government's authoritarian tendencies, however, are not only evident in the arena of national politics, but also extend into the realm of civil society. In this regard, different NGO reports highlight the government's direct intimidation of human rights associations, its consistent attacks on Ibuka, the principle association of Rwandan genocide survivors, and its banning of a small Rwandan NGo" devoted to conflict resolution. They also note the stringent restrictions imposed on the Rwandan press by the rPF administration. 8 As further evidence of this trend, Human Rights Watch observes that even RPF membership is sometimes gained by force, with at least some individuals saying that they joined the RPF because they believed they had no choice and others maintaining that they had been "threatened with sanctions if they chose not to do so. 19 These repressive practices are reinforced by the felt omnipresence of the RPF Intelligence Service that, as Dorsey discusses at length, effectively constrains any potential space for political dialogue. Also contributing to this omnipresence of the state are the five "local defense force"representatives that watch over each of Rwanda's 10,000 local cellules" in the name of the state, their state legitimation and state- sponsored arms giving them an official stamp of approval for tyrannical behavior. At the same time, beatings, fines, and even arbitrary imprisonment for local government administrators who are not deemed sufficiently obedient are not uncommon Predictably, such practices accompanied by the various restrictions on civil society outlined above, have effectively squelched any viable political opposition Various scholars note that this concentration of power within the hands of the rpf is not without ethnic connotations. Although not an explicitly Tutsi party, the RPF is nonetheless dominated by International Crisis Group, Rwanda at the End of the Transition, 13; Human Rights Watch, 10-13 International Crisis Group, "Rwanda at the End of the Transition, 14-15; Human Rights Watch, 11 Human Rights Watch. 3 Dorsey. 312 2"Cellules, "often translated as"communes, "are the smallest political unit in Rwanda, each comprising proximately eight-hundred individuals Brauman, Smith, and Vidal, 152
26 government’s authoritarian tendencies, however, are not only evident in the arena of national politics, but also extend into the realm of civil society. In this regard, different NGO reports highlight the government’s direct intimidation of human rights associations, its consistent attacks on Ibuka, the principle association of Rwandan genocide survivors, and its banning of a small Rwandan NGO “devoted to conflict resolution.”17 They also note the stringent restrictions imposed on the Rwandan press by the RPF administration.18 As further evidence of this trend, Human Rights Watch observes that even RPF membership is sometimes gained by force, with at least some individuals saying that they “joined the RPF because they believed they had no choice” and others maintaining that they had been “threatened with sanctions if they chose not to do so.”19 These repressive practices are reinforced by the felt omnipresence of the RPF Intelligence Service that, as Dorsey discusses at length, effectively constrains any potential space for political dialogue.20 Also contributing to this omnipresence of the state are the five “local defense force” representatives that watch over each of Rwanda’s 10,000 local cellules21 in the name of the state, their state legitimation and statesponsored arms giving them an official stamp of approval for tyrannical behavior.22 At the same time, beatings, fines, and even arbitrary imprisonment for local government administrators who are not deemed sufficiently obedient are not uncommon.23 Predictably, such practices, accompanied by the various restrictions on civil society outlined above, have effectively squelched any viable political opposition. Various scholars note that this concentration of power within the hands of the RPF is not without ethnic connotations. Although not an explicitly Tutsi party, the RPF is nonetheless dominated by 17 International Crisis Group, “Rwanda at the End of the Transition,” 13; Human Rights Watch, 10-13. 18 International Crisis Group, “Rwanda at the End of the Transition,” 14-15; Human Rights Watch, 11. 19 Human Rights Watch, 3. 20 Dorsey, 312. 21 “Cellules,” often translated as “communes,” are the smallest political unit in Rwanda, each comprising approximately eight-hundred individuals. 22 Brauman, Smith, and Vidal, 152. 23 Ibid
individuals of Tutsi ethnicity. Given this fact, the political dominance of the RPF represents a clear perpetuation of the ethnically structured political organization of the colonial era. In fact, as Rwanda expert Filip Reyntjens noted as early as 1999, the tutsisation of the state machinery"is evident in everything from the Tutsi majority in the National Assembly, to the 14 out of 18 Tutsi general-secretaries in Rwanda's different governmental ministries. It is evident, Reyntjens maintains, in the fact that approximately 80% of Rwanda's mayors were tutsi, the fact that out of the fourteen army and police officers in high command, only one was Hutu, and also in the overwhelming preponderance of Tutsi individuals holding key posts within the judiciary. All in all as of late 2003, 90% of the posts within the administration were held by Tutsis. As Reyntjens stresses, "One does not have to suffer from ethnic fundamentalism in order to see that a regime claiming to fight ethnicity is actually spearheading ethnic policies Such a"Tutsisation"is not only evident in the realm of politics. In the domain of education, for example, as of 1997, 95% of the academic staff at the National University in Butare were Tutsi as were 80%of their students, 90% of the judges being trained for the Justice Department, and 95%of the army, police, and "Local Defense Units. 30 Now, just as in the colonial era, the political and economic dominance of the Tutsi as a group is clear. Nonetheless, the current version of Tutsi dominance has an additional twist, for the current system privileges not only Tutsis in general, but particularly Tutsis who grew up in the Rwandan diaspora, and most specifically those diaspora- born Tutsis with Ugandan origins. Dorsey notes that within the army. 25 of the 27 principal posts are held by Rwandan Tutsis from Uganda, 10 by Rwandan Tutsis from Burundi, and 3 by Tutsis born and raised in Rwanda, and that "every one of the unit commanders of the RPA is ' Ugandan He notes the same Ugandan Tutsi dominance in the 2 Dorsey,316-17,324,327 25Ibid Filip Reyntjens, Talking or Fighting? Political Evolution in Rwandan and Burundi, 1998-1999, Current African Issues 21(Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999): 5-6 28 Danielle de Lame, "Deuil, commemoration, justice dans les contextes rwandais et belge: otages existentiels et enjeux politiques, Politique Africaine 92(2003): 5 Reyntjens, 6 30 Prunier. 369
27 individuals of Tutsi ethnicity.24 Given this fact, the political dominance of the RPF represents a clear perpetuation of the ethnically structured political organization of the colonial era.25 In fact, as Rwanda expert Filip Reyntjens noted as early as 1999, the “tutsisation of the state machinery” is evident in everything from the Tutsi majority in the National Assembly, to the 14 out of 18 Tutsi general-secretaries in Rwanda’s different governmental ministries.26 It is evident, Reyntjens maintains, in the fact that approximately 80% of Rwanda’s mayors were Tutsi, the fact that out of the fourteen army and police officers in high command, only one was Hutu, and also in the overwhelming preponderance of Tutsi individuals holding key posts within the judiciary.27 All in all, as of late 2003, 90% of the posts within the administration were held by Tutsis.28 As Reyntjens stresses, “One does not have to suffer from ethnic fundamentalism in order to see that a regime claiming to fight ethnicity is actually spearheading ethnic policies.”29 Such a “Tutsisation” is not only evident in the realm of politics. In the domain of education, for example, as of 1997, 95% of the academic staff at the National University in Butare were Tutsi, as were 80% of their students, 90% of the judges being trained for the Justice Department, and 95% of the army, police, and “Local Defense Units.”30 Now, just as in the colonial era, the political and economic dominance of the Tutsi as a group is clear. Nonetheless, the current version of Tutsi dominance has an additional twist, for the current system privileges not only Tutsis in general, but particularly Tutsis who grew up in the Rwandan diaspora, and most specifically those diaspora-born Tutsis with Ugandan origins. Dorsey notes that within the army, 25 of the 27 principal posts are held by Rwandan Tutsis from Uganda, 10 by Rwandan Tutsis from Burundi, and 3 by Tutsis born and raised in Rwanda, and that “every one of the unit commanders of the RPA is ‘Ugandan.’” He notes the same Ugandan Tutsi dominance in the 24 Dorsey, 316-17, 324, 327. 25 Ibid. 26 Filip Reyntjens, “Talking or Fighting? Political Evolution in Rwandan and Burundi, 1998-1999,” Current African Issues 21 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999): 5-6 27 Ibid., 5-6. 28 Danielle de Lame, “Deuil, commémoration, justice dans les contextes rwandais et belge: otages existentiels et enjeux politiques,” Politique Africaine 92 (2003): 5. 29 Reyntjens, 6. 30 Prunier, 369
Intelligence Service, noting that such individuals hold all of the key leadership positions in this organization. 1 Not only a matter of overt discrimination, some of this discrimination is accomplished quite indirectly, by subtle structures that favor the Ugandan-diaspora(English speaking) Rwandan Tutsis. For example, as English is the preferred language at university, the university system indirectly favors these Ugandan"returnees. 32 This" Tutsisation, or the institutionalized revival of a binary"ethnic logic, also has another side In sum, the ethnic logic that remains at the heart of official messages is that "every Hutu is a suspect because his ethnic group is guilty for the genocide. In essence, the RPF administration has effectively used the history of the genocide to summarily criminalize the Hutu as a group, a process in which the genocide itself has been put to the service of the interests of a minority in power who are desperate to maintain that power at whatever cost. The specific ways by which the history of the genocide is manipulated to this end will be discussed later in this chapter. In the meantime, what must be underlined is that now, more than ever, "ethnicity in Rwanda has come to mask social inequalities, or a social structure in which, as described above, individuals of Tutsi ethnicity hold a disproportionate share of the keys to economic and political power, whether in the domains of education, law enforcement, business, or politics Beyond these discussions of the increasingly authoritarian, ethnicized and exclusive nature of contemporary Rwandan politics, another important topic to highlight in the existing literature is the link between politics and discourse in Rwanda. Before looking at different analyses of this linkage, however, it is first necessary to examine the more general question of state-sponsored knowledge construction in present-day rwanda, as a means of beginning to understand how it is that the RPF administration has exercised and continues to exercise such extraordinary political power 5 Dorsey, 327 32 de lame. 4 33 Mamdani. When Victims Become Killers. 35: Prunier 329-331 Brauman, Smith, and Vidal, 156 de lame. 155 Ibid. 5
28 Intelligence Service, noting that such individuals hold all of the key leadership positions in this organization.31 Not only a matter of overt discrimination, some of this discrimination is accomplished quite indirectly, by subtle structures that favor the Ugandan-diaspora (Englishspeaking) Rwandan Tutsis. For example, as English is the preferred language at university, the university system indirectly favors these Ugandan “returnees.”32 This “Tutsisation,” or the institutionalized revival of a binary “ethnic logic,”33 also has another side. In sum, the ethnic logic that remains at the heart of official messages is that “every Hutu is a suspect because his ethnic group is guilty for the genocide.”34 In essence, the RPF administration has effectively used the history of the genocide to summarily criminalize the Hutu as a group, a process in which the genocide itself has been put to the service of the interests of a minority in power who are desperate to maintain that power at whatever cost.35 The specific ways by which the history of the genocide is manipulated to this end will be discussed later in this chapter. In the meantime, what must be underlined is that now, more than ever, “ethnicity in Rwanda has come to mask social inequalities,”36 or a social structure in which, as described above, individuals of Tutsi ethnicity hold a disproportionate share of the keys to economic and political power, whether in the domains of education, law enforcement, business, or politics. Beyond these discussions of the increasingly authoritarian, ethnicized and exclusive nature of contemporary Rwandan politics, another important topic to highlight in the existing literature is the link between politics and discourse in Rwanda. Before looking at different analyses of this linkage, however, it is first necessary to examine the more general question of state-sponsored knowledge construction in present-day Rwanda, as a means of beginning to understand how it is that the RPF administration has exercised and continues to exercise such extraordinary political power. 31 Dorsey, 327. 32 de Lame, 4. 33 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 35; Prunier, 329-331. 34 Brauman, Smith, and Vidal, 156. 35 de Lame, 155. 36 Ibid., 5
Anthropologist Johan Pottier is one scholar who has examined the issue of knowledge construction under the RPF in great detail. Writing in 2002, he discusses how the RPF has displayed"exceptional skill at converting international feelings of guilt and ineptitude into admissions that the front deserves to have the monopoly on knowledge construction. 37Thi project of monopolizing knowledge in post-genocide Rwanda, he notes, has included international journalists, academics, diplomats and aid workers, all of whom, as Pottier illustrates, have helped "to popularise and spread an RPF-friendly but empirically questionable narrative. These narratives, he discusses, are disseminated through academic works, NGO reports, and international mass media outlets ranging from France's Le Monde to Belgiums De Morgen, to the United Kingdoms Guardian. Noting that history has not been taught in schools since the genocide, due to the practical difficulty of rewriting history books that would be considered acceptable in the current political climate, Pottier discusses how the Rwandan government actively works with these academics and journalists as vehicles of knowledge production and reproduction, using them to propagate its own versions of history and knowedge. Focusing on this interaction between Rwandan government discourse and the international community reproduction of this discourse, he highlights some of the concrete effects of this internationally- reproduced knowledge, particularly in regard to the ability of the Rwandan government to successfully pursue its own political and military objectives with minimal interference from the international community .39 The particular narratives that Pottier examines are the reconstructions both of precolonial and early colonial Rwandan history and of the history of the 1959"Social Revolution. In relation to precolonial history, he demonstrates how the RPF administration has revived idealized conceptions of precolonial history, conceptions that "mask the pre-colonial origins of ethnicity in 37 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20 38 Ibid. 53 s9bid,127-178
29 Anthropologist Johan Pottier is one scholar who has examined the issue of knowledge construction under the RPF in great detail. Writing in 2002, he discusses how the RPF has displayed “exceptional skill at converting international feelings of guilt and ineptitude into admissions that the Front deserves to have the monopoly on knowledge construction.”37 This project of monopolizing knowledge in post-genocide Rwanda, he notes, has included international journalists, academics, diplomats and aid workers, all of whom, as Pottier illustrates, have helped “to popularise and spread an RPF-friendly but empirically questionable narrative.”38 These narratives, he discusses, are disseminated through academic works, NGO reports, and international mass media outlets ranging from France’s Le Monde to Belgium’s De Morgen, to the United Kingdom’s Guardian. Noting that history has not been taught in schools since the genocide, due to the practical difficulty of rewriting history books that would be considered acceptable in the current political climate, Pottier discusses how the Rwandan government actively works with these academics and journalists as vehicles of knowledge production and reproduction, using them to propagate its own versions of history and knowledge. Focusing on this interaction between Rwandan government discourse and the international community’s reproduction of this discourse, he highlights some of the concrete effects of this internationallyreproduced knowledge, particularly in regard to the ability of the Rwandan government to successfully pursue its own political and military objectives with minimal interference from the international community.39 The particular narratives that Pottier examines are the reconstructions both of precolonial and early colonial Rwandan history and of the history of the 1959 “Social Revolution.” In relation to precolonial history, he demonstrates how the RPF administration has revived idealized conceptions of precolonial history, conceptions that “mask the pre-colonial origins of ethnicity in 37 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 202. 38 Ibid., 53. 39 Ibid., 127-178
Rwanda, gloss over"significant social complexities, and attempt to summarily deny the precolonial origins of ethnicity in Rwanda. These discursive manipulations, he explains, allow the RPF administration to claim that "there is only one ethnicity: Rwandan"4 and also to erase from history the inequalities of the precolonial (Tutsi)monarchy Pottier points out that this"academic rewriting encouraged by the rPF- extends to the 1959 social revolution, and that this second revisionist history works to the same end as the first. He discusses how this revisionist history has revived old and now discredited theories that the 1959 pro-democracy movement was the work of only a few"isolated individuals, and has thus erased both the multi-ethnic nature of this movement and also the fact that the revolution targeted"the Tutsi aristocracy and monarchy, not the Tutsi"as a group. In sum, Pottier demonstrates how the RPF has essentialized 1959 as an anti-Tutsi movement, and has thus discredited its democratic and egalitarian aims and instead justified both the victim status and the perceived legitimacy of the RPF administration. Seen together, Pottier emphasizes, these revisionist histories comprise an intellectual justification for Tutsi minority rule, by discrediting the Hutus historical political aspirations, legitimizing Tutsi rule, and denying the saliency of ethnic categories. Furthermore, he stresses, this one-sided rewriting of history poses a potentially dangerous obstacle to the present process of national reconciliation, as reconciliation will remain impossible without a shared understanding of history. This point mirrors much of the theoretical discussion of reconciliation in the previous chapter Scholars Nigel Eltringham and Saskia van Hoyweghen go one step further than does Pottier in their discussion of knowedge construction in present-day Rwanda, for they point out that this " victim/victimiser dichotomy effectively constructs all Tutsi as victims of genocide and all Hutu as Ibid d,l19 3lbid.123-126. 44bid.111 Ibid. 125
30 Rwanda, gloss over “significant social complexities,”40 and attempt to summarily deny the precolonial origins of ethnicity in Rwanda. These discursive manipulations, he explains, allow the RPF administration to claim that “there is only one ethnicity: Rwandan”41 and also to erase from history the inequalities of the precolonial (Tutsi) monarchy. Pottier points out that this “academic rewriting encouraged by the RPF”42 extends to the 1959 social revolution, and that this second revisionist history works to the same end as the first. He discusses how this revisionist history has revived old and now discredited theories that the 1959 pro-democracy movement was the work of only a few “isolated individuals,” and has thus erased both the multi-ethnic nature of this movement and also the fact that the revolution targeted “the Tutsi aristocracy and monarchy, not ‘the Tutsi’” as a group. In sum, Pottier demonstrates how the RPF has essentialized 1959 as an anti-Tutsi movement, and has thus discredited its democratic and egalitarian aims and instead justified both the “victim” status and the perceived legitimacy of the RPF administration.43 Seen together, Pottier emphasizes, these revisionist histories comprise an intellectual justification for Tutsi minority rule, by discrediting the Hutus’ historical political aspirations, legitimizing Tutsi rule, and denying the saliency of ethnic categories.44 Furthermore, he stresses, this one-sided rewriting of history poses a potentially dangerous obstacle to the present process of national reconciliation, as reconciliation will remain impossible without a “shared understanding of history.”45 This point mirrors much of the theoretical discussion of reconciliation in the previous chapter. Scholars Nigel Eltringham and Saskia van Hoyweghen go one step further than does Pottier in their discussion of knowledge construction in present-day Rwanda, for they point out that this “victim/victimiser” dichotomy effectively constructs all Tutsi as victims of genocide and all Hutu as 40 Ibid., 111. 41 Ibid., 119. 42 Ibid., 123. 43 Ibid., 123-126. 44 Ibid., 111. 45 Ibid., 125