《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：Domestic Politics）Before Hegemony. Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization

Origins of the First Era of Globalization 399 their goals but also the varying strategies they use to pursue those goals.6 Thus, the "structure of the international trading system"depends in part on the commer- cial strategies policymakers employ.As such,policymakers'commercial strat- egies are well worth consideration in their own right. Ignoring policymakers'ideas,Krasner overlooked the crucial first step in the march to openness.When he did not observe openness until the 1820s,he inferred that Britain,"the instigator and supporter of the new structure,"did not pursue liberalization until that point.7 Prior to Krasner,however,most scholars agreed that Britain's shift in commercial strategy occurred four decades earlier.8 As Ehr- man put it,the reforms of the 1780s "have long been regarded as marking the start of a new and more liberal commercial policy...as the harbingers...of a free-trade summer which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars then delayed."9 These reforms were a stark departure from centuries of"mercantilist"trade pol- icy.Like realists today,mercantilists recognized that international integration brings absolute gains but they feared that unequal relative gains would threaten national autonomy.20 Policymakers in London attempted to have the best of both worlds by developing an expansive,vertically integrated empire.From Ireland to the Indies, they cultivated overseas colonies to furnish raw materials,alleviate domestic pop- ulation problems,and,ultimately,provide foreign markets for exports.At the same time,they heavily managed trade with rivals in an effort to improve Britain's terms of trade,support the Royal Navy,and amass reserves.21 While their "language" was different,the mercantilists followed the same logic that impels modern states "to induce trade to follow the flag."22 The American Revolution,however,directly challenged this model.Not only did the colonies resist supporting the mother country,but they actually embraced her enemies,reigniting old rivalries.23 After attempting both conciliation and sub- jugation,Britain eventually gave up the fight in 1783. The postwar settlement ended more than just the war.The peace agreements established a framework for reorganizing the international system according to the principles of laissez-faire liberalism.24 The "colonial"trades would be liberal- 16.See Jervis 1976;Odell 1982;Ruggie 1982;Hall 1989;Haas 1992;Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Blyth 2002;Bleich 2003;Legro 2005;Abdelal,Blyth,and Parsons 2010;Schrad 2010;and Branch 2011. 17.Krasner1976,335. 18.Kindleberger recognized that "the movement toward freer trade in Britain began gross in the eighteenth century,net only after the Napoleonic Wars."He focused exclusively on the latter.Kindle- berger 1975,27.See also Semmel 1970,13. 19.Ehrman1962,1. 20.See Grieco,Powell,and Snidal 1993;Gowa 1994;and Mearsheimer 1994. 21.Armitage2000,146-69. 22.See Magnusson 1994;and Gowa 1994,7. 23.The Americans did not revolt under the banner of laissez-faire.Crowley 1993.But British pol- icymakers came to believe that they did. 24.Definitions of these terms abound.I follow those used by Viner 1991 and Irwin 1996.In their view,the mercantilists and the laissez-faire liberals both pursued "power and plenty"but differed on

their goals but also the varying strategies they use to pursue those goals+ 16 Thus, the “structure of the international trading system” depends in part on the commer￾cial strategies policymakers employ+ As such, policymakers’ commercial strat￾egies are well worth consideration in their own right+ Ignoring policymakers’ ideas, Krasner overlooked the crucial first step in the march to openness+ When he did not observe openness until the 1820s, he inferred that Britain, “the instigator and supporter of the new structure,” did not pursue liberalization until that point+ 17 Prior to Krasner, however, most scholars agreed that Britain’s shift in commercial strategy occurred four decades earlier+ 18 As Ehr￾man put it, the reforms of the 1780s “have long been regarded as marking the start of a new and more liberal commercial policy +++ as the harbingers +++ of a free-trade summer which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars then delayed+”19 These reforms were a stark departure from centuries of “mercantilist” trade pol￾icy+ Like realists today, mercantilists recognized that international integration brings absolute gains but they feared that unequal relative gains would threaten national autonomy+ 20 Policymakers in London attempted to have the best of both worlds by developing an expansive, vertically integrated empire+ From Ireland to the Indies, they cultivated overseas colonies to furnish raw materials, alleviate domestic pop￾ulation problems, and, ultimately, provide foreign markets for exports+ At the same time, they heavily managed trade with rivals in an effort to improve Britain’s terms of trade, support the Royal Navy, and amass reserves+ 21 While their “language” was different, the mercantilists followed the same logic that impels modern states “to induce trade to follow the flag+”22 The American Revolution, however, directly challenged this model+ Not only did the colonies resist supporting the mother country, but they actually embraced her enemies, reigniting old rivalries+ 23 After attempting both conciliation and sub￾jugation, Britain eventually gave up the fight in 1783+ The postwar settlement ended more than just the war+ The peace agreements established a framework for reorganizing the international system according to the principles of laissez-faire liberalism+ 24 The “colonial” trades would be liberal- 16+ See Jervis 1976; Odell 1982; Ruggie 1982; Hall 1989; Haas 1992; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Blyth 2002; Bleich 2003; Legro 2005; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010; Schrad 2010; and Branch 2011+ 17+ Krasner 1976, 335+ 18+ Kindleberger recognized that “the movement toward freer trade in Britain began gross in the eighteenth century, net only after the Napoleonic Wars+” He focused exclusively on the latter+ Kindle￾berger 1975, 27+ See also Semmel 1970, 13+ 19+ Ehrman 1962, 1+ 20+ See Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993; Gowa 1994; and Mearsheimer 1994+ 21+ Armitage 2000, 146–69+ 22+ See Magnusson 1994; and Gowa 1994, 7+ 23+ The Americans did not revolt under the banner of laissez-faire+ Crowley 1993+ But British pol￾icymakers came to believe that they did+ 24+ Definitions of these terms abound+ I follow those used by Viner 1991 and Irwin 1996+ In their view, the mercantilists and the laissez-faire liberals both pursued “power and plenty” but differed on Origins of the First Era of Globalization 399

400 International Organization ized.The new American states were granted free trade with Britain and much of its empire.In 1785,London offered essentially free trade to Ireland in exchange for moderate taxation.The change in Britain's approach to its adversaries was equally dramatic.Between 1785 and 1793,Britain pursued more than ten recipro- cal trade agreements.25 While most of these negotiations became stymied,its 1786 agreement with France-Britain's chief rival-proved nothing short of revolution- ary.Previously,Britain had embargoed most French goods.The remaining imports faced an average tariff rate of more than 75 percent ad valorem.The Anglo- French Commercial Treaty of 1786 eliminated tariffs on many goods and reduced the rates on most of the rest to just 10 to 15 percent.26 While the ensuing military conflicts reignited commercial warfare,Britain returned to its strategy of commer- cial liberalization after victory had been assured.27 Thus,the 1780s brought Britain's first decisive shift from mercantilism to laissez- faire liberalism.Under the old system,policymakers pursued "power and plenty" by redirecting foreign trade into intra-imperial commerce.Under the new system, policymakers pursued these same goals with different means.They dismantled the system of mercantile restrictions,allowing trade to flow "naturally"among friends and foes alike. The Independent Variable:Ideational Versus Material Explanations It may be that Britain's hegemonic ascent was necessary to transform the structure of the international trading system in the nineteenth century.But the "distribution of potential economic power"clearly cannot explain Britain's shift toward laissez- faire in the 1780s.At that point,Britain was only slightly more competitive than its European rivals.28 To all but a few leading policymakers,Smith's calls for trade liberalization seemed not merely utopian but downright dangerous.After all,mer- cantilism was widely celebrated as the cause of Britannia's development from a collection of middling,factious kingdoms into an"opulent"world power.29 Those familiar with the history of Britain's shift toward openness have offered no shortage of explanations for the dramatic policy shift.Recognizing that states the extent to which government intervention was required to secure these goals.Beneath his rhetoric Smith understood this disagreement in the same terms.Wyatt-Walter 1996,14. 25.Ehrman1962,1. 26.Heckscher1922,13-20. 27.Harlow overstated the case when he suggested that"Shelburne's slogan...'We prefer trade to dominion'was...the general principle on which the Second Empire was...established."The bitter- ness left by the American Revolution did not diminish Britain's appetite for territorial acquisition.In its "second"empire,however,Britain granted its colonies more autonomy and pursued trade liberal- ization with allies and adversaries alike.See Harlow 1952,1-11;and Hyam 2010,76-77. 28.See Pares 1953;Henderson 1957,111-12;and Ehrman 1962,203-9. 29.See Parliamentary History,vol.26,346-47;and Crowley 1993,13

ized+ The new American states were granted free trade with Britain and much of its empire+ In 1785, London offered essentially free trade to Ireland in exchange for moderate taxation+ The change in Britain’s approach to its adversaries was equally dramatic+ Between 1785 and 1793, Britain pursued more than ten recipro￾cal trade agreements+ 25 While most of these negotiations became stymied, its 1786 agreement with France—Britain’s chief rival—proved nothing short of revolution￾ary+ Previously, Britain had embargoed most French goods+ The remaining imports faced an average tariff rate of more than 75 percent ad valorem+ The Anglo￾French Commercial Treaty of 1786 eliminated tariffs on many goods and reduced the rates on most of the rest to just 10 to 15 percent+ 26 While the ensuing military conflicts reignited commercial warfare, Britain returned to its strategy of commer￾cial liberalization after victory had been assured+ 27 Thus, the 1780s brought Britain’s first decisive shift from mercantilism to laissez￾faire liberalism+ Under the old system, policymakers pursued “power and plenty” by redirecting foreign trade into intra-imperial commerce+ Under the new system, policymakers pursued these same goals with different means+ They dismantled the system of mercantile restrictions, allowing trade to flow “naturally” among friends and foes alike+ The Independent Variable: Ideational Versus Material Explanations It may be that Britain’s hegemonic ascent was necessary to transform the structure of the international trading system in the nineteenth century+ But the “distribution of potential economic power” clearly cannot explain Britain’s shift toward laissez￾faire in the 1780s+ At that point, Britain was only slightly more competitive than its European rivals+ 28 To all but a few leading policymakers, Smith’s calls for trade liberalization seemed not merely utopian but downright dangerous+ After all, mer￾cantilism was widely celebrated as the cause of Britannia’s development from a collection of middling, factious kingdoms into an “opulent” world power+ 29 Those familiar with the history of Britain’s shift toward openness have offered no shortage of explanations for the dramatic policy shift+ Recognizing that states the extent to which government intervention was required to secure these goals+ Beneath his rhetoric Smith understood this disagreement in the same terms+ Wyatt-Walter 1996, 14+ 25+ Ehrman 1962, 1+ 26+ Heckscher 1922, 13–20+ 27+ Harlow overstated the case when he suggested that “Shelburne’s slogan +++ ‘We prefer trade to dominion’ was +++ the general principle on which the Second Empire was +++ established+” The bitter￾ness left by the American Revolution did not diminish Britain’s appetite for territorial acquisition+ In its “second” empire, however, Britain granted its colonies more autonomy and pursued trade liberal￾ization with allies and adversaries alike+ See Harlow 1952, 1–11; and Hyam 2010, 76–77+ 28+ See Pares 1953; Henderson 1957, 111–12; and Ehrman 1962, 203–9+ 29+ See Parliamentary History, vol+ 26, 346–47; and Crowley 1993, 13+ 400 International Organization

Origins of the First Era of Globalization 401 do not behave as monolithic actors,such scholars examine the interplay of ideas, interests,and institutions within Britain.These scholars all confront the correla- tion between the meteoric rise of Smith's ideas and the commercial reforms of the 1780s. Traditionally,scholars assumed that Smith's ideas must have sparked the reforms. They point to the reforms'Smithian character and the homage that leading reform- ers paid to Smith.All these scholars concede,however,that this intellectual re- orientation followed after Britain lost the fight to keep its American colonies.30 This concession has prompted materialists to insist that Smith's ideas were embraced because they fit Britain's new circumstances.For centuries,the story goes,London's policymakers had been in the pockets of England's "merchants and manufacturers."Fearful of international competition,these special interests promoted mercantilism as an intellectual justification for protecting them from foreign competitors and developing complementary colonies "as captive markets and monopolized suppliers."3 By the middle of the eighteenth century,however, keeping the colonies within the system had become remarkably expensive while British industry and trade were becoming competitive abroad.Entrenched inter- ests hesitated to abandon the system that served them so well,but military defeat made American independence "inevitable."32 With the American colonies lost, British policymakers had to reconsider their commercial strategy.33 Thus,the reforms were really attempts to find new revenue streams,to keep the American market open,and to open new foreign markets-so-called "free trade imperial- ism."34 When these policymakers discovered the serendipitous fit between their policies and Smith's prescriptions,they retroactively anointed him the progenitor of their movement.35 Thus the timing of Britain's shift from mercantilism to laissez-faire proves cru- cial.Smith had been lobbying leading policymakers to abandon the mercantilist project in America since the 1760s.After repeated failures,he took to the presses, publishing his Wealth of Nations shortly before the Americans declared indepen- dence.According to all previous accounts,however,Smith's ideas were embraced only after the military contest in America had been decided.If this were true,it would be difficult not to conclude that the shocking loss of the American colonies played a critical role in the adoption of Smith's ideas. 30.See Heckscher 1922,19-21;Harlow 1952,223,228,488-89;Crowley 1993;and Hamilton 2008. 31.Crowley 1993,xiii. 32.Harlow1952,210-28. 33.See ibid..228:and Willis 1979.528. 34.See Fay 1934;Gallagher and Robinson 1953;Harlow 1952,201,210,228;Henderson 1957; and Semmel 1970,7-8. 35.Ehrman 1962,49;Willis 1979;and Ritcheson 1983 emphasize policymakers'opportunistic use of Smith's arguments and limited implementation of his prescriptions.Others argue that the esteem accorded to Smith's Wealth of Nations resulted from Britain's shift toward liberalism rather than vice versa.See Teichgraeber 1987,360;Crowley 1990,340;and Rashid 1998

do not behave as monolithic actors, such scholars examine the interplay of ideas, interests, and institutions within Britain+ These scholars all confront the correla￾tion between the meteoric rise of Smith’s ideas and the commercial reforms of the 1780s+ Traditionally, scholars assumed that Smith’s ideas must have sparked the reforms+ They point to the reforms’ Smithian character and the homage that leading reform￾ers paid to Smith+ All these scholars concede, however, that this intellectual re￾orientation followed after Britain lost the fight to keep its American colonies+ 30 This concession has prompted materialists to insist that Smith’s ideas were embraced because they fit Britain’s new circumstances+ For centuries, the story goes, London’s policymakers had been in the pockets of England’s “merchants and manufacturers+” Fearful of international competition, these special interests promoted mercantilism as an intellectual justification for protecting them from foreign competitors and developing complementary colonies “as captive markets and monopolized suppliers+”31 By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, keeping the colonies within the system had become remarkably expensive while British industry and trade were becoming competitive abroad+ Entrenched inter￾ests hesitated to abandon the system that served them so well, but military defeat made American independence “inevitable+”32 With the American colonies lost, British policymakers had to reconsider their commercial strategy+ 33 Thus, the reforms were really attempts to find new revenue streams, to keep the American market open, and to open new foreign markets—so-called “free trade imperial￾ism+”34 When these policymakers discovered the serendipitous fit between their policies and Smith’s prescriptions, they retroactively anointed him the progenitor of their movement+ 35 Thus the timing of Britain’s shift from mercantilism to laissez-faire proves cru￾cial+ Smith had been lobbying leading policymakers to abandon the mercantilist project in America since the 1760s+ After repeated failures, he took to the presses, publishing his Wealth of Nations shortly before the Americans declared indepen￾dence+ According to all previous accounts, however, Smith’s ideas were embraced only after the military contest in America had been decided+ If this were true, it would be difficult not to conclude that the shocking loss of the American colonies played a critical role in the adoption of Smith’s ideas+ 30+ See Heckscher 1922, 19–21; Harlow 1952, 223, 228, 488–89; Crowley 1993; and Hamilton 2008+ 31+ Crowley 1993, xiii+ 32+ Harlow 1952, 210–28+ 33+ See ibid+, 228; and Willis 1979, 528+ 34+ See Fay 1934; Gallagher and Robinson 1953; Harlow 1952, 201, 210, 228; Henderson 1957; and Semmel 1970, 7–8+ 35+ Ehrman 1962, 49; Willis 1979; and Ritcheson 1983 emphasize policymakers’ opportunistic use of Smith’s arguments and limited implementation of his prescriptions+ Others argue that the esteem accorded to Smith’s Wealth of Nations resulted from Britain’s shift toward liberalism rather than vice versa+ See Teichgraeber 1987, 360; Crowley 1990, 340; and Rashid 1998+ Origins of the First Era of Globalization 401

402 International Organization Challenging that narrative,I argue that Britain's capitulation after the Battle of Yorktown(1781)depended on the prior transformation of a pivotal policymaker's commercial strategy.This thesis defends the "idiographic"counterfactual that if Shelburne had not engaged Smith's ideas,the American Revolutionary War would have ended on vastly different terms.36 This,of course,cuts against the consensus that American independence was determined by the fortunes of war. Military Disaster Was an Insufficient Cause It is widely assumed that Britain's capitulation became "inevitable"after the loss at Yorktown in 1781.37 Students of international politics,however,know better than to blithely accept claims of historical inevitability.38 Determining the causal weight of multiple variables,however,proves difficult given that Britain's deci- sion to grant independence constitutes a single case.I use both of Fearon's meth- ods to test causality in such small-N cases.First,I increase the number of "actual cases"by comparing Yorktown to similar military setbacks.Second,I develop "counterfactual cases"that might have followed if Shelburne had not embraced Smith's ideas(all else remaining equal).39 Beyond the fact that it was the last major American battle in the war,it is dif- ficult to understand why Yorktown is so commonly assumed to have been"deci- sive."40 The loss at Yorktown,while substantial,was hardly Britain's wartime nadir. The loss at Saratoga in 1777 was equally costly from a military standpoint.4 More important,the loss prompted the French to formally commit to the American cause, transforming a "settler revolt"into a world war.2 The summer of 1779 was even bleaker.Following Spain's declaration of war,the French and Spanish amassed an invasion force of 30,000.43 Caught completely unprepared,the meager military force in Britain improvised coastal earthwork defenses while the government enacted universal impressment.44 Had unfavorable winds and sickness not fore- stalled the Franco-Spanish armada,the "American"Revolutionary War may have ended with the British surrendering to the French and Spanish in England. More nuanced accounts emphasize Britain's cumulative losses,suggesting that Yorktown put Britain over a critical threshold."As the nation began to feel the drain and disappointment of an unsuccessful war,"Harlow suggests,"bellicosity 36.Tetlock and Belkin 1996,7-8. 37.Whiteley1996,197. 38.Fearon1991,173. 39.Ibid,172. 40.Wood1990.292 41.Each campaign cost Britain roughly 8,000 troops.See Ketchum 1999,437;and Lengel 2005. 343. 42.Greene2000,100. 43.Mackesy1993,279-81. 44.Fitzmaurice 1875-76.vol.3.48

Challenging that narrative, I argue that Britain’s capitulation after the Battle of Yorktown ~1781! depended on the prior transformation of a pivotal policymaker’s commercial strategy+ This thesis defends the “idiographic” counterfactual that if Shelburne had not engaged Smith’s ideas, the American Revolutionary War would have ended on vastly different terms+ 36 This, of course, cuts against the consensus that American independence was determined by the fortunes of war+ Military Disaster Was an Insufficient Cause It is widely assumed that Britain’s capitulation became “inevitable” after the loss at Yorktown in 1781+ 37 Students of international politics, however, know better than to blithely accept claims of historical inevitability+ 38 Determining the causal weight of multiple variables, however, proves difficult given that Britain’s deci￾sion to grant independence constitutes a single case+ I use both of Fearon’s meth￾ods to test causality in such small-N cases+ First, I increase the number of “actual cases” by comparing Yorktown to similar military setbacks+ Second, I develop “counterfactual cases” that might have followed if Shelburne had not embraced Smith’s ideas ~all else remaining equal!+ 39 Beyond the fact that it was the last major American battle in the war, it is dif- ficult to understand why Yorktown is so commonly assumed to have been “deci￾sive+”40 The loss at Yorktown, while substantial, was hardly Britain’s wartime nadir+ The loss at Saratoga in 1777 was equally costly from a military standpoint+ 41 More important, the loss prompted the French to formally commit to the American cause, transforming a “settler revolt” into a world war+ 42 The summer of 1779 was even bleaker+ Following Spain’s declaration of war, the French and Spanish amassed an invasion force of 30,000+ 43 Caught completely unprepared, the meager military force in Britain improvised coastal earthwork defenses while the government enacted universal impressment+ 44 Had unfavorable winds and sickness not fore￾stalled the Franco-Spanish armada, the “American” Revolutionary War may have ended with the British surrendering to the French and Spanish in England+ More nuanced accounts emphasize Britain’s cumulative losses, suggesting that Yorktown put Britain over a critical threshold+ “As the nation began to feel the drain and disappointment of an unsuccessful war,” Harlow suggests, “bellicosity 36+ Tetlock and Belkin 1996, 7–8+ 37+ Whiteley 1996, 197+ 38+ Fearon 1991, 173+ 39+ Ibid+, 172+ 40+ Wood 1990, 292+ 41+ Each campaign cost Britain roughly 8,000 troops+ See Ketchum 1999, 437; and Lengel 2005, 343+ 42+ Greene 2000, 100+ 43+ Mackesy 1993, 279–81+ 44+ Fitzmaurice 1875–76, vol+ 3, 48+ 402 International Organization

Origins of the First Era of Globalization 403 began to fade...into war-weariness and a longing for peace."45 But this is diffi- cult to square with Britain's uninterrupted bellicosity throughout the"long"eigh- teenth century.After all,Britain fought in a major military conflict in virtually every decade from the 1690s to the 1810s.In the two decades prior to the Revo- lutionary War,Britain had expended unprecedented quantities of blood and trea- sure to expand its control over North America.46 But even these sums were dwarfed by the costs incurred just a few years later in the French Revolutionary and Napo- leonic Wars.Between 1793 and 1815,Britain spent fl billion and suffered 250,000 casualties fighting abroad-more than ten times its costs in the American Revolu- tionary War.7 Throughout this period,Britain remained materially capable of with- standing losses like that suffered at Yorktown.In 1782,it wanted resolve,not capacity. By comparing Britain's position in 1782 to its bleaker circumstances before and after,it becomes clear that military losses were necessary but insufficient to make Britain concede American independence.Indeed,we can construct several"easily imagined"counterfactual courses that Britain might have taken after Yorktown.48 Historical data show that each alternative path was "available,considered,and narrowly defeated by the relevant actors."4 Britain might simply have continued the war,albeit with a different military strategy.This was precisely the option the king pressed upon Lord North,the Tory prime minister.so Assuming North would retain power,the king spent much of the ensuing parliamentary recess discussing alternative military strategies and com- manders with his prime minister.3!King George III was not (yet)mad.Britain had lost 8,000 troops at Yorktown,but it had another 30,000 garrisoned through- out America.32 These forces easily could have been deployed on another cam- paign had the pro-independence opposition not captured the government. Second,Britain could have acknowledged de jure independence but nonethe- less pursued de facto dependence.33 After the defeat at Saratoga(in 1777),the king had proposed using loyalist strongholds to"continue destroying the trade and ports of the rebellious colonies"and,by "distressing the rebels,""secure the depen- dence of America."54 This strategy remained equally valid after Yorktown- particularly after several major naval victories in 1782.Short of maintaining 45.See Harlow 1952,210;and Middlekauff 2007,590. 46.Harlow1952,454. 47.See Tombs and Tombs 2006,179;and Monod 2009,282. 48.Tetlock and Belkin 1996,8. 49.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,356. 50.Lord North(1732-92)was a leading Tory.As prime minister(1770-82),he reluctantly endeav- ored to pacify the American colonies. 51.Donne1867,392-402. 52.Mackesy1993,435. 53.Military capitulation may have determined the "form"of the Anglo-American relationship,but it did not dictate its "content."Ruggie 1982,382. 54.Donne1867,148.161-63,207

began to fade +++ into war-weariness and a longing for peace+”45 But this is diffi- cult to square with Britain’s uninterrupted bellicosity throughout the “long” eigh￾teenth century+ After all, Britain fought in a major military conflict in virtually every decade from the 1690s to the 1810s+ In the two decades prior to the Revo￾lutionary War, Britain had expended unprecedented quantities of blood and trea￾sure to expand its control over North America+ 46 But even these sums were dwarfed by the costs incurred just a few years later in the French Revolutionary and Napo￾leonic Wars+ Between 1793 and 1815, Britain spent £1 billion and suffered 250,000 casualties fighting abroad—more than ten times its costs in the American Revolu￾tionary War+ 47 Throughout this period, Britain remained materially capable of with￾standing losses like that suffered at Yorktown+ In 1782, it wanted resolve, not capacity+ By comparing Britain’s position in 1782 to its bleaker circumstances before and after, it becomes clear that military losses were necessary but insufficient to make Britain concede American independence+ Indeed, we can construct several “easily imagined” counterfactual courses that Britain might have taken after Yorktown+ 48 Historical data show that each alternative path was “available, considered, and narrowly defeated by the relevant actors+”49 Britain might simply have continued the war, albeit with a different military strategy+ This was precisely the option the king pressed upon Lord North, the Tory prime minister+ 50 Assuming North would retain power, the king spent much of the ensuing parliamentary recess discussing alternative military strategies and com￾manders with his prime minister+ 51 King George III was not ~yet! mad+ Britain had lost 8,000 troops at Yorktown, but it had another 30,000 garrisoned through￾out America+ 52 These forces easily could have been deployed on another cam￾paign had the pro-independence opposition not captured the government+ Second, Britain could have acknowledged de jure independence but nonethe￾less pursued de facto dependence+ 53 After the defeat at Saratoga ~in 1777!, the king had proposed using loyalist strongholds to “continue destroying the trade and ports of the rebellious colonies” and, by “distressing the rebels,” “secure the depen￾dence of America+”54 This strategy remained equally valid after Yorktown— particularly after several major naval victories in 1782+ Short of maintaining 45+ See Harlow 1952, 210; and Middlekauff 2007, 590+ 46+ Harlow 1952, 454+ 47+ See Tombs and Tombs 2006, 179; and Monod 2009, 282+ 48+ Tetlock and Belkin 1996, 8+ 49+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 356+ 50+ Lord North ~1732–92! was a leading Tory+ As prime minister ~1770–82!, he reluctantly endeav￾ored to pacify the American colonies+ 51+ Donne 1867, 392–402+ 52+ Mackesy 1993, 435+ 53+ Military capitulation may have determined the “form” of the Anglo-American relationship, but it did not dictate its “content+” Ruggie 1982, 382+ 54+ Donne 1867, 148, 161– 63, 207+ Origins of the First Era of Globalization 403