UNIVERSITY OF CALIF WAR CRIMES STUDIES CENTER SC Report on Rwanda Radha Webley Researcher L Introduction The crises that followed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda captured the world's attention, generating a morbid display of belated concern from around the globe. United Nations(UN) agencies, governmental bodies and nongovernmental organizations(NGos) from around the world rushed in to this tiny central African country with their humanitarian toolboxes ready for action, their sudden interest in helping Rwanda fueled by a potent cocktail of collective guilt mixed with much belated human empathy As nearly two million Rwandans fled their homes in the days, weeks and months following the genocide, approximately 2. 5 billion international aid dollars were funneled into the refugee camps that framed Rwanda's borders. In the years that followed, billions more dollars were spent by international donors toward the project of post-genocide humanitarian intervention and reconstruction in Rwanda. These dollars were critical in alleviating the surface level of the human catastrophe that faced Rwanda in July 1994. They helped to clean up the nearly one million bodies that were rotting in outhouses, roads, rivers and mass graves across the country. They provided basic healthcare services and food aid for thousands of Rwandan citizens. They assisted in the rebuilding of the many houses and buildings that had been destroyed during the months of killing. Finally, they helped to address the economic and political vacuum that was Rwanda in the months following the genocide, a project for which many international governments, agencies and organizations remain in Rwanda up to the present day Yet all of these dollars did not mask the fact that approximately 800,000 individuals had been brutally slaughtered in the space of three months, that Rwanda's pre-genocide population of approximately 8 million people had been quite literally decimated in the fastest mass killing in recorded history. They did not mask the fact that all of this had taken place while the Elizabeth Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbor's House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda(New York 001),249
1 War Crimes Studies Center University of California at Berkeley Report on Rwanda Radha Webley Researcher I. Introduction The crises that followed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda captured the world’s attention, generating a morbid display of belated concern from around the globe. United Nations (UN) agencies, governmental bodies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from around the world rushed in to this tiny central African country with their humanitarian toolboxes ready for action, their sudden interest in helping Rwanda fueled by a potent cocktail of collective guilt mixed with muchbelated human empathy. As nearly two million Rwandans fled their homes in the days, weeks and months following the genocide, approximately 2.5 billion international aid dollars were funneled into the refugee camps that framed Rwanda’s borders.1 In the years that followed, billions more dollars were spent by international donors toward the project of post-genocide humanitarian intervention and reconstruction in Rwanda. These dollars were critical in alleviating the surface level of the human catastrophe that faced Rwanda in July 1994. They helped to clean up the nearly one million bodies that were rotting in outhouses, roads, rivers and mass graves across the country. They provided basic healthcare services and food aid for thousands of Rwandan citizens. They assisted in the rebuilding of the many houses and buildings that had been destroyed during the months of killing. Finally, they helped to address the economic and political vacuum that was Rwanda in the months following the genocide, a project for which many international governments, agencies and organizations remain in Rwanda up to the present day. Yet all of these dollars did not mask the fact that approximately 800,000 individuals had been brutally slaughtered in the space of three months, that Rwanda’s pre-genocide population of approximately 8 million people had been quite literally decimated in the fastest mass killing in recorded history. They did not mask the fact that all of this had taken place while the 1 Elizabeth Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbor’s House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda (New York: Picador Books, 2001), 249
international community not only turned a blind eye to the violence that was brewing in the early months of 1994 Rwanda, but adamantly refused to take any substantive action to stop the violence once it had started. These dollars did not erase the pain of the hundreds of thousands of women and girls, some as young as two years old, who had been subjected to sexual violence of unspeakable brutality during the infernal months of 1994. Neither did they erase the pain of the many survivors who had seen their entire families slaughtered, many right before their eyes They did not return parents to the 95,000 children orphaned by the genocide. And, above all these dollars did not, could not have, dissipated the animosities, structured across ethnic lines that had provided the fuel for the genocide, and that had made this incomprehensibly gruesome political strategy an achievable reality in 1994 Rwanda Perhaps one of the most important aspects of international aid to post-genocide Rwanda however, one that seeks to address these very animosities at their socio-cultural roots, has been the concerted international involvement in supporting the process of post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda. In recognition of the central importance of this particular process in the context of contemporary Rwanda, this paper will focus on this one facet of Rwanda's post-conflict process Noting the fundamental inseparability of the process of reconciliation from the political intricacies of post-genocide Rwanda, as well as the evident dialectical interaction between post-genocide politics and this process of reconciliation, this paper will explore and analyze some of the many aspects of the relationship between politics and reconciliation in contemporary Rwanda. Before delving into this discussion, however, it is first necessary to understand the various historical processes that led up to the 1994 genocide, and that thus created a situation in which such a process of reconciliation has become not only necessary, but truly pivotal. In this light, this It is well documented that the UN, as well as many individual governments, were aware of the plans for the genocide months before it actually began. See Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Sto"ort Genocide in Rwanda(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999),18. Also see United Nations, "Rep Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 16 December1999,shttp://www.un.org/news/dH/latest/rwanda.htm>(7April2004) Binaifer Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 24 United Nations Childrens Fund, "Rwanda: Ten years after the genocide, n d fobycountry/rwanda genocide. html>(7 April 2004)
2 “international community” not only turned a blind eye to the violence that was brewing in the early months of 1994 Rwanda, but adamantly refused to take any substantive action to stop the violence once it had started.2 These dollars did not erase the pain of the hundreds of thousands of women and girls, some as young as two years old, who had been subjected to sexual violence of unspeakable brutality during the infernal months of 1994.3 Neither did they erase the pain of the many survivors who had seen their entire families slaughtered, many right before their eyes. They did not return parents to the 95,000 children orphaned by the genocide.4 And, above all, these dollars did not, could not have, dissipated the animosities, structured across ethnic lines, that had provided the fuel for the genocide, and that had made this incomprehensibly gruesome political strategy an achievable reality in 1994 Rwanda. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of international aid to post-genocide Rwanda, however, one that seeks to address these very animosities at their socio-cultural roots, has been the concerted international involvement in supporting the process of post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda. In recognition of the central importance of this particular process in the context of contemporary Rwanda, this paper will focus on this one facet of Rwanda’s post-conflict process. Noting the fundamental inseparability of the process of reconciliation from the political intricacies of post-genocide Rwanda, as well as the evident dialectical interaction between post-genocide politics and this process of reconciliation, this paper will explore and analyze some of the many aspects of the relationship between politics and reconciliation in contemporary Rwanda. Before delving into this discussion, however, it is first necessary to understand the various historical processes that led up to the 1994 genocide, and that thus created a situation in which such a process of reconciliation has become not only necessary, but truly pivotal. In this light, this 2 It is well documented that the UN, as well as many individual governments, were aware of the plans for the genocide months before it actually began. See Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 18. Also see United Nations, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” 16 December 1999, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/rwanda.htm> (7 April 2004). 3 Binaifer Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 24. 4 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Rwanda: Ten years after the genocide,” n.d., <http://unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_genocide.html> (7 April 2004)
chapter will now turn to an overview of select themes from Rwanda's history, and then to a background discussion of theoretical and comparative conceptualizations of the process that has become known in scholarly parlance as "post-conflict reconciliation Background to Genocide There are three principal ethnic groups in Rwanda- the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Throughout the 20 century, the numerical breakdown of these groups was approximately 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi and 1% Twa. Although Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity comprised the bulk of the individuals killed during the genocide, it is generally thought that this breakdown remains largely the same today and that the many Tutsi refugees that returned to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide replaced numerically the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis who were killed during this time. Given that the Rwandan genocide involved the systematic massacre of one particular ethnic group, it is tempting to attribute the genocide merely to primordial ethnic hatred and thus to relegate it to the realm of ancient and therefore intractable conflicts. Such a simple explanation, however, does not even begin to touch on the complex interplay of political, economic, historical and cultural factors that together gave birth to this mass human tragedy. Thus, in attempting to grasp the causative origins of the genocide, scholars point to everything from ethnic animosity to economic inequalit from colonial historyto political opportunism, and from ecological pressure to the vicissitudes of the stringent economic policy reforms that accompanied the World Bank's aid and loan packages. 8 Des Forges. 31-37. 6 The Rwandan refugee diaspora was the result of the events surrounding and following the 1959"Social Revolution "in Rwanda. During this time, many large-scale massacres of Rwandan Tutsis took place causing many Tutsis to flee to neighboring countries, particularly Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 7 Rwanda was first colonized by the Germans in 1897, and was taken over by Belgium in 1916 during World War I. Belgium officially relinquished its imperial control over Rwanda in 1962 For further discussions of the many factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide, see Des Forges Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001); David Newbury, "Understanding Genocide, African Studies Review 41, no. 1(1998): 73-97; Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994. History of a Genocide(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Peter Uvin Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda(west Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998)
3 chapter will now turn to an overview of select themes from Rwanda’s history, and then to a background discussion of theoretical and comparative conceptualizations of the process that has become known in scholarly parlance as “post-conflict reconciliation.” Background to Genocide There are three principal ethnic groups in Rwanda – the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Throughout the 20th century, the numerical breakdown of these groups was approximately 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi, and 1% Twa.5 Although Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity comprised the bulk of the individuals killed during the genocide, it is generally thought that this breakdown remains largely the same today, and that the many Tutsi refugees that returned to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide replaced numerically the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis who were killed during this time.6 Given that the Rwandan genocide involved the systematic massacre of one particular ethnic group, it is tempting to attribute the genocide merely to primordial ethnic hatred and thus to relegate it to the realm of ancient and therefore intractable conflicts. Such a simple explanation, however, does not even begin to touch on the complex interplay of political, economic, historical and cultural factors that together gave birth to this mass human tragedy. Thus, in attempting to grasp the causative origins of the genocide, scholars point to everything from ethnic animosity to economic inequality, from colonial history7 to political opportunism, and from ecological pressure to the vicissitudes of the stringent economic policy reforms that accompanied the World Bank’s aid and loan packages.8 5 Des Forges, 31-37. 6 The Rwandan refugee diaspora was the result of the events surrounding and following the 1959 “Social Revolution” in Rwanda. During this time, many large-scale massacres of Rwandan Tutsis took place, causing many Tutsis to flee to neighboring countries, particularly Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 7 Rwanda was first colonized by the Germans in 1897, and was taken over by Belgium in 1916 during World War I. Belgium officially relinquished its imperial control over Rwanda in 1962. 8 For further discussions of the many factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide, see Des Forges; Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001); David Newbury, “Understanding Genocide,” African Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1998): 73-97; Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Peter Uvin Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998)
Without denying this complexity, however, it must be stressed that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was, above all else, a political event. The violence of 1994 did not appear in a political vacuum Rather, it appeared in the context of a civil war in Rwanda that had begun in October 1990 as a result of military incursions into Rwanda' s northern region that were led by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army(RPA).In light of these ongoing invasions, and in the context of growing demands from moderate political voices to bring an end to the single-party state that had governed Rwanda since 1973, the Rwandan government, under the direction of President Juvenal Habyarimana, was faced with growing threats to its power. This sense of imminent threat was only reinforced by the Arusha Accord signed into law in August 1993. This internationally- monitored peace agreement mandated a transition to a power-sharing government in Rwanda This new"transitional government was intended to include a number of different political parties, to incorporate the Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF) into the Rwandan political structure and to integrate the armed forces with the RPA. In this context, the Arusha Accord, along with the menacing presence of the RPa on Rwanda's northern border, provided a clear enemy against which the exclusionary "Hutu Power movement. once an extremist political party relegated to the fringe" of Rwandan politics, could move into "the mainstream of respectable politics. This extremist movement forged an alliance with the akazu, the group that effectively monopolized the bulk of political power under the Habyarimana regime and that thus likewise balked at the threat of multi-party reforms. In this context, the Hutu The Rwandan Patriotic Army(RPA)was a guerrilla army originally formed in Uganda within a diasporic Rwandan population comprised primarily of Tutsi refugees(see Footnote 6). The sons of these early Rwandan refugees in Uganda eventually formed the RPA. See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers 159-184 The Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF, is the political party that evolved alongside the rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) d,. Des Forges, 123-125 Bruce D. Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process, "in Howard Adelman and Astri Republic of Rwanda, "The Arusha Peace Agreement, " nd http:/www.rwandal.com/government/historvfhtmi>(9April2004 12 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 189 IS Akazu, or"little house, "is the term commonly used to denote the group of individuals associated with President Habyarimana. This group exercised significant political power during the period of Habyarimana's rule, and included individuals who had special connections to the President either through regional affiliation or through family ties. It especially included the extended family of the Presidents wife
4 Without denying this complexity, however, it must be stressed that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was, above all else, a political event. The violence of 1994 did not appear in a political vacuum. Rather, it appeared in the context of a civil war in Rwanda that had begun in October 1990 as a result of military incursions into Rwanda’s northern region that were led by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).9 In light of these ongoing invasions, and in the context of growing demands from moderate political voices to bring an end to the single-party state that had governed Rwanda since 1973, the Rwandan government, under the direction of President Juvénal Habyarimana, was faced with growing threats to its power. This sense of imminent threat was only reinforced by the Arusha Accord signed into law in August 1993. This internationallymonitored peace agreement mandated a transition to a power-sharing government in Rwanda. This new “transitional” government was intended to include a number of different political parties, to incorporate the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)10 into the Rwandan political structure, and to integrate the armed forces with the RPA.11 In this context, the Arusha Accord, along with the menacing presence of the RPA on Rwanda’s northern border, provided a clear enemy against which the exclusionary “Hutu Power” movement, once an extremist political party relegated to the “fringe” of Rwandan politics, could move into “the mainstream of respectable politics.”12 This extremist movement forged an alliance with the akazu,13 the group that effectively monopolized the bulk of political power under the Habyarimana regime and that thus likewise balked at the threat of multi-party reforms. In this context, the Hutu 9 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was a guerrilla army originally formed in Uganda within a diasporic Rwandan population comprised primarily of Tutsi refugees (see Footnote 6). The sons of these early Rwandan refugees in Uganda eventually formed the RPA. See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 159-184. 10 The Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF, is the political party that evolved alongside the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). 11 Des Forges, 123-125; Bruce D. Jones, “The Arusha Peace Process,” in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., The Path of a Genocide (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Republic of Rwanda, “The Arusha Peace Agreement,” n.d., <http:/www.rwanda1.com/government/historyf.html> (9 April 2004). 12 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 189. 13 Akazu, or “little house,” is the term commonly used to denote the group of individuals associated with President Habyarimana. This group exercised significant political power during the period of Habyarimana’s rule, and included individuals who had special connections to the President either through regional affiliation or through family ties. It especially included the extended family of the President’s wife
Power movement, led by Colonel Bagasora(also the head of Habyarimana's Presidential Guard began to exercise unprecedented power within the politics of early 1990s Rwanda. During this time, anti-Tutsi ideologies were actively propagated, fears of"Tutsi power were revived and nurtured, and massacres against Tutsis began to be organized and implemented on a sporad basis across the country. Using the tutsis as a convenient scapegoat both for the heightening political threats and also for growing economic decline, political leaders effectively mobilized the Rwandan population against an ethnically-defined Tutsi threat. It was in this context that the 1994 genocide began, and that Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity, as well as politically moderate Hutu individuals and their families were murdered en masse 14 Although planned, organized and implemented at the highest levels of government, the genocide was nonetheless carried out by hundreds of thousands of ordinary Rwandans who used machetes and other small arms to torture rape and kill their victims. Scholars speculate about whether this mass participation was supported by fear of the consequences of refusing to engage in the slaughter, by hopes of personal gain, by a culture in which obedience to authority was both culturally mandated and deeply instilled, or simply by raw ethnic prejudice. Whether this mass participation can be attributed to any one of these factors or whether it must instead be understood as a combination of all of them, the fact remains that this killing was, for the most part, structured around ethnicity, and that it was fueled by a discourse of ethnic prejudice Ethnicity and Power in Rwanda: a Brief History Both as an ascriptive category and as a historical process, ethnicity in Rwanda is ridden with uncertainties. Although generally considered within academic scholarship to be a category that denotes cultural difference, ethnicity in Rwanda is not in fact a cultural marker, for the different ethnic groups in this country share the same language, the same customs, and the same For a full discussion of the political background to the genocide, see Des Forges, 47-93: Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 185-233 5 Mamdani. When Victims Become Killers.196 Ibid. 200: Prunier. 242-248
5 Power movement, led by Colonel Bagasora (also the head of Habyarimana’s Presidential Guard), began to exercise unprecedented power within the politics of early 1990s Rwanda. During this time, anti-Tutsi ideologies were actively propagated, fears of “Tutsi power” were revived and nurtured, and massacres against Tutsis began to be organized and implemented on a sporadic basis across the country. Using the Tutsis as a convenient scapegoat both for the heightening political threats and also for growing economic decline, political leaders effectively mobilized the Rwandan population against an ethnically-defined Tutsi threat. It was in this context that the 1994 genocide began, and that Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity, as well as politically moderate Hutu individuals and their families, were murdered en masse. 14 Although planned, organized and implemented at the highest levels of government, the genocide was nonetheless carried out by hundreds of thousands of ordinary Rwandans who used machetes and other small arms to torture, rape and kill their victims.15 Scholars speculate about whether this mass participation was supported by fear of the consequences of refusing to engage in the slaughter, by hopes of personal gain, by a culture in which obedience to authority was both culturally mandated and deeply instilled, or simply by raw ethnic prejudice.16 Whether this mass participation can be attributed to any one of these factors or whether it must instead be understood as a combination of all of them, the fact remains that this killing was, for the most part, structured around ethnicity, and that it was fueled by a discourse of ethnic prejudice. Ethnicity and Power in Rwanda: a Brief History Both as an ascriptive category and as a historical process, ethnicity in Rwanda is ridden with uncertainties. Although generally considered within academic scholarship to be a category that denotes cultural difference, ethnicity in Rwanda is not in fact a cultural marker, for the different ethnic groups in this country share the same language, the same customs, and the same 14 For a full discussion of the political background to the genocide, see Des Forges, 47-93; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 185-233. 15 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 196. 16 Ibid., 200; Prunier, 242-248