56 International Organization international bargains.The traditional and confederal alternatives display the his- torical range across which these ideas demonstrably mattered.30 Three points merit immediate clarification.First,I do not claim that ideas "mattered more"than other causes.Causality cannot be allocated meaningfully in percentage terms.Instead,my answer to the "how much"question specifies the range of historical outcomes dictated by each cause.Objective geopolitical and economic conditions ruled out autarchy or war in postwar Europe,causing some sort of international cooperation.3 They also made certain issues salient over time:coal and steel during early reconstruction,defense with the outbreak of the Korean War, and trade and atomic energy in the later 1950s.But objective trends never set the shape or extent of cooperation.Ideas,as a distinct cause,selected among three European formats with different institutional and material features.Second,French choices were necessary but not sufficient causes of European outcomes.If all accounts see French choices as pivotal,Benelux leadership (from Beyen and Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak)and German assent (from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer)were also crucial to the EEC.Third,my evidence is largely qualitative.Where possible I offer numbers to substantiate cross-cutting patterns, but my interview,archival,and secondary sources often sustain only estimates.Few precise figures are available.In France,leaders deliberately avoided divisive parliamentary votes that contrasted European alternatives.Most votes were called after policy choices,when leaders engaged coalitional pressures and side-payments to assemble support.Similarly,public opinion polls never contrasted policy options. They show mainly that many voters liked "Europe,"but knew little of European alternatives.Nonetheless,I submit,the evidence strongly supports my analysis. The section first presents how a new French debate emerged in the late 1940s. Then it narrates the French choices leading to the ECSC,EDC,and EEC.Finally, it considers why,if only"community"ideas led France to the EEC,these institu- tions survived when Charles de Gaulle brought"traditional"ideas to power in 1958. Three Models of French Interests Immediately after World War II,French elites largely agreed on their basic European strategy.Their primary goal was to keep Germany weak while rebuilding French strength.Their means were direct controls on occupied Germany,bolstered by alliances and economic cooperation with other European powers.32 The advent of the Cold War in 1946-47,however,partly blocked this strategy.The United 30.The only academic precedents to this argument are vague histories without specific causal claims: Lipgens 1977;and Brugmans 1965.McNamara's argument about ideas in the EU concerns ideas about economic policies,not Europe itself.McNamara 1998. 31.Here I allow competitors to pack many other institutionalized ideas (about the state,sovereignty. capitalism,democracy)into "objective conditions." 32.French disagreements before 1947 mainly concerned who the major European ally was against Germany:the Soviets,the British,or the Benelux and Italy.See Knipping 1990:Gerbet 1991:Young 1990:and Willis 1962
international bargains. The traditional and confederal alternatives display the historical range across which these ideas demonstrably mattered.30 Three points merit immediate clarification. First, I do not claim that ideas “mattered more” than other causes. Causality cannot be allocated meaningfully in percentage terms. Instead, my answer to the “how much” question specifies the range of historical outcomes dictated by each cause. Objective geopolitical and economic conditions ruled out autarchy or war in postwar Europe, causing some sort of international cooperation.31 They also made certain issues salient over time: coal and steel during early reconstruction, defense with the outbreak of the Korean War, and trade and atomic energy in the later 1950s. But objective trends never set the shape or extent of cooperation. Ideas, as a distinct cause, selected among three European formats with different institutional and material features. Second, French choices were necessary but not sufficient causes of European outcomes. If all accounts see French choices as pivotal, Benelux leadership (from Beyen and Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak) and German assent (from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer) were also crucial to the EEC. Third, my evidence is largely qualitative. Where possible I offer numbers to substantiate cross-cutting patterns, but my interview, archival, and secondary sources often sustain only estimates. Few precise figures are available. In France, leaders deliberately avoided divisive parliamentary votes that contrasted European alternatives. Most votes were called after policy choices, when leaders engaged coalitional pressures and side-payments to assemble support. Similarly, public opinion polls never contrasted policy options. They show mainly that many voters liked “Europe,” but knew little of European alternatives. Nonetheless, I submit, the evidence strongly supports my analysis. The section first presents how a new French debate emerged in the late 1940s. Then it narrates the French choices leading to the ECSC, EDC, and EEC. Finally, it considers why, if only “community” ideas led France to the EEC, these institutions survived when Charles de Gaulle brought “traditional” ideas to power in 1958. Three Models of French Interests Immediately after World War II, French elites largely agreed on their basic European strategy. Their primary goal was to keep Germany weak while rebuilding French strength. Their means were direct controls on occupied Germany, bolstered by alliances and economic cooperation with other European powers.32 The advent of the Cold War in 1946–47, however, partly blocked this strategy. The United 30. The only academic precedents to this argument are vague histories without specific causal claims: Lipgens 1977; and Brugmans 1965. McNamara’s argument about ideas in the EU concerns ideas about economic policies, not Europe itself. McNamara 1998. 31. Here I allow competitors to pack many other institutionalized ideas (about the state, sovereignty, capitalism, democracy) into “objective conditions.” 32. French disagreements before 1947 mainly concerned who the major European ally was against Germany: the Soviets, the British, or the Benelux and Italy. See Knipping 1990; Gerbet 1991; Young 1990; and Willis 1962. 56 International Organization
Origins of the EU 57 States demanded the rapid revival of a West German state and economy as bulwark and ally against the Soviets.Pressure increased with the Marshall Plan in June 1947, offering the French badly needed economic aid on the condition that they coordinate their recovery with Germany and other countries.33 These huge changes opened what Gerald Berk calls an "epochal moment"in French policymaking.34 Rapid change can destabilize how actors understand their interests.Innovative actors may assemble new ideational "frames"out of the "tool kit"of ideas present in their culture.35 Such innovations do not necessarily respond functionally to the new situation:adaptation of older framing ideas,or other new ideas,may suggest competing analyses.The result is a "battle of ideas"in which groups debate several viable strategies.This is what developed in France in the late 1940s.Major change in objective conditions brought new ideas to the fore but did not dictate their success.The rise of the super powers,the destruction of national economies,and domestic delegitimation of the nationalist far Right turned"Euro- peanist"projects-utopian musings before the war-into active options.36 But older ideas survived these objective shifts as well.The battle over postwar Europe remained to be fought. Some French elites held to traditional strategies.They retained a familiar realist analysis,with legitimacy and security located in the independent nation-state.If the attempt to block Germany's recovery had been frustrated,traditional options remained.Some direct controls on Germany could still be salvaged;military and economic alliances with other powers could still be sought;if necessary,bilateral deals could even be struck with the Germans themselves.All would uphold the balance of European power,protecting French interests better than uncontrollable international organizations.This was also more worthy of "great power"France, whose independence was sacrosanct,and whose peers were the United States,the United Kingdom,and the USSR-not the other Europeans. Another group favored "confederal"strategies.They based their analysis on liberal thinking:The nation-state remained the source of legitimacy and security, but like-minded states should cooperate closely,given their interdependence. France's natural partner was its liberal counterpart,Britain;together they would preside over pragmatic cooperation in broad European forums,while supervising the illiberal,atavistic Germans.Only combined Franco-British leadership would prevent the Germans from dominating Europe-ruling out narrower Franco-German projects.Broad but weak organizations could provide a platform for a European "third way"between the super powers,and for economic cooperation,without requiring direct losses of French sovereignty. 33.See Milward 1984:and Lundestad 1998. 34.Berk 1994.Similar notions are Ann Swidler's"unsettled periods,"Neil Fligstein's"institution- building moments,"Robert Unger's"context making"eras,and Robert Dahl's"historic commitments." See Swidler 1986:Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996:Unger 1987;Ackerman 1991;and Dahl 1986. 35.See Schon and Rein 1994:Snow et al.1986:and Kingdon 1984. 36.On interwar Europeanism,see Brugmans 1965
States demanded the rapid revival of a West German state and economy as bulwark and ally against the Soviets. Pressure increased with the Marshall Plan in June 1947, offering the French badly needed economic aid on the condition that they coordinate their recovery with Germany and other countries.33 These huge changes opened what Gerald Berk calls an “epochal moment” in French policymaking.34 Rapid change can destabilize how actors understand their interests. Innovative actors may assemble new ideational “frames” out of the “tool kit” of ideas present in their culture.35 Such innovations do not necessarily respond functionally to the new situation; adaptation of older framing ideas, or other new ideas, may suggest competing analyses. The result is a “battle of ideas” in which groups debate several viable strategies. This is what developed in France in the late 1940s. Major change in objective conditions brought new ideas to the fore but did not dictate their success. The rise of the super powers, the destruction of national economies, and domestic delegitimation of the nationalist far Right turned “Europeanist” projects—utopian musings before the war—into active options.36 But older ideas survived these objective shifts as well. The battle over postwar Europe remained to be fought. Some French elites held to traditional strategies. They retained a familiar realist analysis, with legitimacy and security located in the independent nation-state. If the attempt to block Germany’s recovery had been frustrated, traditional options remained. Some direct controls on Germany could still be salvaged; military and economic alliances with other powers could still be sought; if necessary, bilateral deals could even be struck with the Germans themselves. All would uphold the balance of European power, protecting French interests better than uncontrollable international organizations. This was also more worthy of “great power” France, whose independence was sacrosanct, and whose peers were the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR—not the other Europeans. Another group favored “confederal” strategies. They based their analysis on liberal thinking: The nation-state remained the source of legitimacy and security, but like-minded states should cooperate closely, given their interdependence. France’s natural partner was its liberal counterpart, Britain; together they would preside over pragmatic cooperation in broad European forums, while supervising the illiberal, atavistic Germans. Only combined Franco-British leadership would prevent the Germans from dominating Europe—ruling out narrower Franco-German projects. Broad but weak organizations could provide a platform for a European “third way” between the super powers, and for economic cooperation, without requiring direct losses of French sovereignty. 33. See Milward 1984; and Lundestad 1998. 34. Berk 1994. Similar notions are Ann Swidler’s “unsettled periods,” Neil Fligstein’s “institutionbuilding moments,” Robert Unger’s “context making” eras, and Robert Dahl’s “historic commitments.” See Swidler 1986; Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Unger 1987; Ackerman 1991; and Dahl 1986. 35. See Scho¨n and Rein 1994; Snow et al. 1986; and Kingdon 1984. 36. On interwar Europeanism, see Brugmans 1965. Origins of the EU 57
58 International Organization A third group called for a more radical departure from standard diplomacy,in "community"strategies.In their functionalist analysis-where legitimate policies were those that best provided welfare-two world wars and the rise of the super powers showed that Europe needed more than the nation-state.Only a new sort of "supranational"institution,partly independent of governments,could lead fractious Europe to peace and prosperity.In particular,weak intergovernmental accords could not hold the Germans down.In order to make such control acceptable to the Germans,however,France would have to submit to it as well.This might entail a break with the British,who abhorred supranationality.Thus a supranational solution meant forsaking the security of Franco-British balancing against Germany.But the result could be real“integration,”leading to a“United States of Europe'”as powerful and rich as the United States of America. If these models divided most clearly on the "German problem,"their key difference was not pro-or anti-Germanism.Some traditionalists soon proved quite willing to deal bilaterally with Germany.Others arrived at confederal or community strategies out of visceral fear of Germany unfettered.Instead,the fundamental distinctions concerned the "master frame"linking France itself and its European environment.In the slightly different vocabulary of John Searle,they suggested different"constitutive rules"about France as a player in a European game. 37 Each packaged a set of normative and causal claims that defined France's position vis-a-vis its neighbors. Crucially,these different views of Europe had no direct connection to the Right-Left cleavage that dominated French politics.Each model's constitutive rules were general enough to link to various lower-level "regulative rules";arguments soon arose that pictured a"community"Europe (and its competitors)as either advancing or impeding goals across Left and Right(except for the Communists).38 For the Left,a supranational community could undo conservative legacies at the national level-or mean capitulation to the German Konzerns.For the Right. supranational integration could open France to broader markets-or emasculate national strength and identity.Since Right,Left,and Center had their realists, pragmatists,idealists,Anglophiles,and even Germanophiles,domestic allies grav- itated to different European strategies.After several years of confusion,their positions crystallized around the ECSC proposal.Some elites sought to mobilize coalitions in favor of community projects;others in the same parties and bureau- cracies called for confederal or traditional alternatives. The Parting of the Ways:The ECSC The community model first entered French debates seriously with Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's proposal for a "European Coal and Steel Community"in May 37.See Searle 1995:and Ruggie 1998. 38.On ideas at different levels of generality.see Campbell 1998;and Goldstein and Keohane 1993
A third group called for a more radical departure from standard diplomacy, in “community” strategies. In their functionalist analysis—where legitimate policies were those that best provided welfare—two world wars and the rise of the super powers showed that Europe needed more than the nation-state. Only a new sort of “supranational” institution, partly independent of governments, could lead fractious Europe to peace and prosperity. In particular, weak intergovernmental accords could not hold the Germans down. In order to make such control acceptable to the Germans, however, France would have to submit to it as well. This might entail a break with the British, who abhorred supranationality. Thus a supranational solution meant forsaking the security of Franco-British balancing against Germany. But the result could be real “integration,” leading to a “United States of Europe” as powerful and rich as the United States of America. If these models divided most clearly on the “German problem,” their key difference was not pro- or anti-Germanism. Some traditionalists soon proved quite willing to deal bilaterally with Germany. Others arrived at confederal or community strategies out of visceral fear of Germany unfettered. Instead, the fundamental distinctions concerned the “master frame” linking France itself and its European environment. In the slightly different vocabulary of John Searle, they suggested different “constitutive rules” about France as a player in a European game.37 Each packaged a set of normative and causal claims that defined France’s position vis-a`-vis its neighbors. Crucially, these different views of Europe had no direct connection to the Right–Left cleavage that dominated French politics. Each model’s constitutive rules were general enough to link to various lower-level “regulative rules”; arguments soon arose that pictured a “community” Europe (and its competitors) as either advancing or impeding goals across Left and Right (except for the Communists).38 For the Left, a supranational community could undo conservative legacies at the national level—or mean capitulation to the German Konzerns. For the Right, supranational integration could open France to broader markets—or emasculate national strength and identity. Since Right, Left, and Center had their realists, pragmatists, idealists, Anglophiles, and even Germanophiles, domestic allies gravitated to different European strategies. After several years of confusion, their positions crystallized around the ECSC proposal. Some elites sought to mobilize coalitions in favor of community projects; others in the same parties and bureaucracies called for confederal or traditional alternatives. The Parting of the Ways: The ECSC The community model first entered French debates seriously with Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s proposal for a “European Coal and Steel Community” in May 37. See Searle 1995; and Ruggie 1998. 38. On ideas at different levels of generality, see Campbell 1998; and Goldstein and Keohane 1993. 58 International Organization