INTRODUCTION argument of the Republic is that stated here. The sixth book continues this topic with an en eration of the qualities of the perfect student, the natural endowments that are the prercq the higher education (485 ff. and the reasons why so few(196 A) of those thus fortunately endowed saved(494 A) for philosophy from th e corrupti influences of the crowd and the crowd-compellir sophists. b In an ideal state these sports of nature (as Huxley styles them) will be systematically selected (499 n ff. ested through all the stages of ordinary education and finally conducted by the longer way(504 n with 135 D) of the higher education in the abstract sciences the idea of good, which will be their guide in the con duct of the This simple thought is expressee a series of symbols-the sun(506 E ff.), the divided line(509 D), the cave(514 ff. )-which has obscured its plain meaning for the majority of readers. o For the purposes of the Republic and apart from disputabl metaphysical implications it means simply that ethi and politics ought to be something more than mere empiricism. Their principles and practice must be consistently related to a learly conceived final standard and ideal of human welfare and good. To conceive such a standard and apply it systematically a Cf. The Unity of Plato's Thought, PP 55-56 of Plat in Hastings, Encyelopaed Religion and eth XVIll
INTRODUCTION physical implications of this passage " its practical significance for the higher education and the main argument of the Republic is that stated here. The sixth book continues this topic with an enumeration of the qualities of the perfect student, the natural endowments that are the prerequisites of the higher education (4-85 ff.) and the reasons why so few (496 a) of those thus fortunately endowed are saved (-tQ* a) for philosophy from the corrupting influences of the crowd and the crowd-compelling sophists.'' In an ideal state these sports of nature (as Huxley styles them) will be systematically selected (499 b ff.), tested through all the stages of ordinary education and finally conducted by the longer way (504 b with 435 d) of the higher education in the abstract sciences and mathematics and dialectics to the apprehension of the idea of good, which will be their guide in the con- duct of the state. This simple thought is expressed in a series of symbols—the sun (506 e ff.), the divided line (509 d), the cave (514 ff.) —which has obscured its plain meaning for the majority of readers." For the purposes of the Republic and apart from disputable metaphysical implications it means simply that ethics and politics ought to be something more than mere empiricism. Their principles and practice must be consistently related to a '^learly conceived final standard and ideal of human welfare and good. To conceive such a standard and apply it systematically » Cf. The Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 55-56. " Cf. 490 E, 492 ff. ' Cf. my paper on " The Idea of Good," The Unity of Plato's Thovffht, pp. 16 ff. and 74, and my article '* Summum Bonum " in Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics
INTRODUCTION to the complications of institutions, law, and educa tion is possible only for first-class minds who have undergone a severe discipline in abstract thought supplemented by a long experience in affairs(484 A 589E). But it is even more impossible that the multitude should be critics than that they should be philosophers(+9+ A). And so this which is Plato's olain meaning has been lost in the literature of mystic and fanciful interpretation of the imagery in which he clothes it. From these heights the seventh book descends to a sober account of the higher education in the mathematical sciences and dialectic (521 c ff.). The assage is an interesting document for Plato's con ception of education and perhaps for the practice in the chief text for the e con & nd the place s tion of Plato's attitude towards science troverted qu of Platonism in the history of science ut it need not further detain us here. a This book in a sense, completes the description of the ideal state The eighth book, one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato, is a rapid survey of the diver- gence, the progressive degeneracy from the ideal state in the four types to which Plato thinks the tiresome infinity of the forms of government that These are the timocracy, whose principle is honor 15c ff.), the oligarchy, which regards (550c ff, 551 c), the democracy, whose slogan is .my paper. "Platonism 27,pp,17I在
INTRODUCTION to the complications of institutions, law, and education is possible only for first-class minds who have undergone a severe discipline in abstract thought, supplemented by a long experience in affairs (-tS-i a, 539 e). But it is even more impossible that the multitude should be critics than that they should be philosophers (49^ a). And so this which is Plato's plain meaning has been lost in the literature of mystic and fanciful interpretation of the imagery in which he clothes it. From these heights the seventh book descends to a sober account of the higher education in the mathematical sciences and dialectic (521 c ff.). The passage is an interesting document for Plato's conception of education and perhaps for the practice in his Academy. It also is the chief text for the controverted question of Plato's attitude towards science and the place of Platonism in the history of science, but it need not further detain us here." This book, in a sense, completes the description of the ideal state. The eighth book, one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato, is a rapid survey of the diver- gence, the progressive degeneracy from the ideal state in the four types to which Plato thinks the tiresome infinity of the forms of government that minute research enunr 'grates among Greeks and barbarians may be conveniently reduced (54'+ c-d). These are the timocracy, whose principle is honour (545 c ff.), the oUgarchy, which regards wealth (550 c ff., 551c), the democracy, whose slogan is • Cf. my paper, " Platonism and the History of Science," American Philosophical Society's Proceedings, vol. Ixvi., 1927, pp. 171 ff
INTRODUCTION liberty, or"doing as one likes""(557 B-B), the tyranny, enslaved to appetite. In this review history, satire litical philosophy, and the special literary motives of the Republic are blended in a mixture hopelessly Aristotle down In the first two types Plato is evidently thinkin of the better(544 c) and Sparta. In his portrayal of the democratic state he lets himself go in satire of fourth-century Athens (557 B ff. ) intoxicated with too heady draughts of liberty (562 D) and dying of the triumph of the liberal party. His picture of the tyrant is in part a powerful restatement of Greek commonplace (565 A-576) and in part a preparation for the return to the main argument of the Republic (577 ff. by direct applica- tion of the analogy between the individual and the state with which he begas w jinner a final touches to In the ninth book all lines converge on the original problem.After the picture of the terrors and inner discords (576-580) of the tyrant's soul, Plato finally decides the issue between the just and the unjust life by three argu ments. The just life is proved the happier(1) by t (idea gy with the contrasted happiness of. n/al and the unhappiness of the tyrannized state (577 c ff. ),(2) by reason of an argument which Plato never repeats but which John Stuart Mill seriously accepts(582-583): The man who lives mainly for her spiritual satisfactions has necessarily had experience of the pleasures f sens of the higher happiness of the intellect and the
INTRODUCTION liberty, or " doing as one likes " (557 B-E),the tyranny, enslaved to appetite. In this review history, satire, political philosophy, and the special literary motives of the Republic are blended in a mixture hopelessly disconcerting to all literal-minded critics from Aristotle down. In the first two types Plato is evidently thinking of the better (544 c) and the worse aspects (548 a) of Sparta. In his portrayal of the democratic state he lets himself go in satire of fourth-century Athens (557 B ff.), intoxicated with too heady draughts of liberty (562 d) and dying of the triumph of the liberal party. His picture of the tyrant is in part a powerful restatement of Greek commonplace (5G5 a-576) and in part a preparation for the return to the main argument of the Republic (577 ff.) by direct applica- tion of the analogy between the individual and the state with which he began. In the ninth book all the lines converge on the original problem. After adding the final touches to the picture of the terrors and inner discords (576-580) of the tyrant's soul, Plato finally decides the issue between the just and the unjust life by three argu- ments. The just life is proved the happier (1) by the analogy with the contrasted happiness of the royal (ideal) and the unhappiness of the tyrannized state (577 c ff.), (2) by reason of an argument which Plato never repeats but which John Stuart Mill seriously accepts (582-583) : The man who lives mainly for the higher spiritual satisfactions has necessarily had experience of the pleasures of sense and ambition also. He only can compare and judge. The devotees of sense and ambition know little or nothing of the higher happiness of the intellect and the soul
INTRODUCTION (S)The third and perhaps the most weighty proof i the principle on which the Platonic philosophy science of ethics rests, the fact that the pleasures of sense are essentially negative, not to say worthless, because they are ditioned by equivalent wants which are pains. a rinciple is clearly suggested in the Gorgias, Meno, Phaedrus, and Phaedo, and is elaborately explained in the psychology of the Philebus. It is in fact the basis of the Platonic ethics which the mai of critics persist in deducing from their notion of Plato's metaphysics. These three arguments, however, are not the last word. For final conviction Plato falls back on the old analogy of th which the fourt provisionally concluded the argument, and which as we there saw is all that the scientific ethics of Leslie Stephen can urge in the last resort. b The immoral oul is diseased and cannot enjoy true happiness This thought is expressed in the image of the many-headed beast (588 c ff.) and confirmed in a final passage of moral eloquence which forms a climax and the apparent conclusion of the whole (591-59 The tenth book may be regarded either as ar ppendis alared by an intervening level tract separat- d after-piece or as the second and higher ing it from the eloquent conclusion of the ninth book The discussion in the first half of the book of the deeper psychological justification of the banisher tive poets is interesting in itself. It is something that Plato had to say and that could supra, p. xVi, note
INTRODUCTION (S) The third and perhaps the most weighty proof is the principle on which the Platonic philosophy or science of ethics rests, the fact that the pleasures of sense are essentially negative, not to say worthless, because thev are preconditioned by equivalent wants which are pains.'' This principle is clearly suggested in the Gorgias, Meno, Phaedrns, and Phaedo, and is elaborately explained in the psychology of the Philehus. It is in fact the basis of the Platonic ethics, which the majority of critics persist in deducing from their notion of Plato's metaphysics. These three arguments, however, are not the last word. For final conviction Plato falls back on the old analogy of health and disease, with which the fourth book provisionally concluded the argument, and which as we there saw is all that the scientific ethics of Leslie Stephen can urge in the last resort.* The immoral soul is diseased and cannot enjoy true happiness. This thought is expressed in the image of the many-headed beast (588 c ff.) and confirmed in a final passage of moral eloquence which forms a climax and the apparent conclusion of the whole (591-592). The tenth book may be regarded either as an appendix and after-piece or as the second and higher climax prepared bv an intervening level tract separating it from the eloquent conclusion of the ninth book. The discussion in the first half of the book of the deeper psychological justification of the banishment of imitative poets is interesting in itself. It is something that Plato had to say and that could be » C/. 583 B ff. and Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 23 f. and 26 f., and '* The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic," pp. 192 ff. * Cf. supra, p. xvi, note a
INTRODUCTION said here with the least interruption of the general design. But its chief service is that it rests the ween twe allows each its full force. Whether by accident or design, this method of composition is found in the Iliad, where the games of the twenty-third book relieve the emotional tension of the death of Hector in the twenty-second and prepare us for the final climax of the ransom of his body and his burial in the twenty-fourth. It is also found in the oration On the Crown, which has two almost equally eloquen peroration separated by a tame level tract. In Platos case there is no improbability in th tion of conscious design of justice has been proved and eloquently summe up. The impression of that moral eloquence would ave been weakened if Plato hac ceeded to the myth that sets forth the rewards that await the just man in the life to come. And the myth itself is much more effective after an interval of sober argument and discussion. Then that natural human desire for variation and relief of monotony for which the modulations of Plato's art everywher rovide makes us welcome the tale of Er the son of Arminius (614 n), the " angel"' from over there (614 D). And we listen entranced to the myth that s saved and will save us if we believe it--believe that the soul is immortal, capable of of good and evil, of weal or woe, So shall we hold ever to the upward way and follow righteousness ind sobriety with clear-eyed reason that we may be dear to ourselves and to God, both in the time of our sojourn and trial here below and also when, like victors in the games, we receive the final crown and
INTRODUCTION said here with the least interruption of the general design. But its chief service is that it rests the emotions between two culminating points and so allows each its full force. Whether by accident or design, this method of composition is found in the Iliad, where the games of the twenty-third book relieve the emotional tension of the death of Hector in the twenty-second and prepare us for the final climax of the ransom of his body and his burial in the twenty-fourth. It is also found in the oration On the Crofim, which has two almost equally eloquent perorations separated by a tame level tract. In Plato's case there is no improbability in the assumption of conscious design. The intrinsic preferability of justice has been proved and eloquently summed up. The impression of that moral eloquence would have been weakened if Plato had immediately pro- ceeded to the myth that sets forth the rewards that await the just man in the life to come. And the mvth itself is much more effective after an interval of sober argument and discussion. Then that natural human desire for variation and relief of monotony for which the modulations of Plato's art everywhere provide makes us welcome the tale of Er the son of Arminius (614 b), the " angel " from over there (614 d). And we listen entranced to the myth that was saved and will save us if we believe it—believe that the soul is immortal, capable of infinite issues of good and evil, of weal or woe. So shall we hold ever to the upward way and follow righteousness and sobriety with clear-eyed reason that we may be dear to ourselves and to God, both in the time of our sojourn and trial here below and also when, like victors in the games, we receive the final crown and