Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and limitation Robert o. Keohane James b. duke professor of political science Duke University Author's note: The article appears in The Journal of Legal Studies, Volume XXXI(1), Pt. 2, January 2002 S307-S319. This volume is an attempt to explore the value of rational-choice analysis for the study of international law. As the editors suggest, the field of international law has been quite resistant to rational-choice analysis. It is important to recognize, however, that the enterprise of which this volume is an example is not new. Political scientists have used rational-choice analysis for two decades to understand international institutions, beginning notably with a special issue of international Organization in 1982. Some international legal scholars understood fairly quickly that"international institutions, "in the language of political science, were largely equivalent to "international law"as they understood it. Indeed, Anne-Marie Slaughter characterized institutionalist work on international regimes as"reinventing international law in rational-choice language Kenneth abbott was the pioneer among international legal scholars in introducing political scientists' arguments about institutions into the legal literature. More recently, another special issue of International Organization -this time an interdisciplinary venture involving international legal scholars -has been devoted to the subject of realization I These comments are highly indebted to the discussion at the conference on Rational Choice and International Law, University of Chicago Law School, April 27-29, 2001. I especially want to thank Lenneth Abbott, George Downs, John Ferejohn, Jack Goldsmith, Nannerl O Keohane, Eric Posner, Imke Risopp-Nickelson, and Duncan Snidal for comments on earlier drafts. 2 International Organization, volume 36, no. 2(Spring 1982), reprinted in Stephen DKrasner,ed International Regimes(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983). The papers in this volume that used rational-choice frameworks were Arthur A Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World"(pp 115-140 in the Krasner volume)and Robert O Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes"(pp. 141-171). The latter paper is the theoretical kernel of my 1984 book, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the world Political Economy(Princeton: Princeton University Press) Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, " 87 American Journal of International Law 205(1993), p. 220. Kenneth w. Abbott, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for Intermational Lawyer 14 Yale ournal of international Law 335 (1989) International Organization, volume 54, no. 3(summer 2000), reprinted as Judith L. Goldstein, Miles, Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds, Legalization and World Politics(Cambridge MIT Press, 2001). Kenneth w. Abbott and duncan Nidal rely heavily on rational-choice analysis in their ontribution to this volume; and the influence of the rationalist way of thinking pervades it. See Abbott and Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, "in Legalization, pp. 37-7
1 Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations1 Robert O. Keohane James B. Duke Professor of Political Science Duke University Author’s note: The article appears in The Journal of Legal Studies, Volume XXXI (1), Pt. 2, January 2002: S307-S319. This volume is an attempt to explore the value of rational-choice analysis for the study of international law. As the editors suggest, the field of international law has been quite resistant to rational-choice analysis. It is important to recognize, however, that the enterprise of which this volume is an example is not new. Political scientists have used rational-choice analysis for two decades to understand international institutions, beginning notably with a special issue of International Organization in 1982.2 Some international legal scholars understood fairly quickly that “international institutions,” in the language of political science, were largely equivalent to “international law” as they understood it. Indeed, Anne-Marie Slaughter characterized institutionalist work on international regimes as “reinventing international law in rational-choice language.”3 Kenneth Abbott was the pioneer among international legal scholars in introducing political scientists’ arguments about institutions into the legal literature.4 More recently, another special issue of International Organization – this time an interdisciplinary venture involving international legal scholars -- has been devoted to the subject of legalization.5 1 These comments are highly indebted to the discussion at the conference on Rational Choice and International Law, University of Chicago Law School, April 27-29, 2001. I especially want to thank Kenneth Abbott, George Downs, John Ferejohn, Jack Goldsmith, Nannerl O. Keohane, Eric Posner, Imke Risopp-Nickelson, and Duncan Snidal for comments on earlier drafts. 2 International Organization, volume 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), reprinted in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983). The papers in this volume that used rational-choice frameworks were Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World” (pp. 115-140 in the Krasner volume) and Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes” (pp. 141-171). The latter paper is the theoretical kernel of my 1984 book, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 3 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,” 87 American Journal of International Law 205 (1993), p. 220. 4 Kenneth W. Abbott, “Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers,” 14 Yale Journal of International Law 335 (1989). 5 International Organization, volume 54, no. 3 (summer 2000), reprinted as Judith L. Goldstein, Miles, Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds., Legalization and World Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal rely heavily on rational-choice analysis in their contribution to this volume; and the influence of the rationalist way of thinking pervades it. See Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” in Legalization, pp. 37-72
My own work has been part of this rationalist research program and I am highly committed to a modest form of rational-choice theory. Hence I wish to begin this commentary by indicating what that commitment means-and doesnt mean-to me Defining rationality involves very difficult issues of information. Rationality could be defined in such that the proposition of rational choice is irrefutable principle. If rationality simply means that a person does what he most prefers, a madman is perfectly rational. Perhaps he prefers to mutilate himself or to destroy those he loves On this basis, Hitler would have had to be judged rational-evil, but rational --when he ordered the Holocaust. But if all behavior is by definition rational, the concept of rationality"becomes meaningless. However, rationality need not be a meaningless concept, because a key condition for rationality involves the agents beliefs. Jon Elster offers a definition of what might be called"pure rationality, which emphasizes beliefs: An action, to be rational, must be the final result of three optimal decisions. First, it must be the best means of realizing an individual's desires, given his beliefs. Next, these beliefs must themselves be optimal given the information available to him. Finally, the person must collect an optimal amount of evidence -neither too much nor too little Of course, this definition of rationality turns it into an ideal type. No action is ever,in this definition, perfectly rational. But we can certainly make judgments about whether the behavior of particular agents approximates rationality or whether, like Hitler's, it flunks the informational tests. Hitler's beliefs about non-Aryans were wildly distorted, even given the information available to him. And he by no means searched analysis as inapplicable at least to some aspects of his behavior View rational-choice thoroughly for evidence. Hence we can judge him irrational and When I say that an actor behaves strategically, I do not mean that she behaves perfectly according to the rationalist ideal-type. To characterize behavior as strategic however, does have six implications: 1)that the agent makes choices in anticipation of the likely choices and reactions of others; 2)that she is concerned about the consequences of her actions; 3)that she orders her preferences in a broadly consistent fashion, so that her preferences are relatively stable across time and across issues; 4) that she selects means that she believes will achieve better rather than worse anticipated consequences in terms of her own ordered preferences; 5) that her beliefs are reasonable in view of available information; and 6) that she has searched for information that is relevant to the attainment of her objectives Strategic action is a matter of degree-we can act more or less strategically. Rationality is an ideal type, which is useful as a baseline for judging behavior as more or ss strategic. The assumption of rationality is also useful for creating formal models but is important to recognize that these are not models of actual behavior, but of ideal- typical behavior. Another way to express this point is to say that these models do not Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences( Cambridge: 1989), p. 30
2 My own work has been part of this rationalist research program and I am highly committed to a modest form of rational-choice theory. Hence I wish to begin this commentary by indicating what that commitment means – and doesn’t mean – to me. Defining rationality involves very difficult issues of information. Rationality could be defined in such a way that the proposition of rational choice is irrefutable in principle. If rationality simply means that a person does what he most prefers, a madman is perfectly rational. Perhaps he prefers to mutiliate himself or to destroy those he loves. On this basis, Hitler would have had to be judged rational – evil, but rational -- when he ordered the Holocaust. But if all behavior is by definition rational, the concept of “rationality” becomes meaningless. However, rationality need not be a meaningless concept, because a key condition for rationality involves the agent’s beliefs. Jon Elster offers a definition of what might be called “pure rationality,” which emphasizes beliefs: “An action, to be rational, must be the final result of three optimal decisions. First, it must be the best means of realizing an individual’s desires, given his beliefs. Next, these beliefs must themselves be optimal, given the information available to him. Finally, the person must collect an optimal amount of evidence – neither too much nor too little.”6 Of course, this definition of rationality turns it into an ideal type. No action is ever, in this definition, perfectly rational. But we can certainly make judgments about whether the behavior of particular agents approximates rationality or whether, like Hitler’s, it flunks the informational tests. Hitler’s beliefs about non-Aryans were wildly distorted, even given the information available to him. And he by no means searched thoroughly for evidence. Hence we can judge him irrational and view rational-choice analysis as inapplicable at least to some aspects of his behavior. When I say that an actor behaves strategically, I do not mean that she behaves perfectly according to the rationalist ideal-type. To characterize behavior as strategic, however, does have six implications: 1) that the agent makes choices in anticipation of the likely choices and reactions of others; 2) that she is concerned about the consequences of her actions; 3) that she orders her preferences in a broadly consistent fashion, so that her preferences are relatively stable across time and across issues; 4) that she selects means that she believes will achieve better rather than worse anticipated consequences in terms of her own ordered preferences; 5) that her beliefs are reasonable in view of available information; and 6) that she has searched for information that is relevant to the attainment of her objectives. Strategic action is a matter of degree – we can act more or less strategically. Rationality is an ideal type, which is useful as a baseline for judging behavior as more or less strategic. The assumption of rationality is also useful for creating formal models – but is important to recognize that these are not models of actual behavior, but of idealtypical behavior. Another way to express this point is to say that these models do not 6 Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: 1989), p. 30
purport to be comprehensive, but rather focus on one central aspect of human behavior. The models may turn out to be good approximations of behavior under certain conditions, and therefore of great value. But they are not universally and unconditionally correc They generate hypotheses, not conclusions Furthermore, it is important not to equate rationality with materialistic self- interest, or to regard strategic action as motivated solely by materialistic self-interest. To do so would be to equate rational choice theory with a crude philosophical materialism. Yet there is no necessary connection at all. a rational altruist allocates her charitable donations so that the marginal value of the additional dollar, given to each of a variety of charities, is equalized. The rational environmentalist chooses strategies with the highest expected value of improving environmental outcomes. The rational anti-globalization demonstrator picks situations where the world 's media will be hungry for pictures of demonstrators, engulfed in waves of tear-gas, confronting troops in ugly gas masks. A Elster says, the rational-choice theorist"can say that the person acts so as to maximize utility, as long as we keep in mind that this is nothing but a convenient way of saying that option might be one that gives pleasure to others and none to himself ng act, his preferred he does what he most prefers. There is no implication of hedonism. In I believe that political actors behave strategically, according to what James March and Johan Olsen call a"logic of consequences, most of the time, perhaps almost all of the time. Hence rational-choice analysis is essential for studying political interactions and the institutions that both shape such interactions and are created by them. But members of the mass public often do not act strategically- and in the theory of rational choice, often should not. If one has negligible influence over an outcome, the investments in information and calculation necessary to determine one s optimal strategy will not themselves be optimal, so it may make more sense to operate on the basis of a rule of thumb. Voters, for instance, may be"rationally ignorant. " Likewise, citizens may decide to uphold broad norms, such as defending human rights, or protecting life, even if they do not find it worthwhile to think-through the consequences of doing so They could, for instance, have favored the arrest, in Great Britain, of former President inochet of Chile without being required, by reason or interest, to calculate whether that action would advance or retard the protection of human rights in developing countries Making such a calculation in a definitive way would be impossible even for specialists since it would depend not only on correctly modeling the various interlocked games involved, now and in the future, but upon the values of certain parameters of these games Given this understanding of rationality and strategic action, I ask: what do the papers in this volume tell us about the contributions that theories based on the assumption of rationality-"rational-choice theories"-make to the study of international law? I do 7I am indebted to duncan Nidal for this formulation Elster, Nuts and Bolts, pp. 23-24 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. In Exploration and Contestation, pp 303-329 Shepsh ering work in this field was done in the late 1970s and the 1980s by Kenneth A Shepsle ce of "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, "in Political Science: The Scie Politics, ed. Herbert F. Weisberg(New York: Agathon), pp. 51-81
3 purport to be comprehensive, but rather focus on one central aspect of human behavior.7 The models may turn out to be good approximations of behavior under certain conditions, and therefore of great value. But they are not universally and unconditionally correct. They generate hypotheses, not conclusions. Furthermore, it is important not to equate rationality with materialistic selfinterest, or to regard strategic action as motivated solely by materialistic self-interest. To do so would be to equate rational choice theory with a crude philosophical materialism. Yet there is no necessary connection at all. A rational altruist allocates her charitable donations so that the marginal value of the additional dollar, given to each of a variety of charities, is equalized. The rational environmentalist chooses strategies with the highest expected value of improving environmental outcomes. The rational anti-globalization demonstrator picks situations where the world’s media will be hungry for pictures of demonstrators, engulfed in waves of tear-gas, confronting troops in ugly gas masks. As Elster says, the rational-choice theorist “can say that the person acts so as to maximize utility, as long as we keep in mind that this is nothing but a convenient way of saying that he does what he most prefers. There is no implication of hedonism. In fact, his preferred option might be one that gives pleasure to others and none to himself.”8 I believe that political actors behave strategically, according to what James March and Johan Olsen call a “logic of consequences,” most of the time, perhaps almost all of the time.9 Hence rational-choice analysis is essential for studying political interactions and the institutions that both shape such interactions and are created by them.10 But members of the mass public often do not act strategically – and in the theory of rational choice, often should not. If one has negligible influence over an outcome, the investments in information and calculation necessary to determine one’s optimal strategy will not themselves be optimal, so it may make more sense to operate on the basis of a “rule of thumb.” Voters, for instance, may be “rationally ignorant.” Likewise, citizens may decide to uphold broad norms, such as defending human rights, or protecting life, even if they do not find it worthwhile to think-through the consequences of doing so. They could, for instance, have favored the arrest, in Great Britain, of former President Pinochet of Chile without being required, by reason or interest, to calculate whether that action would advance or retard the protection of human rights in developing countries. Making such a calculation in a definitive way would be impossible even for specialists, since it would depend not only on correctly modeling the various interlocked games involved, now and in the future, but upon the values of certain parameters of these games. Given this understanding of rationality and strategic action, I ask: what do the papers in this volume tell us about the contributions that theories based on the assumption of rationality – “rational-choice theories” – make to the study of international law? I do 7 I am indebted to Duncan Snidal for this formulation. 8 Elster, Nuts and Bolts, pp. 23-24. 9 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” In Exploration and Contestation, pp. 303-329. 10 Pioneering work in this field was done in the late 1970s and the 1980s by Kenneth A. Shepsle. See Shepsle, “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions,” in Political Science: The Science of Politics, ed. Herbert F. Weisberg (New York: Agathon), pp. 51-81
not attempt a systematic evaluation of these highly varied papers, but rather use some of them to illustrate the points I want to make. In discussing the value of rational-choice theory, I will also refer to its limitations, of which it is particularly important for its practitioners to be aware My argument is that rational-choice theory is valuable in at least five ways: 1 )as a basis for skeptical interpretations of talk and action; 2)as a menu of causal mechanisms; 3) as an explanatory device for helping to resolve specific puzzles; 4 )as part-but only part-of an explanation of legal and political phenomena; and 5)as the basis for generating further puzzles for research. Different methods are associated with these different tasks Rational-Choice Skepticism ultimate skepticism, renouncing the possibility of stable knowledge. Rationalism can a In an age of doubt, skepticism is easy. In a sense, postmodernism constitutes th also be relentlessly skeptical, but in a way that is ultimately more constructive. By exposing the failures of superficial or inconsistent explanations, it can clear the way for positive theory, empirical testing, and a better understanding of social reality The paper in this volume by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner exemplifies the skepticism of rational-choice theory. Goldsmith and Posner quite elegantly demonstrate that moralistic and legalistic talk is not necessarily indicative of moralist and legalistic motivations by the speakers. Their method, quite appropriately, is conceptual rather than mpirical. Signalling theory indicates that cynically self-interested statesmen should sound as moralistic as truly moralistic statesmen in environments that reward such talk What Goldsmith and posner do not claim to establish is what the motivations of these statesmen in fact are. Since there are typically pooling equilibria, what the theory tells us is that we can't tell. The theory that leaders of some states are influenced by moral norms may under some conditions imply the same behavior as the theory that all leaders act on the basis of narrow self-interest Rational-choice theory is quite good at telling us what we don' t know. Another case in point is principal-agent theory, which makes the important methodological point that we should not attribute power to agents merely on the basis that they undertake important actions, without being contradicted by their principals. The theory of agent autonomy and that of perfect dominance by the principal are observationally equivalent It is important to know what we don't know. But we should remind ourselves that being aware of our ignorance is not equivalent to having made a valid inference about social reality II Jack Goldsmith and Eric A Posner. "Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, this volume, pp --- Mark A Pollack, "Learning from the Americanists(Again): Theory and method in the Study of Delegation, "West European Politics, January 20
4 not attempt a systematic evaluation of these highly varied papers, but rather use some of them to illustrate the points I want to make. In discussing the value of rational-choice theory, I will also refer to its limitations, of which it is particularly important for its practitioners to be aware. My argument is that rational-choice theory is valuable in at least five ways: 1) as a basis for skeptical interpretations of talk and action; 2) as a menu of causal mechanisms; 3) as an explanatory device for helping to resolve specific puzzles; 4) as part – but only part – of an explanation of legal and political phenomena; and 5) as the basis for generating further puzzles for research. Different methods are associated with these different tasks. Rational-Choice Skepticism In an age of doubt, skepticism is easy. In a sense, postmodernism constitutes the ultimate skepticism, renouncing the possibility of stable knowledge. Rationalism can also be relentlessly skeptical, but in a way that is ultimately more constructive. By exposing the failures of superficial or inconsistent explanations, it can clear the way for positive theory, empirical testing, and a better understanding of social reality. The paper in this volume by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner exemplifies the skepticism of rational-choice theory.11 Goldsmith and Posner quite elegantly demonstrate that moralistic and legalistic talk is not necessarily indicative of moralist and legalistic motivations by the speakers. Their method, quite appropriately, is conceptual rather than empirical. Signalling theory indicates that cynically self-interested statesmen should sound as moralistic as truly moralistic statesmen in environments that reward such talk. What Goldsmith and Posner do not claim to establish is what the motivations of these statesmen in fact are. Since there are typically pooling equilibria, what the theory tells us is that we can’t tell. The theory that leaders of some states are influenced by moral norms may under some conditions imply the same behavior as the theory that all leaders act on the basis of narrow self-interest. Rational-choice theory is quite good at telling us what we don’t know. Another case in point is principal-agent theory, which makes the important methodological point that we should not attribute power to agents merely on the basis that they undertake important actions, without being contradicted by their principals. The theory of agent autonomy and that of perfect dominance by the principal are observationally equivalent.12 It is important to know what we don’t know. But we should remind ourselves that being aware of our ignorance is not equivalent to having made a valid inference about social reality. 11 Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective,” this volume, pp --- . 12 Mark A. Pollack, “Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation,” West European Politics, January 2002
Rational-Choice Theory and Causal Mechanisms Any coherent social science explanation requires a causal mechanism. That i there must not merely be a correlation, but also an account of how one set of actions led to another. Causal mechanisms are embedded in ordinary narratives-we ask "why" all the time. When we ask, "why did someone do that? "we usually have in mind a potential set of explanations, each of which either focuses on the person's preferences and his choices of means to attain them, or on the ideas of appropriate behavior that he held Historians seek to infer causality in specific cases by showing that they have identified the crucial causal mechanisms at work in the situation, whose operation they can trace through time. Social scientists typically seek to find a number of instances of a phenomenon, or good tests of a causal mechanism, in order to arrive at generalizations, nd to decrease the uncertainty of their inferences Before causal mechanisms can be tested, they must be articulated and specified. Rational-choice theory is particularly good at this task, since interesting causal mechanisms can be developed on the basis of casual observation, followed by the methods of logical analysis and modeling. The problem is not to understand empirically how frequently patterns of actual behavior approximate the causal mechanism, or the conditions under which the mechanism operates, but simply how the mechanism The paper in this volume by George Downs and Michael Jones is a fine example of how rational-choice theory can be used to explore a causal mechanism, in this case that of reputation. Downs and Jones do not focus on a particular puzzle, but on the mechanism of reputation itself. The hypothetical mechanism under scrutiny is that commitments will be kept, even when it is costlier to abide by a particular provision than to break it, because of the potential reneger's concern about the consequences of renegin for its reputation. Downs and Jones take this mechanism -which is suggested by rational-choice theory -seriously. But they also point out the fallacy of believing that concern about reputation would guarantee compliance with all commitments In the Downs and Jones model, the costs and benefits of compliance with contractual obligations fluctuate stochastically, and it is inefficient or ineffective for actors to impose penalties for noncompliance above a certain threshold. Given these conditions, compliance with treaties is expected to be imperfect. There is also little ason to believe, they argue, that states will have equally strong incentives to comply with all of their agreements a states different agreements will be of different value to it, and the state may find that reneging on an agreement in one issue-area does not have a major impact on its reputation for compliance on other issues I3 On causal mechanisms see Elster, Nuts and Bolts, cited above. On problems of inference in social science, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 14 George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, "Reputation, Compliance and International Law. "This
5 Rational-Choice Theory and Causal Mechanisms Any coherent social science explanation requires a causal mechanism. That is, there must not merely be a correlation, but also an account of how one set of actions led to another. Causal mechanisms are embedded in ordinary narratives – we ask “why” all the time. When we ask, “why did someone do that?” we usually have in mind a potential set of explanations, each of which either focuses on the person’s preferences and his choices of means to attain them, or on the ideas of appropriate behavior that he held. Historians seek to infer causality in specific cases by showing that they have identified the crucial causal mechanisms at work in the situation, whose operation they can trace through time. Social scientists typically seek to find a number of instances of a phenomenon, or good tests of a causal mechanism, in order to arrive at generalizations, and to decrease the uncertainty of their inferences.13 Before causal mechanisms can be tested, they must be articulated and specified. Rational-choice theory is particularly good at this task, since interesting causal mechanisms can be developed on the basis of casual observation, followed by the methods of logical analysis and modeling. The problem is not to understand empirically how frequently patterns of actual behavior approximate the causal mechanism, or the conditions under which the mechanism operates, but simply how the mechanism operates. The paper in this volume by George Downs and Michael Jones is a fine example of how rational-choice theory can be used to explore a causal mechanism, in this case that of reputation.14 Downs and Jones do not focus on a particular puzzle, but on the mechanism of reputation itself. The hypothetical mechanism under scrutiny is that commitments will be kept, even when it is costlier to abide by a particular provision than to break it, because of the potential reneger’s concern about the consequences of reneging for its reputation. Downs and Jones take this mechanism – which is suggested by rational-choice theory – seriously. But they also point out the fallacy of believing that concern about reputation would guarantee compliance with all commitments. In the Downs and Jones model, the costs and benefits of compliance with contractual obligations fluctuate stochastically, and it is inefficient or ineffective for actors to impose penalties for noncompliance above a certain threshold. Given these conditions, compliance with treaties is expected to be imperfect. There is also little reason to believe, they argue, that states will have equally strong incentives to comply with all of their agreements. A state’s different agreements will be of different value to it, and the state may find that reneging on an agreement in one issue-area does not have a major impact on its reputation for compliance on other issues. 13 On causal mechanisms see Elster, Nuts and Bolts, cited above. On problems of inference in social science, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 14 George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, “Reputation, Compliance and International Law.” This volume, pp. ---