOGIC OF NUMBERS When interaction occurs randomly, the chance that a woman in a certain group marries someone in her own group equals the pro￾portion of men who are in that group. As a result, members of a small group will have lower chances of marrying endogamously than members of a larger group. The effect of group size implies that endogamy is negatively related to the degree of heterogeneity of a population (Blau & Schwartz 1984). To ex￾plain this, one can think of two populations, each consisting of two groups. One population is heterogeneous and has 50% in each group (e.g. 100 in group A, 100 in group B), while the other is homogeneous and has 90% in one group and 10% in the other (e.g. 180 in group A, 20 in group B). Both populations have equal numbers of males and females in each group. In the heterogeneous population, the number of women expected to marry within the group will be 0.5 x 50 = 25 for A and 0.5 x 50 = 25 for B, which boils down to 50% marrying within the group. In the homogeneous population, the number of women ex￾pected to marry within the group will be 0.9 x 90 = 81 for A and 0.1 x 10 = 1 for B, which boils down to 82%. This shows that in a heterogeneous population, endogamy is lower than in a homogeneous population, provided that marriage is random. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GROUPS The chance to encounter a member of one’s own group does not depend on group size alone but also on the way a group is 402 KALMIJN Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 403 dispersed geographically (Blau Schwartz 1984).Groups that are concen- trated in specific regions of the country generally have more opportunity to marry endogamously than groups that are not(Lieberson Waters 1988).Ex- amples are common in the literature on ethnic groups,e.g.Asian-Americans in California,Jewish-Americans in New York City,or Catholics and Protestants separated in the southern and northern parts of the Netherlands.An additional reason why it is important to consider the geography of groups is that isolation may be correlated with group size.Smaller groups are often more isolated. Jewish-Americans,for example,may have partly overcome the constraints of their small group size through geographic concentration.They are a small group in a large country,but a large group in a small region. Although relaxing the assumption of an even geographic distribution is more realistic,it also leads to new problems.If one controls for geographic segregation-by calculating endogamy rates for specific regions,for in- 'MA wo poppouMo1-6:8661010S stance-one implicitly assumes that people base their decision to live in a given area on factors that are independent of ingroup preferences.This is not always realistic.For instance,there is much regional concentration of Italian- Americans in the United States,but even though this can in part be attributed to 多 their particular immigration history and occupational opportunities,the prefer- ences of Italian-Americans play a role as well (Lieberson 1980).While it is dif- ficult to make a precise distinction between preferences and constraints,it is generally true that the smaller the marriage market one studies,the more the structure of the market is affected by preferences and the less by constraints. LOCAL MARRIAGE MARKETS Unmarried people do not just wander around a region looking for a spouse;they spend most of their life in small and func- reyaueys q pop tional places,such as neighborhoods,schools,workplaces,bars,and clubs Such"local marriage markets"are often socially segregated,and that is why they are important for explaining marriage patterns.In the sociological litera- 2 ture,three local markets have been considered most frequently:the school,the neighborhood,and the workplace.Of these three,schools are considered the 具量 most efficient markets because they are homogeneous with respect to age and heterogeneous with respect to sex.Workplaces are considered less efficient, but increased participation of women in the labor market and declining occu- pational sex segregation suggest that this may have changed(Davis 1984).Al- though it has not often been studied where couples meet,a French study shows that the settings sociologists analyze are not the most common meeting places. Among young French couples,fewer than 5%met in the neighborhood,fewer than 10%met at school,and just over 10%met at work(Bozon Heran 1989). To clarify how local marriage markets affect homogamy,authors have looked at the composition of these markets with respect to social characteris- tics.What distinguishes the neighborhood from the school and the workplace

dispersed geographically (Blau & Schwartz 1984). Groups that are concen￾trated in specific regions of the country generally have more opportunity to marry endogamously than groups that are not (Lieberson & Waters 1988). Ex￾amples are common in the literature on ethnic groups, e.g. Asian-Americans in California, Jewish-Americans in New York City, or Catholics and Protestants separated in the southern and northern parts of the Netherlands. An additional reason why it is important to consider the geography of groups is that isolation may be correlated with group size. Smaller groups are often more isolated. Jewish-Americans, for example, may have partly overcome the constraints of their small group size through geographic concentration. They are a small group in a large country, but a large group in a small region. Although relaxing the assumption of an even geographic distribution is more realistic, it also leads to new problems. If one controls for geographic segregation—by calculating endogamy rates for specific regions, for in￾stance—one implicitly assumes that people base their decision to live in a given area on factors that are independent of ingroup preferences. This is not always realistic. For instance, there is much regional concentration of Italian￾Americans in the United States, but even though this can in part be attributed to their particular immigration history and occupational opportunities, the prefer￾ences of Italian-Americans play a role as well (Lieberson 1980). While it is dif￾ficult to make a precise distinction between preferences and constraints, it is generally true that the smaller the marriage market one studies, the more the structure of the market is affected by preferences and the less by constraints. LOCAL MARRIAGE MARKETS Unmarried people do not just wander around a region looking for a spouse; they spend most of their life in small and func￾tional places, such as neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, bars, and clubs. Such “local marriage markets” are often socially segregated, and that is why they are important for explaining marriage patterns. In the sociological litera￾ture, three local markets have been considered most frequently: the school, the neighborhood, and the workplace. Of these three, schools are considered the most efficient markets because they are homogeneous with respect to age and heterogeneous with respect to sex. Workplaces are considered less efficient, but increased participation of women in the labor market and declining occu￾pational sex segregation suggest that this may have changed (Davis 1984). Al￾though it has not often been studied where couples meet, a French study shows that the settings sociologists analyze are not the most common meeting places. Among young French couples, fewer than 5% met in the neighborhood, fewer than 10% met at school, and just over 10% met at work (Bozon & Heran 1989). To clarify how local marriage markets affect homogamy, authors have looked at the composition of these markets with respect to social characteris￾tics. What distinguishes the neighborhood from the school and the workplace INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 403 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only