Krupka and Weber Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games 505 基的 59383 供片世代禽蕾盛著 $墨些罩南器器图 供登等的驾盛等馨鲨置 信费黄装出咨等世坐其 孕释将得稻 生西8月 房学学爵等器学拳普 Aling Jol ((D)N 房牌墨紫道生常黄背鉴塑 潜紫牌背背母 菌道器号营些芝芒胃 得解稻格 店8首 8方路房月
Krupka and Weber Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games 505 TABLE 1. Elicited norms (N(ak)) for bully versus standard dictator environments (data from Experiment 1). Standard (n = 107) (Initial wealth: $10, $0) Bully (n = 92) (Initial wealth: $5, $5) Action Rank-sum (final wealth) Action Mean –– – + ++ Action Mean –– – + ++ test (z) $10, $0 “Give $0” −0.80 82% 10% 3% 5% “Take $5” −0.90 91% 5% 0% 3% 1.85∗ $9, $1 “Give $1” −0.64 61% 31% 3% 6% “Take $4” −0.83 82% 14% 1% 3% 3.13∗∗∗ $8, $2 “Give $2” −0.44 35% 51% 10% 4% “Take $3” −0.67 55% 40% 3% 1% 3.27∗∗∗ $7, $3 “Give $3” −0.16 8% 62% 26% 4% “Take $2” −0.38 28% 53% 16% 2% 3.34∗∗∗ $6, $4 “Give $4” 0.14 3% 30% 61% 7% “Take $1” −0.09 12% 46% 36% 7% 3.42∗∗∗ $5, $5 “Give $5” 0.87 0% 3% 14% 83% “Give $0” / 0.93 0% 0% 11% 89% 1.26 “Take $0” $4, $6 “Give $6” 0.57 0% 7% 50% 43% “Give $1” 0.48 4% 12% 40% 43% 0.72 $3, $7 “Give $7” 0.42 1% 22% 39% 37% “Give $2” 0.31 7% 23% 38% 33% 1.12 $2, $8 “Give $8” 0.32 6% 31% 23% 40% “Give $3” 0.20 14% 27% 23% 36% 1.08 $1, $9 “Give $9” 0.22 17% 24% 19% 40% “Give $4” 0.10 27% 16% 21% 31% 0.99 $0, $10 “Give $10” 0.18 26% 13% 18% 43% “Give $5” 0.04 36% 10% 16% 38% 1.13 ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0. 01; all two-tailed. Responses are: “very socially inappropriate” (– –), “somewhat socially inappropriate” (–), “somewhat socially appropriate” ( +), “very socially appropriate” (+ +); modal response are shaded. To construct the mean ratings, we converted responses into numerical scores (“very socially inappropriate” = –1, “somewhat socially inappropriate” = –1/3, “somewhat socially appropriate” = 1/3, “very socially appropriate” = 1)
506 Journal of the European Economic Association is also denoted by the final wealth distribution produced by that action choice.in nts,the next that wealth distribution,the mean of the social appropriateness ratings(ranging from complete agreement on"very socially inappropriate"(-1.0)to complete agreement on propiate(1))and then the ful distribuion of oxon rank-sum tests c of responses. Not surprisingly,the general pattern of social appropriateness ratings is the same across the two choice environments.There is substantial social agreement that the action that produces equal payoffs (S5.5)is very socially appropriate in either ing A's own payoff and leaving the other However,as predicted,we also observe that actions involving "taking"are generally less appropriate than those involving "giving".For example,the action yielding payoffs($10,S0)is less appropriate in the bully treatment than in the standard dictator game.and this difference i s marginally statistically significant.Moreover.we mes in which the dictator obtains most,bu ain a payoff from $6 to $9 in the standard environment the dictator must"give"to the other person while the bully environment requires the dictator to"take"from the other person to obtain the same payoffs.The ratings confirm our expectation that"giving"is more socially appropriate than"taking".For ne from($9,$1)to($6.$4).the me the is higher in the nding actior estandard (g ving)environme and these differences are all highly statistically significant. Even in the cases where the ratings for the two environments diverge,subjects are still quite able to anticipate others'ratings-the modal response almost always receives over half of the responses.But what they agree upon often differs.For example,for the ment for giving thee isomewhat inappropriate But in the bullyevirom where the same outcome involves taking S3 from the other person,there is social agreement that the action is"very inappropriate".Similarly,for the wealth allocation (S6.$4).the modal response in the standard environment is"somewhat appropriate". but in the bully environment it is"somewhat inappropriate" 15.Interestingly.actions that leave the recipient with more money ()to(0))produce les
506 Journal of the European Economic Association is also denoted by the final wealth distribution produced by that action choice, in the first column (payoff for A, payoff for B). For each of the two variants, the next several columns report first the action that the dictator had to take in order to obtain that wealth distribution, the mean of the social appropriateness ratings (ranging from complete agreement on “very socially inappropriate” (–1.0) to complete agreement on “very socially appropriate” (1.0)), and then the full distribution of responses. The final column reports the results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the two distributions of responses. Not surprisingly, the general pattern of social appropriateness ratings is the same across the two choice environments. There is substantial social agreement that the action that produces equal payoffs ($5, $5) is very socially appropriate in either environment. Further, maximizing A’s own payoff and leaving the other person with nothing ($10, $0) is the most socially inappropriate action in either variant.15 However, as predicted, we also observe that actions involving “taking” are generally less appropriate than those involving “giving”. For example, the action yielding payoffs ($10, $0) is less appropriate in the bully treatment than in the standard dictator game, and this difference is marginally statistically significant. Moreover, we observe even larger differences for outcomes in which the dictator obtains most, but not all, of the wealth. To obtain a payoff from $6 to $9 in the standard environment, the dictator must “give” to the other person while the bully environment requires the dictator to “take” from the other person to obtain the same payoffs. The ratings confirm our expectation that “giving” is more socially appropriate than “taking”. For every outcome from ($9, $1) to ($6, $4), the mean rating for the corresponding action is higher in the standard (giving) environment than in the bully (taking) environment, and these differences are all highly statistically significant. Even in the cases where the ratings for the two environments diverge, subjects are still quite able to anticipate others’ ratings—the modal response almost always receives over half of the responses. But what they agree upon often differs. For example, for the wealth allocation ($8, $2), the modal response in the standard environment for giving $2 to the other person is “somewhat inappropriate”. But in the bully environment, where the same outcome involves taking $3 from the other person, there is social agreement that the action is “very inappropriate”. Similarly, for the wealth allocation ($6, $4), the modal response in the standard environment is “somewhat appropriate”, but in the bully environment it is “somewhat inappropriate”. 15. Interestingly, actions that leave the recipient with more money (($4, $6) to ($0, $10)) produce less consensus. The modal and median responses lie between “very” and “somewhat” socially appropriate, but a significant proportion of respondents rate such behavior as socially inappropriate, and this proportion generally increases with other-regarding inequality. This might reflect the belief that it is socially inappropriate to be “too generous” —for example, when one gives a gift that is too expensive or when one attempts to tip a member of a profession that generally does not accept tips