STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE NETHERLANDS Tom Z IVB3 Introduction The present report deals with the stand ing rules applicable in the Netherlands. So as to keep the report within mana geable proportions no attention will be paid to the actio popularis prevalent in planning and environmental law, as it is the exception to the rule that the applicant must have a stake in the outcome to succeed. In order to make the Dutch standing rules more accessible, US term inology has been followed wherever possible Section 2 will deal with some prelim inary constitutional questions necessary to put the rest of the report into perspective. Section 3 will discuss the sources of and the rationale for standing. Section 4 will be devoted to the standing rules applicable to indiv iduals, organisations and political entities respectively. Section 5 will consider the separate issues of mootness and ripeness. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks Constitutional preliminaries Before going into the details of Dutch law on standing, three constitutional points should be made at the outset First of all. under art icle 120 of the constitution courts in the Netherlands are not allowed to review the constitutiona lity of Acts of Parliament Despite courts not being permitted to look into the constitutiona lity of Acts of Parliament, no such im pediments exists regarding secondary legislation, such as orders in council and ministerial regulations. Additionally, courts may review the compatibility of any national rule with self-executing provisions of treaties and decisions of intemational organisations due to Article 94 of the Constitution. 3 This article stipulates that self-executing provisions in treaties and decisions taken by intemational organisations which bind the Netherlands may set aside statutory regulations, i.e. all instruments conta ining rules, including Acts of Parliament and the Constitution itself. The power conferred on the judiciary by Article 94 has become an importa nt tool which compensates for the absence of constitutional review of Acts of Parliament For the purpose of the present report, the phrase to raise constitutional issues will therefore be interpreted as covering those cases in which the court is invited review the validity of legislation, either under the Constitution( secondary legislation) or under self-executing provisions of intemational law(both primary and secondary legislation) Law Faculty. Utrecht University the Netherlands. I would like to thank chloe Flatley and Judith Van Haersma Buma for their valuable ass istance The Artick reads as follows: The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not This Article reads as follows: Statutory regulations in force withn the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application s in conflict with prov is ions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of resolutions by
STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE NETHERLANDS Tom Zwart* IV B 3 1 Introduction The present report deals with the standing rules applicable in the Netherlands.1 So as to keep the report within manageable proportions no attention will be paid to the actio popularis prevalent in planning and environmental law, as it is the exception to the rule that the applicant must have a stake in the outcome to succeed. In order to make the Dutch standing rules more accessible, US terminology has been followed wherever possible. Section 2 will deal with some preliminary constitutional questions necessary to put the rest of the report into perspective. Section 3 will discuss the sources of and the rationale for standing. Section 4 will be devoted to the standing rules applicable to individuals, organisations and political entities respectively. Section 5 will consider the separate issues of mootness and ripeness. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. 2 Constitutional preliminaries Before going into the details of Dutch law on standing, three constitutional points should be made at the outset. First of all, under Article 120 of the Constitution, courts in the Netherlands are not allowed to review the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament.2 Despite courts not being permitted to look into the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament, no such impediments exists regarding secondary legislation, such as orders in council and ministerial regulations. Additionally, courts may review the compatibility of any national rule with self-executing provisions of treaties and decisions of international organisations due to Article 94 of the Constitution.3 This article stipulates that self-executing provisions in treaties and decisions taken by international organisations which bind the Netherlands may set aside statutory regulations, i.e. all instruments containing rules, including Acts of Parliament and the Constitution itself. The power conferred on the judiciary by Article 94 has become an importa nt tool which compensates for the absence of constitutional review of Acts of Parliament. For the purpose of the present report, the phrase to raise constitutional issues will therefore be interpreted as covering those cases in which the court is invited to review the validity of legislation, either under the Constitution (secondary legislation) or under self-executing provisions of international law (both primary and secondary legislation). * Law Faculty, Utrecht University, the Netherlands. 1. I would like to thank Chloé Flatley and Judith Van Haersma Buma for their valuable assistance. 2. The Article reads as follows: The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts. 3. This Article reads as follows: Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions
ZWART Secondly, the Netherands has a dual court system, consisting of ordinary and adm inistrative courts which apply private law and administrative law respectively.4 Constitutional issues may arise in both courts. According to Article 112, section l of the Constitution, the adjudication of disputes involving rights under civil law and debts shall be the responsibility of the regular judiciary. According to Article 113, section 1, the same jurisdiction applies to the trial of offences. Under section 2 of Article 112, responsibility for the adjud ication of disputes which do not arise from matters of private law, i.e. adm inistrative law type disputes, may be granted by Act of Parliament to either the regular judiciary or courts that do not fomm part of the dicary. Such jurisdiction has been conferred by Act of Parliament amongst others to the administrative divisions of the courts of first instance, the afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak(Administrative Judicary Division)of the Council of State, the Centrale Raad van Beroep( Central Appeal Board)and the College van Bermep woor het Bedrijfsleven(Industrial Appeals Board) According to Article 8: 1, section 1 of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht( General Adm inistrative Law Act or GALA), orders of administrative authorities may be contested before adm inistrative div isions of the courts of first instance or on appea before the Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak and the Centrale Raad van Beroep. An order of an adm inistrative a uthority has been defined in Article 1: 3, section 1, ofthe said Act as a written decision intending to ca use legal effect under public law challenging the order, the applicant may question the constitutional validity of Alternatively, the constitutional propriety of legislation may also be tested directly. Under Article 112, section 1 of the Constitution, a person aggrieved by an adm inistrative act may bring a tort claim before an ordinary court. In interpreting Article 112, section 1, the Supreme Court ruled in Noordwijkerhout v. Guldenmond that the judiciary is com petent to try cases in which an adm inistra tive authority acts the defendant, as long as the plaintiff can va idly claim to be the victim of a tort committed by that authority. Its competence will be determined by the claim put forward and not by the nature of the relationship between the parties. Although the judicary has full jurisdiction in this kind of cases, it will dismiss a claim as inadm issible if it concerns an order which can be brought before one of the adm inistrative tribunals mentioned above. In practice plaintiffs tend to rely on tort proceedings only in cases relating to measures to which GALa does not apply, such as Acts of Parliament?or orders which have been explicitly excluded from the risdiction of the adm inistrative courts, secondary legislation being among them By seeking private law remedies like an injunction, the applicant may prevent the legislation from entering into effect or render it inoperative. This kind of action See T. Zwart& F Goudappel, Judicial rev iew exercised by ordnary courts and administrative 45678 courts in the Netherlands: a comparison, 12 European Review of Public Law(2000), pp. 665-680 Supreme Court, 31 December 1915, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie( Dutch Law Reports)1916,p This approach is generally being referred to as the objectum litis-concept Cf. Article 1: 1(2)(a)GALA. Cf. Article 8: 2(a)GALA
ZWART 2 Secondly, the Netherlands has a dual court system, consisting of ordinary and administrative courts which apply private law and administrative law respectively.4 Constitutional issues may arise in both courts. According to Article 112, section 1 of the Constitution, the adjudication of disputes involving rights under civil law and debts shall be the responsibility of the regular judiciary. According to Article 113, section 1, the same jurisdiction applies to the trial of offences. Under section 2 of Article 112, responsibility for the adjudication of disputes which do not arise from matters of private law, i.e. administrative law type disputes, may be granted by Act of Parliament to either the regular judiciary or courts that do not form part of the judiciary. Such jurisdiction has been conferred by Act of Parliament amongst others to the administrative divisions of the courts of first instance, the Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak (Administrative Judiciary Division) of the Council of State, the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Central Appeal Board) and the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Industrial Appeals Board). According to Article 8:1, section 1 of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht (General Administrative Law Act or GALA), orders of administrative authorities may be contested before administrative divisions of the courts of first instance or on appeal before the Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak and the Centrale Raad van Beroep. An order of an administrative authority has been defined in Article 1:3, section 1, of the said Act as a written decision intending to cause lega l effect under public law. In challenging the order, the applicant may question the constitutional validity of the underlying legislation. Alternatively, the constitutional propriety of legislation may also be tested directly. Under Article 112, section 1 of the Constitution, a person aggrieved by an administrative act may bring a tort claim before an ordinary court. In interpreting Article 112, section 1, the Supreme Court ruled in Noordwijkerhout v. Guldenmond that the judiciary is competent to try cases in which an administra tive authority acts as the defendant, as long as the plaintiff can validly claim to be the victim of a tort committed by that authority.5 Its competence will be determined by the claim put forward and not by the nature of the relationship between the parties.6 Although the judiciary has full jurisdiction in this kind of cases, it will dismiss a claim as inadmissible if it concerns an order which can be brought before one of the administrative tribunals mentioned above. In practice plaintiffs tend to rely on tort proceedings only in cases relating to measures to which GALA does not apply, such as Acts of Parliament7 or orders which have been explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the administrative courts, secondary legislation being among them.8 By seeking private law remedies like an injunction, the applicant may prevent the legislation from entering into effect or render it inoperative. This kind of action is 4. See T. Zwart & F. Goudappel, Judicial review exercised by ordinary courts and administrative courts in the Netherlands: a comparison, 12 European Review of Public Law (2000), pp. 665-680. 5. Supreme Court, 31 December 1915, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Dutch Law Reports) 1916, p. 407. 6. This approach is generally being referred to as the objectum litis-concept. 7. Cf. Article 1:1 (2) (a) GALA. 8. Cf. Article 8:2 (a) GALA
STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES often entertained by public interest groups. This report will therefore deal both with standing in administrative courts under GALA and with the standing of public interest groups under Dutch tort kw Finally, contrary to the situation in Ireland? and Canada, 0I Dutch courts app the same standing rules in constitutional and non-constitutional cases. The present report therefore will deal with standing in general, making no distinction between these two ty pes of cases 3 The sources of and rationale for standing rules The man rules relating to standing have been bid down in legislation. Under Article I GALA, an interested party may appeal to the court aga instan order. Article 1: 2(1) gal a describes an interested party as a person whose interest is directly affected by an order. These provisions closely resemble the standing rules laid down in the predecessor of GALA, the Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions Act According to Article 3: 305a of the Civil Code, an association or foundation with full legal capacity is entitled to enterta in an action for the purpose of protecting interests of other persons, inasmuch as it promotes these interests accord ing to its articles of However, courts have plyed a vital part in developing the rules on standing both in the area of adm inistrative and private a w. One may even claim without exaggeration that the right of public interests groups to initiate court proceedings in private law is the creation of the judiciary rather than the legislature. In add ition, academ ic commentary has also left its mark. In his very influental thesis entitled Kringen van belanghebbenden (Circles of interested parties), Peter van Buuren not only prov ided an illum inating analysis of the existing standing rules, but also set the tone for the development of those rules during the atter part of the twentieth century Unlike in the US, 12 in the Netherlands there has not been any discussion on the rationale for standing rules. Stand ing requirements are considered to be ofa technical nature and are not usually linked to the concept of separation of powers. Thi discourages debate on the constitutional and political role of the judiciary 13which technical approach is probably motivated by the Dutch civil law tradition, which See Cahill v Sutton[1980JIR 269, Cotty v. An Taoiseach [1987]1.R 713, lamnid Eireann v. Ireland [1996]3 I.R. 321 and James Casey, Constitutional law in Ireland, third ed iton, Dublin 2000pp358364 10. See Thorson v. Attomey General of Canada [1975] I S.C.r 138, Noua Scotia Board of Censors v. MeNeill[976 2S. Cr 265, MinisterofJhustice of Canada. Borowski[1981]2S.CR 575 and Peter Hogg, Constitutional law of Canada, fourth edition, Scarborough 1997, pp 1368-1371. Deventer. 1978 12 See in particular Antonn Scala, The doctrine of standing as an essential element of the ation of powers, 17Suffolk L Rev. (1983) See Tom Zwart, The evolution of the roleof the judge in the Netherlands, 1 3 European Revew of Public Law(2001)(forthcoming)
STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 3 often entertained by public interest groups. This report will therefore deal both with standing in administrative courts under GALA and with the standing of public interest groups under Dutch tort law. Finally, contrary to the situation in Ireland9 and Canada,10 Dutch courts apply the same standing rules in constitutiona l and non-constitutional cases. The present report therefore will deal with standing in general, making no distinction between these two types of cases. 3 The sources of and rationale for standing rules The main rules relating to standing have been laid down in legislation. Under Article 8:1 GALA, an interested party may appeal to the court against an order. Article 1:2 (1) GALA describes an interested party as a person whose interest is directly affected by an order. These provisions closely resemble the standing rules laid down in the predecessor of GALA, the Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions Act. According to Article 3:305a of the Civil Code, an association or foundation with full legal capacity is entitled to entertain an action for the purpose of protecting interests of other persons, inasmuch as it promotes these interests according to its articles of association. However, courts have played a vital part in developing the rules on standing both in the area of administrative and private la w. One may even claim without exaggeration that the right of public interests groups to initiate court proceedings in private law is the creation of the judiciary rather than the legislature. In addition, academic commentary has also left its mark. In his very influential thesis entitled Kringen van belanghebbenden (Circles of interested parties), Peter van Buuren not only provided an illuminating analysis of the existing standing rules, but also set the tone for the development of those rules during the latter part of the twentieth century.11 Unlike in the US,12 in the Netherlands there has not been any discussion on the rationale for standing rules. Standing requirements are considered to be of a technical nature and are not usually linked to the concept of separation of powers. This technical approach is probably motivated by the Dutch civil law tradition, which discourages debate on the constitutional and political role of the judicia ry.13 9. See Cahill v. Sutton [1980] I.R. 269, Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] I.R. 713, Iarnród Éireann v. Ireland [1996] 3 I.R. 321 and James Casey, Constitutional law in Ireland, third edition, Dublin 2000, pp. 358-364. 10. See Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeill [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265, Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575 and Peter Hogg, Constitutional law of Canada, fourth edition, Scarborough 1997, pp. 1368-1371. 11. Deventer, 1978. 12. See in particular Antonin Scalia, The doctrine of standing as an essential element of the separation of powers, 17 Suffolk L.Rev. (1983) 881-889. 13. See Tom Zwart, The evolution of the role of the judge in the Netherlands, 13 European Review of Public Law (2001) (forthcoming)
ZWART The standing rules in practice 4.1 4. An applicant will only be considered to have standing if he is personally affected by the decision at issue. This would, for instance, be the case if the applicant lives or works in the vicinity of the site to which the decision applies. Thus, when an applicant challenged the pemission given by the states deputies 4 to a company t start a quarry, he was considered to have standing because he resided some 1000 metres from the proposed excavation site. The states deputies mainta ined that no direct interest of the applicant was involved, since his house was too far removed from the location The court found that the distance was not so great that it should be led out the excavation would have consequences for the applicant. It relied on evidence put forward by an expert which showed that the digging could cause damage to the applicant s property. I5 When an authority gave pem ission to a company to transfer polluted soil to another location, two employees work ing clos to the new site were also deemed to have standing. 6 Similarly, when the board of burgomaster and aldermen granted a pemit for the exploitation of a brothel, those working nearby were deemed to have standing 8 If the distance is considered too eat, the appeal will fail. This was exemplified when the states deputies gave permission for the construction of a road. The applicant was considered to lack standingsince he lived some 700 metres from the site In addition to distance, visibil ity is sometimes deemed to be important. When the board of burgomaster and aldermen gave pemission for the construction of a penitentary, the applicant s objection was that the prison would ham the peacefu character of the town. The court denied him standing because he lived 2000 metres from the building site and a nearby residential area would block his view of the build ing. 20 The case is also noteworthy for the fact that the court decided the building would not have such an impact as to affect the socal climate and the living 14. The executiveat the provincial level 15 Judicial Divsion of the Council of State, 4 November 1987, Adminstratiefrechtelij Beslissingen( Administrative Decisions Reports)1989, 135 Pres dentof the Judical Div ision of the Council of State, 24 November 1982, Admnistratief- rechtelijke Besl singen(Administrative Decisions Reports)1983, 174 789 The executive at the local level Pres identof the Judical Div iion of the Council of State, 20 November 1980, Admin rechtelijke Besl singen(Administrative Decisions Reports)1981, 328 Pres dent of the Judical Division of the Council of State, 13 April 1983, Administratefrechtelijke Beslissingen(Administrative Decisions Reports)1983, 366 20. Adminstrative Judiciary Divsion of the Council of State, 27 November 1997, Nederlands Tristen Blad(Dutch Lawyers Journal)1998, p. 270
ZWART 4 4 The standing rules in practice 4.1 Individuals 4.1.1 Personally affected 4.1.1.1 Factors causing a personal interest An applicant will only be considered to have standing if he is personally affected by the decision at issue. This would, for instance, be the case if the applicant lives or works in the vicinity of the site to which the decision applies. Thus, when an applicant challenged the permission given by the states deputies14 to a company to start a quarry, he was considered to have standing because he resided some 1000 metres from the proposed excavation site. The states deputies maintained that no direct interest of the applicant was involved, since his house was too far removed from the location. The court found that the distance was not so great that it should be ruled out the excavation would have consequences for the applicant. It relied on evidence put forward by an expert which showed that the digging could cause damage to the applicant s property.15 When an authority gave permission to a company to transfer polluted soil to another location, two employees working close to the new site were also deemed to have standing.16 Similarly, when the board of burgomaster and aldermen17 granted a permit for the exploitation of a brothel, those working nearby were deemed to have standing.18 If the distance is considered too great, the appeal will fail. This was exemplified when the states deputies gave permission for the construction of a road. The applicant was considered to lack standing since he lived some 700 metres from the site.19 In addition to distance, visibility is sometimes deemed to be important. When the board of burgomaster and aldermen gave permission for the construction of a penitentiary, the applicant s objection was that the prison would harm the peaceful character of the town. The court denied him standing because he lived 2000 metres from the building site and a nearby residential area would block his view of the building.20 The case is also noteworthy for the fact that the court decided the building would not have such an impact as to affect the social climate and the living 14. The executive at the provincial level. 15. Judicial Division of the Council of State, 4 November 1987, Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen (Administrative Decisions Reports) 1989, 135. 16. President of the Judicial Division of the Council of State, 24 November 1982, Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen (Administrative Decisions Reports) 1983, 174. 17. The executive at the local level. 18. President of the Judicial Division of the Council of State, 20 November 1980, Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen (Administrative Decisions Reports) 1981, 328. 19. President of the Judicial Division of the Council of State, 13 April 1983, Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen (Administrative Decisions Reports) 1983, 366. 20. Administrative Judiciary Division of the Council of State, 27 November 1997, Nederlands Juristen Blad (Dutch Lawyers Journal) 1998, p. 270
STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES conditions in the vicinity of the applicant s home 2I This implies that even if the applicant lives or works at some distance from the site, he may nevertheless have standing because of the impact the use of the building will have. Such an approach has been adopted in the following cases. Although living outside the municipality concerned, some applicants challenged the building permission for a storage facility for nuclear waste. The court concluded they still had stand ing because of the use that would be made of the building. However, those living a 100 miles or more from the building site could not validly cla im to have standing 22 When the board of burgomaster and aldermen granted permission to build a school, the court found that the applicants living 115 metres to 750 metres from the site would not be inconvenienced by the building On the other hand, it was likely that the amount of traffic in their living environment would increase as a result of the com ingand going f teachers and pupils. The fact that one of the applicants was living in a dead-end-street did not distract from this conclusion. 23 Sometimes factors which may not be sufficient separately establish standing when viewed in combination. This point was made in a case in which the applicant challenged a decision of the board of burgomaster and aldermen to grant a license to cut a num ber of trees in a park. The applicant clamed to have standing beca use she lived in the vicinity and should be considered a patroness of the trees in view of her pecial relationship with them. The court ignored the patroness issue, focusing on geographical circumstances instead. It pointed out that the applicant was unable to view the trees concerned from her house. She was nevertheless considered to have standing for three reasons. First of all, as had been acknowled ged in official ocuments, the park was considered to have quite an impact on the neighbouring reas. Secondly, the applicant lived so close to the park, approx ima tely a distance of some 100 metres, that it should be considered part of her living environment when taking into account its impact. Finally, cutting the trees was the first step of a total overhaul of the park, which would undoubtedly affect the applicant s living environment 24 As the following cases demonstrate, the competitors of the beneficiary of the decision are considered to be personally affected by it. When the states deputies decided to subsid ise a group of women bargees, in order to ena ble them to acquire a canal boat for carrying trade, several bargemen objected. The court felt that they had standing since the decision would have ramifications for the inland shipping market and would therefore affect competition in this line of business.25 In another case the board of burgomaster and aldermen had designated a local physician as an Adm instrative Judiciary Div iion of the Council of State, 27 November 1997, Nederlands uristen Blad(Dutch Lawyers Joumal)1998, P. 270 Pres ident of the Judicial Division of the Council of State, 19 January 1982, Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen(Administrative Decisions Reports)1982, 286 Pres identof the Amhem Dstrit Court, 10 January 1995, Awb-katem( GALAquire)1995, 86 Groningen Ditrict Court, 29 July 1998, Milieu& Recht Judicial Divsion of the Council of State 17 October 1985, Admnstratief rechtelifke
STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 5 conditions in the vicinity of the applicant s home.21 This implies that even if the applicant lives or works at some distance from the site, he may nevertheless have standing because of the impact the use of the building will have. Such an approach has been adopted in the following cases. Although living outside the municipality concerned, some applicants challenged the building permission for a storage facility for nuclear waste. The court concluded they still had standing because of the use that would be made of the building. However, those living a 100 miles or more from the building site could not validly claim to have standing. 22 When the board of burgomaster and aldermen granted permission to build a school, the court found that the applicants living 115 metres to 750 metres from the site would not be inconvenienced by the building. On the other hand, it was likely that the amount of traffic in their living environment would increase as a result of the coming and going of teachers and pupils. The fact that one of the applicants was living in a dead-end-street did not distract from this conclusion.23 Sometimes factors which may not be sufficient separately establish standing when viewed in combination. This point was made in a case in which the applicant challenged a decision of the board of burgomaster and aldermen to grant a license to cut a number of trees in a park. The applicant claimed to have standing because she lived in the vicinity and should be considered a patroness of the trees in view of her special relationship with them. The court ignored the patroness issue, focusing on geographical circumstances instead. It pointed out that the applicant was unable to view the trees concerned from her house. She was nevertheless considered to have standing for three reasons. First of all, as had been acknowledged in official documents, the park was considered to have quite an impact on the neighbouring areas. Secondly, the applicant lived so close to the park, approxima tely a distance of some 100 metres, that it should be considered part of her living environment when taking into account its impact. Finally, cutting the trees was the first step of a total overhaul of the park, which would undoubtedly affect the applicant s living environment.24 As the following cases demonstrate, the competitors of the beneficiary of the decision are considered to be personally affected by it. When the states deputies decided to subsidise a group of women bargees, in order to enable them to acquire a canal boat for carrying trade, several bargemen objected. The court felt that they had standing since the decision would have ramifications for the inland shipping market and would therefore affect competition in this line of business.25 In another case the board of burgomaster and aldermen had designated a local physician as an 21. Administrative Judiciary Division of the Council of State, 27 November 1997, Nederlands Juristen Blad (Dutch Lawyers Journal) 1998, p. 270. 22. President of the Judicial Division of the Council of State, 19 January 1982, Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen (Administrative Decisions Reports) 1982, 286. 23. President of the Arnhem District Court, 10 January 1995, Awb-katern (GALA quire) 1995, 86. 24. Groningen District Court, 29 July 1998, Milieu & Recht jurisprudentiekatern (Environmental Law Reports) 1999, 24. 25. Judicial Division of the Council of State, 17 October 1985, Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen (Administrative Decisions Reports) 1986, 305