上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Geneva, Bandung & Rapprochement_Sino-US Rapprochement_Yafeng Xia

Xia "wage war against China"and had actually deployed forces for this purpose, the Soviet Politburo was unable to reach a final decision"because of political considerations.The marshals proposed that,in addition to waging"a tit-for- tat struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union,"China should use "negotiation as a means of struggle against them."Perhaps the Sino-American ambassadorial talks should be resumed "when the timing is proper."1s The report by the Four Marshals'Study Group provided Chinese leaders with a strategic assessment that emphasized the benefits of improving Sino- American relations.As subsequent developments revealed,the marshals're- ports to Mao and Zhou was the catalyst for important decisions regarding the United States,paving the way for the Sino-American rapprochement.During the heyday of the Cultural Revolution,Mao's power was unchallengeable,but he had to take into consideration potential opposition from the "ultra- leftists,"many of whom would have had difficulty understanding an abrupt change in policy toward the United States.There is no evidence,however, that Lin Biao,Mao's second in command,was informed or aware of the mar- shals'assignment.The marshals themselves,in their memoirs or biographies, gave no indication that they had ever consulted in any fashion with Lin Biao about Sino-American relations.20 The war scare gave Chinese leaders sufficient incentive,both strategically and psychologically,to reconsider their long-standing confrontation with the United States.The perception of an extremely grave threat from the Soviet Union pushed Mao Zedong to break with the existing conceptual frame- work of Chinese policy."The catch was how to establish a communication channel. 18.Xiong,Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya,pp.184-186. 19.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,p.408. 20.Xu Xiangqian,Lishi de buigu [Reflections on Historyl.3 vols.(Beijing:Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1987),3:p.848;and"Dangdai Zhongguo Renwu Zhuanji"Congshu Bianjibu [Editorial Board of Biographical Series of Contemporary Chinese Figures],Chen yihn [Biography of Chen Yi] (Beijing:Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe,1991),pp.614-615. 21.The historian Chen Jian contends that the geopolitics-centered interpretation alone does not fully reveal the complicated reasons for Mao's decision to improve relations with the United States.To achieve a better understanding of the issue,he places the Sino-American rapprochement in the context of the fading status of Mao's continuous revolution.Chen points out that the Sino-American rap- prochement came at a time when the Cultural Revolution and the more general enterprise of Mao's continuous revolution had been declining.See Chen Jian,Maos China and the Cold War(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,2001),p.239.My own view is that multiple factors,includ- ing the decade-long Sino-American ambassadorial talks,China's nuclear arsenal,the U.S.quagmire in Vietnam,and Nixon's personality contributed to the U.S.-China rapprochement. 8

“wage war against China” and had actually deployed forces for this purpose, the Soviet Politburo was unable “to reach a ªnal decision” because of political considerations. The marshals proposed that, in addition to waging “a tit-for￾tat struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union,” China should use “negotiation as a means of struggle against them.” Perhaps the Sino-American ambassadorial talks should be resumed “when the timing is proper.”18 The report by the Four Marshals’ Study Group provided Chinese leaders with a strategic assessment that emphasized the beneªts of improving Sino￾American relations. As subsequent developments revealed, the marshals’ re￾ports to Mao and Zhou was the catalyst for important decisions regarding the United States, paving the way for the Sino-American rapprochement. During the heyday of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s power was unchallengeable, but he had to take into consideration potential opposition from the “ultra￾leftists,” many of whom would have had difªculty understanding an abrupt change in policy toward the United States.19 There is no evidence, however, that Lin Biao, Mao’s second in command, was informed or aware of the mar￾shals’ assignment. The marshals themselves, in their memoirs or biographies, gave no indication that they had ever consulted in any fashion with Lin Biao about Sino-American relations.20 The war scare gave Chinese leaders sufªcient incentive, both strategically and psychologically, to reconsider their long-standing confrontation with the United States. The perception of an extremely grave threat from the Soviet Union pushed Mao Zedong to break with the existing conceptual frame￾work of Chinese policy.21 The catch was how to establish a communication channel. 8 Xia 18. Xiong, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya, pp. 184–186. 19. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, p. 408. 20. Xu Xiangqian, Lishi de huigu [Reºections on History], 3 vols. (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1987), 3: p. 848; and “Dangdai Zhongguo Renwu Zhuanji” Congshu Bianjibu [Editorial Board of Biographical Series of Contemporary Chinese Figures], Chen Yi zhuan [Biography of Chen Yi] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 614–615. 21. The historian Chen Jian contends that the geopolitics-centered interpretation alone does not fully reveal the complicated reasons for Mao’s decision to improve relations with the United States. To achieve a better understanding of the issue, he places the Sino-American rapprochement in the context of the fading status of Mao’s continuous revolution. Chen points out that the Sino-American rap￾prochement came at a time when the Cultural Revolution and the more general enterprise of Mao’s continuous revolution had been declining. See Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 239. My own view is that multiple factors, includ￾ing the decade-long Sino-American ambassadorial talks, China’s nuclear arsenal, the U.S. quagmire in Vietnam, and Nixon’s personality contributed to the U.S.-China rapprochement

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement The Resumption of the Warsaw channel In September 1969,Soviet leaders attempted to hold a summit meeting with their Chinese counterparts in order to relax the tension that had been build- ing since March.After some complications,Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin was able to meet with his Chinese counterpart,Zhou Enlai,at Beijing airport on 11 September.22 Mao had several reasons for agreeing to these talks.He was interested in mitigating the tension with the USSR after the two costly border clashes and was seeking to avoid a two-front war (against both the Soviet Union and the United States).He also wanted to re- duce any chance of Soviet-American collusion.Zhou sought to use the occa- sion to provoke U.S.interest in a possible Sino-American rapprochement.To this end,Zhou tried hard to avoid“closeness”and“friendliness”with Kosygin,lest he send the wrong signals to Washington.The subsequent Sino- Soviet border negotiations at the level of deputy foreign ministers gave the United States another impetus to improve relations with the PRC.23 The Chinese strategy seemed to work well.U.S.officials began to rethink their policy toward China.In late 1969 and early 1970,the Nixon adminis- tration made several attempts to establish direct talks with China.During the summer senior U.S.officials had been in secret contact with the Chinese through the Pakistanis and Romanians.2 To supplement these indirect chan- 22.Western journalists suspected that Kosygin planned to meet with Zhou Enlai at Ho Chi Minh's fu- neral in early September 1969.Zhou led a Chinese delegation to the funeral,arriving on 4 September and leaving the same day.Chinese spokesmen denied that Zhou had deliberately avoided a meeting with Kosygin,though the snub was obvious.After arriving in Hanoi on 6 September,Kosygin with help from the Chinese embassy proposed to meet with Zhou in Beijing en route to Moscow.However, Kosygin did not hear back until 11 September,by which time he was already in Dushanbe,the capital of Soviet Tajikistan.See Jin Chongji,ed.,Zhou Enlai zhuan,1949-1976 [A Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976],2 vols.(Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe,1998),pp.1083-1084;and Wang Taiping,ed.,Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi,1957-1969 [A Diplomatic History of the Peo- ple's Republic of China,1957-1969](Beijing:Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe,1998),pp.274-276. 23.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,p.411.The Sino-Soviet border negotiations,which started on 20 Oc- tober 1969,continued with a few interruptions until the late 1980s.Chinese leaders tried to give the impression that if the United States remained uncompromising in negotiation with the PRC,a break- through might occur in Sino-Soviet relations.See Alexei Elizavetin,"Kosygin-Zhou Talks at Beijing Airport,"Far Eastern Affairs,Nos.1-3 (1993),pp.52-54. 24.During an around-the-world trip in August 1969,Nixon informed Romanian and Pakistani lead- ers that he was interested in improving relations with the PRC.In the late summer and fall of that year,Pakistani president Yahya Khan offered to play an active role in the quest.The Pakistani channel gave Nixon and Kissinger a secret avenue for communication that bypassed the State Department.In December,the Pakistani ambassador to the United States,Agha Hilaly,transmitted the first direct message from the PRC.Hilaly reported that Chinese leaders had released two detained Americans and were willing to resume the Warsaw talks without preconditions.Kissinger replied that the United States was interested in improving relations.See Steven Phillips,"Nixon's China Initiative,1969- 1972,"in U.S.Department of State,Documenting Diplomacy in the 2Ist Century (Washington D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office,2001),p.135

The Resumption of the Warsaw Channel In September 1969, Soviet leaders attempted to hold a summit meeting with their Chinese counterparts in order to relax the tension that had been build￾ing since March. After some complications, Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin was able to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai, at Beijing airport on 11 September.22 Mao had several reasons for agreeing to these talks. He was interested in mitigating the tension with the USSR after the two costly border clashes and was seeking to avoid a two-front war (against both the Soviet Union and the United States). He also wanted to re￾duce any chance of Soviet-American collusion. Zhou sought to use the occa￾sion to provoke U.S. interest in a possible Sino-American rapprochement. To this end, Zhou tried hard to avoid “closeness” and “friendliness” with Kosygin, lest he send the wrong signals to Washington. The subsequent Sino￾Soviet border negotiations at the level of deputy foreign ministers gave the United States another impetus to improve relations with the PRC.23 The Chinese strategy seemed to work well. U.S. ofªcials began to rethink their policy toward China. In late 1969 and early 1970, the Nixon adminis￾tration made several attempts to establish direct talks with China. During the summer senior U.S. ofªcials had been in secret contact with the Chinese through the Pakistanis and Romanians.24 To supplement these indirect chan- 9 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement 22. Western journalists suspected that Kosygin planned to meet with Zhou Enlai at Ho Chi Minh’s fu￾neral in early September 1969. Zhou led a Chinese delegation to the funeral, arriving on 4 September and leaving the same day. Chinese spokesmen denied that Zhou had deliberately avoided a meeting with Kosygin, though the snub was obvious. After arriving in Hanoi on 6 September, Kosygin with help from the Chinese embassy proposed to meet with Zhou in Beijing en route to Moscow. However, Kosygin did not hear back until 11 September, by which time he was already in Dushanbe, the capital of Soviet Tajikistan. See Jin Chongji, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan, 1949–1976 [A Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 1083–1084; and Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969 [A Diplomatic History of the Peo￾ple’s Republic of China, 1957–1969] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 274–276. 23. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, p. 411.The Sino-Soviet border negotiations, which started on 20 Oc￾tober 1969, continued with a few interruptions until the late 1980s. Chinese leaders tried to give the impression that if the United States remained uncompromising in negotiation with the PRC, a break￾through might occur in Sino-Soviet relations. See Alexei Elizavetin, “Kosygin-Zhou Talks at Beijing Airport,” Far Eastern Affairs, Nos. 1–3 (1993), pp. 52–54. 24. During an around-the-world trip in August 1969, Nixon informed Romanian and Pakistani lead￾ers that he was interested in improving relations with the PRC. In the late summer and fall of that year, Pakistani president Yahya Khan offered to play an active role in the quest. The Pakistani channel gave Nixon and Kissinger a secret avenue for communication that bypassed the State Department. In December, the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Agha Hilaly, transmitted the ªrst direct message from the PRC. Hilaly reported that Chinese leaders had released two detained Americans and were willing to resume the Warsaw talks without preconditions. Kissinger replied that the United States was interested in improving relations. See Steven Phillips, “Nixon’s China Initiative, 1969– 1972,” in U.S. Department of State, Documenting Diplomacy in the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 2001), p. 135

Xia nels,Nixon and Kissinger decided to reopen the long-suspended U.S.-China ambassadorial talks in Warsaw.25 In September 1969 they ordered Walter Stoessel,the U.S.ambassador to Poland,to contact his Chinese counterpart for a new meeting.To Kissinger's irritation,it took almost three months be- fore Stoessel could approach Chinese diplomats in Warsaw.Kissinger was ex- ploring possible paths for an earlier meeting when U.S.intelligence learned of a secret directive issued by Zhou Enlai to Chinese embassies in November calling for greater diplomatic flexibility to protect China from the Soviet Union.Zhou declared that the PRC's "flexible tactics"would include a re- sumption of talks with Washington to keep Moscow off balance and exacer- bate U.S.-Soviet tensions.Meanwhile,for domestic political consumption, Zhou stated that Beijing would not abandon its"revolutionary principles," the first of many times over the next few years that Chinese leaders made this pledge. Stoessel acted in an unusual fashion when,on 3 December,he spotted Chinese diplomats at a Yugoslav fashion show at Warsaw's Palace of Culture and followed them outside the building afterward.The Chinese diplomats, caught off guard,quickly fled.Stoessel ran after them and was able to catch the Chinese interpreter,telling him in"broken Polish"that he had an impor- tant message for the Chinese embassy.27 The Chinese embassy sent a report to Beijing about the U.S.ambassa- dor's "unusual behavior,"and it was conveyed to Zhou Enlai.Up to this point,Mao and Zhou had regarded Nixon's probing as only exploratory.But 25.China and the United States had originally agreed to hold the 135th session of the ambassadorial talks on 20 February 1969. 26.U.S.Central Intelligence Agency,Intelligence Memorandum,"Signs of Life in Chinese Foreign Policy,"11 April 1970,copy at National Security Archive:quoted in William Burr,"Sino-American Relations,1969:Sino-Soviet Border Conflict and Steps toward Rapprochement,"Cold War History Vol.1,No.3(April 2001),p.97. 27.Xue Mouhong,ed.,Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy](Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe,1990),p.219.See also Stoessel to Secretary of State,3 Decem- ber 1969,pp.23-28,POL-US,Subject-Numeric Files,1967-1969.Record Group(RG)59,NARA. In the telegram Stoessel mistakenly said that the Chinese diplomat he tried to approach was Lei Yang. the Chinese charge d'affaires to Poland.Actually,it was Li Juqing,the Chinese embassy's second secre- tary,and the interpreter was Jing Zhicheng.See Luo Yisu,"Zai Bolan de suiyue"[My Years in Poland], in Wang Taiping,ed.,Dangdai Zhongguo shijie waijiao shengya [Diplomatic Careers of Contemporary Chinese Envoys](Beijing:Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe,1996),pp.179-180;and Zong Daoyi,"Xin Zhongguo waijiaoshi ruogan shishi kaoding"[Textual Research into Some Facts of Chinese Diplo- matic Historyl,Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjin,No.6,(1997),pp.103-109.Kissinger was dissatisfied with Stoessel's delay in establishing contact and sent three cables warning him that "either you do it or we will get someone who will."Stoessel claimed that he was unable to approach Chinese officials pri- vately at any party or diplomatic reception that fall and winter.See Seymour M.Hersh,The Price of Power:Kisinger in the White House (New York:Summit Books,1983),p.359.It is not clear why the United States did not contact Beijing through the extant channel between the Chinese and U.S.em- bassy second secretaries in Warsaw.One possibility is that the second-secretary-level contact was only for routine issues,and the Chinese did not regard the channel as important. 10

nels, Nixon and Kissinger decided to reopen the long-suspended U.S.-China ambassadorial talks in Warsaw.25 In September 1969 they ordered Walter Stoessel, the U.S. ambassador to Poland, to contact his Chinese counterpart for a new meeting. To Kissinger’s irritation, it took almost three months be￾fore Stoessel could approach Chinese diplomats in Warsaw. Kissinger was ex￾ploring possible paths for an earlier meeting when U.S. intelligence learned of a secret directive issued by Zhou Enlai to Chinese embassies in November calling for greater diplomatic ºexibility to protect China from the Soviet Union. Zhou declared that the PRC’s “ºexible tactics” would include a re￾sumption of talks with Washington to keep Moscow off balance and exacer￾bate U.S.-Soviet tensions. Meanwhile, for domestic political consumption, Zhou stated that Beijing would not abandon its “revolutionary principles,” the ªrst of many times over the next few years that Chinese leaders made this pledge.26 Stoessel acted in an unusual fashion when, on 3 December, he spotted Chinese diplomats at a Yugoslav fashion show at Warsaw’s Palace of Culture and followed them outside the building afterward. The Chinese diplomats, caught off guard, quickly ºed. Stoessel ran after them and was able to catch the Chinese interpreter, telling him in “broken Polish” that he had an impor￾tant message for the Chinese embassy.27 The Chinese embassy sent a report to Beijing about the U.S. ambassa￾dor’s “unusual behavior,” and it was conveyed to Zhou Enlai. Up to this point, Mao and Zhou had regarded Nixon’s probing as only exploratory. But 10 Xia 25. China and the United States had originally agreed to hold the 135th session of the ambassadorial talks on 20 February 1969. 26. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, “Signs of Life in Chinese Foreign Policy,” 11 April 1970, copy at National Security Archive: quoted in William Burr, “Sino-American Relations, 1969: Sino-Soviet Border Conºict and Steps toward Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (April 2001), p. 97. 27. Xue Mouhong, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1990), p. 219. See also Stoessel to Secretary of State, 3 Decem￾ber 1969, pp. 23–28, POL-US, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967–1969, Record Group (RG) 59, NARA. In the telegram Stoessel mistakenly said that the Chinese diplomat he tried to approach was Lei Yang, the Chinese chargé d’affaires to Poland. Actually, it was Li Juqing, the Chinese embassy’s second secre￾tary, and the interpreter was Jing Zhicheng. See Luo Yisu, “Zai Bolan de suiyue” [My Years in Poland], in Wang Taiping, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo shijie waijiao shengya [Diplomatic Careers of Contemporary Chinese Envoys] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1996), pp. 179–180; and Zong Daoyi, “Xin Zhongguo waijiaoshi ruogan shishi kaoding” [Textual Research into Some Facts of Chinese Diplo￾matic History], Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu, No. 6, (1997), pp. 103–109. Kissinger was dissatisªed with Stoessel’s delay in establishing contact and sent three cables warning him that “either you do it or we will get someone who will.” Stoessel claimed that he was unable to approach Chinese ofªcials pri￾vately at any party or diplomatic reception that fall and winter. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 359. It is not clear why the United States did not contact Beijing through the extant channel between the Chinese and U.S. em￾bassy second secretaries in Warsaw. One possibility is that the second-secretary-level contact was only for routine issues, and the Chinese did not regard the channel as important

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement upon hearing about the incident,the Chinese leaders seemed convinced that the Americans were serious,and they responded swiftly.Zhou told Mao that "the opportunity is coming;we now have a brick in our hands to knock at the door."28 At Mao's instruction,Zhou acted at once to let the Americans know of Beijing's interest in reopening communication with Washington.On 4 De- cember,Zhou,with Mao's approval,made a goodwill gesture by ordering the release of two Americans who had been held in China since mid-February 1969,when their yacht had strayed into China's territorial water off Guangdong.” Stoessel's encounter with the Chinese diplomats at the Yugoslav fashion show was a turning point in U.S.-China relations.It convinced Mao and Zhou that the United States was genuinely interested in improving relations with the PRC,and it happened at a time when the Chinese leaders were fear- ful of war with the Soviet Union.They were looking for opportunities to ameliorate relations with the United States in order to offset the Soviet Union.Moreover,the circumstances of the Stoessel incident were useful for Mao and Zhou,who could cite it in telling their Chinese colleagues that"it is the Americans who need something from us,not the other way around."The two leaders would retell the story and repeat the theme time and again.3 In reality,the PRC's quest to resume the ambassadorial talks had been under way for some time.When the first group of Chinese ambassadors re- turned to their posts after the Ninth Party Congress,Lei Yang was appointed charge d'affaires in Poland in June 1969.Although Lei was not an ambassador in rank,he was a senior diplomat,having served as director of the Foreign Ministry's education department for many years.Before Lei left for Poland, Zhou Enlai urged him to study the record of Sino-American ambassadorial contacts and to keep an eye out for signs of change in U.S.policy so that he could report back on anything significant.Zhou emphasized the importance of retaining the"Warsaw channel."As instructed,Lei carefully went through the records of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks and other written mate- rials on U.S.-China relations before departing for Warsaw. On 20 January 1970,China and the United States agreed to resume the ambassadorial talks,with sessions alternating between the Chinese and U.S. 28.Jin,ed.,Zhou Enlai zhuan,Vol.2,p.1087. 29.Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [Division of CCP Central Archives and Manuscripts].comp.,Zhou Enlai nianpu:1949-1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai],Vol.3 (Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian and Renmin Chubanshe,1997),p.336;Jin,ed.,Zhou Enlai zhuan,Vol.2,p.1088;and Kissinger,White House Years,p.188. 30.Interview with CCP historians who requested anonymity,in Beijing.January 2002 31.Qian Jiang,"Huifu Zhong Mei Huasha Huitan de Qibu"[The Beginning of the Renewal of Sino- American Warsaw Talks],Bainianchao [Hundred-Year Tide],No.3(2000),pp,20-21

upon hearing about the incident, the Chinese leaders seemed convinced that the Americans were serious, and they responded swiftly. Zhou told Mao that “the opportunity is coming; we now have a brick in our hands to knock at the door.”28 At Mao’s instruction, Zhou acted at once to let the Americans know of Beijing’s interest in reopening communication with Washington. On 4 De￾cember, Zhou, with Mao’s approval, made a goodwill gesture by ordering the release of two Americans who had been held in China since mid-February 1969, when their yacht had strayed into China’s territorial water off Guangdong.29 Stoessel’s encounter with the Chinese diplomats at the Yugoslav fashion show was a turning point in U.S.-China relations. It convinced Mao and Zhou that the United States was genuinely interested in improving relations with the PRC, and it happened at a time when the Chinese leaders were fear￾ful of war with the Soviet Union. They were looking for opportunities to ameliorate relations with the United States in order to offset the Soviet Union. Moreover, the circumstances of the Stoessel incident were useful for Mao and Zhou, who could cite it in telling their Chinese colleagues that “it is the Americans who need something from us, not the other way around.” The two leaders would retell the story and repeat the theme time and again.30 In reality, the PRC’s quest to resume the ambassadorial talks had been under way for some time. When the ªrst group of Chinese ambassadors re￾turned to their posts after the Ninth Party Congress, Lei Yang was appointed chargé d’affaires in Poland in June 1969. Although Lei was not an ambassador in rank, he was a senior diplomat, having served as director of the Foreign Ministry’s education department for many years. Before Lei left for Poland, Zhou Enlai urged him to study the record of Sino-American ambassadorial contacts and to keep an eye out for signs of change in U.S. policy so that he could report back on anything signiªcant. Zhou emphasized the importance of retaining the “Warsaw channel.” As instructed, Lei carefully went through the records of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks and other written mate￾rials on U.S.-China relations before departing for Warsaw.31 On 20 January 1970, China and the United States agreed to resume the ambassadorial talks, with sessions alternating between the Chinese and U.S. 11 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement 28. Jin, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan, Vol. 2, p. 1087. 29. Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [Division of CCP Central Archives and Manuscripts], comp., Zhou Enlai nianpu: 1949–1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], Vol. 3 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian and Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), p. 336; Jin, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan, Vol. 2, p. 1088; and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 188. 30. Interview with CCP historians who requested anonymity, in Beijing, January 2002. 31. Qian Jiang, “Huifu Zhong Mei Huasha Huitan de Qibu” [The Beginning of the Renewal of Sino￾American Warsaw Talks], Bainianchao [Hundred-Year Tide], No. 3 (2000), pp, 20–21