increasingly powerful connotation of ethnic polarization: Just as the Tutsi oligarchy derived an additional sense of corporate solidarity from its exposure to Western education and technology the Hutu as a group were made all the more conscious of their cultural and economic separateness by the ruthless enforcement of corvee labour and other types of [taxes The result of this growing ethnic polarization was the bloody 1959"Social Revolution that, first and foremost, targeted the Tutsi ruling elite, secondarily targeted the Belgian colonizers, and that eventually resulted in Rwanda's independence in 1962. This revolution was driven by a populist fervor, and demanded democratic reforms that would allow for popular participation in the political structure as well as an address to the widespread poverty and general rural discontent that characterized the majority Hutu population "Although the increasing ethnic polarization evident across Rwanda in the late 1950s gave it the "appearance of an ethnic revolution, the 1959 revolution, as Catharine Newbury explains, is best understood as a revolution of the peasants as a class rather than the Hutu as an ethnic group. Furthermore, although "Hutu consciousness was certainly a central driving force of the revolution as well as a product of the revolutionary movement, Newbury emphasizes that it was not Hutu leaders who"created this Hutu ethnic consciousness. Rather, she writes, " it would be more accurate to argue that tutsi chiefs, through their use and abuse of power, created Hutu consclousness46 Over forty years have passed since the formal end of the colonial era in Rwanda in 1962, but the patterns of ethnicity as the basis of political organization and the concomitant pattern of deeply embedded ethnic polarization have continued to characterize Rwanda s political environment over the course of the past forty years. As Mamdani underlines, the 1959"Social Revolution although it succeeded in overturning both Tutsi and Belgian political dominance in Rwanda 4 Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 79 C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 195; Pottier, 124 C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, I Ibid. 181 45Ibid.180-206 46Ibid.209
11 an increasingly powerful connotation of ethnic polarization:40 “Just as the Tutsi oligarchy derived an additional sense of corporate solidarity from its exposure to Western education and technology, the Hutu as a group were made all the more conscious of their cultural and economic separateness by the ruthless enforcement of corvée labour and other types of [taxes].”41 The result of this growing ethnic polarization was the bloody 1959 “Social Revolution” that, first and foremost, targeted the Tutsi ruling élite, secondarily targeted the Belgian colonizers, and that eventually resulted in Rwanda’s independence in 1962.42 This revolution was driven by a populist fervor, and demanded democratic reforms that would allow for popular participation in the political structure as well as an address to the widespread poverty and general rural discontent that characterized the majority Hutu population.43 Although the increasing ethnic polarization evident across Rwanda in the late 1950s gave it the “appearance of an ethnic revolution,” the 1959 revolution, as Catharine Newbury explains, is best understood as a revolution of the peasants as a class rather than the Hutu as an ethnic group. 44 Furthermore, although “Hutu consciousness” was certainly a central driving force of the revolution as well as a product of the revolutionary movement,45 Newbury emphasizes that it was not Hutu leaders who “created” this Hutu ethnic consciousness. Rather, she writes, “it would be more accurate to argue that Tuutsi chiefs, through their use and abuse of power, created Hutu consciousness.”46 Over forty years have passed since the formal end of the colonial era in Rwanda in 1962, but the patterns of ethnicity as the basis of political organization and the concomitant pattern of deeply embedded ethnic polarization have continued to characterize Rwanda’s political environment over the course of the past forty years. As Mamdani underlines, the 1959 “Social Revolution,” although it succeeded in overturning both Tutsi and Belgian political dominance in Rwanda, 40 Ibid., 207. 41 Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 79. 42 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 195; Pottier, 124. 43 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 192. 44 Ibid., 181. 45 Ibid., 180-206. 46 Ibid., 209
utterly failed either to challenge or to transcend the categories of Hutu and tutsi as the means of political organization "and instead embraced ethnicity as the basis for revolutionary mobilization As noted Rwanda historian Gerard Prunier notes, this independence movem rather than being a true "Social Revolution, "more closely resembled an"ethnic transfer of power, 4as illustrated by the hutu political monopoly that lasted from 1962 up until the 1994 genocide In light of this long history of ethnic relations, it is clear that ethnicity in Rwanda is both highly complex and often dangerously potent. As a category that has historically been used to structure cess to economic and political power, it is also a category with the power to evoke marked fear in the Rwandan people both fear of the lack of access to economic resources as well as fear of exclusion from political participation and representation. Furthermore, as it is a grouping that has historically been used to justify and to structure oppression and violence, it also has the power to evoke mortal fear both fear of individual death and also fear of collective elimination all of these fears came into play during the months preceding the 1994 genocide. During this time, fears of Tutsi power" and of a return to a remembered era of oppressive Tutsi rule were intentionally mobilized through the media as a powerful incitement to ethnic hatred and killing. Fears of Hutu massacres at the hands of the advancing(Tutsi-dominated )RPA were manipulated in a similar manner. False rumors were spread about tutsi attacks on Rwandan Hutus, and government officials and propagandists spread fears about Tutsi infiltration and attacks throughout the Rwandan countryside. In sum, fear was used as a political weapon. It was a weapon with a history, a history that made it strong enough to leave a tenth of Rwanda's population dead within the space of three months 47 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers,16 8 Mahmood Mamdani, "African states, citizenship and war: a case-study, "International Affairs 78, no. 3 2002):500 Gerard Prunier qtd. in Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 133 Des Forges, 65-89, Taylor, 151-179 s Des Forges, 78-79,88-89
12 utterly failed either to challenge or to transcend the categories of Hutu and Tutsi as the means of political organization,47 and instead embraced ethnicity as the basis for revolutionary mobilization.48 As noted Rwanda historian Gérard Prunier notes, this independence movement, rather than being a true “Social Revolution,” more closely resembled an “ethnic transfer of power,”49 as illustrated by the Hutu political monopoly that lasted from 1962 up until the 1994 genocide. In light of this long history of ethnic relations, it is clear that ethnicity in Rwanda is both highly complex and often dangerously potent. As a category that has historically been used to structure access to economic and political power, it is also a category with the power to evoke marked fear in the Rwandan people, both fear of the lack of access to economic resources as well as fear of exclusion from political participation and representation. Furthermore, as it is a grouping that has historically been used to justify and to structure oppression and violence, it also has the power to evoke mortal fear, both fear of individual death and also fear of collective elimination. All of these fears came into play during the months preceding the 1994 genocide. During this time, fears of “Tutsi power” and of a return to a remembered era of oppressive Tutsi rule were intentionally mobilized through the media as a powerful incitement to ethnic hatred and killing.50 Fears of Hutu massacres at the hands of the advancing (Tutsi-dominated) RPA were manipulated in a similar manner. False rumors were spread about Tutsi attacks on Rwandan Hutus, and government officials and propagandists spread fears about Tutsi infiltration and attacks throughout the Rwandan countryside.51 In sum, fear was used as a political weapon. It was a weapon with a history, a history that made it strong enough to leave a tenth of Rwanda’s population dead within the space of three months. 47 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 16. 48 Mahmood Mamdani, “African states, citizenship and war: a case-study,” International Affairs 78, no. 3 (2002): 500. 49 Gérard Prunier qtd. in Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 133. 50 Des Forges, 65-89; Taylor, 151-179. 51 Des Forges, 78-79, 88-89
Reconciliation: in theory, in post-genocide Rwanda, and in comparative perspective It was into this scene of mass destruction and death that the Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF) came into power in the months following the genocide. This party evolved out of the Rwandan Patriotic Army(RPA) that brought an end to the genocide, and has dominated Rwanda's government ever since. a party that was birthed out of the horror of genocide, the RPF, as the eader of the post- 1994 Rwandan political administration has inherited the responsibility of leading Rwanda through its process of post-conflict recovery. In partnership with various international community actors, whose guilty conscience has propelled them into an extremely active role in post-genocide Rwanda, the Rwandan government has been engaged in a massive project of national reconstruction and rebuilding over the course of the last ten years. Not only concentrating on the more tangible goals of economic and political reconstruction, however, this administration has also recognized the central importance of actively initiating and promoting a process of socio-cultural reconciliation as a key element of this fragile recovery stage. No mere feel-good" matter, this process of reconciliation is understood to be fundamentally critical to Rwanda's future, for if the animosities that provided the socio-cultural fuel for the government instituted genocide are not actively addressed and transcended, and the newer social tensions created as a result of these 1994 events likewise gone beyond, this recovering country will remain ever vulnerable to future occurrences of mass violence Before delving into a discussion of the particular nature of Rwanda' s own process of reconciliation, however, it is first necessary to take a step back, and to consider how the concept of "reconciliation"is understood theoretically in the context of post-conflict situations. The term reconciliation"itself embodies a variety of meanings. A word often associated with Christian concepts of forgiveness and mercy, it is also a term that evokes a psycho-social process of healing and regeneration. In looking specifically at the concept of reconciliation in post-conflict For an example of such an understanding of reconciliation, see Miroslav Volf, "The Social Meaning of Reconciliation, Interpretation 54, no. 2(2000): 158 Ronald J. Fisher, "Social-Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict Analysis and Reconciliation in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed, Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001),25-45
13 Reconciliation: in theory, in post-genocide Rwanda, and in comparative perspective It was into this scene of mass destruction and death that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) came into power in the months following the genocide. This party evolved out of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) that brought an end to the genocide, and has dominated Rwanda’s government ever since. A party that was birthed out of the horror of genocide, the RPF, as the leader of the post-1994 Rwandan political administration, has inherited the responsibility of leading Rwanda through its process of post-conflict recovery. In partnership with various international community actors, whose guilty conscience has propelled them into an extremely active role in post-genocide Rwanda, the Rwandan government has been engaged in a massive project of national reconstruction and rebuilding over the course of the last ten years. Not only concentrating on the more tangible goals of economic and political reconstruction, however, this administration has also recognized the central importance of actively initiating and promoting a process of socio-cultural reconciliation as a key element of this fragile recovery stage. No mere “feel-good” matter, this process of reconciliation is understood to be fundamentally critical to Rwanda’s future, for if the animosities that provided the socio-cultural fuel for the governmentinstituted genocide are not actively addressed and transcended, and the newer social tensions created as a result of these 1994 events likewise gone beyond, this recovering country will remain ever vulnerable to future occurrences of mass violence. Before delving into a discussion of the particular nature of Rwanda’s own process of reconciliation, however, it is first necessary to take a step back, and to consider how the concept of “reconciliation” is understood theoretically in the context of post-conflict situations. The term “reconciliation” itself embodies a variety of meanings. A word often associated with Christian concepts of forgiveness and mercy,52 it is also a term that evokes a psycho-social process of healing and regeneration.53 In looking specifically at the concept of reconciliation in post-conflict 52 For an example of such an understanding of reconciliation, see Miroslav Volf, “The Social Meaning of Reconciliation,” Interpretation 54, no.2 (2000): 158. 53 Ronald J. Fisher, “Social-Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict Analysis and Reconciliation,” in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed., Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 25-45
situations, however, one scholar explains that this term generally "refers to the processes by which parties that have experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable. In addition to this basic understanding, reconciliation in post-conflict situations is also often understood to be the process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, "which process provides a"base upon which justice and peace can be constructed. In sum, as one of many elements within the larger context of post-conflict peacebuilding, 6 reconciliation is seen as the socio-cultural part of this larger process that, in principle, renders the negotiated settlements and resolutions to the earlier violent conflict durable in the long-term. In this context, the central challenge of reconciliation is the reconstruction of a"single political community in which all sides of the conflict are incorporated within a single collective. A process that clearly focuses on socio-cultural concerns, it also must necessarily extend to the political and economic arenas of society, for many of the issues so essential to the reconciliation process, such as justice and peace, can only be accomplished by efforts that bridge the gap between culture the state and the economy Within this general definition of post-conflict reconciliation, different scholars nonetheless emphasize different aspects of the reconciliation process. Some scholars highlight its restorative intent, some focus on the mutual harmony and cooperation that must be reestablished between S4 Louis Kriesberg, "Changing Forms of Coexistence, "in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed, Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 48 Johan Galtung,"After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution: Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence. " in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed. Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 3 For a broader discussion of the peacebuilding process, see John Paul Lederach, Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, s8 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 266 Regeneration of War-Torn Societies(New York: St Martins Press, 2000), 17> in Michael Pugh, ed&g s Mahmood Mamdani, "The Truth According to the TR, "in Ifi Amadiume and Abdullahi An Na'im, ed The Politics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice(London: Zed Books, 2000), 182-183; Also Sophie Albert, "International Law and National Reconciliation in Peacebuildi Mamdani, "The Truth According to the trC, 182
14 situations, however, one scholar explains that this term generally “refers to the processes by which parties that have experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable.”54 In addition to this basic understanding, reconciliation in post-conflict situations is also often understood to be “the process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence,” which process provides a “base upon which justice and peace can be constructed.”55 In sum, as one of many elements within the larger context of post-conflict peacebuilding,56 reconciliation is seen as the socio-cultural part of this larger process that, in principle, renders the negotiated settlements and resolutions to the earlier violent conflict durable in the long-term.57 In this context, the central challenge of reconciliation is the reconstruction of a “single political community,”58 in which all sides of the conflict are incorporated within a single collective.59 A process that clearly focuses on socio-cultural concerns, it also must necessarily extend to the political and economic arenas of society, for many of the issues so essential to the reconciliation process, such as justice and peace, can only be accomplished by efforts that bridge the gap between culture, the state and the economy. Within this general definition of post-conflict reconciliation, different scholars nonetheless emphasize different aspects of the reconciliation process. Some scholars highlight its restorative intent,60 some focus on the mutual harmony and cooperation that must be reestablished between 54 Louis Kriesberg, “Changing Forms of Coexistence,” in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed., Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 48. 55 Johan Galtung, “After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution: Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence,” in Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ed., Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 3. 56 For a broader discussion of the peacebuilding process, see John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997). 57 Fisher, 26. 58 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 266. 59 Mahmood Mamdani, “The Truth According to the TRC,” in Ifi Amadiume and Abdullahi An Na’im, eds., The Politics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice (London: Zed Books, 2000), 182-183; Also see Sophie Albert, “International Law and National Reconciliation in Peacebuilding,” in Michael Pugh, ed., Regeneration of War-Torn Societies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 177. 60 Mamdani, “The Truth According to the TRC,” 182
mutual antagonists and/or between antagonists and victims, others stress the necessity of mutual renunciation of active feelings of hate, fear and desires for revenge 2 and still others see reconciliation as the locus where efforts to achieve truth, mercy, justice and peace conjoin Peacebuilding scholar John Paul Lederach's conception of relationship as the basis of sustainable solutions to violent conflict encompasses all of these different aspects. In sum, he proposes that reconciliation is a process of"building relationship between antagonists, a process that is "not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans- in- relationship. Lederach describes this process as an encounter which different groups' mutual concerns about both the past and the future can be openly discussed,and a mutually-shared vision of the future constructed. b6 Although the idea of " reconciliation"is closely related to the concept of"coexistence, many scholars take care to differentiate these two concepts. Johan Galtung, a scholar widely considered to be the founder of the discipline of "Peace Studies in fact divides the idea of coexistence into two categories, "passive coexistence" and"active coexistence. Conflict resolution scholar Louis Kriesberg expands on this distinction, pointing out that although coexistence"generally refers to an accommodation between members of different communities or separate countries who live together without one collectivity trying to destroy or severely harm the other, it is"often understood to go beyond this minimal level, to include a sense of mutual tolerance and even respect. While the former, or"passive"version of coexistence does not include the restorative depth implied in the term "reconciliation, the latter, or more"active"form of coexistence is in fact very similar to ideas of reconciliation, yet still suggests a much more passive concept than does the term "reconciliation It must be noted, however, that when the 6 Fisher. 26 62 Louis Kriesberg 1997, qtd in Fisher, 26-7 63 Lederach 29-30 Ibid. 34 65 Tbid 2 Ibid. 27 67 Galtung. 3 Kriesberg, "Changing Forms of Coexistence, "45
15 mutual antagonists and/or between antagonists and victims,61 others stress the necessity of mutual renunciation of active feelings of hate, fear and desires for revenge,62 and still others see reconciliation as the locus where efforts to achieve truth, mercy, justice and peace conjoin.63 Peacebuilding scholar John Paul Lederach’s conception of relationship as the basis of sustainable solutions to violent conflict encompasses all of these different aspects. In sum, he proposes that reconciliation is a process of “building relationship between antagonists,”64 a process that is “not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups’ affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship.”65 Lederach describes this process as an encounter in which different groups’ mutual concerns about both the past and the future can be openly discussed, and a mutually-shared vision of the future constructed.66 Although the idea of “reconciliation” is closely related to the concept of “coexistence,” many scholars take care to differentiate these two concepts. Johan Galtung, a scholar widely considered to be the founder of the discipline of “Peace Studies,” in fact divides the idea of coexistence into two categories, “passive coexistence” and “active coexistence.”67 Conflict resolution scholar Louis Kriesberg expands on this distinction, pointing out that although coexistence “generally refers to an accommodation between members of different communities or separate countries who live together without one collectivity trying to destroy or severely harm the other,” it is “often understood to go beyond this minimal level, to include a sense of mutual tolerance and even respect.”68 While the former, or “passive” version of coexistence does not include the restorative depth implied in the term “reconciliation,” the latter, or more “active” form of coexistence is in fact very similar to ideas of reconciliation, yet still suggests a much more passive concept than does the term “reconciliation.” It must be noted, however, that when the 61 Fisher, 26. 62 Louis Kriesberg 1997, qtd. in Fisher, 26-7. 63 Lederach, 29-30. 64 Ibid., 34. 65 Ibid., 26. 66 Ibid., 27. 67 Galtung, 3. 68 Kriesberg, “Changing Forms of Coexistence,” 48