复旦大学：《文化人类学 Cultural Anthropology》阅读资料_China’s One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters

VANESSA L. FONG Research articles Chinas One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters ABSTRACT Urban daughters have benefited from the demographic pattern produced by China's one-child policy. In the system of trilineal kinship that has long characterized most of Chinese society, parents had little incentive to invest in their daughters. Singleton daughters, however, enjoy unprecedented parental support because they do not have to compete with brothers for parental invest- ment. Low fertility enabled mothers to get paid work and, thus, gain the ability to demonstrate their filiality by providing their own parents with financial support Because their mothers have already proven that daughters can provide their parents with old age sup- and because singletons have no brothers for their parents to favor, daughters have more power than ever before to defy disad- tageous gender norms while using equivocal ones to their own advantage. [Keywords: gender, family, fertility, demography, China N 1998, WHEN I FIRST started tutoring Ding Na, the scores, checking and rechecking her arithmetic, her eyes daughter of two factory workers in Dalian City, China, wide. "Are you sure you heard correctly? "her mother thought her father's attitude exemplified the asked. Ding Na was sure. She had scored higher than she bias against daughters portrayed in many studies of Chi- had ever scored on a practice exam in high school, and lese family life(Greenhalgh 1985a, 1994b; Harrell 1982; well above the likely cutoff for her top-choice four-year Salaff 1995; Wolf 1968, 1972). Although studious and well college. She shouted with joy as we congratulated her. Her behaved, Ding Na was often criticized by her father, who father beamed at her with tears in his eyes and said, " I was liked to remind her that he had always wanted a son. He wrong to have wanted a son. a daughter like you is worth worried that she might not score high enough to get into ten sons good four-year college, even though she usually ranked in e experiences of girls like Ding Na are quite differ the top 20 percent of her high school class on practice ex- ent from those of daughters who grew up in the patril ams."What will you do if you don't get into a good col- ineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal world described in classic lege? " he lamented. " If you were a boy, you could study studies of gender in Chinese societies(Andors 1983; Croll abroad while supporting yourself as a laborer, but what 1995: Greenhalgh 1985a, 1994b; Jaschok and Miers 1994; can a girl do abroad besides sit around waiting for remit- Stacey 1983; Watson 1986, 1996; Wolf 1968, 1972). The afford? Although her mother praised her devastating effect of gender norms on daughters of th for being more willing to help with chores than most world is evident in the life stories of women born prior to other teenagers, whenever Ding Na had trouble helping the 1950s, and to a lesser extent in those of women born her father carry groceries or move furniture, he snapped, in the 1950s and 1960s. girls born after Chinas one-child Girls are so useless. A boy would have no trouble with this. policy began in 1979, however, have more power to chal On July 26, 1999, when Ding Na's college entrance lenge detrimental gender norms and use helpful ones than between Ding Na and her father in a different light. I sence of brothers for their parents to favor y and the ab- exam scores were released, I began to see the relationship ever before, thanks to the decline of patrili stayed up with Ding Na and her parents as we waited well In this article, I argue that urban daughters born un past our bedtimes for her scores to become available der Chinas one-child policy have benefited from the hrough an automated phone hotline at midnight. After demographic pattern produced by that policy. By compa her call finally went through, she wrote down her subject ing the experiences of daughters born in the 1980s with AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 104(4) 3-1109. COPYRIGHT 2002. AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

VANESSA L. FONG Research Articles China’s One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters ABSTRACT Urban daughters have benefited from the demographic pattern produced by China’s one-child policy. In the system of patrilineal kinship that has long characterized most of Chinese society, parents had little incentive to invest in their daughters. Singleton daughters, however, enjoy unprecedented parental support because they do not have to compete with brothers for parental invest￾ment. Low fertility enabled mothers to get paid work and, thus, gain the ability to demonstrate their filiality by providing their own parents with financial support. Because their mothers have already proven that daughters can provide their parents with old age sup￾port, and because singletons have no brothers for their parents to favor, daughters have more power than ever before to defy disad￾vantageous gender norms while using equivocal ones to their own advantage. [Keywords: gender, family, fertility, demography, China] IN 1998, WHEN I FIRST started tutoring Ding Na, the daughter of two factory workers in Dalian City, China, I thought her father’s attitude exemplified the parental bias against daughters portrayed in many studies of Chi￾nese family life (Greenhalgh 1985a, 1994b; Harrell 1982; Salaff 1995; Wolf 1968, 1972). Although studious and well behaved, Ding Na was often criticized by her father, who liked to remind her that he had always wanted a son. He worried that she might not score high enough to get into a good four-year college, even though she usually ranked in the top 20 percent of her high school class on practice ex￾ams. “What will you do if you don’t get into a good col￾lege?” he lamented. “If you were a boy, you could study abroad while supporting yourself as a laborer, but what can a girl do abroad besides sit around waiting for remit￾tances I can’t afford?” Although her mother praised her for being more willing to help with chores than most other teenagers, whenever Ding Na had trouble helping her father carry groceries or move furniture, he snapped, “Girls are so useless. A boy would have no trouble with this.” On July 26, 1999, when Ding Na’s college entrance exam scores were released, I began to see the relationship between Ding Na and her father in a different light. I stayed up with Ding Na and her parents as we waited well past our bedtimes for her scores to become available through an automated phone hotline at midnight. After her call finally went through, she wrote down her subject scores, checking and rechecking her arithmetic, her eyes wide. “Are you sure you heard correctly?” her mother asked. Ding Na was sure. She had scored higher than she had ever scored on a practice exam in high school, and well above the likely cutoff for her top-choice four-year college. She shouted with joy as we congratulated her. Her father beamed at her with tears in his eyes and said, “I was wrong to have wanted a son. A daughter like you is worth ten sons.” The experiences of girls like Ding Na are quite differ￾ent from those of daughters who grew up in the patril￾ineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal world described in classic studies of gender in Chinese societies (Andors 1983; Croll 1995; Greenhalgh 1985a, 1994b; Jaschok and Miers 1994; Stacey 1983; Watson 1986, 1996; Wolf 1968, 1972). The devastating effect of gender norms on daughters of that world is evident in the life stories of women born prior to the 1950s, and to a lesser extent in those of women born in the 1950s and 1960s. Girls born after China’s one-child policy began in 1979, however, have more power to chal￾lenge detrimental gender norms and use helpful ones than ever before, thanks to the decline of patriliny and the ab￾sence of brothers for their parents to favor.1 In this article, I argue that urban daughters born un￾der China’s one-child policy have benefited from the demographic pattern produced by that policy. By compar￾ing the experiences of daughters born in the 1980s with AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 104(4):1098–1109. COPYRIGHT © 2002, AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Fong China's One-Child Policy 1099 the experiences of their mothers and grandmothers, I well-compensated work rather than using it to bear and show how singleton daughters have unprecedented power rear large numbers of children. Fertility is especially low to deal with gender norms in ways that benefit them. Al- when most women are expected to work at jobs incompat though I argue that low fertility has been a key factor in ible with childrearing. A high rate of female employment the empowerment of urban Chinese daughters, I do not is one of the strongest correlates of low fertility(Burggraf claim that it is the only necessary and sufficient factor. 1997; Essock- Vitale and McGuire 1988: 229, 233; Felmlee Low fertility can only empower daughters in areas where 1993; Gerson 1985; Sander 1990; Weinberg 1976).School- opportunities for employment and education are already ing is also likely to cause women to learn childrearing available to women. In the Chinese countryside, where practices that reduce infant mortality and, thus, reduce such opportunities remain out of reach for many women, the need to have large numbers of children, as Robert A ompulsory low fertility tends to frustrate women more Levine and his coauthors found in a 1983 study of Mexi- than it empowers them In cities like Dalian, however, it is can mothers' education and childcare practices(Levine et clear that daughters would have been less able to take ad- al. 1991 vantage of available opportunities if they had to compete Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo attributed gender inequal- with brothers for family resources, and if their mothers ity to a universal"opposition between the'domestic'ori had not demonstrated that women can support their par- entation of women and the extra-domestic or public'ties ents in old age that, in most societies, are primarily available to men (Rosaldo 1974: 17-18). The public sphere offers greater THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS possibilities for empowerment because, unlike the domes Studies of many developed and developing societies tic sphere, it involves formal roles, rights, and duties; the worldwide have documented a high correlation between authority that comes from lack of intimacy; the opportu- nity to achieve rather than be ascribed status; the power to low fertility and women's empowerment(Abadian 1996, create"culture"; the tendency to be categorized as the Balk 1997; Davis 1986; Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996 Keyfitz 1986; Sathar 1988). Although these studies have norm"rather than the anomaly", and control over the focused on low fertility as a cause and effect of mothers production of goods with greater cultural value(rosaldo empowerment, my findings suggest that more attention 1974: 25-35). This theory was later criticized by Rosaldo herself (1980)as well as by other feminist anthropologist should be paid to how low fertility affects daughters. The for relying on dichotomies that do not exist in all societies effects of China's one-child policy on mothers are equivo-( Collier and Yanagisako 1987; Mac Cormack and Strathern cal. On one hand, it has freed mothers from heavy child bearing and child-rearing burdens; on the other hand, it standing gender systems in societies like China, in which has deprived mothers of the freedom to choose their fam- gender inequality has long been based on distinctions be- by men and a nd enforcement tactics. The policy's effects on urban subordinate domestic sphere associated with women daughters, however, are largely beneficial In such societies, the adoption of a modern economy Low resistance to the one-child policy in cities like tends to increase women's employment rates and parental Dalian can be attributed to the rapid pace with which people bias against daughters tends to decrease when daughters in such cities have internalized the same cultural model of are seen as capable of earning money. This pattern was modernization that has caused fertility decline in many documented in late 1980s Taiwan(Stafford 1995) and in lates with the degree to which it has adopted a modern Rosenweig and Schultz 1982). When d i et al. 1995 societies worldwide. A society's fertility rate usually corre 1970s-1980s India (Kishor 1993: Murt economy in which child mortality is low, most people live modernization, the fertility transition enables and com- in urban environments in which children consume a lot pels women to devote themselves to work and education more than they produce, most mothers as well as fathers rather than motherhood. This is not always beneficial to work at jobs incompatible with childrearing, and exten- the first generation of women to experience the fertility sive education is widespread for both genders and seen as transition, since they tend to have been socialized to de the road to socioeconomic success. All of these factors are sire large numbers of children and may suffer when they kely to be both causes and effects of low fertility cannot realize this desire. It is much more beneficial. how Parents are likely to want few children in a modern ever, for daughters born to low-fertility mothers, since economy, in which children cannot contribute much to these daughters tend to be socialized from childhood to family income even though they cost a lot of time and value the educational and career success that the modern money to raise and educate(Aries 1996: 413; Handwerker economy and the fertility transition enable them to pur 3; Knodel et al. 1984; Oshima 1983). Daughters sue. Among my survey respondents, 32 percent(N without brothers are more likely to be encouraged to pur- 1, 215)of girls indicated that they hoped to remain child- sue advanced education and demanding careers that tend less all their lives. The fertility transition has also enabled to reduce fertility. Highly educated daughters have signifi- urban Chinese daughters to receive heavy parental invest- cant incentives to use their time to pursue prestigious and ment and remain filial all their livesan ideal that has

the experiences of their mothers and grandmothers, I show how singleton daughters have unprecedented power to deal with gender norms in ways that benefit them. Al￾though I argue that low fertility has been a key factor in the empowerment of urban Chinese daughters, I do not claim that it is the only necessary and sufficient factor. Low fertility can only empower daughters in areas where opportunities for employment and education are already available to women. In the Chinese countryside, where such opportunities remain out of reach for many women, compulsory low fertility tends to frustrate women more than it empowers them. In cities like Dalian, however, it is clear that daughters would have been less able to take ad￾vantage of available opportunities if they had to compete with brothers for family resources, and if their mothers had not demonstrated that women can support their par￾ents in old age. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS Studies of many developed and developing societies worldwide have documented a high correlation between low fertility and women’s empowerment (Abadian 1996; Balk 1997; Davis 1986; Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996; Keyfitz 1986; Sathar 1988). Although these studies have focused on low fertility as a cause and effect of mothers’ empowerment, my findings suggest that more attention should be paid to how low fertility affects daughters. The effects of China’s one-child policy on mothers are equivo￾cal. On one hand, it has freed mothers from heavy child￾bearing and child-rearing burdens; on the other hand, it has deprived mothers of the freedom to choose their fam￾ily size and subjected them to intrusive state surveillance and enforcement tactics. The policy’s effects on urban daughters, however, are largely beneficial. Low resistance to the one-child policy in cities like Dalian can be attributed to the rapid pace with which people in such cities have internalized the same cultural model of modernization that has caused fertility decline in many societies worldwide. A society’s fertility rate usually corre￾lates with the degree to which it has adopted a modern economy in which child mortality is low, most people live in urban environments in which children consume a lot more than they produce, most mothers as well as fathers work at jobs incompatible with childrearing, and exten￾sive education is widespread for both genders and seen as the road to socioeconomic success. All of these factors are likely to be both causes and effects of low fertility. Parents are likely to want few children in a modern economy, in which children cannot contribute much to family income even though they cost a lot of time and money to raise and educate (Aries 1996:413; Handwerker 1986:3; Knodel et al. 1984; Oshima 1983). Daughters without brothers are more likely to be encouraged to pur￾sue advanced education and demanding careers that tend to reduce fertility. Highly educated daughters have signifi￾cant incentives to use their time to pursue prestigious and well-compensated work rather than using it to bear and rear large numbers of children. Fertility is especially low when most women are expected to work at jobs incompat￾ible with childrearing. A high rate of female employment is one of the strongest correlates of low fertility (Burggraf 1997; Essock-Vitale and McGuire 1988:229, 233; Felmlee 1993; Gerson 1985; Sander 1990; Weinberg 1976). School￾ing is also likely to cause women to learn childrearing practices that reduce infant mortality and, thus, reduce the need to have large numbers of children, as Robert A. Levine and his coauthors found in a 1983 study of Mexi￾can mothers’ education and childcare practices (LeVine et al. 1991). Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo attributed gender inequal￾ity to a universal “opposition between the ‘domestic’ ori￾entation of women and the extra-domestic or ‘public’ ties that, in most societies, are primarily available to men” (Rosaldo 1974:17–18). The public sphere offers greater possibilities for empowerment because, unlike the domes￾tic sphere, it involves formal roles, rights, and duties; the authority that comes from lack of intimacy; the opportu￾nity to achieve rather than be ascribed status; the power to create “culture”; the tendency to be categorized as the “norm” rather than the “anomaly”; and control over the production of goods with greater cultural value (Rosaldo 1974:25–35). This theory was later criticized by Rosaldo herself (1980) as well as by other feminist anthropologists for relying on dichotomies that do not exist in all societies (Collier and Yanagisako 1987; MacCormack and Strathern 1980). Still, Rosaldo’s argument is useful for under￾standing gender systems in societies like China, in which gender inequality has long been based on distinctions be￾tween a superior public sphere dominated by men and a subordinate domestic sphere associated with women. In such societies, the adoption of a modern economy tends to increase women’s employment rates and parental bias against daughters tends to decrease when daughters are seen as capable of earning money. This pattern was documented in late 1980s Taiwan (Stafford 1995) and in 1970s–1980s India (Kishor 1993; Murthi et al. 1995; Rosenweig and Schultz 1982). When accompanied by modernization, the fertility transition enables and com￾pels women to devote themselves to work and education rather than motherhood. This is not always beneficial to the first generation of women to experience the fertility transition, since they tend to have been socialized to de￾sire large numbers of children and may suffer when they cannot realize this desire. It is much more beneficial, how￾ever, for daughters born to low-fertility mothers, since these daughters tend to be socialized from childhood to value the educational and career success that the modern economy and the fertility transition enable them to pur￾sue. Among my survey respondents, 32 percent (N = 1,215) of girls indicated that they hoped to remain child￾less all their lives. The fertility transition has also enabled urban Chinese daughters to receive heavy parental invest￾ment and remain filial all their lives—an ideal that has Fong • China’s One-Child Policy 1099

1100 American Anthropologist VoL 104, No 4. December 2002 long been valued by Chinese people of both genders but the experiences of the highest-ranked university graduates was usually only attainable by men who dominate intellectual discourse, or of the rural citi zens who constituted 64 percent( China Population Infor METHODS AND REPRESENTATIONS mation and Research Center 2001)of the Chinese popula Ding Na is one of the students I tutored in English during tion in 2000 two years of fieldwork (1997, 1998-2000) conducted in Dalian,a large coastal city(1999 urban population: THE ONE-CHILD POLICY 1, 977, 214)in Liaoning Province, northeastern China. To The primary aim of China's one-child policy is not to em- learn about the experiences of singletons, I conducted par- power women but, rather, to promote modernization by ticipant observation in a junior high school, a vocational reducing the number of people who must compete for re- high school, a college prep high school, and the homes of sources, both in the family and the nation. while the goal 107 families that invited me to tutor their children in Eng- of emancipating women from the burdens of high fertility lish or provide information about going abroad. I estab- was prominent in campaigns to promote the use of cor lished long-term relationships with 31 of these families traceptive technology during the 1950s and 1960s, gov- and participated in their social lives, leisure time, and eve- ernment propaganda promoting the one-child policy that ryday activities. I also conducted a survey of 2, 273 stu- began in 1979 tended to mention women's empowerment dents at the schools I studied. Only two of the 31 families only as an auxiliary benefit of the policy (White 1994) I befriended had more than one child. Only six percent of Contraceptive technology has enjoyed official approval in my survey respondents(n= 2, 167) had siblings the People's Republic of China since 1954, although it did The schools where I conducted my survey enrolled not become widely available until 1962. Family planning students from a wide variety of socioeconomic backgrounds, was voluntary until 1970, when Premier Zhou Enlai initi- although the most disadvantaged teenagers(such as those ated a population control campaign with paramount who were disabled or lacked urban citizenship)and the leader Mao Zedongs blessing. This campaign encouraged most elite teenagers(who were more likely to attend pi families to have no more than two children but it was un- vate schools, keypoint high schools, or study abroad pro- evenly enforced Strictly enforced fertility limitation be- grams)were underrepresented. Because of the midlevel gan in 1978, when government officials set a population statuses of the schools I studied, my survey results seem target of no more than 1.2 billion people by the year 2000, unlikely to deviate too far from the norms that might be and decided that a nationwide one-child policy was the found by a census or random sample of Dalian teenagers. only way to avoid exceeding this target (Liu Zheng 1981 Dalian's educational system divided high schools into six Peng Xizhe 1991). Despite widespread rural resistance that ranks of prestige. The nonkeypoint college prep high led to a de facto two-child policy in the countryside school I studied belonged in the second most prestigious ( Greenhalgh 1994a), China had close to its target popula category, and the vocational high school I studied be- tion in 2000, when a nationwide census counted a popula- longed in the fifth most prestigious category. The junior tion of 1. 27 billion( Chu 2001). In 1970, when population gh school I studied had the widest range of achievement control policies began, China's total fertility rate was six levels and socioeconomic statuses, since it admitted all births per woman; in 1980, two years after the start of the primary school graduates in its district without consider- one-child policy, Chinas total fertility rate was down to ing their exam scores or ability to pay. Almost all Dalian two births per woman( Coale and Chen 1987: Whyte and teenagers attended primary and junior high school and Gu 1987: 473). Farmers had higher fertility than urban most went on to secondary education as well(Dalian Shi residents even before the one-child policy, and two-child Jiaoyu Zhi Bian Zuan Bangongshi [ Dalian City Education families are the norm in rural areas, where farmers'over Records Compilation Office] 1999: 219-221, 394-426) whelming desire for sons who can serve as labor resources The tutoring and information I provided was only and old-age insurance has made the one-child policy diffi- useful to those who believed they had some chance of get- cult to enforce( Greenhalgh 1990, 1994a; Greenhalgh et ting high school or college degrees, going abroad, or get- al. 1994; White 1987, 2000). In urban areas, however, the ting work that required English skills. I suspect that most vast majority of women who married after 1978 have only urban singletons held this belief, since 94 percent (N one child. Compliance with the policy has remained high 2, 192) of survey respondents indicated that they were tu- in cities like Dalian even during the 1990s, when the costs tored or took private classes at some point in their lives, of violating the policy were reduced by rising incomes and and I seldom heard of urban singletons who thought they the decline of the state sector and its surveillance and en had no possible chance of upward mobility. Still, I cannot forcement mechanisms claim to have known families from all areas of Chinas so- Much of the literature on China's one-child policy has cioeconomic pyramid. Like my survey sample, my ethno- emphasized that compulsory fertility limitation harms wo- raphic sample does not include youth from the narrow, men. American opponents of China's one-child policy have extremely elite top or the wide, impoverished, rural bot- focused on abuses associated with the policy, such as cad- tom of that pyramid. My findings are not representative of res killing babies or physically forcing women to undergo

long been valued by Chinese people of both genders but was usually only attainable by men. METHODS AND REPRESENTATIONS Ding Na is one of the students I tutored in English during two years of fieldwork (1997, 1998–2000) conducted in Dalian, a large coastal city (1999 urban population: 1,977,214) in Liaoning Province, northeastern China. To learn about the experiences of singletons, I conducted par￾ticipant observation in a junior high school, a vocational high school, a college prep high school, and the homes of 107 families that invited me to tutor their children in Eng￾lish or provide information about going abroad. I estab￾lished long-term relationships with 31 of these families and participated in their social lives, leisure time, and eve￾ryday activities. I also conducted a survey of 2,273 stu￾dents at the schools I studied.2 Only two of the 31 families I befriended had more than one child. Only six percent of my survey respondents (N = 2,167) had siblings. The schools where I conducted my survey enrolled students from a wide variety of socioeconomic backgrounds, although the most disadvantaged teenagers (such as those who were disabled or lacked urban citizenship) and the most elite teenagers (who were more likely to attend pri￾vate schools, keypoint high schools, or study abroad pro￾grams) were underrepresented. Because of the midlevel statuses of the schools I studied, my survey results seem unlikely to deviate too far from the norms that might be found by a census or random sample of Dalian teenagers. Dalian’s educational system divided high schools into six ranks of prestige. The nonkeypoint college prep high school I studied belonged in the second most prestigious category, and the vocational high school I studied be￾longed in the fifth most prestigious category. The junior high school I studied had the widest range of achievement levels and socioeconomic statuses, since it admitted all primary school graduates in its district without consider￾ing their exam scores or ability to pay. Almost all Dalian teenagers attended primary and junior high school and most went on to secondary education as well (Dalian Shi Jiaoyu Zhi Bian Zuan Bangongshi [Dalian City Education Records Compilation Office] 1999:219–221, 394–426). The tutoring and information I provided was only useful to those who believed they had some chance of get￾ting high school or college degrees, going abroad, or get￾ting work that required English skills. I suspect that most urban singletons held this belief, since 94 percent (N = 2,192) of survey respondents indicated that they were tu￾tored or took private classes at some point in their lives, and I seldom heard of urban singletons who thought they had no possible chance of upward mobility. Still, I cannot claim to have known families from all areas of China’s so￾cioeconomic pyramid. Like my survey sample, my ethno￾graphic sample does not include youth from the narrow, extremely elite top or the wide, impoverished, rural bot￾tom of that pyramid. My findings are not representative of the experiences of the highest-ranked university graduates who dominate intellectual discourse, or of the rural citi￾zens who constituted 64 percent (China Population Infor￾mation and Research Center 2001) of the Chinese popula￾tion in 2000. THE ONE-CHILD POLICY The primary aim of China’s one-child policy is not to em￾power women but, rather, to promote modernization by reducing the number of people who must compete for re￾sources, both in the family and the nation. While the goal of emancipating women from the burdens of high fertility was prominent in campaigns to promote the use of con￾traceptive technology during the 1950s and 1960s, gov￾ernment propaganda promoting the one-child policy that began in 1979 tended to mention women’s empowerment only as an auxiliary benefit of the policy (White 1994). Contraceptive technology has enjoyed official approval in the People’s Republic of China since 1954, although it did not become widely available until 1962. Family planning was voluntary until 1970, when Premier Zhou Enlai initi￾ated a population control campaign with paramount leader Mao Zedong’s blessing. This campaign encouraged families to have no more than two children, but it was un￾evenly enforced. Strictly enforced fertility limitation be￾gan in 1978, when government officials set a population target of no more than 1.2 billion people by the year 2000, and decided that a nationwide one-child policy was the only way to avoid exceeding this target (Liu Zheng 1981; Peng Xizhe 1991). Despite widespread rural resistance that led to a de facto two-child policy in the countryside (Greenhalgh 1994a), China had close to its target popula￾tion in 2000, when a nationwide census counted a popula￾tion of 1.27 billion (Chu 2001). In 1970, when population control policies began, China’s total fertility rate was six births per woman; in 1980, two years after the start of the one-child policy, China’s total fertility rate was down to two births per woman (Coale and Chen 1987; Whyte and Gu 1987:473). Farmers had higher fertility than urban residents even before the one-child policy, and two-child families are the norm in rural areas, where farmers’ over￾whelming desire for sons who can serve as labor resources and old-age insurance has made the one-child policy diffi￾cult to enforce (Greenhalgh 1990, 1994a; Greenhalgh et al. 1994; White 1987, 2000). In urban areas, however, the vast majority of women who married after 1978 have only one child. Compliance with the policy has remained high in cities like Dalian even during the 1990s, when the costs of violating the policy were reduced by rising incomes and the decline of the state sector and its surveillance and en￾forcement mechanisms. Much of the literature on China’s one-child policy has emphasized that compulsory fertility limitation harms wo￾men. American opponents of China’s one-child policy have focused on abuses associated with the policy, such as cad￾res killing babies or physically forcing women to undergo 1100 American Anthropologist • Vol. 104, No. 4 • December 2002

Fong China's One-Child Policy 1101 sterilizations or abortions (Aird 1990; Mosher 1993) Earlier studies attribute much of the male dominance Scholarly studies of the one-child policy have focused on in Chinese societies to parents' preferential treatment of the suffering of women who long for additional children; sons over daughters( Greenhalgh 1985a, 1994b; Salaff are blamed by husbands and parents-in-law for giving 1995; Wolf 1968, 1972). My students' grandparents told birth to singleton daughters instead of sons; and face sur- me that, in their youth, daughters could not live with reillance, gynecological exams, mandatory contraception, their parents after marriage or provide nursing care or eco- fines, and the loss of benefits or jobs(Anagnost 1988, nomic support for their elderly parents. A sig 1995;Greenhalgh and Li 1995; Kaufman 1993; Wolf stacle to equality between daughters and sons in previous 1985). Even some Chinese feminists have expressed alarm generations was the assumption that daughters would not at the problems the one-child policy has caused for moth be able to support their parents in old age. Because of this ers(Greenhalgh 2001). Demographers have found an in- assumption, parents avoided investing family resources in creasingly skewed Chinese gender ratio, which may result daughters from female infanticide, parents' refusal to register daugh- Because most of my students' grandmothers lacked ters, parents' abandonment or lethal neglect of daughters, the financial resources to support their own parents, they sex selection through selective abortion, or some combi- could not contest the cultural expectation that daughters nation of these factors(Arnold and Liu Zhaoxiang 1986; would be less filial than sons. As early as the 1920s, lead Coale and Banister 1994; Johnson 1996; Li Yongping and g Chinese feminists of both genders have advocated Peng Xizhe 2000; Zeng et al. 1993) paid work as a key to womens emancipation (Lan and Fong 1999). Motivated both by feminist ideals and by a I do not discount the suffering caused by the one- child policy. However, i think a balanced view of the ef- desire to mobilize womens labor for national development, the Communist government began providing women fects of the policy must also take into account the ways in with employment opportunities soon after it took control which the low fertility produced by that policy has em of China in 1949. Yet many of my students' grandmothers powered urban daughters. As scholars working in other told me that they were too busy bearing and rearing chil- Chinese cities have pointed out(Gates 1993; Milwertz dren to take advantage of these opportunities. According 1997), the one-child policy seldom results in extreme acts to the high school and junior high school students I sur- of enforcement or resistance in urban areas, in which de- veyed in 1999, 81 percent(N= 1,998)of their fathers and sire for high fertility is far less intense than in rural areas 2 percent (N= 2,006)of their mothers had at least three While medical techniques for detecting the sex of fetuses siblings who survived infancy. "I got up at dawn, and by have been available (although illegal) in Dalian since the the time I had shopped, cooked, cleaned, and sewed clothes 1980s, the mothers of boys I tutored denied ever having for my five children, the sun would be down, "a grand sed abortion to avoid having daughters and maintained mother told me. Who would have done these things if I that only farmers would do this. Among my survey re- had gotten a job? Grandmothers were far more likely spondents, boys' parents were indeed more likely than than their husbands or children to have remained unem- girls'parents to have lived in rural areas. While I heard ployed all their lives rumors about farmers committing infanticide, physically The maternity leaves and medical problems caused by forcing women to undergo sterilizations or abortions, or frequent childbearing also hindered the careers of those abandoning or lethally neglecting daughters, I never women who did paid work during the 1950s and 1960s. "I heard of such abuses occurring in Dalian. Most Dalian par got to work upstairs in the factory office because I had ents I knew told me that it was acceptable to have just one gone to school, but I couldn't take a position of responsi- child, even if that child was female, and some even told bility because I always had to take time off when I got they were glad they had daughters instead of sons. pregnant, a grandmother told me. "After my fourth child They knew from their own experience that daughters my health was bad all the time, and I had to quit my job could fulfill the filial obligations once reserved for sons Grandmothers were far less likely than their husbands or Unlike their rural counterparts, my female students' par- children to work as cadres, managers, or white-collar workers ents were not desperate to have sons at any cost. at any point in their lives Many scholars writing about women's status in China THE LEGACY OF LOW-FERTILITY MOTHERS (Honig and Hershatter 1988; Stacey 1983; Wolf 1985)and elsewhere (Goldman 1993: Hochschild and Machung My students' mothers were able to begin the transforma- 1989 Molyneux 1985; Randall 1992; Steil 1995: Stockman tion of their societys kinship system from a patrilineal, et al. 1995)have argued that working women are bur- patrilateral, and patrilocal one to a bilineal, bilateral, and dened by having to work both a"first shift"of paid work neolocal one. This was at least partly because of the paid and a"second shift"of housework. Yet the single shift of work their low fertility enabled them to do. Paid work en- housework that a housewife did to take care of numerous abled women to provide their own parents with financial children in the 1950s and 1960s seems at least as exhaust- support in old age and, thus, prove that daughters could ing and time consuming as the combined first and second be as filial as sons hints of an employed mother who only had to take care of

sterilizations or abortions (Aird 1990; Mosher 1993). Scholarly studies of the one-child policy have focused on the suffering of women who long for additional children; are blamed by husbands and parents-in-law for giving birth to singleton daughters instead of sons; and face sur￾veillance, gynecological exams, mandatory contraception, fines, and the loss of benefits or jobs (Anagnost 1988, 1995; Greenhalgh and Li 1995; Kaufman 1993; Wolf 1985). Even some Chinese feminists have expressed alarm at the problems the one-child policy has caused for moth￾ers (Greenhalgh 2001). Demographers have found an in￾creasingly skewed Chinese gender ratio, which may result from female infanticide, parents’ refusal to register daugh￾ters, parents’ abandonment or lethal neglect of daughters, sex selection through selective abortion, or some combi￾nation of these factors (Arnold and Liu Zhaoxiang 1986; Coale and Banister 1994; Johnson 1996; Li Yongping and Peng Xizhe 2000; Zeng et al. 1993). I do not discount the suffering caused by the one￾child policy. However, I think a balanced view of the ef￾fects of the policy must also take into account the ways in which the low fertility produced by that policy has em￾powered urban daughters. As scholars working in other Chinese cities have pointed out (Gates 1993; Milwertz 1997), the one-child policy seldom results in extreme acts of enforcement or resistance in urban areas, in which de￾sire for high fertility is far less intense than in rural areas. While medical techniques for detecting the sex of fetuses have been available (although illegal) in Dalian since the 1980s, the mothers of boys I tutored denied ever having used abortion to avoid having daughters and maintained that only farmers would do this. Among my survey re￾spondents, boys’ parents were indeed more likely than girls’ parents to have lived in rural areas.3 While I heard rumors about farmers committing infanticide, physically forcing women to undergo sterilizations or abortions, or abandoning or lethally neglecting daughters, I never heard of such abuses occurring in Dalian. Most Dalian par￾ents I knew told me that it was acceptable to have just one child, even if that child was female, and some even told me they were glad they had daughters instead of sons. They knew from their own experience that daughters could fulfill the filial obligations once reserved for sons. Unlike their rural counterparts, my female students’ par￾ents were not desperate to have sons at any cost. THE LEGACY OF LOW-FERTILITY MOTHERS My students’ mothers were able to begin the transforma￾tion of their society’s kinship system from a patrilineal, patrilateral, and patrilocal one to a bilineal, bilateral, and neolocal one. This was at least partly because of the paid work their low fertility enabled them to do. Paid work en￾abled women to provide their own parents with financial support in old age and, thus, prove that daughters could be as filial as sons. Earlier studies attribute much of the male dominance in Chinese societies to parents’ preferential treatment of sons over daughters (Greenhalgh 1985a, 1994b; Salaff 1995; Wolf 1968, 1972). My students’ grandparents told me that, in their youth, daughters could not live with their parents after marriage or provide nursing care or eco￾nomic support for their elderly parents. A significant ob￾stacle to equality between daughters and sons in previous generations was the assumption that daughters would not be able to support their parents in old age. Because of this assumption, parents avoided investing family resources in daughters. Because most of my students’ grandmothers lacked the financial resources to support their own parents, they could not contest the cultural expectation that daughters would be less filial than sons. As early as the 1920s, lead￾ing Chinese feminists of both genders have advocated paid work as a key to women’s emancipation (Lan and Fong 1999). Motivated both by feminist ideals and by a desire to mobilize women’s labor for national development, the Communist government began providing women with employment opportunities soon after it took control of China in 1949. Yet many of my students’ grandmothers told me that they were too busy bearing and rearing chil￾dren to take advantage of these opportunities. According to the high school and junior high school students I sur￾veyed in 1999, 81 percent (N = 1,998) of their fathers and 82 percent (N = 2,006) of their mothers had at least three siblings who survived infancy. “I got up at dawn, and by the time I had shopped, cooked, cleaned, and sewed clothes for my five children, the sun would be down,” a grand￾mother told me. “Who would have done these things if I had gotten a job?” Grandmothers were far more likely than their husbands or children to have remained unem￾ployed all their lives.4 The maternity leaves and medical problems caused by frequent childbearing also hindered the careers of those women who did paid work during the 1950s and 1960s. “I got to work upstairs in the factory office because I had gone to school, but I couldn’t take a position of responsi￾bility because I always had to take time off when I got pregnant,” a grandmother told me. “After my fourth child, my health was bad all the time, and I had to quit my job.” Grandmothers were far less likely than their husbands or children to work as cadres, managers, or white-collar workers at any point in their lives.5 Many scholars writing about women’s status in China (Honig and Hershatter 1988; Stacey 1983; Wolf 1985) and elsewhere (Goldman 1993; Hochschild and Machung 1989; Molyneux 1985; Randall 1992; Steil 1995; Stockman et al. 1995) have argued that working women are bur￾dened by having to work both a “first shift” of paid work and a “second shift” of housework. Yet the single shift of housework that a housewife did to take care of numerous children in the 1950s and 1960s seems at least as exhaust￾ing and time consuming as the combined first and second shifts of an employed mother who only had to take care of Fong • China’s One-Child Policy 1101

1102 American Anthropologist VoL 104, No 4. December 2002 one child in the 1980s and 1990s. Both generations of and let wealthier siblings pick up the slack. Because most women worked all day, every day. The main difference is men earned more than most women, these wealthier sib that employed mothers had part of their work valorized lings were more likely to be brothers rather than sisters with monthly wages, which constantly reminded them as Still, my students'mothers had at least proven daughters well as their husbands, parents, and parents-in-law of were capable of providing financial support for their par their power and indispensability ents. This reassured my students' parents that their daugh Because of the Chinese government's policy of assign ters could have the same capability, especially if they were ing apartments that were too small to accommodate joint given the resources to take full advantage of socioeco families, most urban Chinese people have "networked nomic opportunities families"(Davis and Harrell 1993; Unger 1993), in which married children live neolocally but in close proximity to DEALING STRATEGICALLY WITH GENDER NORMS oth sets of parents. Only 17 percent of my survey respon- The strategy of raising a brotherless daughter to fill the dents(N=2,188)indicated that at least one grandparent kinship role usually reserved for sons was occasionally lived in their home. Neolocality allows couples consider practiced even in prerevolutionary China ( ordan 1972 able flexibility in the negotiation of relationships with 91-92: Pasternak 1985; Rofel 1999: 80-94). The approp both sets of parents. In the flexible kinship system en- ateness of such a strateg oo proclaimed by legends like joyed by urban families, paid work gave women the lever that of Mulan, a girl who took her fathers place in the age they needed to maintain ties to their own parents. As a army because he had no son old enough to do so. As a junior high school student's mother told her husband when he complained that she was giving too much money rare and difficult last resort, the strategy of raising a to her parents, Why shouldnt I give them the money daughter as a son"(guniang dang erzi yang) had little influ I' ve earned? You should be grateful that I don't give all my ence on dominant chinese cultural models or the scholars wages to them! who studied them. This strategy gained popularity after Elderly parents who were widowed or disabled usually the one-child policy made it a necessity for half of my stu- moved into an adult childs household. Which child they dents’ families. ended up living with depended less on gender than on in- Parents whose love, hope, and need for old-age sup terpersonal dynamics and on the amount of time and liv. port are all pinned on just one child tend to do whatever is necessary to make that child happy and successful, re- families, elderly parents rotated between all their children, gardless of the child's gender. Daughters and their parents staying a few weeks to a few months in the household of face the extra challenge of winning happiness and success each son or daughter. Regardless of their gender, adult in a society structured by gender norms that have long dis- children tended to contribute as much in care, compan advantaged women. They meet this challenge with a stra- ionship, money, and gifts to their parents as they could af. tegic combination of conformity and resistance ford. Many of my students' mothers provided monetary For academically unsuccessful daughters of poor par- support and nursing care for their own elderly parents ents, gender norms provide a means of upward mobility (often getting their husbands to help), most who per- through marriage and job markets unavailable to their formed annual worship rituals for their husbands' de- male counterparts. Women face a glass ceiling produced ceased parents also did so for their own deceased parents by their extra burden of domestic responsibility, by gender and some inherited money, goods, and housing from their norms that favor men in elite professions, and by in- parents. While 12 percent of my survey respondents(N= equalities between elite husbands and their less elite, hy 2, 187)were living with at least one paternal grandparent pergamous wives. Women also enjoy the protection of a at the time of the survey, 5 percent(N=2, 188)were living glass floor created by the hypergamous marriage system, with at least one maternal grandparent. Because of my stu- by gender norms that favor nonelite women in the educa dents'mothers'success in diverting resources to their own tional system, and by the rapidly expanding market for parents, my students'families accept that daughters can feminine jobs in the service and light industry sectors be as filial as sons This glass floor makes it less likely that women will sink to My students'mothers were not able to completely the bottom of society, into poverty, crime, and unemploy obliterate patrilineal assumptions Because women tended ment. Men have neither the obstacle of the glass ceiling to earn less than men, they also tended to contribute less nor the protection of the glass floor. While elite men are to their parents than their brothers could. This became es- more likely than their female counterparts to rise to the pecially apparent in the 1990s, after the economic reforms top of their society, nonelite men are also more likely than caused layoffs and early retirements that disproportion- their female counterparts to fall to the bottom. ately targeted women. According to survey respondents, 25 percent of their mothers(N= 2, 190)and 12 percent of ple's expectations of how males and females would be- their fathers(N= 2, 190)have been laid off or given early have. They were not interested in debating the extent to retirement. Men and women who lost their jobs tended to which such expectations corresponded with the way peo- reduce the financial support they provided their parents ple actually behaved. Rather, they focused on weighing

one child in the 1980s and 1990s. Both generations of women worked all day, every day. The main difference is that employed mothers had part of their work valorized with monthly wages, which constantly reminded them as well as their husbands, parents, and parents-in-law of their power and indispensability. Because of the Chinese government’s policy of assign￾ing apartments that were too small to accommodate joint families, most urban Chinese people have “networked families” (Davis and Harrell 1993; Unger 1993), in which married children live neolocally but in close proximity to both sets of parents. Only 17 percent of my survey respon￾dents (N = 2,188) indicated that at least one grandparent lived in their home. Neolocality allows couples consider￾able flexibility in the negotiation of relationships with both sets of parents. In the flexible kinship system en￾joyed by urban families, paid work gave women the lever￾age they needed to maintain ties to their own parents. As a junior high school student’s mother told her husband when he complained that she was giving too much money to her parents, “Why shouldn’t I give them the money I’ve earned? You should be grateful that I don’t give all my wages to them!” Elderly parents who were widowed or disabled usually moved into an adult child’s household. Which child they ended up living with depended less on gender than on in￾terpersonal dynamics and on the amount of time and liv￾ing space each child’s household could spare. In many families, elderly parents rotated between all their children, staying a few weeks to a few months in the household of each son or daughter. Regardless of their gender, adult children tended to contribute as much in care, compan￾ionship, money, and gifts to their parents as they could af￾ford. Many of my students’ mothers provided monetary support and nursing care for their own elderly parents (often getting their husbands to help), most who per￾formed annual worship rituals for their husbands’ de￾ceased parents also did so for their own deceased parents, and some inherited money, goods, and housing from their parents. While 12 percent of my survey respondents (N = 2,187) were living with at least one paternal grandparent at the time of the survey, 5 percent (N = 2,188) were living with at least one maternal grandparent. Because of my stu￾dents’ mothers’ success in diverting resources to their own parents, my students’ families accept that daughters can be as filial as sons. My students’ mothers were not able to completely obliterate patrilineal assumptions. Because women tended to earn less than men, they also tended to contribute less to their parents than their brothers could. This became es￾pecially apparent in the 1990s, after the economic reforms caused layoffs and early retirements that disproportion￾ately targeted women. According to survey respondents, 25 percent of their mothers (N = 2,190) and 12 percent of their fathers (N = 2,190) have been laid off or given early retirement. Men and women who lost their jobs tended to reduce the financial support they provided their parents and let wealthier siblings pick up the slack. Because most men earned more than most women, these wealthier sib￾lings were more likely to be brothers rather than sisters. Still, my students’ mothers had at least proven daughters were capable of providing financial support for their par￾ents. This reassured my students’ parents that their daugh￾ters could have the same capability, especially if they were given the resources to take full advantage of socioeco￾nomic opportunities. DEALING STRATEGICALLY WITH GENDER NORMS The strategy of raising a brotherless daughter to fill the kinship role usually reserved for sons was occasionally practiced even in prerevolutionary China (Jordan 1972: 91–92; Pasternak 1985; Rofel 1999:80–94). The appropri￾ateness of such a strategy was proclaimed by legends like that of Mulan, a girl who took her father’s place in the army because he had no son old enough to do so.6 As a rare and difficult last resort, the strategy of “raising a daughter as a son” (guniang dang erzi yang) had little influ￾ence on dominant Chinese cultural models or the scholars who studied them. This strategy gained popularity after the one-child policy made it a necessity for half of my stu￾dents’ families. Parents whose love, hope, and need for old-age sup￾port are all pinned on just one child tend to do whatever is necessary to make that child happy and successful, re￾gardless of the child’s gender. Daughters and their parents face the extra challenge of winning happiness and success in a society structured by gender norms that have long dis￾advantaged women. They meet this challenge with a stra￾tegic combination of conformity and resistance. For academically unsuccessful daughters of poor par￾ents, gender norms provide a means of upward mobility through marriage and job markets unavailable to their male counterparts. Women face a glass ceiling produced by their extra burden of domestic responsibility, by gender norms that favor men in elite professions, and by in￾equalities between elite husbands and their less elite, hy￾pergamous wives. Women also enjoy the protection of a glass floor created by the hypergamous marriage system, by gender norms that favor nonelite women in the educa￾tional system, and by the rapidly expanding market for feminine jobs in the service and light industry sectors. This glass floor makes it less likely that women will sink to the bottom of society, into poverty, crime, and unemploy￾ment. Men have neither the obstacle of the glass ceiling nor the protection of the glass floor. While elite men are more likely than their female counterparts to rise to the top of their society, nonelite men are also more likely than their female counterparts to fall to the bottom. My students and their parents often talked about peo￾ple’s expectations of how males and females would be￾have. They were not interested in debating the extent to which such expectations corresponded with the way peo￾ple actually behaved. Rather, they focused on weighing 1102 American Anthropologist • Vol. 104, No. 4 • December 2002