404 International Organization hostilities,Britain still might have subjected the newly independent states to the same trade restrictions faced by all foreign powers.Instead,Britain unilaterally granted the Americans most of the privileges they had enjoyed as colonists.s5 Finally,Britain could have taken a radically different approach to its European adversaries.Indeed,leading members of Shelburne's own Whig Party animad- verted against the "disastrous and disgraceful peace"of 1783.Citing Britain's naval resurgence late in the war,they insisted that Shelburne could have driven a harder bargain.36 They similarly challenged the subsequent trade negotiations.Clinging to mercantilism,they demanded that trade agreements follow political alliances.7 After Yorktown,Britain granted the Americans independence,made peace with the Europeans,and pursued free trade with all.But the Revolutionary War did not have to end this way.While Britain's military losses did narrow the range of pos- sibilities,they did not dictate policymakers'choices within that range.The war might have ended earlier or later-and on far different terms-than it did.The military disaster at Yorktown became "decisive"because of the political condi- tions in London. The Model:Enterprising Intellectuals and Crises In recent years,scholars of international politics have progressed beyond the ques- tions of whether and how ideas shape foreign policy.8 Discussion now centers on the difficult task of explaining the changes in policymakers'ideas.9 Following Kuhn,most scholars agree that"the disjunctive experience of paradigm shift"fol- lows after "anomalies"generate "policy failures that [discredit]the old para- digm.In some cases,the failure is manifest.In others,the new ideas themselves define"when a given situation actually constitutes a crisis."62 In crisis,policymak- ers initiate"a wide-ranging search for alternatives."63 As Haas suggested,policymakers rely on "epistemic communities"to help them narrow the range of policy alternatives they consider:a "relatively small" community-or,perhaps,even an individual-uses"political infiltration"to"lay] the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community's beliefs and ideas."64 Subsequent scholars,however,have construed their epistemic communities more broadly.Numerous studies originate the policy-influencing ideas in"the econom- 55.Harlow1952.484-91 56.Parliamentary History,vol.23,215,436-93. 57.bid,vol.26,396-408. 58.See Blyth 2002,11;and Parsons 2002,79. 59.See Finnemore and Sikkink 1998,888;and Legro 2005. 60.Hall1993,291. 61.See McNamara 1998.144:and Legro 2005.11. 62.See Blyth 2002,10;and Haas 1992,14. 63.Hall1993,291. 64.Haas1992.27
hostilities, Britain still might have subjected the newly independent states to the same trade restrictions faced by all foreign powers+ Instead, Britain unilaterally granted the Americans most of the privileges they had enjoyed as colonists+ 55 Finally, Britain could have taken a radically different approach to its European adversaries+ Indeed, leading members of Shelburne’s own Whig Party animadverted against the “disastrous and disgraceful peace” of 1783+ Citing Britain’s naval resurgence late in the war, they insisted that Shelburne could have driven a harder bargain+ 56 They similarly challenged the subsequent trade negotiations+ Clinging to mercantilism, they demanded that trade agreements follow political alliances+ 57 After Yorktown, Britain granted the Americans independence, made peace with the Europeans, and pursued free trade with all+ But the Revolutionary War did not have to end this way+ While Britain’s military losses did narrow the range of possibilities, they did not dictate policymakers’ choices within that range+ The war might have ended earlier or later—and on far different terms—than it did+ The military disaster at Yorktown became “decisive” because of the political conditions in London+ The Model: Enterprising Intellectuals and Crises In recent years, scholars of international politics have progressed beyond the questions of whether and how ideas shape foreign policy+ 58 Discussion now centers on the difficult task of explaining the changes in policymakers’ ideas+ 59 Following Kuhn, most scholars agree that “the disjunctive experience of paradigm shift” follows after “anomalies” generate “policy failures that @discredit# the old paradigm+”60 In some cases, the failure is manifest+ 61 In others, the new ideas themselves define “when a given situation actually constitutes a crisis+”62 In crisis, policymakers initiate “a wide-ranging search for alternatives+”63 As Haas suggested, policymakers rely on “epistemic communities” to help them narrow the range of policy alternatives they consider: a “relatively small” community—or, perhaps, even an individual—uses “political infiltration” to “@lay# the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community’s beliefs and ideas+”64 Subsequent scholars, however, have construed their epistemic communities more broadly+ Numerous studies originate the policy-influencing ideas in “the econom- 55+ Harlow 1952, 484–91+ 56+ Parliamentary History, vol+ 23, 215, 436–93+ 57+ Ibid+, vol+ 26, 396–408+ 58+ See Blyth 2002, 11; and Parsons 2002, 79+ 59+ See Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 888; and Legro 2005+ 60+ Hall 1993, 291+ 61+ See McNamara 1998, 144; and Legro 2005, 11+ 62+ See Blyth 2002, 10; and Haas 1992, 14+ 63+ Hall 1993, 291+ 64+ Haas 1992, 27+ 404 International Organization
Origins of the First Era of Globalization 405 ics profession"writ large.35 Another study goes further,attributing policymakers' ideas to"evolving societal debate.The policy-influencing ideas themselves are often disembodied abstractions--“Keynesianism”and“monetarism,”for example- formulated independently of the crises in which they are adopted.7 Occasionally,however,policymakers entertain radical ideas that directly chal- lenge the orthodoxy of the knowledge elites.Britain's experimentation with laissez- faire,for instance,began decades before "Ricardo conquered England."Indeed, the experiment's success was partly a cause of its subsequent embrace "by the city,by statesmen,and by the academic world."6 This case demonstrates an alter- native path by which ideas influence policy:through the agency of an enterprising intellectual.In this case,an ambitious intellectual-Smith-developed a revolu- tionary policy paradigm.This"ideas entrepreneur"then cultivated personal rela- tionships with leading statesmen in an effort to promote his proposals within influential circles.His interactions with policymakers prompted him to refine and repackage his ideas to make them more politically relevant.Framing contempo- rary events as a crisis,he provided converts with the ammunition they needed to further his revolution.69 But how did Smith convince leading policymakers to embrace his revolu- tionary-untested-ideas?On what basis do policymakers choose whether to aban- don orthodoxy in favor of new ideas?Three decades ago,Odell elucidated numerous"dynamics of policy learning."70 Today,however,most accounts default to the "instrumentalist"view that"ideas rise to the fore because they correspond to the interests of influential actors."7 In this view,"It is not something intrinsic to ideas that gives them their power,but their utility in helping actors achieve their desired ends under prevailing constraints."72 Specifically,policymakers choose those ideas with"legitimate social purpose,73 with"social salience,that is,those backed by important constituencies or activist subgroups and that have the abil- ity to vie for new dominant orthodoxy."74 Sometimes,the audiences have to be convinced that the new ideas are compatible with "their interests"and their pre- existing“aims.75 While power and interest may often dictate the choice of ideas,highlighting those cases does little to convince materialists of the causal power of ideas.After 65.See Irwin 1989:McNamara 1998:Leeson 2003:Schonhardt-Bailey 2006:and Chwieroth 2010. 41. 66.Hall1993,288. 67.See Hall 1989;Ikenberry 1993;McNamara 1998;and Legro 2005,35. 68.Keynes 1973,32.The formulations belong to Keynes,but the contention is mine. 69.This process is adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 to fit the adoption of causal(rather than normative)ideas within a state(rather than across states). 70.0del1982.367-76 71.Bleich2011,60. 72.Garrett and Weingast 1993,178. 73.Ruggie1982,382. 74.Legro2005,35. 75.Finnemore and Sikkink 1998,899
ics profession” writ large+ 65 Another study goes further, attributing policymakers’ ideas to “evolving societal debate+”66 The policy-influencing ideas themselves are often disembodied abstractions—“Keynesianism” and “monetarism,” for example— formulated independently of the crises in which they are adopted+ 67 Occasionally, however, policymakers entertain radical ideas that directly challenge the orthodoxy of the knowledge elites+ Britain’s experimentation with laissezfaire, for instance, began decades before “Ricardo conquered England+” Indeed, the experiment’s success was partly a cause of its subsequent embrace “by the city, by statesmen, and by the academic world+”68 This case demonstrates an alternative path by which ideas influence policy: through the agency of an enterprising intellectual+ In this case, an ambitious intellectual—Smith—developed a revolutionary policy paradigm+ This “ideas entrepreneur” then cultivated personal relationships with leading statesmen in an effort to promote his proposals within influential circles+ His interactions with policymakers prompted him to refine and repackage his ideas to make them more politically relevant+ Framing contemporary events as a crisis, he provided converts with the ammunition they needed to further his revolution+ 69 But how did Smith convince leading policymakers to embrace his revolutionary—untested—ideas? On what basis do policymakers choose whether to abandon orthodoxy in favor of new ideas? Three decades ago, Odell elucidated numerous “dynamics of policy learning+”70 Today, however, most accounts default to the “instrumentalist” view that “ideas rise to the fore because they correspond to the interests of influential actors+”71 In this view, “It is not something intrinsic to ideas that gives them their power, but their utility in helping actors achieve their desired ends under prevailing constraints+”72 Specifically, policymakers choose those ideas with “legitimate social purpose,”73 with “social salience, that is, those backed by important constituencies or activist subgroups and that have the ability to vie for new dominant orthodoxy+”74 Sometimes, the audiences have to be convinced that the new ideas are compatible with “their interests” and their preexisting “aims+”75 While power and interest may often dictate the choice of ideas, highlighting those cases does little to convince materialists of the causal power of ideas+ After 65+ See Irwin 1989; McNamara 1998; Leeson 2003; Schonhardt-Bailey 2006; and Chwieroth 2010, 41+ 66+ Hall 1993, 288+ 67+ See Hall 1989; Ikenberry 1993; McNamara 1998; and Legro 2005, 35+ 68+ Keynes 1973, 32+ The formulations belong to Keynes, but the contention is mine+ 69+ This process is adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 to fit the adoption of causal ~rather than normative! ideas within a state ~rather than across states!+ 70+ Odell 1982, 367–76+ 71+ Bleich 2011, 60+ 72+ Garrett and Weingast 1993, 178+ 73+ Ruggie 1982, 382+ 74+ Legro 2005, 35+ 75+ Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 899+ Origins of the First Era of Globalization 405