American Political Science Review (2018)112,4.891-904 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000527 American Political Science Association 2018 The Power of the Multitude:Answering Epistemic Challenges to Democracy SAMUEL BAGG McGill University ecent years have witnessed growing controversy over the "wisdom of the multitude."As epistemic critics drawing on vast empirical evidence have cast doubt on the political competence ofordinary citizens,epistemic democrats have offered a defense of democracy grounded largely in analogies and formal results.So far,I argue,the critics have been more convincing.Nevertheless,democracy can be defended on instrumental grounds,and this article demonstrates an alternative approach.Instead of implausibly upholding the epistemic reliability of average voters,I observe that competitive elections, universal suffrage,and discretionary state power disable certain potent mechanisms ofelite entrenchment. By reserving particular forms ofpower for the multitude ofordinary citizens,they make democratic states more resistant to dangerous forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives.My approach thus offers a robust defense of electoral democracy,yet cautions against expecting too much from it-motivating a thicker conception of democracy,writ large. POWER,NOT WISDOM:THE REALIST CASE dynamics of political power,critics routinely overstate FOR DEMOCRACY the attractiveness of non-democratic alternatives like meritocracy.Meanwhile,defenders of democracy often emocracy faces increasingly pressing chal- understate the challenges of voter ignorance,which lenges on“epistemic'”grounds(Bell2015; prevents them from articulating a robust,realistic ac- Brennan 2016;Caplan 2007;Somin 2013). count of democracy's instrumental value.Developing Though few dispute its superior track record in the a more compelling response to epistemic challenges twentieth century,even committed democrats worry requires that we turn our gaze from questions of & about the political ignorance,short-sightedness,and wisdom to questions of power.This article outlines irrationality of ordinary citizens (Achen and Bartels such an approach. 2016:Green 2009).Given these worries,indeed,many On the one hand,evidence of serious epistemic political philosophers assume that a purely "instru- deficits ought to chasten our expectations for electoral mental"defense of democracy is unstable,concluding that the value of political equality must be conceived in democracy-defined minimally as any system charac- terized by competitive elections,universal suffrage,and “non-instrumental'”or“intrinsic”terms(Griffin2O03: substantial discretionary state power.Nevertheless. 是 Kolodny 2014;Viehoff 2014).Such arguments are each of these three components is indispensable. hardly decisive,however (Arneson 2004;Wall 2007), As I demonstrate in what follows,non-democratic and in the face of rising enthusiasm for non-democratic institutional alternatives would grant incumbents and alternatives(Foa and Mounk 2016).others have wisely other elites too much latitude to entrench their own insisted on justifying democracy in instrumental terms power, presenting unacceptable dangers of "state In particular,recent years have witnessed growing in- capture"without generating significant or systematic terest in epistemic accounts of democracy (Estlund compensatory benefits.Though electoral democracy is 2008:Landemore 2012).which directly answer epis- hardly free of such pathologies,each of its three central temic challenges by defending the"wisdom of the mul- components does enhance resistance to particularly titude"(Waldron 1995). dangerous forms of entrenchment and capture-even This epistemic approach to evaluating rival regimes has a venerable history,dating all the way back to if ordinary people are as politically incompetent as critics claim.My approach thus provides a more Plato and Aristotle.Unfortunately,it is also deeply robust defense of basic democratic institutions than is misleading.In focusing on who has the appropriate available on other instrumental approaches,without skills and knowledge to govern rather than the complex implying any kind of complacency about them.It yields an appropriately enthusiastic appraisal of electoral Samuel Bagg is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on democracy-as a justly celebrated achievement that is Constitutional Studies and the Department of Political Science at nonetheless profoundly insufficient-while encourag- McGill University,855 Sherbrooke St.West,Montreal,QC,Canada, H3A 2T7 (samuel.bagg@gmail.com). ing a thicker conception of democracy,writ large. For valuable feedback and discussion on the themes of this article, My account is not entirely unprecedented-indeed, I am very grateful to Arash Abizadeh,Aaron Ancell,Pablo Bera- it builds on recent efforts to establish realistic founda- mendi,Kevin Elliot,Michael Gillespie,Kelly Gordon,Ruth Grant tions for democratic theory (Green 2009,2016;Knight Jeffrey Green,Ewan Kingston,Jack Knight,Elizabeth Landesberg. and Johnson 2011;Medearis 2015;Przeworski 2010; Catherine Lu,Victor Muniz-Fraticelli,Wayne Norman,Will Roberts, Amit Ron,Christa Scholtz,Melissa Schwartzberg,Lucas Swaine, Rahman 2016;Shapiro 2003,2016)and responds more Daniel Weinstock,and Yves Winter,as well as Leigh Jenco and sev- generally to growing interest in "realist"alternatives eral anonymous reviewers at the APSR. to overly moralized or idealized ways of doing political Received:November 1.2017:revised:March 25.2018:accepted:July philosophy (Bagg 2016,2017;Galston 2010;Mantena 20,2018.First published online:September 6,2018. 2012;Williams 2005).Yet it is unique in engaging 891
American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 891–904 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000527 © American Political Science Association 2018 The Power of the Multitude: Answering Epistemic Challenges to Democracy SAMUEL BAGG McGill University Recent years have witnessed growing controversy over the “wisdom of the multitude.” As epistemic critics drawing on vast empirical evidence have cast doubt on the political competence of ordinary citizens, epistemic democrats have offered a defense of democracy grounded largely in analogies and formal results. So far, I argue, the critics have been more convincing. Nevertheless, democracy can be defended on instrumental grounds, and this article demonstrates an alternative approach. Instead of implausibly upholding the epistemic reliability of average voters, I observe that competitive elections, universal suffrage, and discretionary state power disable certain potent mechanisms of elite entrenchment. By reserving particular forms of power for the multitude of ordinary citizens,they make democratic states more resistant to dangerous forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives. My approach thus offers a robust defense of electoral democracy, yet cautions against expecting too much from it—motivating a thicker conception of democracy, writ large. POWER, NOT WISDOM: THE REALIST CASE FOR DEMOCRACY Democracy faces increasingly pressing challenges on “epistemic” grounds (Bell 2015; Brennan 2016; Caplan 2007; Somin 2013). Though few dispute its superior track record in the twentieth century, even committed democrats worry about the political ignorance, short-sightedness, and irrationality of ordinary citizens (Achen and Bartels 2016; Green 2009). Given these worries, indeed, many political philosophers assume that a purely “instrumental” defense of democracy is unstable, concluding that the value of political equality must be conceived in “non-instrumental” or “intrinsic” terms (Griffin 2003; Kolodny 2014; Viehoff 2014). Such arguments are hardly decisive, however (Arneson 2004; Wall 2007), and in the face of rising enthusiasm for non-democratic alternatives (Foa and Mounk 2016), others have wisely insisted on justifying democracy in instrumental terms. In particular, recent years have witnessed growing interest in epistemic accounts of democracy (Estlund 2008; Landemore 2012), which directly answer epistemic challenges by defending the “wisdom of the multitude” (Waldron 1995). This epistemic approach to evaluating rival regimes has a venerable history, dating all the way back to Plato and Aristotle. Unfortunately, it is also deeply misleading. In focusing on who has the appropriate skills and knowledge to govern rather than the complex Samuel Bagg is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on Constitutional Studies and the Department of Political Science at McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke St. West, Montréal, QC, Canada, H3A 2T7 (samuel.bagg@gmail.com). For valuable feedback and discussion on the themes of this article, I am very grateful to Arash Abizadeh, Aaron Ancell, Pablo Beramendi, Kevin Elliot, Michael Gillespie, Kelly Gordon, Ruth Grant, Jeffrey Green, Ewan Kingston, Jack Knight, Elizabeth Landesberg, Catherine Lu, Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli,Wayne Norman,Will Roberts, Amit Ron, Christa Scholtz, Melissa Schwartzberg, Lucas Swaine, Daniel Weinstock, and Yves Winter, as well as Leigh Jenco and several anonymous reviewers at the APSR. Received: November 1, 2017; revised: March 25, 2018; accepted: July 20, 2018. First published online: September 6, 2018. dynamics of political power, critics routinely overstate the attractiveness of non-democratic alternatives like meritocracy.Meanwhile, defenders of democracy often understate the challenges of voter ignorance, which prevents them from articulating a robust, realistic account of democracy’s instrumental value. Developing a more compelling response to epistemic challenges requires that we turn our gaze from questions of wisdom to questions of power. This article outlines such an approach. On the one hand, evidence of serious epistemic deficits ought to chasten our expectations for electoral democracy—defined minimally as any system characterized by competitive elections, universal suffrage, and substantial discretionary state power. Nevertheless, each of these three components is indispensable. As I demonstrate in what follows, non-democratic institutional alternatives would grant incumbents and other elites too much latitude to entrench their own power, presenting unacceptable dangers of “state capture” without generating significant or systematic compensatory benefits. Though electoral democracy is hardly free of such pathologies, each of its three central components does enhance resistance to particularly dangerous forms of entrenchment and capture—even if ordinary people are as politically incompetent as critics claim. My approach thus provides a more robust defense of basic democratic institutions than is available on other instrumental approaches, without implying any kind of complacency about them. It yields an appropriately enthusiastic appraisal of electoral democracy—as a justly celebrated achievement that is nonetheless profoundly insufficient—while encouraging a thicker conception of democracy, writ large. My account is not entirely unprecedented—indeed, it builds on recent efforts to establish realistic foundations for democratic theory (Green 2009, 2016; Knight and Johnson 2011; Medearis 2015; Przeworski 2010; Rahman 2016; Shapiro 2003, 2016) and responds more generally to growing interest in “realist” alternatives to overly moralized or idealized ways of doing political philosophy (Bagg 2016, 2017; Galston 2010; Mantena 2012; Williams 2005). Yet it is unique in engaging 891 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527
Samuel Bagg directly with both epistemic critiques and non- ability of electoral democracies to overcome systemic democratic alternatives.Moreover,it integrates a pathologies such as bourgeois ideology, patriarchy number of disparate insights within a comprehensive white supremacy,and settler colonialism (Coulthard theoretical framework,oriented around a novel ideal 2014:Davis 2012:Gramsci 1971:Malcolm X 1964). of resisting state capture. Democrats typically rely on one of two strategies In short,I claim,the value of competitive elections, for defending competitive elections with universal suf- universal suffrage,and discretionary state power is not frage.First,many emphasize their intrinsic value,main- to bestow ultimate authority upon the demos as the taining that everyone deserves a say over decisions that wisest possible sovereign.Instead,the value of each bind them.Others prefer to stress the instrumental ben- of these crucial democratic institutions is best under- efits of democratic institutions.observing that modern op//s stood in terms of the power it denies to various elites democratic governments have most reliably promoted and which is thereby retained by various groups of peace and prosperity (Sen 1999).Both of these com- ordinary citizens.The most promising paradigm for mon accounts,however,fail to adequately address re- answering epistemic challenges to democracy,I con- cent epistemic critiques. clude,will emphasize the power,not the wisdom,of the As Brennan and Bell readily admit,for one,high- multitude. lighting the extent of voter ignorance will rarely sway those who take the intrinsic value of democracy as a foundational normative premise.Yet this premise is THE EPISTEMIC FRAME:EVALUATING THE neither self-evident nor universally shared.If ceding a WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE largely symbolic form of political equality like univer- sal suffrage would really yield dramatic improvements Epistemic Critiques of Democracy in social,economic,and environmental outcomes,this tradeoff would understandably appeal to many ob- With fascism and communism as its most salient op- servers around the world.This hardly constitutes a 4号元 ponents,electoral democracy came to enjoy near- thorough rebuttal of arguments for democracy's intrin- universal support in the twentieth century-at least sic value,of course,but given that these arguments are among Western cultural elites.Even as scholars accu both reasonably contestable in theory and widely dis- mulated staggering evidence of the political ignorance puted in practice,democrats would be unwise to ignore of ordinary voters (Campbell et al.1960;Zaller 1992). the domain of instrumental value altogether.2 In what most nonetheless embraced Winston Churchill's view follows,therefore,I set aside intrinsic concerns of democracy as the"worst form of government,except Similarly,epistemic critics happily acknowledge for all the others that have been tried." electoral democracy's relative instrumental success- Recently.however,some have begun to venture especially in the twentieth century (Bell 2015,7;Bren- more full-throated criticisms.Jason Brennan argues,for nan 2016,8,195).Yet it hardly constitutes a guarantee instance,that if people have a right to competent gov- of peace,prosperity,and liberal rights(Levitsky and ernment,we should not leave decisions in the hands of Way 2010);much less a thorough "democratization" the "ignorant,irrational,misinformed nationalists"of of social and economic life (Crouch 2004;Tilly 2007). typical electorates(2016,23).He then outlines a num- Meanwhile,democracies have also done awful things- 15.501 ber of potential alternatives to one-person-one-vote, especially to noncitizens(Bell 2015,46-47).Isn't it pos- including restricted suffrage and plural or weighted sible,critics ask,that some alternative might perform voting.Given democracy's serious and demonstrable even better? flaws,he argues,we have a responsibility to give such Ultimately,I argue,the answer is no:no epistocratic alternatives a try.Daniel A.Bell(2015)raises similar political institutions offer reliable substantive advan- concerns from a rather different perspective,defend- tages over electoral democracy,all things considered. ing a quasi-Confucian political meritocracy modeled Especially given pervasive findings of voter ignorance, on contemporary Singapore and China,which elimi- however,epistemic critics are right to be dissatisfied nates competitive elections altogether.Such proposals with the reasoning offered by prevailing accounts. to allocate political power on the basis of knowledge Despite an almost axiomatic faith in democracy or merit,rather than giving it freely to everyone,are democratic theorists still lack a compelling instru- sometimes called epistocracies(Estlund 2008). mental explanation of why competitive elections and Epistemic skepticism of popular rule has an un- universal suffrage should not be abandoned in favor of flattering history,and it is often dismissed as obso- alternative institutions that would maintain attractive lete.Yet electoral democracy faces troubling practi- features of liberal government while filtering out cal challenges in the twenty-first century (Dresden the ignorance,irrationality,and bigotry of ordinary and Howard 2016),and serious normative worries have come from diverse intellectual quarters.Liber- tarians lament widespread ignorance about economic Indeed,the percentage of people globally who believe democracy L policy (Caplan 2007),for instance,and egalitarians is "essential"has declined dramatically in recent years (Foa and suspect popular commitment to fundamental rights Mounk 2016). (Dworkin 1996).Environmentalists bemoan the im- 2 For more comprehensive arguments against intrinsic accounts of pact of short-sighted democratic choices on natural democracy-whose intuitive plausibility often relies on implicit in. strumental assumptions-see Arneson(1993.2004).Wall(2007).and systems (Humphrey 2007),while radicals doubt the Brennan(2016). 892
Samuel Bagg directly with both epistemic critiques and nondemocratic alternatives. Moreover, it integrates a number of disparate insights within a comprehensive theoretical framework, oriented around a novel ideal of resisting state capture. In short, I claim, the value of competitive elections, universal suffrage, and discretionary state power is not to bestow ultimate authority upon the demos as the wisest possible sovereign. Instead, the value of each of these crucial democratic institutions is best understood in terms of the power it denies to various elites, and which is thereby retained by various groups of ordinary citizens. The most promising paradigm for answering epistemic challenges to democracy, I conclude, will emphasize the power, not the wisdom, of the multitude. THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: EVALUATING THE WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE Epistemic Critiques of Democracy With fascism and communism as its most salient opponents, electoral democracy came to enjoy nearuniversal support in the twentieth century—at least among Western cultural elites. Even as scholars accumulated staggering evidence of the political ignorance of ordinary voters (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992), most nonetheless embraced Winston Churchill’s view of democracy as the “worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried.” Recently, however, some have begun to venture more full-throated criticisms. Jason Brennan argues, for instance, that if people have a right to competent government, we should not leave decisions in the hands of the “ignorant, irrational, misinformed nationalists” of typical electorates (2016, 23). He then outlines a number of potential alternatives to one-person-one-vote, including restricted suffrage and plural or weighted voting. Given democracy’s serious and demonstrable flaws, he argues, we have a responsibility to give such alternatives a try. Daniel A. Bell (2015) raises similar concerns from a rather different perspective, defending a quasi-Confucian political meritocracy modeled on contemporary Singapore and China, which eliminates competitive elections altogether. Such proposals to allocate political power on the basis of knowledge or merit, rather than giving it freely to everyone, are sometimes called epistocracies (Estlund 2008). Epistemic skepticism of popular rule has an unflattering history, and it is often dismissed as obsolete. Yet electoral democracy faces troubling practical challenges in the twenty-first century (Dresden and Howard 2016), and serious normative worries have come from diverse intellectual quarters. Libertarians lament widespread ignorance about economic policy (Caplan 2007), for instance, and egalitarians suspect popular commitment to fundamental rights (Dworkin 1996). Environmentalists bemoan the impact of short-sighted democratic choices on natural systems (Humphrey 2007), while radicals doubt the ability of electoral democracies to overcome systemic pathologies such as bourgeois ideology, patriarchy, white supremacy, and settler colonialism (Coulthard 2014; Davis 2012; Gramsci 1971; Malcolm X 1964). Democrats typically rely on one of two strategies for defending competitive elections with universal suffrage. First, many emphasize their intrinsic value, maintaining that everyone deserves a say over decisions that bind them.Others prefer to stress the instrumental benefits of democratic institutions, observing that modern democratic governments have most reliably promoted peace and prosperity (Sen 1999). Both of these common accounts, however, fail to adequately address recent epistemic critiques. As Brennan and Bell readily admit, for one, highlighting the extent of voter ignorance will rarely sway those who take the intrinsic value of democracy as a foundational normative premise. Yet this premise is neither self-evident nor universally shared.1 If ceding a largely symbolic form of political equality like universal suffrage would really yield dramatic improvements in social, economic, and environmental outcomes, this tradeoff would understandably appeal to many observers around the world. This hardly constitutes a thorough rebuttal of arguments for democracy’s intrinsic value, of course, but given that these arguments are both reasonably contestable in theory and widely disputed in practice, democrats would be unwise to ignore the domain of instrumental value altogether.2 In what follows, therefore, I set aside intrinsic concerns. Similarly, epistemic critics happily acknowledge electoral democracy’s relative instrumental success— especially in the twentieth century (Bell 2015, 7; Brennan 2016, 8, 195). Yet it hardly constitutes a guarantee of peace, prosperity, and liberal rights (Levitsky and Way 2010); much less a thorough “democratization” of social and economic life (Crouch 2004; Tilly 2007). Meanwhile, democracies have also done awful things— especially to noncitizens (Bell 2015, 46–47). Isn’t it possible, critics ask, that some alternative might perform even better? Ultimately, I argue, the answer is no: no epistocratic political institutions offer reliable substantive advantages over electoral democracy, all things considered. Especially given pervasive findings of voter ignorance, however, epistemic critics are right to be dissatisfied with the reasoning offered by prevailing accounts. Despite an almost axiomatic faith in democracy, democratic theorists still lack a compelling instrumental explanation of why competitive elections and universal suffrage should not be abandoned in favor of alternative institutions that would maintain attractive features of liberal government while filtering out the ignorance, irrationality, and bigotry of ordinary 1 Indeed, the percentage of people globally who believe democracy is “essential” has declined dramatically in recent years (Foa and Mounk 2016). 2 For more comprehensive arguments against intrinsic accounts of democracy—whose intuitive plausibility often relies on implicit instrumental assumptions—see Arneson (1993, 2004),Wall (2007), and Brennan (2016). 892 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527
The Power of the Multitude citizens.3 As a result,existing instrumental accounts instrumentalist approaches,then,epistemic accounts remain perpetually vulnerable to challenges from stake out a far more robust commitment to demo- novel forms of non-democracy,like those proposed cratic procedures.The connection between democ- by Brennan and Bell,which are said to transcend the racy and superior outcomes is not just a historical limitations of earlier forms. accident,but a deep and abiding principle of social Such challenges can be understood as versions of organization the perennial "benevolent dictator"objection-that Content neutrality is key here.Most instrumental- is,that if rule by an intelligent and well-intentioned ist accounts emphasize the connection between demo- monarch or aristocratic elite could achieve better re cratic procedures and specific substantive outcomes- sults than rule by the people,instrumentalists should that is,maintaining liberal rights or avoiding famine prefer it to democracy.Many democrats are troubled and war-which inevitably invites "benevolent dicta- by this objection,which has often spurred the develop- tor” objections.On epistemic accounts,by contrast, ment of intrinsic accounts of democracy's value (Beitz democracy is more like the scientific method:we can 1989,98:Christiano1996,16-7,56;Kolodny2014,202) trust it to reach political truths,in the long run,with- If instrumentalism yields only a contingent,defeasible out knowing those truths in advance (Gaus 2011).As commitment to democratic institutions,they conclude Sean Ingham summarizes,epistemic democrats aim to democrats had better rely on the intrinsic value of po show that"democratic institutions have a tendency to litical equality and self-government.Meanwhile,many produce reasonable outcomes [...without presuppos- instrumentalists embrace the hypothetical prospect of ing any narrow,controversial view of what the out- attractive alternatives to democracy.Until recently, comes of democratic procedures should be,much as a however,few have taken this prospect seriously. good justification of a particular scientific research de- We no longer have this luxury.Given the urgent sign does not presuppose the hypothesis that the re- practical and philosophical challenges facing electoral search aims to test"(Ingham 2013,136).Rather than democracy,we cannot be content that it is less awful establishing their empirical propensity to produce par- 4号元 than the other systems we have tried.We must also ticular results,therefore,epistemic democrats empha- explain to challengers like Brennan and Bell-and, size structural features of democratic procedures;turn- more importantly,to reformers and revolutionaries ing to abstract arguments,analogical reasoning,and- around the world-why we should refrain from trying most centrally-formal proofs of collective compe- anything else. tence (Schwartzberg 2015). The simplest and most prevalent of these proofs- Epistemic Defenses of Democracy once called the "jewel in the crown of epistemic democrats"(List and Goodin 2001.283)-is the Con- That is why the "epistemic"account of democracy dorcet Jury Theorem (CJT).This theorem shows gaining popularity among political philosophers ap- roughly,that if many people independently make a bi- pears so promising (Anderson 2007;Bohman 2006: nary decision that has a correct answer,and each has Estlund 2008:Landemore 2012:Misak 2008:Ober a greater-than-random chance of being correct,a ma- 2008).Unlike many intrinsic accounts,epistemic views jority vote is extremely likely to deliver the correct acknowledge that the quality of the outcomes pro- answer.Following its rediscovery in the late twentieth duced by democratic procedures is central to their century,early epistemic democrats eagerly applied the justification.Unlike their instrumentalist rivals,how- theorem to democratic politics (Estlund 1994:Grof- ever,epistemic accounts promise a coherent expla- man and Feld 1988). nation of why we should expect democratic proce- In the years since this initial enthusiasm,however, dures to produce better outcomes than non-democratic the theorem's relevance for democratic theory has re- alternatives:only democratic procedures,they claim, peatedly been challenged (Anderson 2008:Christiano can harness the collective wisdom of the people.As 1996.33-4:Dietrich 2008:Gaus 1997),and even many a whole.that is.the demos possesses greater wisdom former advocates have now conceded its limited use- than the wisest philosopher-king or council of experts, fulness (Estlund 2008,223-36).The requirement that and so democracy-a system in which the demos is individual decisions be independent of one another sovereign-will outperform even the most benevo- for instance,is incompatible with the deliberation and lent of monarchies or aristocracies.Compared to other communication that many epistemic democrats under- stand as crucial to the superior performance of demo- 四 cratic procedures.In assuming a discrete number of 3 Defenders of instrumentalism have typically been more concerned choices,moreover,the CJT also ignores problems of with debunking intrinsic views than explaining democracy's real in- agenda control (Fuerstein 2008).Perhaps the most strumental value (e.g.,Arneson 2004;Wall 2007).Minimalist ac. counts articulated by political scientists like Przeworski (1999.2010) devastating objection to the CJT's practical relevance, and Achen and Bartels(2016.316-9)offer more-and they inform however,is simply that it proves too much(Ingham my own(more comprehensive)account-yet they remain remark- 2013).If we suppose the theorem does apply to ac- ably unpopular(if not entirely unknown)in political philosophy tual democratic elections,we must implausibly con- 4 In response.democrats since Mill have hypothesized that political clude that they almost never deliver the "incorrect"re- participation has intrinsic benefits for people.Yet as Brennan(2016. 54-73)shows,empirical research on this subject is not encouraging sult.Without this supposition,meanwhile,the theorem As Bell (2015,168-78)emphasizes,moreover,local democratic par- provides existing institutions with no defense against ticipation is perfectly consistent with meritocracy "at the top." epistemic critiques. 893
The Power of the Multitude citizens.3 As a result, existing instrumental accounts remain perpetually vulnerable to challenges from novel forms of non-democracy, like those proposed by Brennan and Bell, which are said to transcend the limitations of earlier forms. Such challenges can be understood as versions of the perennial “benevolent dictator” objection—that is, that if rule by an intelligent and well-intentioned monarch or aristocratic elite could achieve better results than rule by the people, instrumentalists should prefer it to democracy.4 Many democrats are troubled by this objection, which has often spurred the development of intrinsic accounts of democracy’s value (Beitz 1989, 98; Christiano 1996, 16–7, 56; Kolodny 2014, 202). If instrumentalism yields only a contingent, defeasible commitment to democratic institutions, they conclude, democrats had better rely on the intrinsic value of political equality and self-government. Meanwhile, many instrumentalists embrace the hypothetical prospect of attractive alternatives to democracy. Until recently, however, few have taken this prospect seriously. We no longer have this luxury. Given the urgent practical and philosophical challenges facing electoral democracy, we cannot be content that it is less awful than the other systems we have tried. We must also explain to challengers like Brennan and Bell—and, more importantly, to reformers and revolutionaries around the world—why we should refrain from trying anything else. Epistemic Defenses of Democracy That is why the “epistemic” account of democracy gaining popularity among political philosophers appears so promising (Anderson 2007; Bohman 2006; Estlund 2008; Landemore 2012; Misak 2008; Ober 2008). Unlike many intrinsic accounts, epistemic views acknowledge that the quality of the outcomes produced by democratic procedures is central to their justification. Unlike their instrumentalist rivals, however, epistemic accounts promise a coherent explanation of why we should expect democratic procedures to produce better outcomes than non-democratic alternatives: only democratic procedures, they claim, can harness the collective wisdom of the people. As a whole, that is, the demos possesses greater wisdom than the wisest philosopher-king or council of experts, and so democracy—a system in which the demos is sovereign—will outperform even the most benevolent of monarchies or aristocracies. Compared to other 3 Defenders of instrumentalism have typically been more concerned with debunking intrinsic views than explaining democracy’s real instrumental value (e.g., Arneson 2004; Wall 2007). Minimalist accounts articulated by political scientists like Przeworski (1999, 2010) and Achen and Bartels (2016, 316–9) offer more—and they inform my own (more comprehensive) account—yet they remain remarkably unpopular (if not entirely unknown) in political philosophy. 4 In response, democrats since Mill have hypothesized that political participation has intrinsic benefits for people. Yet as Brennan (2016, 54–73) shows, empirical research on this subject is not encouraging. As Bell (2015, 168–78) emphasizes, moreover, local democratic participation is perfectly consistent with meritocracy “at the top.” instrumentalist approaches, then, epistemic accounts stake out a far more robust commitment to democratic procedures. The connection between democracy and superior outcomes is not just a historical accident, but a deep and abiding principle of social organization. Content neutrality is key here. Most instrumentalist accounts emphasize the connection between democratic procedures and specific substantive outcomes— that is, maintaining liberal rights or avoiding famine and war—which inevitably invites “benevolent dictator” objections. On epistemic accounts, by contrast, democracy is more like the scientific method: we can trust it to reach political truths, in the long run, without knowing those truths in advance (Gaus 2011). As Sean Ingham summarizes, epistemic democrats aim to show that “democratic institutions have a tendency to produce reasonable outcomes […] without presupposing any narrow, controversial view of what the outcomes of democratic procedures should be, much as a good justification of a particular scientific research design does not presuppose the hypothesis that the research aims to test” (Ingham 2013, 136). Rather than establishing their empirical propensity to produce particular results, therefore, epistemic democrats emphasize structural features of democratic procedures; turning to abstract arguments, analogical reasoning, and— most centrally—formal proofs of collective competence (Schwartzberg 2015). The simplest and most prevalent of these proofs— once called the “jewel in the crown of epistemic democrats” (List and Goodin 2001, 283)—is the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). This theorem shows, roughly, that if many people independently make a binary decision that has a correct answer, and each has a greater-than-random chance of being correct, a majority vote is extremely likely to deliver the correct answer. Following its rediscovery in the late twentieth century, early epistemic democrats eagerly applied the theorem to democratic politics (Estlund 1994; Grofman and Feld 1988). In the years since this initial enthusiasm, however, the theorem’s relevance for democratic theory has repeatedly been challenged (Anderson 2008; Christiano 1996, 33–4; Dietrich 2008; Gaus 1997), and even many former advocates have now conceded its limited usefulness (Estlund 2008, 223–36). The requirement that individual decisions be independent of one another, for instance, is incompatible with the deliberation and communication that many epistemic democrats understand as crucial to the superior performance of democratic procedures. In assuming a discrete number of choices, moreover, the CJT also ignores problems of agenda control (Fuerstein 2008). Perhaps the most devastating objection to the CJT’s practical relevance, however, is simply that it proves too much (Ingham 2013). If we suppose the theorem does apply to actual democratic elections, we must implausibly conclude that they almost never deliver the “incorrect” result. Without this supposition, meanwhile, the theorem provides existing institutions with no defense against epistemic critiques. 893 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527
Samuel Bagg As a result,contemporary epistemic democrats have epistocratic ruling class could be chosen that would be typically looked elsewhere for proof of collective com- "justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points petence.Perhaps most prominently,Helene Lande- of view"(Estlund 2008.41).As Landemore (2012.52) more has recently championed a theorem known as laments,his account thus resorts once again to intrinsic Diversity Trumps Ability (Landemore 2012;Lande- concerns,relying on epistemic considerations only to more and Elster 2012).According to simulations run show that democracy outperforms random selection of by Hong and Page (2004),a randomly selected group outcomes.Though the formal proofs she favors are un- of problem-solvers will often outperform a group of convincing,therefore,she is right to insist that a robust the best individual problem-solvers,due to the bene- fully instrumental defense of democracy is possible. ficial effects of cognitive diversity.Since this theorem Given the serious practical dangers of according po- allows for deliberation.unlike the CJT-and further- litical power on the basis of epistemic merit,I argue,we more does not assume a discrete number of choices- can readily meet epistemic critics of democracy on their it is understandably attractive to epistemic democrats own instrumentalist turf.To do so,however,we must looking for a more realistic alternative. reject the"epistemic frame"long preferred by democ- Unfortunately,however,its validity also depends on racy's critics,which proposes to compare democracy highly restrictive conditions that cannot be assumed and epistocracy in terms of the wisdom of those sup- to hold in real political circumstances(Brennan 2016. posed to have ultimate sovereignty-that is,the demos 180-94;Thompson 2014;Van Hees 2007).Perhaps and the knowers,respectively.Given that all regimes most importantly,it assumes cognitive diversity without are in reality composed of complex,pluralistic power value diversity,and once the latter is introduced,the structures,the notion of "ultimate"sovereignty only theorem fails to show what Landemore claims(Ancell obfuscates(see Pettit 2013,12-5,220-9).As I elaborate 2017).Moreover,she does not sufficiently address the below,democracy and epistocracy are not diametrically possibility that epistocratic institutions could easily co- opposed:in fact,successful democracies rely on certain opt this virtue.Indeed,Bell's model for a modernized epistocratic institutions,while the proposals of Bren- Confucian political meritocracy foregrounds diversity nan and Bell avowedly include democratic elements. in the selection criteria for leaders as well as active con- Instead of evaluating the wisdom of the "sovereign"in sultation of diverse bodies of citizens-in both cases each regime,therefore,I urge sustained attention to the building on existing Chinese Communist Party prac- incentives and opportunities facing those whose power tices (Bell 2015,190). is,in relative terms.most concentrated. There are,of course,a range of other analogies and formal results that have been used to demonstrate the epistemic competence of democratic procedures,many of which rely on the value of cognitive,intellectual,or BEYOND THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: perspectival diversity.We may safely set them aside, DEFENDING THE POWER OF THE MULTITUDE however,given the objection just raised.After all,any epistemic advantages thought to be unique to demo- My core argument proceeds in three parts.defend- cratic institutions could conceivably be co-opted by a ing three central components of electoral democracy sufficiently well-designed epistocracy.Even if the mul- through an engagement with alternatives presented by 。101g titude possesses some special wisdom that no team three contemporary epistemic critics.I begin with the of experts could match,that is,competitive elections two epistocratic proposals discussed above,defending with universal suffrage are not obviously the most ef- political competition against Bell's centralized politi- ficient way of harnessing it,and could conceivably be cal meritocracy,and universal suffrage against Bren- improved upon by clever experts. nan's franchise qualifications.In both cases,I admit that Extant epistemic approaches,it seems,have failed epistrocratic institutions could conceivably produce su- to deliver on their promise to provide an instrumental perior substantive outcomes,yet maintain that they defense of electoral democracy that is robust to are not worth the serious risks they entail.In practice challenges from epistocracy and other "benevolent epistocratic mechanisms would be susceptible to espe- dictator"objections.As the longtime epistemic demo- cially dangerous forms of "capture"by rulers seeking crat David Estlund admits in his recent work,it is no to entrench their power,while their purported advan- use denying that "there are subsets of citizens that are tages are very unlikely to materialize.Despite the many wiser than the group as a whole"(Estlund 2008,40). deficits of competitive elections with universal suffrage The problem with epistocracy,rather,lies with deciding therefore-including their own vulnerabilities to en- which subset to empower.Yet Estlund squanders this trenchment and capture-we have decisive reasons not insight,in my view,by interpreting the problem in to experiment with epistocratic alternatives the terms of public justification,arguing that no I then consider the possibility of mitigating the per- nicious effects of political ignorance by limiting the state's discretionary power,as might seem to be im- 5 This logic is central,for instance.to Waldron's(1995)reading of plied by my concern with state capture.Indeed,I argue, Aristotle-who memorably analogizes democracy to a banquet with constraining and decentralizing political power can many contributors-as well as Estlund's parable of the blind men and the elephant,whereby the men succeed in correctly identifying help to resist certain forms of entrenchment and cap- the animal only by pooling their individual sense data(2008,233-6). ture,but it also enables others,and thus cannot repre- See also Bohman(2006). sent a general solution.In particular,limiting the state's 894
Samuel Bagg As a result, contemporary epistemic democrats have typically looked elsewhere for proof of collective competence. Perhaps most prominently, Hélène Landemore has recently championed a theorem known as Diversity Trumps Ability (Landemore 2012; Landemore and Elster 2012). According to simulations run by Hong and Page (2004), a randomly selected group of problem-solvers will often outperform a group of the best individual problem-solvers, due to the beneficial effects of cognitive diversity. Since this theorem allows for deliberation, unlike the CJT—and furthermore does not assume a discrete number of choices— it is understandably attractive to epistemic democrats looking for a more realistic alternative. Unfortunately, however, its validity also depends on highly restrictive conditions that cannot be assumed to hold in real political circumstances (Brennan 2016, 180–94; Thompson 2014; Van Hees 2007). Perhaps most importantly,it assumes cognitive diversity without value diversity, and once the latter is introduced, the theorem fails to show what Landemore claims (Ancell 2017). Moreover, she does not sufficiently address the possibility that epistocratic institutions could easily coopt this virtue. Indeed, Bell’s model for a modernized Confucian political meritocracy foregrounds diversity in the selection criteria for leaders as well as active consultation of diverse bodies of citizens—in both cases building on existing Chinese Communist Party practices (Bell 2015, 190). There are, of course, a range of other analogies and formal results that have been used to demonstrate the epistemic competence of democratic procedures, many of which rely on the value of cognitive, intellectual, or perspectival diversity.5 We may safely set them aside, however, given the objection just raised. After all, any epistemic advantages thought to be unique to democratic institutions could conceivably be co-opted by a sufficiently well-designed epistocracy. Even if the multitude possesses some special wisdom that no team of experts could match, that is, competitive elections with universal suffrage are not obviously the most efficient way of harnessing it, and could conceivably be improved upon by clever experts. Extant epistemic approaches, it seems, have failed to deliver on their promise to provide an instrumental defense of electoral democracy that is robust to challenges from epistocracy and other “benevolent dictator” objections. As the longtime epistemic democrat David Estlund admits in his recent work, it is no use denying that “there are subsets of citizens that are wiser than the group as a whole” (Estlund 2008, 40). The problem with epistocracy, rather, lies with deciding which subset to empower. Yet Estlund squanders this insight, in my view, by interpreting the problem in the terms of public justification, arguing that no 5 This logic is central, for instance, to Waldron’s (1995) reading of Aristotle—who memorably analogizes democracy to a banquet with many contributors—as well as Estlund’s parable of the blind men and the elephant, whereby the men succeed in correctly identifying the animal only by pooling their individual sense data (2008, 233–6). See also Bohman (2006). epistocratic ruling class could be chosen that would be “justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view” (Estlund 2008, 41). As Landemore (2012, 52) laments, his account thus resorts once again to intrinsic concerns, relying on epistemic considerations only to show that democracy outperforms random selection of outcomes. Though the formal proofs she favors are unconvincing, therefore, she is right to insist that a robust, fully instrumental defense of democracy is possible. Given the serious practical dangers of according political power on the basis of epistemic merit, I argue, we can readily meet epistemic critics of democracy on their own instrumentalist turf. To do so, however, we must reject the “epistemic frame” long preferred by democracy’s critics, which proposes to compare democracy and epistocracy in terms of the wisdom of those supposed to have ultimate sovereignty—that is, the demos and the knowers, respectively. Given that all regimes are in reality composed of complex, pluralistic power structures, the notion of “ultimate” sovereignty only obfuscates (see Pettit 2013, 12–5, 220–9).As I elaborate below, democracy and epistocracy are not diametrically opposed: in fact, successful democracies rely on certain epistocratic institutions, while the proposals of Brennan and Bell avowedly include democratic elements. Instead of evaluating the wisdom of the “sovereign” in each regime, therefore, I urge sustained attention to the incentives and opportunities facing those whose power is, in relative terms, most concentrated. BEYOND THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: DEFENDING THE POWER OF THE MULTITUDE My core argument proceeds in three parts, defending three central components of electoral democracy through an engagement with alternatives presented by three contemporary epistemic critics. I begin with the two epistocratic proposals discussed above, defending political competition against Bell’s centralized political meritocracy, and universal suffrage against Brennan’s franchise qualifications. In both cases, I admit that epistrocratic institutions could conceivably produce superior substantive outcomes, yet maintain that they are not worth the serious risks they entail. In practice, epistocratic mechanisms would be susceptible to especially dangerous forms of “capture” by rulers seeking to entrench their power, while their purported advantages are very unlikely to materialize.Despite the many deficits of competitive elections with universal suffrage, therefore—including their own vulnerabilities to entrenchment and capture—we have decisive reasons not to experiment with epistocratic alternatives. I then consider the possibility of mitigating the pernicious effects of political ignorance by limiting the state’s discretionary power, as might seem to be implied by my concern with state capture. Indeed, I argue, constraining and decentralizing political power can help to resist certain forms of entrenchment and capture, but it also enables others, and thus cannot represent a general solution. In particular,limiting the state’s 894 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527
The Power of the Multitude ability to counteract social and economic inequalities his book's title (i.e.,The China Model),Bell does not facilitates growing stratification and concentration of claim that the contemporary Chinese government ful- private power,which almost inevitably feeds back into fills the meritocratic ideal,nor even that it outperforms the political process.In the long run,that is,certain existing electoral democracies(19).Instead.the version limits on discretionary power will turn out to be self- of political meritocracy he proposes as a "model"will undermining,allowing the growth of powerful enti have eliminated the political repression and corrup- ties or factions that may rival and eventually capture tion characterizing the current regime by implement- the state apparatus.Rather than simply minimizing the ing independent checks on centralized power(116,124 state's discretionary power,I conclude,we must bal- 150),a freer press (134,174),intraparty competition ance "defensive"strategies of constraint and decen- (138),more democratic participation in local affairs tralization with equally necessary "offensive"projects. (169,189-91),improved Confucian moral education which use state power to curtail and redistribute this (124),greater economic equality (132),and diversi- dangerously concentrated private power. fied methods of meritocratic selection (130.135.193- To supporters of each of these proposals,my conclu- 4),among other reforms.Top-level leaders in Bell's sions will likely seem hasty,and there is certainly more imagined political meritocracy,in other words,would to say in each case.My primary aim in article,how- be prevented from abusing their power by a number ever.is not to convince committed epistocrats-indeed of norms and institutions that many will recognize as I expect most readers already share my practical com- liberal.Citing precedents from East Asian history and mitment to electoral democracy.As noted above,my philosophy,however,Bell rightly observes that many of goal is of a higher order:I aim to sketch an integrated these devices are not exclusively Western or liberal in theoretical paradigm for explaining and defending that origin.Notably,this includes meritocracy itself,which commitment amid growing doubts about its intellec- has origins in both Western and Confucian traditions as tual foundations and mounting challenges to its prac- a mechanism for constraining the power of the nobility tical supremacy.The account of electoral democracy and other privileged elites(65-6). present is more compelling than the alternatives,I Bell's emphasis on independent checks on central- suggest,because it responds to epistemic critiques and ized power is not surprising.The evils of unconstrained "benevolent dictator"objections without relying on in- authoritarian rule-or,more classically,tyranny-have trinsic concerns,Churchillian complacency,or the du- long been obvious to all serious observers.As the bious analogies and formal results employed by epis- power of modern centralized states has continued temic democrats. to expand,moreover,effective constraints have only As should be clear,the concept of "state capture" become more important (El Amine 2016).Even if is central to this account,though its role is perhaps unconstrained rulers are initially benevolent,the unconventional.Rather than explaining why certain political institutions they create can be used by less outcomes are undesirable,the term functions in my ar- benevolent successors (or usurpers)in tremendously gument to highlight similarities between different out- harmful ways.Meanwhile,opposition leaders have comes that are antecedently accepted as bad:namely, no feasible non-violent path to power and are thus that all involve the use of state power by a particu- more likely to engage in violent resistance;inducing lar faction to achieve its partial ends at the expense coercive repression and/or civil war (Przeworski of other groups.Applying such a normatively laden 1999).Finally,the absence of independent constraints concept to particular cases will inevitably generate dis- associated with "extractive"institutions and re- agreement,of course,but there are plenty of uncontro- duced long-run economic growth (Acemoglu and versial cases-ranging from slavery and tyranny to reg- Robinson 2012;Fukuyama 2014;North, Wallis ulatory capture-and my argument proceeds largely and Weingast 2009). from these cases.Indeed,I prefer to see state capture Like most historical advocates of rule by the few. as a family resemblance concept,rather than as a set therefore,contemporary epistocrats happily concede of necessary and sufficient conditions.Regardless,the that rule by unconstrained,extractive elites is worse concept anchors my defense of all three components of than rule by the many.They insist,however,that electoral democracy,and thus provides a genuine,com- non-democracies are not necessarily tyrannical in this orehensive alternative to the prevailing intrinsic and way.As Bell points out,for instance,the leaders of instrumental theories that I set aside or rejected above contemporary China and Singapore are already con- Instead of purporting to achieve an intrinsically valu- strained by a range of norms and institutions,and his re- eys able form of collective self-rule or an instrumentally forms would constrain them further.Moreover,effec- valuable form of collective wisdom,electoral democ tive constraints predated competitive elections in most racy emerges in the following sections as a limited yet early liberal states,while implementing elections with- indispensable tool for resisting particularly dangerous out supporting reforms in certain contemporary non- forms of state capture. democracies could be counterproductive.As a result,I readily concede that elections need not always be our Political Meritocracy and the Necessity of first practical priority. Competition for Power What I maintain,however,is that no large-scale, long-term political vision is plausible without open We may begin with Bell's (2015)arguments for po political competition.Within democracies,suspend- litical meritocracy.Despite what many assume from ing elections may be necessary when the electoral 895
The Power of the Multitude ability to counteract social and economic inequalities facilitates growing stratification and concentration of private power, which almost inevitably feeds back into the political process. In the long run, that is, certain limits on discretionary power will turn out to be selfundermining, allowing the growth of powerful entities or factions that may rival and eventually capture the state apparatus. Rather than simply minimizing the state’s discretionary power, I conclude, we must balance “defensive” strategies of constraint and decentralization with equally necessary “offensive” projects, which use state power to curtail and redistribute this dangerously concentrated private power. To supporters of each of these proposals, my conclusions will likely seem hasty, and there is certainly more to say in each case. My primary aim in article, however,is not to convince committed epistocrats—indeed, I expect most readers already share my practical commitment to electoral democracy. As noted above, my goal is of a higher order: I aim to sketch an integrated theoretical paradigm for explaining and defending that commitment amid growing doubts about its intellectual foundations and mounting challenges to its practical supremacy. The account of electoral democracy I present is more compelling than the alternatives, I suggest, because it responds to epistemic critiques and “benevolent dictator” objections without relying on intrinsic concerns, Churchillian complacency, or the dubious analogies and formal results employed by epistemic democrats. As should be clear, the concept of “state capture” is central to this account, though its role is perhaps unconventional. Rather than explaining why certain outcomes are undesirable, the term functions in my argument to highlight similarities between different outcomes that are antecedently accepted as bad: namely, that all involve the use of state power by a particular faction to achieve its partial ends at the expense of other groups. Applying such a normatively laden concept to particular cases will inevitably generate disagreement, of course, but there are plenty of uncontroversial cases—ranging from slavery and tyranny to regulatory capture—and my argument proceeds largely from these cases. Indeed, I prefer to see state capture as a family resemblance concept, rather than as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Regardless, the concept anchors my defense of all three components of electoral democracy, and thus provides a genuine, comprehensive alternative to the prevailing intrinsic and instrumental theories that I set aside or rejected above. Instead of purporting to achieve an intrinsically valuable form of collective self-rule or an instrumentally valuable form of collective wisdom, electoral democracy emerges in the following sections as a limited yet indispensable tool for resisting particularly dangerous forms of state capture. Political Meritocracy and the Necessity of Competition for Power We may begin with Bell’s (2015) arguments for political meritocracy. Despite what many assume from his book’s title (i.e., The China Model), Bell does not claim that the contemporary Chinese government fulfills the meritocratic ideal, nor even that it outperforms existing electoral democracies (19). Instead, the version of political meritocracy he proposes as a “model” will have eliminated the political repression and corruption characterizing the current regime by implementing independent checks on centralized power (116, 124, 150), a freer press (134, 174), intraparty competition (138), more democratic participation in local affairs (169, 189–91), improved Confucian moral education (124), greater economic equality (132), and diversified methods of meritocratic selection (130, 135, 193– 4), among other reforms. Top-level leaders in Bell’s imagined political meritocracy, in other words, would be prevented from abusing their power by a number of norms and institutions that many will recognize as liberal. Citing precedents from East Asian history and philosophy, however, Bell rightly observes that many of these devices are not exclusively Western or liberal in origin. Notably, this includes meritocracy itself, which has origins in both Western and Confucian traditions as a mechanism for constraining the power of the nobility and other privileged elites (65–6). Bell’s emphasis on independent checks on centralized power is not surprising. The evils of unconstrained authoritarian rule—or, more classically, tyranny—have long been obvious to all serious observers. As the power of modern centralized states has continued to expand, moreover, effective constraints have only become more important (El Amine 2016). Even if unconstrained rulers are initially benevolent, the political institutions they create can be used by less benevolent successors (or usurpers) in tremendously harmful ways. Meanwhile, opposition leaders have no feasible non-violent path to power and are thus more likely to engage in violent resistance; inducing coercive repression and/or civil war (Przeworski 1999). Finally, the absence of independent constraints is associated with “extractive” institutions and reduced long-run economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2014; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Like most historical advocates of rule by the few, therefore, contemporary epistocrats happily concede that rule by unconstrained, extractive elites is worse than rule by the many. They insist, however, that non-democracies are not necessarily tyrannical in this way. As Bell points out, for instance, the leaders of contemporary China and Singapore are already constrained by a range of norms and institutions, and his reforms would constrain them further. Moreover, effective constraints predated competitive elections in most early liberal states, while implementing elections without supporting reforms in certain contemporary nondemocracies could be counterproductive. As a result, I readily concede that elections need not always be our first practical priority. What I maintain, however, is that no large-scale, long-term political vision is plausible without open political competition. Within democracies, suspending elections may be necessary when the electoral 895 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527