82 C.Z.Guilmoto have,however,added a constraint to this model:the age difference at marriage between men and women is assumed to remain the same.In other words,women are not only able to marry at the chosen age but are also able to select husbands with a constant age difference.This model offers surplus men no flexibility,such as delaying marriage.Because this model depends almost exclusively on female nuptiality behavior,it is crucial to delineate appropriately the most likely course of female marriage patterns over the coming decades. Simulating Female Nuptiality in Asia It would be rather unrealistic to assume that current female nuptiality patterns will remain unchanged in China and India until 2100.On the contrary,Asian marriage systems are today characterized by rapid and deep transformations:under the impact of various factors such as prolonged education,urbanization,access to formal employment,and increasing social autonomy,women have delayed their marriages in many East Asian countries and metropolitan areas.New phenomena,such as the end of universal marriage or,to a lesser extent,cohabitation,have even emerged over the last 15 years. In India,women still marry rather early-19.8 years is the latest estimated average age at first marriage(see Appendix B).Such a low figure may appear at first sight to reflect the permanence of traditional matrimonial arrangements privileging early female union soon after menarche.Until the 1930s,the country was indeed characterized by very early marriages,with a large proportion of women betrothed before reaching physiological maturity.But the pace of change observed in India has been remarkable,and age at first marriage has regularly increased ever since:it increased from 13 to 15 years in 1951,reaching 18.3 in 1981 and 20.2 in 2001 (census-based estimates).The progress in female age at first marriage-one additional year per decade since 1931-has,in fact,been strictly linear in India. Moreover,recent NFHS data (IIPS 2007)indicate that age at marriage in today's India is also closely correlated to education levels as well as to urban residence and socioeconomic status.With such covariates of late female marriage,current trends in rapidly modernizing India suggest further gains in mean age at marriage in the future.A plausible hypothesis for India thus consists in positing a gradual rise in female age at first marriage in India,reaching 23.5 years at the middle of the century, at a level similar to what is observed today in China.I have also posited a gradual leveling of remarriage rates between men and women in 2005-2050.10 In 2005,Chinese women married on average at the age of 23.5 years,a value significantly above the legal age at union (20 years),but with only 2%of women still unmarried in the 30-to 34-year age group.The proportion single at 50 was as low as 0.2%.Female age at first marriage was 22.4 years at the time of the 1982 Jones(2007)provides the most recent comprehensive synthesis of nuptiality in East Asia.Detailed statistics and case studies are also available in Jones and Ramdas(2004)and Xenos et al.(2006).as well as in United Nations (1990)for trends prior to the 1990s.See also Retherford et al.(2001)on Japan,and Kwon (2007)on South Korea. This figure is slightly above that of Kerala women today but still distinctly below that of Sri Lankan women(Caldwell 2005). 10 Higher remarriage rates among men than women represent a rather untenable hypothesis in view of the mounting surplus of unmarried men.On remarriage in India,see Mari Bhat and Halli(1999)and Chen(2000). ②Springer
have, however, added a constraint to this model: the age difference at marriage between men and women is assumed to remain the same. In other words, women are not only able to marry at the chosen age but are also able to select husbands with a constant age difference. This model offers surplus men no flexibility, such as delaying marriage. Because this model depends almost exclusively on female nuptiality behavior, it is crucial to delineate appropriately the most likely course of female marriage patterns over the coming decades. Simulating Female Nuptiality in Asia It would be rather unrealistic to assume that current female nuptiality patterns will remain unchanged in China and India until 2100. On the contrary, Asian marriage systems are today characterized by rapid and deep transformations: under the impact of various factors such as prolonged education, urbanization, access to formal employment, and increasing social autonomy, women have delayed their marriages in many East Asian countries and metropolitan areas.8 New phenomena, such as the end of universal marriage or, to a lesser extent, cohabitation, have even emerged over the last 15 years. In India, women still marry rather early—19.8 years is the latest estimated average age at first marriage (see Appendix B). Such a low figure may appear at first sight to reflect the permanence of traditional matrimonial arrangements privileging early female union soon after menarche. Until the 1930s, the country was indeed characterized by very early marriages, with a large proportion of women betrothed before reaching physiological maturity. But the pace of change observed in India has been remarkable, and age at first marriage has regularly increased ever since: it increased from 13 to 15 years in 1951, reaching 18.3 in 1981 and 20.2 in 2001 (census-based estimates). The progress in female age at first marriage—one additional year per decade since 1931—has, in fact, been strictly linear in India. Moreover, recent NFHS data (IIPS 2007) indicate that age at marriage in today’s India is also closely correlated to education levels as well as to urban residence and socioeconomic status. With such covariates of late female marriage, current trends in rapidly modernizing India suggest further gains in mean age at marriage in the future. A plausible hypothesis for India thus consists in positing a gradual rise in female age at first marriage in India, reaching 23.5 years at the middle of the century, at a level similar to what is observed today in China.9 I have also posited a gradual leveling of remarriage rates between men and women in 2005–2050.10 In 2005, Chinese women married on average at the age of 23.5 years, a value significantly above the legal age at union (20 years), but with only 2% of women still unmarried in the 30- to 34-year age group. The proportion single at 50 was as low as 0.2%. Female age at first marriage was 22.4 years at the time of the 1982 8 Jones (2007) provides the most recent comprehensive synthesis of nuptiality in East Asia. Detailed statistics and case studies are also available in Jones and Ramdas (2004) and Xenos et al. (2006), as well as in United Nations (1990) for trends prior to the 1990s. See also Retherford et al. (2001) on Japan, and Kwon (2007) on South Korea. 9 This figure is slightly above that of Kerala women today but still distinctly below that of Sri Lankan women (Caldwell 2005). 10 Higher remarriage rates among men than women represent a rather untenable hypothesis in view of the mounting surplus of unmarried men. On remarriage in India, see Mari Bhat and Halli (1999) and Chen (2000). 82 C.Z. Guilmoto
Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze 83 census,and it has only marginally increased since then.Jones (2007:466)attributed these features to both institutional and structural factors.Among men,the average age at first marriage was 25.1 years and has remained constant over the last two decades.However,because the experience of neighboring countries,such as South Korea and Japan,suggests that female age at marriage may rise in the future,I have also postulated a gradual increase in age at marriage among Chinese women up to 26.5 years in 2050,a pace of change comparable to that hypothesized for India.It may be observed that the projected female age at first marriage for China in 2050 remains significantly below the current figures for Japan and South Korea,where women today marry,on average,at age 29. Alterative Marriage Models The modified FD model corresponds to a reasonable scenario of future marriages based on both nuptiality changes among Asian women and a strictly parallel rise in male nuptiality.Yet,this system allows for almost no flexibility in marriage patterns since both female and male marriage schedules are fixed.In this section,I relax some of these assumptions and explore two alternative ways in which the marriage market may adjust to gender imbalances,mostly through a gradual increase in the age difference between spouses caused either by earlier female marriages or by delayed male marriages(methods and parameters are in Appendix B). One possible change corresponds to symmetrical changes in male and female marriage schedules.This is the harmonic mean(HM)model,which is probably the most commonly used marriage matching function(Schoen 1981;see also Okun 2001;Qian and Preston 1993;and Raymo and Iwasawa 2005).This method provides the basis for a self-regulatory marriage system in the case of imbalances,such that the surplus sex is assumed to temporarily defer marriage while the deficit sex is expected to marry earlier.At the same time,the average age at first marriage of the combined male and female cohorts remains the same.The HM model implies that the deficit sex takes advantage of the relative surplus of the opposite sex by marrying earlier because its pool of prospective spouses has momentarily expanded.In other words,union is regarded as partly constrained by the number of suitable partners,and marriage probabilities are expected to rise when the relative size of the unmarried population of the opposite sex increases.Because union has long been nearly universal among women in China and India,there is no pool of available unmarried women,and the application of the HM model entails a reduction in female age at marriage.Such an adjustment may be conceivable if current constraints on marriage-such as intense dowry negotiations in India or prohibition of early marriage in China-were relaxed. Similarly,the abundance of marriageable men could also improve the probability of women finding suitable partners by shortening the search period.2 I also use a different model that combines features from the FD model (rising female age at marriage)and the HM model(rising age difference).In this hybrid model based on delayed male marriage (DMM),I posit a regular increase in female I am grateful to the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer on this point. Better marriage opportunities for women and lower dowry costs in high sex-ratio societies are among the hypotheses put forward by Guttentag and Secord(1983). ②Springer
census, and it has only marginally increased since then. Jones (2007:466) attributed these features to both institutional and structural factors. Among men, the average age at first marriage was 25.1 years and has remained constant over the last two decades. However, because the experience of neighboring countries, such as South Korea and Japan, suggests that female age at marriage may rise in the future, I have also postulated a gradual increase in age at marriage among Chinese women up to 26.5 years in 2050, a pace of change comparable to that hypothesized for India.11 It may be observed that the projected female age at first marriage for China in 2050 remains significantly below the current figures for Japan and South Korea, where women today marry, on average, at age 29. Alternative Marriage Models The modified FD model corresponds to a reasonable scenario of future marriages based on both nuptiality changes among Asian women and a strictly parallel rise in male nuptiality. Yet, this system allows for almost no flexibility in marriage patterns since both female and male marriage schedules are fixed. In this section, I relax some of these assumptions and explore two alternative ways in which the marriage market may adjust to gender imbalances, mostly through a gradual increase in the age difference between spouses caused either by earlier female marriages or by delayed male marriages (methods and parameters are in Appendix B). One possible change corresponds to symmetrical changes in male and female marriage schedules. This is the harmonic mean (HM) model, which is probably the most commonly used marriage matching function (Schoen 1981; see also Okun 2001; Qian and Preston 1993; and Raymo and Iwasawa 2005). This method provides the basis for a self-regulatory marriage system in the case of imbalances, such that the surplus sex is assumed to temporarily defer marriage while the deficit sex is expected to marry earlier. At the same time, the average age at first marriage of the combined male and female cohorts remains the same. The HM model implies that the deficit sex takes advantage of the relative surplus of the opposite sex by marrying earlier because its pool of prospective spouses has momentarily expanded. In other words, union is regarded as partly constrained by the number of suitable partners, and marriage probabilities are expected to rise when the relative size of the unmarried population of the opposite sex increases. Because union has long been nearly universal among women in China and India, there is no pool of available unmarried women, and the application of the HM model entails a reduction in female age at marriage. Such an adjustment may be conceivable if current constraints on marriage—such as intense dowry negotiations in India or prohibition of early marriage in China—were relaxed. Similarly, the abundance of marriageable men could also improve the probability of women finding suitable partners by shortening the search period.12 I also use a different model that combines features from the FD model (rising female age at marriage) and the HM model (rising age difference). In this hybrid model based on delayed male marriage (DMM), I posit a regular increase in female 11 I am grateful to the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer on this point. 12 Better marriage opportunities for women and lower dowry costs in high sex-ratio societies are among the hypotheses put forward by Guttentag and Secord (1983). Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze 83
84 C.Z.Guilmoto age at marriage as in the FD model,but also a two-year increase in the age gap between men and women.This DMM model presupposes that women would accept marriage to older men more than they did in the past,suggesting that social status or accumulated assets of older men compensate the growing age difference.This could also be interpreted as a lengthened search period among unmarried men caused by the diminishing number of prospective brides. Results My simulations rely on three different population projections based on SRB parameters -namely,the no-transition scenario,the rapid-transition scenario,and the normal-SRB scenario.Based on these projected populations,I examine in the first section the extent of the marriage squeezes as measured by cross-sectional and longitudinal indicators. Since the SRB may be overestimated in China,I include the results of a sensitivity analysis based on lower SRB levels for this country (Appendix C). The results of marriage simulations presented in the following section are based first on the FD model,which assumes a nuptiality regime determined by the future course of female nuptiality.The outcomes of these simulations are given in terms of marriage tempo (age at marriage)and intensity (unmarried men at age 50).Finally,I use the two additional alternative marriage functions(HM and DMM models)to illustrate different ways in which male and female nuptiality may adjust to the marriage crunch. A New Look at the Marriage Squeeze I start with the usual index of marriage squeeze computed as weighted sex ratios.As Fig.I indicates,the rise in the weighted adult ratio in China is rather abrupt after 2010 in both SRB scenarios,and the sex ratio reaches 122 in 2025.Results based on the normal SRB scenario show that the imbalance was bound to increase to 108 in 2020 because of past fluctuations in birth cohort size in China(Goodkind 2006).Following the transitional scenario,the adult sex ratio will record an equally rapid fall after 2025 and will oscillate around 104 during the second part of the century.As expected,the difference between the normal and rapid-transition scenarios declines gradually,and both series are similar in 2050,when the impact of surplus male births before 2020 disappears.In contrast,the no-transition scenario suggests that the weighted adult sex ratio in China would not retumn to normal levels and would instead oscillate after 2025 around a high level of 119.My results agree with findings already found in the literature on China suggesting that the marriage squeeze will peak in 2030 (Jiang et al.2007). When measured through marriage simulations,the marriage squeeze in the future appears rather different from the preceding picture(Fig.1 and Table 1).As previously explained,the MSI is computed as the sex ratio of expected first marriages based on the single populations estimated during the previous period,while the weighted sex ratio is based on projected age and sex distributions.Both indicators would be similar if the observed proportions unmarried in each period were identical to that of the corresponding marriage tables.But the gradual accumulation of unmarried men in several cohorts tends to enlarge the number of expected marriages,leading to MSI levels far higher than projected weighted sex ratios. ②Springer
age at marriage as in the FD model, but also a two-year increase in the age gap between men and women. This DMM model presupposes that women would accept marriage to older men more than they did in the past, suggesting that social status or accumulated assets of older men compensate the growing age difference. This could also be interpreted as a lengthened search period among unmarried men caused by the diminishing number of prospective brides. Results My simulations rely on three different population projections based on SRB parameters —namely, the no-transition scenario, the rapid-transition scenario, and the normal-SRB scenario. Based on these projected populations, I examine in the first section the extent of the marriage squeezes as measured by cross-sectional and longitudinal indicators. Since the SRB may be overestimated in China, I include the results of a sensitivity analysis based on lower SRB levels for this country (Appendix C). The results of marriage simulations presented in the following section are based first on the FD model, which assumes a nuptiality regime determined by the future course of female nuptiality. The outcomes of these simulations are given in terms of marriage tempo (age at marriage) and intensity (unmarried men at age 50). Finally, I use the two additional alternative marriage functions (HM and DMM models) to illustrate different ways in which male and female nuptiality may adjust to the marriage crunch. A New Look at the Marriage Squeeze I start with the usual index of marriage squeeze computed as weighted sex ratios. As Fig. 1 indicates, the rise in the weighted adult ratio in China is rather abrupt after 2010 in both SRB scenarios, and the sex ratio reaches 122 in 2025. Results based on the normal SRB scenario show that the imbalance was bound to increase to 108 in 2020 because of past fluctuations in birth cohort size in China (Goodkind 2006). Following the transitional scenario, the adult sex ratio will record an equally rapid fall after 2025 and will oscillate around 104 during the second part of the century. As expected, the difference between the normal and rapid-transition scenarios declines gradually, and both series are similar in 2050, when the impact of surplus male births before 2020 disappears. In contrast, the no-transition scenario suggests that the weighted adult sex ratio in China would not return to normal levels and would instead oscillate after 2025 around a high level of 119. My results agree with findings already found in the literature on China suggesting that the marriage squeeze will peak in 2030 (Jiang et al. 2007). When measured through marriage simulations, the marriage squeeze in the future appears rather different from the preceding picture (Fig. 1 and Table 1). As previously explained, the MSI is computed as the sex ratio of expected first marriages based on the single populations estimated during the previous period, while the weighted sex ratio is based on projected age and sex distributions. Both indicators would be similar if the observed proportions unmarried in each period were identical to that of the corresponding marriage tables. But the gradual accumulation of unmarried men in several cohorts tends to enlarge the number of expected marriages, leading to MSI levels far higher than projected weighted sex ratios. 84 C.Z. Guilmoto