Voluntas developments contributed liberal elements to a still restrictive political context.It is within this paradoxically restrictive and conducive Chinese political system that social movements in the PRC are situated,including Beijing ADV organizations. Collective social actors today remain densely controlled by the party-state through various measures,among them the need to work under a responsible mother organization(Lingdao Danwei)in order to receive an official registration(Ma 2009) and obstacles to receive registration as a non-governmental organization,which would grant them possible tax benefits and/or the possibility of obtaining funding from foreign organizations(Ma 2009).Despite all of these restrictions,the POS in the PRC today is far more conducive to social activism (providing such activism does not challenge the CCP's supremacy)than it was in the late 1980s.Moreover, the FWCW brought DV into official discourse and onto the radar of a broader (party-elite)audience.In this way,the conference led to a boom in women's organizations,including professional ADV organizations and a diversification of their services (Howell 1997;Liu 2000;Milwertz and Bu 2007).Following this boom,Beijing became a hub of organized action against DV. Despite the growth of women's and ADV organizations after 1995,the number of organizations combating DV remained relatively small.This is particularly evident when compared with sectors strongly supported by the government such as environmental agencies (Interview 3).The China Development Brief (2013),an organization observing third-sector development in the PRC,states that there are 18 nationwide ADV organizations compared to,for example,226 environmental agencies(cf.China Development Brief).Nonetheless,the FCWC marks the initial spark of the formation of an organized ADV movement,initially centered around Beijing. However,the most conducive POS is no guarantee for successful mobilization (McAdam 1999);activists must also decide whether the 'time is ripe'-and,if so, employ their organizational strength and tailored tactics to exploit these opportu- nities.I argue that the POS in the PRC improved overall,and that innovations in actors'tactics resulted in clear changes in Beijing ADV activism. Innovation is Key:The Role of Tactical Innovation in Mobilization Beijing ADV activists aim at mobilizing public and political support for better legal protection against DV.Tactical innovations play a crucial role here;they are, however,embedded within the broader mobilization of Beijing ADV activists. Social actors'mobilization rests on external factors [a conducive political environment (POS)]and internal factors (the indigenous organization)(Rucht s The China Development Brief counts only legally registered organizations:furthermore,due to anti- competition regulation,it is officially forbidden for more than one social organization working on the same topic to exist (Ma 2009.p.66). Mobilization refers to the activities of movements,organizations or individual social actors to gain more control over resources that contribute to achieving their goals (Opp 2009,p.140)Resources can be understood as something that can potentially be used by a movement to further its goals(Edwards and McCarthy 2004). 2Springer
developments contributed liberal elements to a still restrictive political context. It is within this paradoxically restrictive and conducive Chinese political system that social movements in the PRC are situated, including Beijing ADV organizations. Collective social actors today remain densely controlled by the party-state through various measures, among them the need to work under a responsible mother organization (Lingdao Danwei) in order to receive an official registration (Ma 2009) and obstacles to receive registration as a non-governmental organization, which would grant them possible tax benefits and/or the possibility of obtaining funding from foreign organizations (Ma 2009). Despite all of these restrictions, the POS in the PRC today is far more conducive to social activism (providing such activism does not challenge the CCP’s supremacy) than it was in the late 1980s. Moreover, the FWCW brought DV into official discourse and onto the radar of a broader (party-elite) audience. In this way, the conference led to a boom in women’s organizations, including professional ADV organizations and a diversification of their services (Howell 1997; Liu 2000; Milwertz and Bu 2007). Following this boom, Beijing became a hub of organized action against DV. Despite the growth of women’s and ADV organizations after 1995, the number of organizations combating DV remained relatively small. This is particularly evident when compared with sectors strongly supported by the government such as environmental agencies (Interview 3). The China Development Brief (2013), an organization observing third-sector development in the PRC, states that there are 18 nationwide ADV organizations compared to, for example, 226 environmental agencies (cf. China Development Brief).8 Nonetheless, the FCWC marks the initial spark of the formation of an organized ADV movement, initially centered around Beijing. However, the most conducive POS is no guarantee for successful mobilization (McAdam 1999); activists must also decide whether the ‘time is ripe’—and, if so, employ their organizational strength and tailored tactics to exploit these opportunities. I argue that the POS in the PRC improved overall, and that innovations in actors’ tactics resulted in clear changes in Beijing ADV activism. Innovation is Key: The Role of Tactical Innovation in Mobilization Beijing ADV activists aim at mobilizing public and political support for better legal protection against DV. Tactical innovations play a crucial role here; they are, however, embedded within the broader mobilization of Beijing ADV activists. Social actors’ mobilization9 rests on external factors [a conducive political environment (POS)] and internal factors (the indigenous organization) (Rucht 8 The China Development Brief counts only legally registered organizations; furthermore, due to anticompetition regulation, it is officially forbidden for more than one social organization working on the same topic to exist (Ma 2009, p. 66). 9 Mobilization refers to the activities of movements, organizations or individual social actors to gain more control over resources that contribute to achieving their goals (Opp 2009, p. 140) Resources can be understood as something that can potentially be used by a movement to further its goals (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Voluntas 123
Voluntas 1996;Meyer 2004;Meyer and Minkoff 2001;McCarthy and Zald 1977;McAdam 1999).This indigenous organization serves to mobilize resources and supplies leaders to direct their use(McAdam and Snow 1997,p.340),and is situated within a mobilizing structure of social actors,composed of networks,infrastructures and organizations-formal and informal-through which people and resources are engaged in collective action (McAdam et al.1996).This structure includes pre- existing (professional)groups,movement organizations,and formal and informal networks among potential activists(Caren 2007).The indigenous organization is thus situated in a structure within which tactics and tactical innovations are devised and carried out (McAdam 1997,p.340).Tactics only become important when external and internal factors are conducive to mobilization. The significance of tactics for mobilization of social actors rests on social actors' positions in the political system.Social actors are challengers or outsiders of the polity,and as such must devise ways to overcome their relative institutional powerlessness.Polity outsiders aim at bypassing routine decision-making channels and seek,often by applying non-institutionalized tactics,to force their opponents to deal with them in spaces within which they are more powerful-often outside of traditional arenas.Scholars argue that challenging social actors gain influence when they break out of routine decision-making channels,disrupting the social order and applying pressure to the established polity to make concessions (Gamson 1975; Piven and Cloward 1979).They achieve this through strategically framing their issue to create common understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate their actions (McAdam 1996;Benford and Snow 2000).Strategic framing is thus the means by which actors sell their activities,their claims,and their right to existence to non-activists.In this sense,they form an integral part of the tactical repertoire of(collective)social actors. In the PRC,due to the political environment,(collective)social actors initially have to choose a general tactical approach:are they aiming to set up legal operations and hence officially register or are they remaining in legal limbo (Yang and Alpermann 2014)?Both approaches entail possibilities and limitations.Social actors working under an official legal registration,a tactical orientation considered in this article,largely adopt either a corporatist or a challenging approach toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Especially with regard to the adaption of a challenging orientation,the application of one tactic for a long time allows activists' opponents-party-state actors-to devise effective counter-measures,forcing social actors to consistently add innovative tactics to their repertoire if they want to gain or maintain influence (McAdam and Snow 1997).It is within this context that tactical innovation-the creativity of insurgents to devise new tactical forms-gains crucial importance (McAdam 1997).The performance art advocacy applied by Beijing ADV activists can be understood as such a tactical innovation.It consists of live performances in public places which,by disturbing the social order,aim at stirring up bystanders and gaining media attention-and,through the latter,the support of the general public (Wang 2012;Guo et al.2013).It is an inexpensive advocacy strategy dependent on creativity and individual dedication rather than the employment of expensive experts and materials typical of traditional strategies.It is also an inclusive strategy,which allows diverse activists to join forces ②Springer
1996; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2001; McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1999). This indigenous organization serves to mobilize resources and supplies leaders to direct their use (McAdam and Snow 1997, p. 340), and is situated within a mobilizing structure of social actors, composed of networks, infrastructures and organizations—formal and informal—through which people and resources are engaged in collective action (McAdam et al. 1996). This structure includes preexisting (professional) groups, movement organizations, and formal and informal networks among potential activists (Caren 2007). The indigenous organization is thus situated in a structure within which tactics and tactical innovations are devised and carried out (McAdam 1997, p. 340). Tactics only become important when external and internal factors are conducive to mobilization. The significance of tactics for mobilization of social actors rests on social actors’ positions in the political system. Social actors are challengers or outsiders of the polity, and as such must devise ways to overcome their relative institutional powerlessness. Polity outsiders aim at bypassing routine decision-making channels and seek, often by applying non-institutionalized tactics, to force their opponents to deal with them in spaces within which they are more powerful—often outside of traditional arenas. Scholars argue that challenging social actors gain influence when they break out of routine decision-making channels, disrupting the social order and applying pressure to the established polity to make concessions (Gamson 1975; Piven and Cloward 1979). They achieve this through strategically framing their issue to create common understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate their actions (McAdam 1996; Benford and Snow 2000). Strategic framing is thus the means by which actors sell their activities, their claims, and their right to existence to non-activists. In this sense, they form an integral part of the tactical repertoire of (collective) social actors. In the PRC, due to the political environment, (collective) social actors initially have to choose a general tactical approach: are they aiming to set up legal operations and hence officially register or are they remaining in legal limbo (Yang and Alpermann 2014)? Both approaches entail possibilities and limitations. Social actors working under an official legal registration, a tactical orientation considered in this article, largely adopt either a corporatist or a challenging approach toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Especially with regard to the adaption of a challenging orientation, the application of one tactic for a long time allows activists’ opponents—party-state actors—to devise effective counter-measures, forcing social actors to consistently add innovative tactics to their repertoire if they want to gain or maintain influence (McAdam and Snow 1997). It is within this context that tactical innovation—the creativity of insurgents to devise new tactical forms—gains crucial importance (McAdam 1997). The performance art advocacy applied by Beijing ADV activists can be understood as such a tactical innovation. It consists of live performances in public places which, by disturbing the social order, aim at stirring up bystanders and gaining media attention—and, through the latter, the support of the general public (Wang 2012; Guo et al. 2013). It is an inexpensive advocacy strategy dependent on creativity and individual dedication rather than the employment of expensive experts and materials typical of traditional strategies. It is also an inclusive strategy, which allows diverse activists to join forces. Voluntas 123
Voluntas The remainder of this article will discuss the political environment and the changing opportunity structure for Beijing ADV activism,followed by an assessment of the mobilization process prior to the emergence of ADV performance art advocacy.Subsequently,two examples of performance art advocacy as manifestations of tactical innovation in the Beijing ADV movement are illustrated. The aim of this discussion is to illustrate the rationale behind a turn within ADV activism:from traditional tactics aimed at incremental policy reform to rather more disruptive tactics.The article outlines the effects that this change of tactics had on overall ADV mobilization,as well as shedding light on the current status of civic engagement in the PRC. From Expert Advisor Groups to Performance Art Displays:The Tactical Repertoire of Beijing ADV Organizations Until recently,Beijing ADV activism comprised expert organizations driven by charismatic leaders rather than individual activists (Interview 7).The founders, employees,and volunteers of such organizations are mostly experts in their particular fields;for instance,legal scholars in legal aid organizations or social workers in organizations providing educational seminars for cadres.These experts have often been committed to tackling DV for a long time (Interviews 1,10,11,and 12)and have well-established links to the political system,either through their networks or as a result of being embedded in established political and academic institutions (Interviews 1 and 10).In Beijing,four organizations are crucially important to the ADV professional movement,12 all of which hold an official registration.To obtain their official registration status,these organizations are associated with state entities3(Ma 2009);as such,the state entities are responsible for their activities and thus function as a control mechanism.As a result of both official registration with incorporated supervision and the networks of leaders in the polity,Beijing ADV organizations have a rather corporatist and non-challenging tactical orientation. Cadres are elites of party and state institutions.They can be understood as policy elires.While elires can be understood as those who control large resource pools (McCarthy and Zald 1977,p.1221),policy elites refers to state actors with some influence over the direction,shape,and timing of policy making and implementation(Skrenntny 2006,p.1766). To protect the anonymity of these organizations,they are given the pseudonyms Orgnizion B.C. or D.All four organizations are based in Beijing Organization A focuses on women's rights issues using new media and with increasing expertise in performance art advocacy.Organization B specializes in ADV legal advocacy.Organization C is an NGO specializing in human rights advocacy,which only started to work on women's rights in 2012.Organization D focuses on legal aid and legal improvements. A professional movement differs from a public movement primarily regarding the involved actors. While public movements rely mainly on large numbers of volunteers and the support of the general public,professional movements are formed by (a small number of)professional organizations(Opp 2009). 13 The affiliation of two Beijing ADV organizations changed at the end of 2010 and they were forced to re-register independently from a supervising state institution. 2Springer
The remainder of this article will discuss the political environment and the changing opportunity structure for Beijing ADV activism, followed by an assessment of the mobilization process prior to the emergence of ADV performance art advocacy. Subsequently, two examples of performance art advocacy as manifestations of tactical innovation in the Beijing ADV movement are illustrated. The aim of this discussion is to illustrate the rationale behind a turn within ADV activism: from traditional tactics aimed at incremental policy reform to rather more disruptive tactics. The article outlines the effects that this change of tactics had on overall ADV mobilization, as well as shedding light on the current status of civic engagement in the PRC. From Expert Advisor Groups to Performance Art Displays: The Tactical Repertoire of Beijing ADV Organizations Until recently, Beijing ADV activism comprised expert organizations driven by charismatic leaders rather than individual activists (Interview 7). The founders, employees, and volunteers of such organizations are mostly experts in their particular fields; for instance, legal scholars in legal aid organizations or social workers in organizations providing educational seminars for cadres.10 These experts have often been committed to tackling DV for a long time (Interviews 1, 10, 11, and 12) and have well-established links to the political system, either through their networks or as a result of being embedded in established political and academic institutions (Interviews 1 and 10). In Beijing, four organizations11 are crucially important to the ADV professional movement,12 all of which hold an official registration. To obtain their official registration status, these organizations are associated with state entities13 (Ma 2009); as such, the state entities are responsible for their activities and thus function as a control mechanism. As a result of both official registration with incorporated supervision and the networks of leaders in the polity, Beijing ADV organizations have a rather corporatist and non-challenging tactical orientation. 10 Cadres are elites of party and state institutions. They can be understood as policy elites. While elites can be understood as those who control large resource pools (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1221), policy elites refers to state actors with some influence over the direction, shape, and timing of policy making and implementation (Skrenntny 2006, p. 1766). 11 To protect the anonymity of these organizations, they are given the pseudonyms Organization A, B, C, or D. All four organizations are based in Beijing Organization A focuses on women’ s rights issues using new media and with increasing expertise in performance art advocacy. Organization B specializes in ADV legal advocacy. Organization C is an NGO specializing in human rights advocacy, which only started to work on women’s rights in 2012. Organization D focuses on legal aid and legal improvements. 12 A professional movement differs from a public movement primarily regarding the involved actors. While public movements rely mainly on large numbers of volunteers and the support of the general public, professional movements are formed by (a small number of) professional organizations (Opp 2009). 13 The affiliation of two Beijing ADV organizations changed at the end of 2010 and they were forced to re-register independently from a supervising state institution. Voluntas 123
Voluntas Turning to Corporatist Tactics Supporting the CCPs Line One Gender Equality Prior to 1995,the psychological and emotional support of DV victims was the cornerstone of ADV organizations'efforts.After 1995,ADV organizations increasingly turned to the legal dimension of DV and to raising awareness about the issue (Interview 10).However,the corporate tactical approach adopted by ADV actors toward the party-state remained the same pre-and post-1995;they adapted to the prevailing political environment in which the party-state officially remained the dominant policy decision-maker.As such,ADV organizations raised awareness (including through small-scale community campaigns),provided legal recommen- dations,seminars,and workshops for policy cadres and other multipliers,and conducted pilot projects on DV prevention.Most of these activities were,supported by the official state women's institution,the All China Women's Federation (ACWF).14 One organization also offered legal counseling and representation for DV victims.Initially,this service was provided to everyone,but demand grew so immensely that the organization started to select only those cases with the most potential to improve overall legal protection against DV for all Chinese citizens (Interviews 2 and 10). These mobilization efforts were framed as supportive to the CCP's efforts.As a result,organizations were able to establish themselves as important advisors for policy cadres regarding legal protection against DV (Interview 1).In this sense, professional ADV organizations function(ed)as service providers and professional advocacy organizations simultaneously.Initially,their advocacy was directed to a wide range of recipients ranging from policy elites [such as members of the ACWF and National People's Congress (NPC)]to lawyers and judges. More recently,dissemination activities gained increasing importance in the tactical approach of Beijing ADV organizations.Such dissemination is no longer only directed at policy cadres but also to official and new media as well as scientific publication channels(nterview6,Guo et al..2003;中国法学会反对家庭暴力网络 2010).Scientific support for social actor's demands has recently been identified as a crucial factor in gaining party-state elites'support for collective social actors'goals (Yang and Alpermann 2014).New media,particularly the internet,has also gained increasing importance as a mobilization and information tool for collective social actors (Yang 2003,2009),and an alternative source of information to censored official state media.Moreover,DV experts argue that awareness of DV among the general public has increased significantly through ADV organizations'activities (Interviews 1 and 10);their mobilization through media and activities can support these professional activists'claims. Through this tactical approach,activists were able to establish themselves as advisors on legal aspects of DV for policy elites.In this sense,their mobilization 14 The All Chinese Women's Federation(ACWF)was established in 1949 as the official representative of women's rights and interests and the link between women and the CCP(Liu 2001).The ACWF has branches at all administrative levels.Following the emergence of independent women's organizations after 1995,the ACWF came under increasing pressure to adequately represent women's interests.Due to this rising pressure,the ACWF has undergone several reforms (Howell 1997). ②Springer
Turning to Corporatist Tactics Supporting the CCPs Line One Gender Equality Prior to 1995, the psychological and emotional support of DV victims was the cornerstone of ADV organizations’ efforts. After 1995, ADV organizations increasingly turned to the legal dimension of DV and to raising awareness about the issue (Interview 10). However, the corporate tactical approach adopted by ADV actors toward the party-state remained the same pre- and post-1995; they adapted to the prevailing political environment in which the party-state officially remained the dominant policy decision-maker. As such, ADV organizations raised awareness (including through small-scale community campaigns), provided legal recommendations, seminars, and workshops for policy cadres and other multipliers, and conducted pilot projects on DV prevention. Most of these activities were, supported by the official state women’s institution, the All China Women’s Federation (ACWF).14 One organization also offered legal counseling and representation for DV victims. Initially, this service was provided to everyone, but demand grew so immensely that the organization started to select only those cases with the most potential to improve overall legal protection against DV for all Chinese citizens (Interviews 2 and 10). These mobilization efforts were framed as supportive to the CCP’s efforts. As a result, organizations were able to establish themselves as important advisors for policy cadres regarding legal protection against DV (Interview 1). In this sense, professional ADV organizations function(ed) as service providers and professional advocacy organizations simultaneously. Initially, their advocacy was directed to a wide range of recipients ranging from policy elites [such as members of the ACWF and National People’s Congress (NPC)] to lawyers and judges. More recently, dissemination activities gained increasing importance in the tactical approach of Beijing ADV organizations. Such dissemination is no longer only directed at policy cadres but also to official and new media as well as scientific publication channels (Interview 6, Guo et al. 2003; 中国法学会反对家庭暴力网络 2010). Scientific support for social actor’s demands has recently been identified as a crucial factor in gaining party-state elites’ support for collective social actors’ goals (Yang and Alpermann 2014). New media, particularly the internet, has also gained increasing importance as a mobilization and information tool for collective social actors (Yang 2003, 2009), and an alternative source of information to censored official state media. Moreover, DV experts argue that awareness of DV among the general public has increased significantly through ADV organizations’ activities (Interviews 1 and 10); their mobilization through media and activities can support these professional activists’ claims. Through this tactical approach, activists were able to establish themselves as advisors on legal aspects of DV for policy elites. In this sense, their mobilization 14 The All Chinese Women’s Federation (ACWF) was established in 1949 as the official representative of women’s rights and interests and the link between women and the CCP (Liu 2001). The ACWF has branches at all administrative levels. Following the emergence of independent women’s organizations after 1995, the ACWF came under increasing pressure to adequately represent women’s interests. Due to this rising pressure, the ACWF has undergone several reforms (Howell 1997). Voluntas 123