political community, this process necessarily involves a multi-faceted address to issues of justice in all of its forms, to concerns regarding socio-economic security, equality and distribution, to society-wide dialogue about Rwanda's history, and to the meaning of ethnicity itself. In recognition of all of these factors involved in the process of post-conflict reconciliation, the post- genocide Rwandan government has instituted a variety of policies that collectively aim to address different aspects of this reconciliation process. First, as the present government considers reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda inseparable from the pursuit of justice for the heinous crimes of the genocide, one of the key reconciliation measures of this administration has been the recent inauguration of the participatory-based gacaca courts. The second key element in the RPF government's strategy of reconciliation is the reengineering of ethnicity in Rwanda. In sum, this process revolves around the goal of " national unity and hinges on the idea, propounded by the rPF government, that ethnicity has only ever created violence in Rwanda, and that in order to avoid the violence inherent in this construction, ethnic identity must be replaced with a new unified"Rwandan identity. To this end, the government has implemented a number of different programs, key among which are sensibilisation, or"awareness, campaigns, as well as various other "civic education programs, all of which aim to promote the RPF government's vision of a unified and ethnicity-free Rwanda In addition the Rwandan government, as well as vanous civil society organizations, have implemented a number of programs designed specifically to aid the survivors of the genocide Survivor organizations and collectives, trauma counseling units, and other such organizations 93 Mamdani. When Victims Become Killers. 266 Pronounced"ga-cha-cha, the gacaca courts are a judicial system combined of traditional wandan participatory approaches to justice and of classical legal precepts. Currently in the process of being mplemented across Rwanda, the gacaca system is a key legal mechanism for bringing the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide to justice, and is envisioned as a means of punishing their crimes while also contributing to national reconciliation. This system will be discussed in detail in later chapters of this paper. See blicofRwanda,"presentationGeneralen.d.,shttp://www.inkiko-gacaca.govrw>(7April2004 Michael Dorsey, "Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda, "in Ruddy Doom and Jan Gorus, eds, Politics of ldentity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region(Brussels: University Press, 2000): Nigel Eltringham and Saskia Van Hoyweghen, "Power and Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in Ruddy Doom and Jan Gorus, eds, Politics of ldentity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region(Brussels: University Press, 2000); Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, Republic of Rwanda, Nation-wide Grassroots Consultations Report: Unity and Reconciliation Initiatives in Rwanda, (Kigali
21 political community,”93 this process necessarily involves a multi-faceted address to issues of justice in all of its forms, to concerns regarding socio-economic security, equality and distribution, to society-wide dialogue about Rwanda’s history, and to the meaning of ethnicity itself. In recognition of all of these factors involved in the process of post-conflict reconciliation, the postgenocide Rwandan government has instituted a variety of policies that collectively aim to address different aspects of this reconciliation process. First, as the present government considers reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda inseparable from the pursuit of justice for the heinous crimes of the genocide, one of the key reconciliation measures of this administration has been the recent inauguration of the participatory-based gacaca courts.94 The second key element in the RPF government’s strategy of reconciliation is the reengineering of ethnicity in Rwanda. In sum, this process revolves around the goal of “national unity,” and hinges on the idea, propounded by the RPF government, that ethnicity has only ever created violence in Rwanda, and that in order to avoid the violence inherent in this construction, ethnic identity must be replaced with a new unified “Rwandan identity.” To this end, the government has implemented a number of different programs, key among which are sensibilisation, or “awareness,” campaigns, as well as various other “civic education” programs, all of which aim to promote the RPF government’s vision of a unified and ethnicity-free Rwanda.95 In addition, the Rwandan government, as well as various civil society organizations, have implemented a number of programs designed specifically to aid the survivors of the genocide. Survivor organizations and collectives, trauma counseling units, and other such organizations 93 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 266. 94 Pronounced “ga-cha-cha,” the gacaca courts are a judicial system combined of traditional Rwandan participatory approaches to justice and of classical legal precepts. Currently in the process of being implemented across Rwanda, the gacaca system is a key legal mechanism for bringing the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide to justice, and is envisioned as a means of punishing their crimes while also contributing to national reconciliation. This system will be discussed in detail in later chapters of this paper. See Republic of Rwanda, “Présentation Générale,” n.d., <http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw> (7 April 2004). 95 Michael Dorsey, “Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” in Ruddy Doom and Jan Gorus, eds., Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region (Brussels: University Press, 2000); Nigel Eltringham and Saskia Van Hoyweghen, “Power and Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” in Ruddy Doom and Jan Gorus, eds., Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region (Brussels: University Press, 2000); Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda; Republic of Rwanda, Nation-wide Grassroots Consultations Report: Unity and Reconciliation Initiatives in Rwanda, (Kigali: n.d.), 13-14
abound in present-day Rwanda. Aiming to also actively incorporate other key groups within post genocide Rwanda in the reconciliation process, the government currently has several programs underway that are purposed towards the reintegration of former prisoners and of members of the pre-genocide armed forces. Although the Rwandan government has not completely overlooked questions of socio-economic justice, this area of reconciliation has tended to be largely, though not entirely, overlooked by the Rwandan government(and also by international donors)in the context of Rwanda s own process of reconciliation All of the various initiatives associated with the Rwandan project of reconciliation are, on the surface, overwhelmingly benign. The problem, however, as this paper will seek to expound, is that the concept of reconciliation is not being used towards entirely benign ends. Instead, as this process of reconciliation is necessarily taking place within a political context, it inevitably has both political connotations and political implications that in turn reflect the nature of the political milieu in which the process of reconciliation is embedded In the case of Rwanda, as the current government is increasingly characterized by authoritarian tendencies, the political meaning of the concept of reconciliation is inescapably intertwined with the increasingly repressive nature of the state. This paper will seek to probe this relationship between politics and reconciliation, and to highlight the political functions of the discourse surrounding the process of reconciliation in Rwanda
22 abound in present-day Rwanda. Aiming to also actively incorporate other key groups within postgenocide Rwanda in the reconciliation process, the government currently has several programs underway that are purposed towards the reintegration of former prisoners and of members of the pre-genocide armed forces. Although the Rwandan government has not completely overlooked questions of socio-economic justice, this area of reconciliation has tended to be largely, though not entirely, overlooked by the Rwandan government (and also by international donors) in the context of Rwanda’s own process of reconciliation. All of the various initiatives associated with the Rwandan project of reconciliation are, on the surface, overwhelmingly benign. The problem, however, as this paper will seek to expound, is that the concept of reconciliation is not being used towards entirely benign ends. Instead, as this process of reconciliation is necessarily taking place within a political context, it inevitably has both political connotations and political implications that in turn reflect the nature of the political milieu in which the process of reconciliation is embedded. In the case of Rwanda, as the current government is increasingly characterized by authoritarian tendencies, the political meaning of the concept of reconciliation is inescapably intertwined with the increasingly repressive nature of the state. This paper will seek to probe this relationship between politics and reconciliation, and to highlight the political functions of the discourse surrounding the process of reconciliation in Rwanda
Chapter One: The Politics of Reconciliation in Rwanda As Mahmood Mamdani discusses, "the problem of Rwanda is first and foremost one of political power. Consequently, he posits, "[]here can be no reconciliation without a reorganization of power. Thus, in order to shed some light on what must occur for Rwanda' s process of reconciliation to become truly meaningful, and on how such a "reorganization of power might take place, this paper finds it necessary to first carefully examine the relationship between power, politics, discourse and reconciliation in contemporary Rwanda. Before launching into a discussion of this complex relationship, however, it is necessary to locate the relationship between politics and reconciliation within the existing literature on contemporary Rwanda. Turning thus to analyses of the current political milieu in Rwanda, two principal themes emerge. The first is the overwhelming concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the RPF, and the second is the equally evident authoritarian leanings and practices of the current RPF regime As noted in the previous chapter, the rPf has dominated Rwandan politics since it first came to power in 1994, after having brought an end to the genocide by means of the RPA's military victory. A recent report from leading international conflict monitor, International Crisis Group, however, notes that this dominance has not been confined to the political domain, but has extended well beyond the realm of politics. As of November 2002, the report notes, 13 out of 15 ambassadors are affiliated with the RPF...7 out of 9 security services are headed up by the RPF... [ with the remaining two] supervised by the rPF in junior posts .. all of the institutes of higher education are run by RPF members.8 out of 9 Rwandan banks are managed by RPF members.[and]25 out of the 29 leaders of the top state-run companies in Rwanda are RPF members. In addition, this report notes that eleven out of twelve governors, the prosecutor general, and, of course, the President of the Republic, Paul Kagame, are all RPF members I Mahmood Mamdani. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism. Nativism. and the Genocide in rwanda New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 268 2 International Crisis Group, "Rwanda at the End of the Transition: a Necessary Political Liberalisation,"13 November2002,<http://129.194.252.80/catfiles/2555.pdf(4April2004),11
23 Chapter One: The Politics of Reconciliation in Rwanda As Mahmood Mamdani discusses, “the problem of Rwanda is first and foremost one of political power.” Consequently, he posits, “[t]here can be no reconciliation without a reorganization of power.”1 Thus, in order to shed some light on what must occur for Rwanda’s process of reconciliation to become truly meaningful, and on how such a “reorganization of power” might take place, this paper finds it necessary to first carefully examine the relationship between power, politics, discourse and reconciliation in contemporary Rwanda. Before launching into a discussion of this complex relationship, however, it is necessary to locate the relationship between politics and reconciliation within the existing literature on contemporary Rwanda. Turning thus to analyses of the current political milieu in Rwanda, two principal themes emerge. The first is the overwhelming concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the RPF, and the second is the equally evident authoritarian leanings and practices of the current RPF regime. As noted in the previous chapter, the RPF has dominated Rwandan politics since it first came to power in 1994, after having brought an end to the genocide by means of the RPA’s military victory. A recent report from leading international conflict monitor, International Crisis Group, however, notes that this dominance has not been confined to the political domain, but has extended well beyond the realm of politics. As of November 2002, the report notes, “13 out of 15 ambassadors are affiliated with the RPF… 7 out of 9 security services are headed up by the RPF… [with the remaining two] supervised by the RPF in junior posts…all of the institutes of higher education are run by RPF members…8 out of 9 Rwandan banks are managed by RPF members…[and] 25 out of the 29 leaders of the top state-run companies in Rwanda are RPF members.”2 In addition, this report notes that eleven out of twelve governors, the prosecutorgeneral, and, of course, the President of the Republic, Paul Kagame, are all RPF members. 1 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 268. 2 International Crisis Group, “Rwanda at the End of the Transition: a Necessary Political Liberalisation,” 13 November 2002, <http://129.194.252.80/catfiles/2555.pdf> (4 April 2004), 11
Although ministers are drawn from all political parties, 12 out of 16 ministries have an RPF secretary general, and at the remaining four ministries, the ministers are RPF In explaining this last statistic, the report explains that the practice of appointing a politically diverse ministry while appointing exclusively RPF secretary-generals effectively"amounts to giving the ministers a post but no power, while the pro-RPF secretary-generals wield the real power. Various other scholars also discuss this pattern, including Gerard Prunier and conflict management expert Michael Dorsey. They note that, although the Rwandan regime feigns a democratic power-sharing arrangement with former opposition parties, this amounts to little more than a" make-believe exercise. Instead, this structure masks a pattern in which ministers from non-RPF parties are paired up with RPF individuals who, although apparently subordinate to the minister, are in fact invested by the administration with the real keys to political power in their inistry As Dorsey observes, " non-RPF ministers have showed a common characteristic since 1997-limited room to manoeuvre 7 As does the International Crisis Group report mentioned above, Dorsey emphasizes that this concentration of power in the hands of rPF members is not exclusive to politics but also extends to the economic sector. He notes that the leadership of such key Rwandan companies as Rwandex(Rwanda,s leading coffee exporter), Rwandatel(Rwanda's national telephone company), and Sonarwa insurance company are all affiliated with the RPF. As many scholar Between 1994 and August 2003, the RPF held power as a"transitional government, "as per the Arusha Accord of 1993. Presidential and parliamentary elections were recently held in Rwanda(in August and September 2003, respectively), making the RPFs hold on power at least apparently legitimate, but the fairness and freedom with which these elections were conducted were, as will be discussed in Chapter Three of this paper, highly questionable. Thus, although the government apparently holds the stamp of democratic"legitimacy, the degree to which it commands such legitimacy from the Rwandan population remains unclear Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994. History of a Genocide(New York: Columbia University Press,1997),369 7 Michael Dorsey"Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda, "in Ruddy Doom and Jan orus,eds, Politics of ldentity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region(Brussels: University Press,2000),316 lbid.324-325
24 Although ministers are drawn from all political parties, “12 out of 16 ministries have an RPF secretary general, and at the remaining four ministries, the ministers are RPF.”3 In explaining this last statistic, the report explains that the practice of appointing a politically diverse ministry while appointing exclusively RPF secretary-generals effectively “amounts to giving the ministers a post but no power, while the pro-RPF secretary-generals wield the real power.”4 Various other scholars also discuss this pattern, including Gérard Prunier and conflict management expert Michael Dorsey. They note that, although the Rwandan regime feigns a democratic power-sharing arrangement with former opposition parties, 5 this amounts to little more than a “make-believe exercise.”6 Instead, this structure masks a pattern in which ministers from non-RPF parties are paired up with RPF individuals who, although apparently subordinate to the minister, are in fact invested by the administration with the real keys to political power in their ministry. As Dorsey observes, “non-RPF ministers have showed a common characteristic since 1997 – limited room to manoeuvre.”7 As does the International Crisis Group report mentioned above, Dorsey emphasizes that this concentration of power in the hands of RPF members is not exclusive to politics but also extends to the economic sector. He notes that the leadership of such key Rwandan companies as Rwandex (Rwanda’s leading coffee exporter), Rwandatel (Rwanda’s national telephone company), and Sonarwa insurance company are all affiliated with the RPF.8 As many scholars 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Between 1994 and August 2003, the RPF held power as a “transitional government,” as per the Arusha Accord of 1993. Presidential and parliamentary elections were recently held in Rwanda (in August and September 2003, respectively), making the RPF’s hold on power at least apparently legitimate, but the fairness and freedom with which these elections were conducted were, as will be discussed in Chapter Three of this paper, highly questionable. Thus, although the government apparently holds the stamp of “democratic” legitimacy, the degree to which it commands such legitimacy from the Rwandan population remains unclear. 6 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 369. 7 Michael Dorsey “Violence and Power-Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” in Ruddy Doom and Jan Gorus, eds., Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region (Brussels: University Press, 2000), 316. 8 Ibid., 324-325
observe, this concentration of combined political and economic power in the hands of the RPF in effect constitutes the creation of a new akazu that mirrors the system of power and privilege that existed under the Habyarimana regime, a network that links politicians, military leaders and businessmen in pillaging state resources, misappropriating international aid, and reaping the benefits of the privatization of public companies This RPF "monopoly on power is made possible by the practice of overt authoritarianism. In this light, International Crisis Group reports that"Rwanda has been in the grip of a hazardous authoritarian drift over the last three years. During this time, the report notes, grass-roots political organizing has been banned, the"domain of public criticism [has been]. whittled away to nothing, and nearly forty key political leaders, both Hutu and Tutsi, have been forced into exile, ostensibly for challenging the RPF"party line. In addition, Pasteur Bizimungu, the President of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000, continues to be held in jail on what are widely considered,within the international human rights community to be questionable charges. 5A well-known international NGO, Human Rights Watch, corroborates this repressive trend, listing various other opposition party members who mysteriously"disappeared"in April 2003. The RPF Rony Brauman, Stephen Smith, and Claudine Vidal, "Politique de terreur et privilege d'impunite au Rwanda, Esprit 266-267(2000): 151 [translated by Radha Webley] International Crisis Group, Rwanda at the End of the Transition, 11 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 13 Ibid. 10 I4 Ibid., 11-12; For a similar discussion, also see Human Rights Watch, "Preparing for Elections Tightening Control in the Name of Unity, May 200%.ack pdt(4 April 2004) IS Pasteur Bizimungu, President of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000, and both an RPF member and a Hutu, was forced to resign in 2000 by the RPF party leadership acting in accord with the National Assembly. He was placed as president of rwanda by Paul Kagame, formerly Vice President of Rwanda and earlier major general of the RPA. This move did not entirely change the location of political power in Rwanda, however for it is widely understood that although Bizimungu held the post of President for the first six post-genocide years, Vice-President Kagame was in fact the most power ful individual in the Rwandan government izimungu was placed under house arrest in 2001 after launching a new political party, and was jailed in the Party for Democracy and Regeneration(PDR), was subsequently banned, though there were no laws the rwandan books at the time that prohibited the formation of political parties. He continues to remain in jail, now on charges including treason, embezzlement, attempting to form a militia, illegal possession of firearms, and threatening national security. See International Crisis Group, "Rwanda at the End of the Transition. 30 Human Rights Watch. 8-9
25 observe, this concentration of combined political and economic power in the hands of the RPF in effect constitutes the creation of a new akazu that mirrors the system of power and privilege that existed under the Habyarimana regime, a network that links politicians, military leaders and businessmen in pillaging state resources, misappropriating international aid, and reaping the benefits of the privatization of public companies.9 This RPF “monopoly on power”10 is made possible by the practice of overt authoritarianism. In this light, International Crisis Group reports that “Rwanda has been in the grip of a hazardous authoritarian drift over the last three years.”11 During this time, the report notes, grass-roots political organizing has been banned,12 the “domain of public criticism [has been]…whittled away to nothing,”13 and nearly forty key political leaders, both Hutu and Tutsi, have been forced into exile, ostensibly for challenging the RPF “party line.”14 In addition, Pasteur Bizimungu, the President of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000, continues to be held in jail on what are widely considered, within the international human rights community, to be questionable charges.15 A well-known international NGO, Human Rights Watch, corroborates this repressive trend, listing various other opposition party members who mysteriously “disappeared” in April 2003.16 The RPF 9 Rony Brauman, Stephen Smith, and Claudine Vidal, “Politique de terreur et privilège d’impunité au Rwanda,” Esprit 266-267 (2000): 151 [translated by Radha Webley]. 10 International Crisis Group, “Rwanda at the End of the Transition,” 11. 11 Ibid., 10. 12 Ibid., 11. 13 Ibid., 10. 14 Ibid., 11-12; For a similar discussion, also see Human Rights Watch, “Preparing for Elections: Tightening Control in the Name of Unity,” May 2003, <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503bck.pdf> (4 April 2004). 15 Pasteur Bizimungu, President of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000, and both an RPF member and a Hutu, was forced to resign in 2000 by the RPF party leadership acting in accord with the National Assembly. He was replaced as president of Rwanda by Paul Kagame, formerly Vice President of Rwanda and earlier MajorGeneral of the RPA. This move did not entirely change the location of political power in Rwanda, however, for it is widely understood that although Bizimungu held the post of President for the first six post-genocide years, Vice-President Kagame was in fact the most powerful individual in the Rwandan government. Bizimungu was placed under house arrest in 2001 after launching a new political party, and was jailed in 2002 for supposedly “illegal” political activities, accused of “advocating divisionism.” His political party, the Party for Democracy and Regeneration (PDR), was subsequently banned, though there were no laws on the Rwandan books at the time that prohibited the formation of political parties. He continues to remain in jail, now on charges including treason, embezzlement, attempting to form a militia, illegal possession of firearms, and threatening national security. See International Crisis Group, “Rwanda at the End of the Transition,” 30. 16 Human Rights Watch, 8-9