WHAT SEARLE SAID IS TRUE OF LOGICAL SYSTEMS o As we have seen Searle holds that the chinese room scenario shows that one cannot get semantics from syntax alone. In formal systems, rules are given for syntax, and this procedure appears to be quite independent of semantics One specifies the basic symbol set and some rules for manipulating strings to produce new ones. These rules are purely formal or syntactic--they are applied to strings of symbols solely in virtue of their syntax or form. A semantics, if any, for the symbol system must be provided separately. And if one wishes to show that interesting additional relationships hold between the syntactic operations and semantics, such as that the symbol manipulations preserve truth, one must provide sometimes complex meta-proofs to show this. So on the face of it, semantics is quite independent of syntax for artificial languages, and one cannot get semantics from syntax alone Formal symbols by themselves can never be enough for mental contents, because the symbols, by definition, have no meaning (or interpretation, or semantics)except insofar as someone outside the system gives it to them"( Searle 1989, 45)
WHAT SEARLE SAID IS TRUE OF LOGICAL SYSTEMS As we have seen, Searle holds that the Chinese Room scenario shows that one cannot get semantics from syntax alone. In formal systems, rules are given for syntax, and this procedure appears to be quite independent of semantics. One specifies the basic symbol set and some rules for manipulating strings to produce new ones. These rules are purely formal or syntactic—they are applied to strings of symbols solely in virtue of their syntax or form. A semantics, if any, for the symbol system must be provided separately. And if one wishes to show that interesting additional relationships hold between the syntactic operations and semantics, such as that the symbol manipulations preserve truth, one must provide sometimes complex meta-proofs to show this. So on the face of it, semantics is quite independent of syntax for artificial languages, and one cannot get semantics from syntax alone. “Formal symbols by themselves can never be enough for mental contents, because the symbols, by definition, have no meaning (or interpretation, or semantics) except insofar as someone outside the system gives it to them” (Searle 1989, 45)
BUT IS WHAT SEARLE SAID TRUE OF COMPUTERS? o As many of searle's critics(e.g. Cole 1984, Dennett 1987, Boden 1988, and Chalmers 1996) have noted, a computer running a program is not the same as syntax alone". A computer is a causal system that changes state in accord with a program. The states are syntactically specified by programmers, but they are fundamentally states of a complex causal system embedded in the real world. This is quite different from the abstract formal systems that logicians study. Dennett notes that no "computer program by itself (Searle,s language)e.g. a program lying on a shelf- can cause anything, even simple addition, let alone mental states. The program must be running
BUT IS WHAT SEARLE SAID TRUE OF COMPUTERS? As many of Searle‘s critics (e.g. Cole 1984, Dennett 1987, Boden 1988, and Chalmers 1996) have noted, a computer running a program is not the same as “syntax alone”. A computer is a causal system that changes state in accord with a program. The states are syntactically specified by programmers, but they are fundamentally states of a complex causal system embedded in the real world. This is quite different from the abstract formal systems that logicians study. Dennett notes that no “computer program by itself” (Searle’s language)—e.g. a program lying on a shelf— can cause anything, even simple addition, let alone mental states. The program must be running