culture. Because of this apparent inconsistency between the usual definition of ethnicity and the actual reality of ethnicity in Rwanda, scholars have long debated the origins of ethnic difference in Rwanda, and the question of whether this difference is based in class, better resembles the concept of"caste, or in fact reflects the distinct historical origins of the three Rwandan groupings. 18 What is resoundingly clear in examining the history of ethnicity in Rwanda, however, is that, more than anything, ethnicity in Rwanda is about power, a means of structuring access to and exclusion from political and economic power. It is for this reason that, when discussing ethnicity in the Rwandan context, the author finds it most useful to employ anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani's conception of ethnicity as political identity, a conception based on his argument that ethnic identity must be understood as a direct consequence of the way in which power is rganized in relation to the state. Such a "processual approach to ethnicity is also articulated by Catharine Newbury, a well-known historian of Rwanda, who maintains that ethnicity must be seen as a dynamic process that develops in relation to state power and political processes These particular interpretations of ethnicity are critical to understanding Rwanda, not only because they allow us to see the concrete political implications and origins of ethnicity, but also because they emphasize that ethnicity, rather than being a primordial, static, and thus insurmountable reality, is in fact a historical process. of equal importance this approach to ethnicity as "political identity allows us to extricate ourselves from the highly contested(and ultimately irresolvable)question of the historical origins of the Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda 21 es Forges, 31-38; Prunier, 1-40 For a taste of these debates, see Des Forges, 31-38: D. Newbury, 73-97; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 41-75 Mamdani. When victims Become killers. 2 Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988),14 2I There are two main competing interpretations of the nature of ethnicity in precolonial Rwanda. Some claim that in the precolonial era, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa lived in harmony, and that it was European colonialism that introduced and created cleavages between these groups. Others assert that the precolonial period involved the brutal conquest of the Hutu and Twa by the Tutsi "who imposed an oppressive exploitative rule, and that colonial rule only intensified these already-deep divisions. However, as historian Catharine Newbury points out, these two stances "reflect political positions more than valid historical reconstruction"and ignore the complex historical processes that have shaped the current form of
6 culture.17 Because of this apparent inconsistency between the usual definition of ethnicity and the actual reality of ethnicity in Rwanda, scholars have long debated the origins of ethnic difference in Rwanda, and the question of whether this difference is based in class, better resembles the concept of “caste,” or in fact reflects the distinct historical origins of the three Rwandan groupings.18 What is resoundingly clear in examining the history of ethnicity in Rwanda, however, is that, more than anything, ethnicity in Rwanda is about power, a means of structuring access to and exclusion from political and economic power. It is for this reason that, when discussing ethnicity in the Rwandan context, the author finds it most useful to employ anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani’s conception of ethnicity as political identity, a conception based on his argument that ethnic identity must be understood as a direct consequence of the way in which power is organized in relation to the state.19 Such a “processual approach to ethnicity” is also articulated by Catharine Newbury, a well-known historian of Rwanda, who maintains that ethnicity must be seen as a dynamic process that develops in relation to state power and political processes.20 These particular interpretations of ethnicity are critical to understanding Rwanda, not only because they allow us to see the concrete political implications and origins of ethnicity, but also because they emphasize that ethnicity, rather than being a primordial, static, and thus insurmountable reality, is in fact a historical process. Of equal importance, this approach to ethnicity as “political identity” allows us to extricate ourselves from the highly contested (and ultimately irresolvable) question of the historical origins of the Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda.21 17 Des Forges, 31-38; Prunier, 1-40. 18 For a taste of these debates, see Des Forges, 31-38; D. Newbury, 73-97; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 41-75. 19 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 22. 20 Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 14. 21 There are two main competing interpretations of the nature of ethnicity in precolonial Rwanda. Some claim that in the precolonial era, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa lived in harmony, and that it was European colonialism that introduced and created cleavages between these groups. Others assert that the precolonial period involved the brutal conquest of the Hutu and Twa by the Tutsi “who imposed an oppressive, exploitative rule,” and that colonial rule only intensified these already-deep divisions. However, as historian Catharine Newbury points out, these two stances “reflect political positions more than valid historical reconstruction” and ignore the complex historical processes that have shaped the current form of
In approaching Rwandan ethnicity as"political identity, this question of origins is relegated to the background and we can instead focus on the development of the meaning attributed to these categories, and on how people understand and have understood this distinction over time With this theoretical background in mind, it is possible to trace the linkages between ethnicity and power over the course of Rwandan history. This linkage was already evident in Rwanda long before Europeans, first German and then Belgian, established a presence there in 1897 Nonetheless, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about what ethnic categories actually meant in precolonial Rwanda and on what basis they were structured Many historians, for example, note that clear physical differences existed between the hutu and the Tutsi groups ,22 but just as many scholars underline the inconsistency of such physical difference as a marker of ethnic difference in precolonial times. At the same time, while it is generally agreed that Hutu as a group tended to be primarily agriculturists while Tutsi as a group tended to be cattle-herders, 3 scholars emphasize the need to historicize this occupational pattern as an artifact"created alongside the institutionalized power of the Rwandan state. Other explanations note that Tutsi as a category tended to denote access to economic power, while Hutu as a category tended to be marked by the lack of access to such power." Whatever the scholarly disagreements, however there is a general agreement that the precolonial categories of Hutu and Tutsi were fairly flexible, and were characterized by a relatively high degree of intermarriage as well as by socio-cultural processes that allowed individuals to move, over time, between ethnic groupings Nonetheless, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the flexibility of these categories started to diminish, and their political meanings began to increase. During this time, the Tutsi ethnicity in Rwanda. See Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda, "Africa 7oday45,no.l(1999) 22 The stereotypical construction of Tutsis envisions them as"extremely tall and thin, and often displaying sharp, angular facial features"(Prunier, 5). Hutus are stereotyped as being shorter, with flatter and broader facial feature unier Mamdani, When victims Become Killers, 51 PC Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 11-12 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 53-4; C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 12
7 In approaching Rwandan ethnicity as “political identity,” this question of origins is relegated to the background and we can instead focus on the development of the meaning attributed to these categories, and on how people understand and have understood this distinction over time. With this theoretical background in mind, it is possible to trace the linkages between ethnicity and power over the course of Rwandan history. This linkage was already evident in Rwanda long before Europeans, first German and then Belgian, established a presence there in 1897. Nonetheless, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about what ethnic categories actually meant in precolonial Rwanda and on what basis they were structured. Many historians, for example, note that clear physical differences existed between the Hutu and the Tutsi groups,22 but just as many scholars underline the inconsistency of such physical difference as a marker of ethnic difference in precolonial times. At the same time, while it is generally agreed that Hutu as a group tended to be primarily agriculturists, while Tutsi as a group tended to be cattle-herders,23 scholars emphasize the need to historicize this occupational pattern as an artifact “created alongside the institutionalized power of the Rwandan state.”24 Other explanations note that Tutsi as a category tended to denote access to economic power, while Hutu as a category tended to be marked by the lack of access to such power.25 Whatever the scholarly disagreements, however, there is a general agreement that the precolonial categories of Hutu and Tutsi were fairly flexible, and were characterized by a relatively high degree of intermarriage26 as well as by socio-cultural processes that allowed individuals to move, over time, between ethnic groupings. Nonetheless, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the flexibility of these categories started to diminish, and their political meanings began to increase. During this time, the Tutsi ethnicity in Rwanda. See Catharine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 (1999): 7. 22 The stereotypical construction of Tutsis envisions them as “extremely tall and thin, and often displaying sharp, angular facial features” (Prunier, 5). Hutus are stereotyped as being shorter, with flatter and broader facial features. 23 Prunier, 5. 24 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 51. 25 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 11-12 . 26 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 53-4; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 12
monarchy, their rule once confined to the central region of present-day Rwanda, began to undertake a major territorial expansion. It was in the process of this expansion that ethnicity in Rwanda began to acquire a distinct rigidity, as well as to acquire the polarized quality that it still holds today. This expansion entailed not only the physical extension of the Tutsi monarchy's rule but also the gradual consolidation and centralization of its political and economic power. This was accomplished by changes in the manner in which chiefship were allocated by the monarchical administration, by the introduction of new structures of patron-client relations, and by the state- sponsored revision of traditional structures of land ownership As Catharine Newbury points out, the collective result of these changes was a pronounced increase in the social stratification between the increasingly oppressed Hutu peasantry and the cattle-owning Tutsi ruling class, and the rigidification of the once-flexible categories of Hutu and Tutsi. In sum, this process involved the "transformation of the tutsi nobility into a well defined social class, the increasing association of the category"Tutsi with proximity to power(even though it was only a small Tutsi minority with such access to power), and the institution of a markedly stratified and hierarchical society ruled by a small section of the Tutsi class. It is also important to note, however, that although the central monarchy was predominantly Tutsi Rwanda's nineteenth-century political structure included not only the central monarchical together served as a system of checks and balances against the monarchical state y that administration, but also a complex system of overlapping(and multi-ethnic)chiefdoms 2 The Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda, which can be traced to the 14th century, was, during of the 19thcentury led by the nyiginya clan, one of 12 Tutsi clans in 19 century Rwanda. For a fuller discussion of this topic see Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 26-30, 499; Jan Vansina, L'evolution du royaume rwanda des origines a 1900 (Bruxelles: Academie Royales des Sciences d Outre-Mer, 1999) lan Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda(Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1977), 15-16 C Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 16-17, 38-40, 81-90: Vansina C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 12, 38-72 50 Linden, 17-18 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression,11,51 Rene lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Settings(London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1977), 77-8: C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 95-150
8 monarchy,27 their rule once confined to the central region of present-day Rwanda, began to undertake a major territorial expansion. It was in the process of this expansion that ethnicity in Rwanda began to acquire a distinct rigidity, as well as to acquire the polarized quality that it still holds today. This expansion entailed not only the physical extension of the Tutsi monarchy’s rule, but also the gradual consolidation and centralization of its political and economic power. This was accomplished by changes in the manner in which chiefships were allocated by the monarchical administration, by the introduction of new structures of patron-client relations, and by the statesponsored revision of traditional structures of land ownership.28 As Catharine Newbury points out, the collective result of these changes was a pronounced increase in the social stratification between the increasingly oppressed Hutu peasantry and the cattle-owning Tutsi ruling class, and the rigidification of the once-flexible categories of Hutu and Tutsi.29 In sum, this process involved the “transformation of the Tutsi nobility into a well defined social class,” the increasing association of the category “Tutsi” with proximity to power (even though it was only a small Tutsi minority with such access to power), and the institution of a markedly stratified and hierarchical society ruled by a small section of the Tutsi class.30 It is also important to note, however, that although the central monarchy was predominantly Tutsi, Rwanda’s nineteenth-century political structure included not only the central monarchical administration, but also a complex system of overlapping (and multi-ethnic) chiefdoms that together served as a system of checks and balances against the monarchical state.31 27 The Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda, which can be traced to the 14th century, was, during of the 19th century, led by the nyiginya clan, one of 12 Tutsi clans in 19th century Rwanda. For a fuller discussion of this topic, see René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 26-30, 499; Jan Vansina, L’évolution du royaume rwanda des origines à 1900 (Bruxelles: Academie Royales des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1999). 28 Ian Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda (Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1977), 15-16; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 16-17, 38-40, 81-90; Vansina. 29 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 12, 38-72. 30 Linden, 17-18; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 11, 51. 31 René Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Settings (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1977), 77-8; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 95-150
An understanding of the precolonial past, however, is not sufficient to fully fathom the contemporary nature of ethnicity in Rwanda, for colonization left indelible markings on Rwanda's ethnic structure. By the end of the colonial era, the linkages between ethnicity and power had been fundamentally altered as a result of the many changes wrought by the colonial state Beginning in 1897 with the establishment of German colonial rule in Rwanda, and continuing until 1962 when Rwanda officially gained its independence from Belgium, Rwanda's colonial administrators(first German, then Belgian) critically reinforced the growing tendency toward ethnically structured social stratification The European attitude towards ethnicity in Rwanda revolved around the Hamitic hypothesis This then-fashionable theory" held that all peoples exhibiting signs of true civilization"in Africa must have been descended from a superior"Caucasoid "race originally from northeastern Africa. In relation to Rwanda, this theory led to the construction of Tutsis as a group that was considered both foreign and also distinctly superior to the Hutu majority. As anthropologist Johan Pottier explains, "Belgian colonists contributed to the ideology of (elite) Tutsi self- consciousness an explanation of physical difference in terms of ancestral migration- for which there was no firm empirical basis-and they made all Tutsi superior, all Hutu inferior. This stands in stark contrast to the precolonial linkages between Tutsi and power, in which context it was only the Tutsi elite, primarily drawn from the nyiginya clan, who were socially constructed as superior to the Hutu This perceived racial divide was not purely ideological, but was translated into concrete institutional policies Implemented by the colonial state in Rwanda, these policies explicitly In the case of Rwanda, it was assumed that the precolonial Tutsi monarchy was evidence of foreign descent, for Europeans refused to believe that such a symbol of civilization"as a monarchy could have its as a group must be of foreign descent Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 74-5; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 35, 80 88; Prunier, 7; Des Forges, 36; Christopher Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of1994 (Oxford New York: Berg, 1999), 55-94 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),112
9 An understanding of the precolonial past, however, is not sufficient to fully fathom the contemporary nature of ethnicity in Rwanda, for colonization left indelible markings on Rwanda’s ethnic structure. By the end of the colonial era, the linkages between ethnicity and power had been fundamentally altered as a result of the many changes wrought by the colonial state. Beginning in 1897 with the establishment of German colonial rule in Rwanda, and continuing until 1962 when Rwanda officially gained its independence from Belgium, Rwanda’s colonial administrators (first German, then Belgian) critically reinforced the growing tendency towards ethnically structured social stratification. The European attitude towards ethnicity in Rwanda revolved around the “Hamitic hypothesis.” This then-fashionable “theory” held that all peoples exhibiting signs of “true civilization” in Africa must have been descended from a superior “Caucasoid” race originally from northeastern Africa.32 In relation to Rwanda, this theory led to the construction of Tutsis as a group that was considered both foreign and also distinctly superior to the Hutu majority.33 As anthropologist Johan Pottier explains, “Belgian colonists contributed to the ideology of (élite) Tutsi selfconsciousness an explanation of ‘physical difference’ in terms of ancestral migration – for which there was no firm empirical basis – and they made all Tutsi superior, all Hutu inferior.”34 This stands in stark contrast to the precolonial linkages between Tutsi and power, in which context it was only the Tutsi élite, primarily drawn from the nyiginya clan, who were socially constructed as superior to the Hutu. This perceived racial divide was not purely ideological, but was translated into concrete institutional policies. Implemented by the colonial state in Rwanda, these policies explicitly 32 In the case of Rwanda, it was assumed that the precolonial Tutsi monarchy was evidence of foreign descent, for Europeans refused to believe that such a symbol of “civilization” as a monarchy could have its origins in “savage” sub-Saharan Africa. Based on this assumption, the Europeans assumed that the Tutsis as a group must be of foreign descent. 33 Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 74-5; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 35, 80, 88; Prunier, 7; Des Forges, 36; Christopher Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (Oxford & New York: Berg, 1999), 55-94. 34 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 112
10 favored the Tutsi and effectively excluded the Hutu from all positions of power within both the colonial and the monarchical administrations, thus significantly sharpening the polarization of Hutu and Tutsi identities. Starting in 1926, the Belgians implemented a series of reforms under which Hutus were systematically removed from all positions of political power and the control of the existing Tutsi monarchy further centralized and concentrated. Furthermore, Hutus were indirectly excluded from access to political power by the denial of access to education, the gateway to political power under the Belgian colonial administration. These policies of ethnic differentiation were fully and finally codified with the 1933 Belgian introduction of mandatory identity cards. By including ethnic categories, these cards decisively rigidified the once flexible categories of ethnicity in Rwanda and also provided a practical means for the implementation of discriminatory policies and practices. In addition to thus constructing ethnicity as the basis both of political organization and political exclusion, the colonial era was also characterized by increasing economic exploitation along ethnic axes. This was closely linked to the process of political privilege described above, for the increased political power invested in Tutsi chiefs by the European colonial administrations, in combination with the destruction of earlier mechanisms of political accountability wrought by these administrations, effectively allowed the Tutsi chiefs to exploit their newly-enhanced power for their own economic gain 37 The result of this colonial reconfiguration of ethnicity was that on the eve of the 1959 revolution that led to Rwanda's independence, forty-three chiefs out of forty-five were Tutsi as were 549 sub-chiefs out of 559, and political power in Rwanda continued to remain largely confined within a "closed oligarchy of a few noble lineages"drawn from the ruling Tutsi class. The fundamental outcome of this system of ethnic privilege institutionalized under colonialism however, was not only increasing political and economic inequality, political oppression, and economic exploitation. More precisely, it was inequality, oppression and exploitation that carried 5> Des Forges, 35; Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 77-8; Prunier, 25 56 Linden, 152; Des Forges, 35 37 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression,117-121,131-40,151-2 38 Prunier. 27 C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 3
10 favored the Tutsi and effectively excluded the Hutu from all positions of power within both the colonial and the monarchical administrations, thus significantly sharpening the polarization of Hutu and Tutsi identities. Starting in 1926, the Belgians implemented a series of reforms under which Hutus were systematically removed from all positions of political power35 and the control of the existing Tutsi monarchy further centralized and concentrated. Furthermore, Hutus were indirectly excluded from access to political power by the denial of access to education, the gateway to political power under the Belgian colonial administration.36 These policies of ethnic differentiation were fully and finally codified with the 1933 Belgian introduction of mandatory identity cards. By including ethnic categories, these cards decisively rigidified the once flexible categories of ethnicity in Rwanda and also provided a practical means for the implementation of discriminatory policies and practices. In addition to thus constructing ethnicity as the basis both of political organization and political exclusion, the colonial era was also characterized by increasing economic exploitation along ethnic axes. This was closely linked to the process of political privilege described above, for the increased political power invested in Tutsi chiefs by the European colonial administrations, in combination with the destruction of earlier mechanisms of political accountability wrought by these administrations, effectively allowed the Tutsi chiefs to exploit their newly-enhanced power for their own economic gain.37 The result of this colonial reconfiguration of ethnicity was that on the eve of the 1959 revolution that led to Rwanda’s independence, “forty-three chiefs out of forty-five were Tutsi as were 549 sub-chiefs out of 559,”38 and political power in Rwanda continued to remain largely confined within a “closed oligarchy of a few noble lineages” drawn from the ruling Tutsi class.39 The fundamental outcome of this system of ethnic privilege institutionalized under colonialism, however, was not only increasing political and economic inequality, political oppression, and economic exploitation. More precisely, it was inequality, oppression and exploitation that carried 35 Des Forges, 35; Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 77-8; Prunier, 25. 36 Linden, 152; Des Forges, 35. 37 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 117-121, 131-40, 151-2. 38 Prunier, 27. 39 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 3