500 Journal of the European Economic Association ratings over all actions is validated in our analysis of the experimental data.We show that even though the mos socially appropriate behavior is the same across all the experiments we examine- share the experimental endowment equally(Andreoni and Bernheim 2009)-we also find that differences in the relative appropriateness of the other actions exert an important influence on behavior. To embed this definition of social norms in a simple utility framework-which will allow us to sub sequently estimate the hat individuals ha ve for compic relative to moneye assume thata both the monetary payoff produced by the selected action,(as),and the degree to which the action is collectively perceived as socially appropriate: u(a)=V(π(a)+yN(ag). (1) The function VO represents the value the individual places on the monetary payoff:we assume that this function is increasing in ()The parametery about to social n ays select th payoff-maximizing action.On the other hand,as y increases,an individual will derive greater utility from selecting actions that are socially appropriate relative to the utility from those that are not. It follows directly from these preferences that behavior may change substantially across choice en vironments in which the sets of payoffs are identic if the socia norms change.Consider two choice environments,A=(a.a2)and A'=(j) such that (a)=(a)>(a2)=(a2).Then,if there exist no social norms in either environment (N(ag)=N(a)=0,for k =1,2)the decision maker will choose a in the first environment and a:in the second.However.if social norms differ between the two choice er nte the individual may selec payoffs in the two environments.For example,if N()=N(N()N() then for some values of y a decision maker will select a in the first environment and a in the second environment.This is in spite of the fact that the most appropriate actions,az and a,are analogous across the two contexts. The above framework.while simple.presents a potentially useful approach for understanding how varying so cial no ms mig ht affect behavic when choice environments are payoff-equivalent.It also providesaprecise.and testab e,relationship between the degree of social approval of actions(N(a))and individuals'willingness to take those actions,provided one has a method for empirically measuring the"social appropriateness"of the different available actions. of this paper.we predict and explain behavior of social appropriateness(N().We first measure social appropriateness using a nove ocial,or derive utility from
500 Journal of the European Economic Association ratings over all actions is validated in our analysis of the experimental data. We show that even though the most socially appropriate behavior is the same across all the experiments we examine—share the experimental endowment equally (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009)—we also find that differences in the relative appropriateness of the other actions exert an important influence on behavior. To embed this definition of social norms in a simple utility framework – which will allow us to subsequently estimate the concern that individuals have for norm compliance, relative to money – we assume that a decision maker cares about both the monetary payoff produced by the selected action, π(ak ), and the degree to which the action is collectively perceived as socially appropriate: u(ak ) = V(π(ak )) + γ N(ak ). (1) The function V() represents the value the individual places on the monetary payoff; we assume that this function is increasing in π(ak ). The parameter γ ≥ 0 represents the degree to which the individual cares about adhering to social norms. An individual entirely unconcerned with social norms (γ = 0) will always select the payoff-maximizing action. On the other hand, as γ increases, an individual will derive greater utility from selecting actions that are socially appropriate relative to the utility from those that are not.8 It follows directly from these preferences that behavior may change substantially across choice environments in which the sets of payoffs are identical, if the social norms change. Consider two choice environments, A = {a1, a2} and A = {a 1, a 2}, such that π(a1) = π(a 1) > π(a2) = π(a 2). Then, if there exist no social norms in either environment (N(ak ) = N(a k ) = 0, for k = 1, 2) the decision maker will choose a1 in the first environment and a 1 in the second. However, if social norms differ between the two choice environments, the individual may select actions corresponding to different payoffs in the two environments. For example, if N(a1) = N(a 1) < N(a2) < N(a 2), then for some values of γ a decision maker will select a1 in the first environment and a 2 in the second environment. This is in spite of the fact that the most appropriate actions, a2 and a 2, are analogous across the two contexts. The above framework, while simple, presents a potentially useful approach for understanding how varying social norms might affect behavior even when choice environments are payoff-equivalent. It also provides a precise, and testable, relationship between the degree of social approval of actions (N(ak )) and individuals’ willingness to take those actions, provided one has a method for empirically measuring the “social appropriateness” of the different available actions. In the rest of this paper, we predict and explain behavior using elicited measures of social appropriateness (N(ak )). We first measure social appropriateness using a novel 8. Other researchers have noted that individuals care heterogeneously about norm compliance (Ostrom 2000, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Such heterogeneity in pro-social concern is also common in most models of social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Andreoni and Miller 2002). Cases in which γ < 0, which we do not explore here, might correspond to individuals who are anti-social, or derive utility from violating norms
Krupka and Weber Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games 501 incentivized elicitation method.We elicit social norms over possible action choices across different contexts,from individuals who do not make choices in those contexts. We then observe how well the elicited social norms.when integrated into the above simple utility framework,explain the actual choices made by a separate group of individuals We measure the extent to which actions are socially appropriate or inappropriate by presenting respondents with a description of a choice environment,including all the possible available actions (i.e.,A=fa.....ax).We ask respondents to judge the sca appropriateness -that is,we elicit N(s),for all a four point that ran ges ov "very socially inappropria inappropriate"somewhat socially appropriate tovery socially appropiateW provide respondents with incentives not to reveal their own personal preferences but instead to match the responses of others.Thus,respondents play a pure matching coordination game(Schelling 1960:Mehta,Starmer,and Sugden 1994)in which their ipate the extent to which others will rate an action as socially appropriate and to respond accordingly. Because social norms reflect"collective perceptions",coordination games present a useful incentivized way to identify such socially held judgments.From a game- theoretic point of view.pure matching games such as the one we use in our experiment have many equilibria and nothin intrinsic to the payoffs of the gan me make equilibrium fa the oth Sche ling (1960 theorized and Mehta.Stamer,and Sugden (1)and Sugden(195)demonstrated that prominence derived from common culture and shared experiences can create focal points.In our experiment,we allow collectively recognized social norms to create focal points in the matching game.Therefore,our elicitation method will yield a representation of a ocial norm if(a)there is gen al social greement that ome actions are more or less and if (b)respondents attemptng tacitly match others'responses rely on such shared perceptions to help them do so. We begin by focusing on two payoff-identical variants of the dictator game.In Experiment I subiects see a description of one of these two choice environments including all the possible choices available to the"dictator."From these subjects. who ctually play the dictator game des d to m or see the othe we elicit social norms over actions in the described choice environment using th incentives we describe above.We then use the social norms elicited in Experiment 1 to predict behavioral changes across the two environments,and we test these predicted considering the tradeoff )and hav ine too mar (in which case it might be too difficult for s naps from the social norm. and oue 2011). s can be used with economic incentives to reveal shared understanding(see also Xiao
Krupka and Weber Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games 501 incentivized elicitation method. We elicit social norms over possible action choices across different contexts, from individuals who do not make choices in those contexts. We then observe how well the elicited social norms, when integrated into the above simple utility framework, explain the actual choices made by a separate group of individuals. We measure the extent to which actions are socially appropriate or inappropriate by presenting respondents with a description of a choice environment, including all the possible available actions (i.e., A = {a1,..., aK }). We ask respondents to judge the social appropriateness of each action—that is, we elicit N(ak ), for all ak - on a four point scale that ranges over “very socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially appropriate”, to “very socially appropriate”.9 We provide respondents with incentives not to reveal their own personal preferences but instead to match the responses of others. Thus, respondents play a pure matching coordination game (Schelling 1960; Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994) in which their goal is to anticipate the extent to which others will rate an action as socially appropriate or inappropriate, and to respond accordingly. Because social norms reflect “collective perceptions”, coordination games present a useful incentivized way to identify such socially held judgments. From a gametheoretic point of view, pure matching games such as the one we use in our experiment have many equilibria and nothing intrinsic to the payoffs of the game makes one equilibrium favored (or focal) over the others. Schelling (1960) theorized and Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994) and Sugden (1995) demonstrated that prominence derived from common culture and shared experiences can create focal points. In our experiment, we allow collectively recognized social norms to create focal points in the matching game. Therefore, our elicitation method will yield a representation of a social norm if (a) there is general social agreement that some actions are more or less socially appropriate, constituting the social norm, and if (b) respondents attempting to tacitly match others’ responses rely on such shared perceptions to help them do so.10 We begin by focusing on two payoff-identical variants of the dictator game. In Experiment 1 subjects see a description of one of these two choice environments, including all the possible choices available to the “dictator.” From these subjects, who never actually play the dictator game described to them or see the other variant, we elicit social norms over actions in the described choice environment using the incentives we describe above. We then use the social norms elicited in Experiment 1 to predict behavioral changes across the two environments, and we test these predicted 9. The decision to have only four appropriateness categories was made after considering the tradeoff between having too few (in which case it would be harder to discriminate between degrees of appropriateness) and having too many (in which case it might be too difficult for subjects to match on the social norm, perhaps leading them to attempt to match using other focal principles). Further, we omitted the “neutral” category, as this would have been a focal point separate from the focal point stemming from the social norm. 10. Many previous researchers have noted the important relationship between social norms and equilibrium selection in games (Kandori 1992; Young 1998). Camerer and Fehr (2004) note that coordination games can be used with economic incentives to reveal shared understanding (see also Xiao and Houser 2011)
502 Journal of the European Economic Association effects of social norms using data collected from a second,separate,group of subjects who make choices in one of the ofour analysis involves identifving social norms ment 2) in previously studied additional variants of the dictator game (Lazear.Malmendier.and Weber 2012;List 2007;Dana,Cain,and Dawes 2006).Therefore,as part of Experiment of diffe available in thes r experimen ts We te that the identified social normsexplain considerable variation across treatments in both our owr experiment(Experiment 2)and across these previously studied experiments.We also use a conditional logic choice model to obtain estimates of the weights that individuals place on complying with social norms(y)and on monetary payoffs in several of these showthata stable setof weights cnexp a considerable amoun of the variation in behavio or across these experiments 3.Identifying Social Norms in Payoff-Equivalent Environments(Experiment 1) Consider the following two choice environments.In a"standard"dictator game,a decision maker initially receives $10 while another person receives $0.The decision maker must then decide how much,between $0 and $10.in one-dollar increments. to give to the other person.In a"bully"variant of the game,the decision maker and othe eive $5 and the deciding individual can giv t between $0 and $5,agair n in one person.Both choice environments offer the decision maker exactly the same eleven choices over final wealth allocations ranging from($10,$0)to ($0,$10),but vary in the actions required to obtain those dollar allocations. While the two choice sets are identical in terms of final payoffs,they differ in contextual features o the actior required to achieve those payoffs.In the standar case,any outcome other than ($10.S0)involves"giving"money to the other person; in the bully variant all outcomes from($10,$0)to(S6,$4)involve the decision maker taking from the other person.Therefore.it is possible that social norms govering the two sets of behaviors might differ,even though the resulting outcomes do not.In njecture that s s will diffe ver actions that involveaking versus"giving",holding the res that involve "taking less socially appropriate. To identify social norms in the two choice environments,we applied our elicitation method to obtain ratings of the extent to which different actions in the two environments are collectively perceived as socially appropriate or inappropriate.Subjects providing 2031.0 r "bully" e dictaorgame地n dng options (sec
502 Journal of the European Economic Association effects of social norms using data collected from a second, separate, group of subjects who make choices in one of the two environments (Experiment 2). A second part of our analysis involves identifying social norms governing behavior in previously studied additional variants of the dictator game (Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2012; List 2007; Dana, Cain, and Dawes 2006). Therefore, as part of Experiment 1, we also use our elicitation method to measure the degree of social appropriateness of different actions available in these particular experiments. We demonstrate that the identified social norms explain considerable variation across treatments in both our own experiment (Experiment 2) and across these previously studied experiments. We also use a conditional logic choice model to obtain estimates of the weights that individuals place on complying with social norms (γ ) and on monetary payoffs in several of these experiments, and show that a stable set of weights can explain a considerable amount of the variation in behavior across these experiments. 3. Identifying Social Norms in Payoff-Equivalent Environments (Experiment 1) Consider the following two choice environments. In a “standard” dictator game, a decision maker initially receives $10 while another person receives $0. The decision maker must then decide how much, between $0 and $10, in one-dollar increments, to give to the other person. In a “bully” variant of the game, the decision maker and other person both initially receive $5 and the deciding individual can give or take any amount between $0 and $5, again in one-dollar increments, to or from the other person. Both choice environments offer the decision maker exactly the same eleven choices over final wealth allocations ranging from ($10, $0) to ($0, $10), but vary in the actions required to obtain those dollar allocations.11 While the two choice sets are identical in terms of final payoffs, they differ in contextual features of the actions required to achieve those payoffs. In the standard case, any outcome other than ($10, $0) involves “giving” money to the other person; in the bully variant all outcomes from ($10, $0) to ($6, $4) involve the decision maker “taking” from the other person. Therefore, it is possible that social norms governing the two sets of behaviors might differ, even though the resulting outcomes do not. In particular, we conjecture that social norms will differ over actions that involve “taking” versus “giving”, holding the resulting payoffs constant, in a manner that makes actions that involve “taking” less socially appropriate. To identify social norms in the two choice environments, we applied our elicitation method to obtain ratings of the extent to which different actions in the two environments are collectively perceived as socially appropriate or inappropriate. Subjects providing 11. Our experiment joins other research that examines the effect of varying initial endowment levels, such that dictators may “take” money from the recipient (Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad 2007, Swope et al. 2008). Our “bully” variant differs from the dictator games with taking options studied by List (2007) and Bardsley (2008), which modify the standard dictator game by introducing additional taking options (see Section 5.2)
Krupka and Weber Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games 503 the ratings saw only one of the two choice environments,and received incentives to match the modal response provided by others rating the same choice environment. 3.1.Experimental Design for Experiment 1 ms of expe partic pants at Car Participants received S7 for showing up to the experiment and could earn additional money from a task in which they attempted to match others'appropriateness ratings. Subject payment in the matching task was not tied to the hypothetical dictator games about which they read. The instru ions (see Online Appendix)explained that subjects would read descriptions of different situations in which a person("Individual A")faced a choice among several possible alternatives.For each situation,subjects were asked to rate the extent to which each alterative available to the person was "'socially appropriate' and 'consistent with moral or proper social behavioror'socially inappropriate'and inconsistent with mo ral or ocial behavior how they might indicate their ratings for each action in this situation.3 After subjects were led through the example situation,but before they began to fill out the tables for the actual situations,they were told that one of the situations for which they were to dhatoicehtobedmy e possible choices in this situation would also be e randomly as the modal response in the session,then that participant would receive an additional payment($5 in Pittsburgh,$10 in Michigan)at the conclusion of the session.Thus, participants were incentivized to match the modal rating in their session,for each Subjects then saw a description of the standard or bully variant of th dictator game.Subjects in Experiment 1 never actually played this game,but only read about the situation and were asked to consider all of the actions that Individual A(the dictator)could take.In each session,only one of these two variants was used,meaning that no subject read descriptions of both the bully and standard choice contexts.The descriptio of th on stated that the target individual (IndividualA)was matche with another random and anonymous person(Individual B)and that both people would th 20 and Mic akin the the wallet belonged to them.eavin the allet the store manager
Krupka and Weber Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games 503 the ratings saw only one of the two choice environments, and received incentives to match the modal response provided by others rating the same choice environment. 3.1. Experimental Design for Experiment 1 We recruited 199 subjects from populations of experimental participants at Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Michigan.12 Participants received $7 for showing up to the experiment and could earn additional money from a task in which they attempted to match others’ appropriateness ratings. Subject payment in the matching task was not tied to the hypothetical dictator games about which they read. The instructions (see Online Appendix) explained that subjects would read descriptions of different situations in which a person (“Individual A”) faced a choice among several possible alternatives. For each situation, subjects were asked to rate the extent to which each alternative available to the person was “ ‘socially appropriate’ and ‘consistent with moral or proper social behavior’ or ‘socially inappropriate’ and ‘inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior’.” Participants then read, as an example, a hypothetical situation and were shown how they might indicate their ratings for each action in this situation.13 After subjects were led through the example situation, but before they began to fill out the tables for the actual situations, they were told that one of the situations for which they were to provide appropriateness ratings would be selected at random at the end of the session, and that one of the possible action choices in this situation would also be randomly selected. If, for this action choice, the participant’s appropriateness rating was the same as the modal response in the session, then that participant would receive an additional payment ($5 in Pittsburgh, $10 in Michigan) at the conclusion of the session. Thus, participants were incentivized to match the modal rating in their session, for each possible action. Subjects then saw a description of either the standard or bully variant of the dictator game. Subjects in Experiment 1 never actually played this game, but only read about the situation and were asked to consider all of the actions that Individual A (the dictator) could take. In each session, only one of these two variants was used, meaning that no subject read descriptions of both the bully and standard choice contexts. The description of the situation stated that the target individual (Individual A) was matched with another random and anonymous person (Individual B) and that both people would 12. Sessions conducted in Pittsburgh used 115 subjects and were conducted using pen and paper, while the sessions conducted at Michigan used 84 subjects and were conducted using the software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). We find virtually no difference between the ratings obtained in Pittsburgh and in Michigan, despite there being differences in procedures (choices collected on paper in Pittsburgh versus through a computer in Michigan; slightly different payoffs; sessions conducted years apart), indicating robustness of the social norms we elicit in these populations. We therefore pool across the two locations in the analyses. 13. In the example, the decision maker found a wallet at a coffee shop and faced four alternatives: taking the wallet, asking others if the wallet belonged to them, leaving the wallet alone, or giving it to the store manager
504 Journal of the European Economic Association receive a"small participation fee"as well as any money produced by Individual A's The description then listed the eleven action choices available to Individual A. The labels associated with these action choices varied depending on which dictator game variant subjects were asked to consider(see Table 1).Subjects were also shown hoy paymens to each indv y evry lised acton ice.For ea possible bject had to ra the choice as either"very socially inappropriate""somewhat socially inappropriate" “somewhat socially appropriate”,or“very socially appropriate'”,with the goal of matching this rating to the modal response in the session. In the above manner.each subiect provided social appropriateness ratings for all actions available in either the standard or bully variant of the dictator g me.This vields our primary outcome measured abjects”elicite ratings of social appropriateness N()for the bully and standard choice environments After rating all actions in either the bully or standard dictator variants,subjects then saw descriptions of either four(Pittsburgh)or five (Michigan)additional variants of the dictator game.Each situation corresponded to a variant of the dictator game used mental Malmendier and Weber 2012:List 2007 Dana.Cain.and Dawes 2006).We discuss these variants in more detail in Section 5 After subjects indicated social appropriateness ratings in all choice scenarios,the experimenter randomly selected one scenario and one possible action choice in that scenario.The experimenter computed the modal response for that choice and privately ect s of whethe r no tthei modal rating Subjects were then paid privately in cash.rec an additional payment if they had selected the modal appropriateness rating for the selected scenario and action. 3.2.Results of Experiment 1 Recall that we conjectured that"taking"would generally be considered less socially n“giving",even when t hey produc cediden The or thah that eft the dictator dndivdunl cal with more money than the recipient,the corresponding actions would be generally considered less socially appropriate in the bully variant than in the standard variant of the dictator game We c verted subjectsresponses into numerical scores.Arating of "very socially appropriate "received a score of-1."somewhat socially inappropriate"a score o rtTblemy Each row corresponds to one possible action choice that Individual A could take and fencorcsof-l
504 Journal of the European Economic Association receive a “small participation fee” as well as any money produced by Individual A’s choice. The description then listed the eleven action choices available to Individual A. The labels associated with these action choices varied depending on which dictator game variant subjects were asked to consider (see Table 1). Subjects were also shown the monetary payments to each individual (A and B) produced by every listed action choice. For each possible action choice available to Individual A, a subject had to rate the choice as either “very socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially appropriate”, or “very socially appropriate”, with the goal of matching this rating to the modal response in the session. In the above manner, each subject provided social appropriateness ratings for all actions available in either the standard or bully variant of the dictator game. This yields our primary outcome measured in Experiment 1—the “between-subjects” elicited ratings of social appropriateness N(ak ) for the bully and standard choice environments. After rating all actions in either the bully or standard dictator variants, subjects then saw descriptions of either four (Pittsburgh) or five (Michigan) additional variants of the dictator game. Each situation corresponded to a variant of the dictator game used in previous experimental research (Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2012; List 2007; Dana, Cain, and Dawes 2006). We discuss these variants in more detail in Section 5. After subjects indicated social appropriateness ratings in all choice scenarios, the experimenter randomly selected one scenario and one possible action choice in that scenario. The experimenter computed the modal response for that choice and privately informed subjects of whether or not their appropriateness rating matched the modal rating. Subjects were then paid privately in cash, receiving a $7 participation fee and an additional payment if they had selected the modal appropriateness rating for the selected scenario and action. 3.2. Results of Experiment 1 Recall that we conjectured that “taking” would generally be considered less socially appropriate than “giving”, even when they produced identical outcomes. Therefore, we expected that, for those wealth allocations that left the dictator (Individual A) with more money than the recipient, the corresponding actions would be generally considered less socially appropriate in the bully variant than in the standard variant of the dictator game. We converted subjects’ responses into numerical scores. A rating of “very socially inappropriate” received a score of –1, “somewhat socially inappropriate” a score of –1/3, “somewhat socially appropriate” a score of 1/3, and “very socially appropriate” a score of 1.14 Table 1 presents subjects’ social appropriateness ratings by condition. Each row corresponds to one possible action choice that Individual A could take and 14. We chose this particular scoring because it is intuitive (the least and most appropriate possible ratings receive scores of –1 and 1, respectively) and simple (possible ratings are evenly spaced over the –1 to 1 interval)