Mixed Constitution and Common Law (15 of mankind, he reported, offered no comparable instance of a community governed'in a manner so free, so rational and so suitable to the dignity of human nature(Hume 1994 p 217). But in reaching this conclusion, Hume distanced himself from many contemporary commentators by emphasizing the historical novelty, institutional fragility and considerable political risks of this distinctive form In his response to the country'attack on Walpolean corruption, Hume maintained that what had there been treated as pathological features of post-Revolution politics instead needed to be acknowledged as the inevitable, though potentially dangerousness, features of England's complex institutional structures. The political order secured through the Glorious Revolution and protestant succession had ended the destructive constitutional conflicts of the Stuart era. And these developments likewise had served to blur and attenuate the kingdoms earlier political divisions between Whig and Tory parties. But it was wrong to expect that this clarification of the constitution simply eliminated political division and partisanship The constitution's 'extremely delicate' combination of republican and monarchical parts meant that ' different opinions must arise' over its proper balance, 'even among persons of the best understanding. On any particular issue ' some will incline to trust larger powers to the crown,, while others would fear the approaches of tyranny and despotic power, and hence, partisan divisions had to allowed as the genuine offspring of the British government (pp 40-1, 44-55). Moreover, since the power of the crown' al ways lodged in a single person, either king or minister,, the extent of this power would inevitably vary according to the ambition and capacity of the individual exercising it. And accordingly, the constitutional structures could never assign to the crown such a determinate degree of power, as will every hand' serve the purposes of constitutional balance(p. 27; and see pp 203-5) If, for Hume, political division and constitutional ambiguity formed an unavoidable disadvantage of England's system of limited monarchy'(p. 27), the mechanisms of constitutional balance themselves required similar re-examination and elucidation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom concerning the balance among king, lords and commons, Hume
Mixed Constitution and Common Law (15) of mankind,’ he reported, offered no comparable instance of a community governed ‘in a manner so free, so rational and so suitable to the dignity of human nature’ (Hume 1994, p.217). But in reaching this conclusion, Hume distanced himself from many contemporary commentators by emphasizing the historical novelty, institutional fragility and considerable political risks of this distinctive form. In his response to the ‘country’ attack on Walpolean corruption, Hume maintained that what had there been treated as pathological features of post-Revolution politics instead needed to be acknowledged as the inevitable, though potentially dangerousness, features of England’s complex institutional structures. The political order secured through the Glorious Revolution and Protestant succession had ended the destructive constitutional conflicts of the Stuart era. And these developments likewise had served to blur and attenuate the kingdom’s earlier political divisions between Whig and Tory parties. But it was wrong to expect that this clarification of the constitution simply eliminated political division and partisanship. The constitution’s ‘extremely delicate’ combination of ‘republican and monarchical parts’ meant that ‘different opinions must arise’ over its proper balance, ‘even among persons of the best understanding’. On any particular issue ‘some will incline to trust larger powers to the crown’, while others would fear the ‘approaches of tyranny and despotic power’; and hence, partisan divisions had to allowed as ‘the genuine offspring of the British government’ (pp.40-1, 44-55). Moreover, since ‘the power of the crown’ was ‘always lodged in a single person, either king or minister’, the extent of this power would inevitably vary according to the ambition and capacity of the individual exercising it. And accordingly, the constitutional structures could never ‘assign to the crown such a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand’ serve the purposes of constitutional balance (p.27; and see pp.203-5). If, for Hume, political division and constitutional ambiguity formed an ‘unavoidable disadvantage’ of England’s system of ‘limited monarchy’ (p.27), the mechanisms of constitutional balance themselves required similar re-examination and elucidation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom concerning the balance among king, lords and commons, Hume
Mixed Constitution and Common Law (16) maintained that the constitution in fact allotted to the house of commons' a ' share of power . so great that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government'(p 25) Neither the monarch's legislative veto, nor the privileges of the lords, was sufficient to counter the strength of the commons. The costs of modern statecraft, coupled with the house of commons settled control over the right of granting money', gave the body more than enough capacity to overwhelm the constitutional order(pp 25-6) What, in fact, prevented this destruction of the mixed constitution were precisely those frequently-condemned patronage resources of the crown which created a block of support in the house of commons sufficient to maintain the crowns authority (p. 26). In this manner. Hume concluded. executive influence was revealed as the true savior of the constitutional order. We may . give to this influence what name we please, we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed government.(Hume 1994, p. 26) In the decades which followed, constitutional argument and programs of reform routinely adhered to the script set out in these polemics of the early-Hanoverian period Apologists for the political order emphasized the manner in which executive influence'had simply replaced prerogative'as the main source of royal power in the scheme of constitutional balance(see Blackstone 1979, I, pp. 322-5). But even the most complacent observers recognized that the scale of British government and its military establishment gave the executive, in Blackstones phrase, an influence most amazingly extensive(p. 324) Accordingly, the conduct of executive government and its impact on parliamentary independence necessarily remained a leading preoccupation(see Hume 1994, pp 26-7; and Burke I, pp. 444-50). This was an imperative that framed both moderate and radical projects of constitutional purification(see Cannon 1972, pp. 47-97, and Langford 1989, pp. 710-9
Mixed Constitution and Common Law (16) maintained that the constitution in fact ‘allotted … to the house of commons’ a ‘share of power … so great that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government’ (p.25). Neither the monarch’s legislative veto, nor the privileges of the lords, was sufficient to counter the strength of the commons. The costs of modern statecraft, coupled with the house of commons settled control over the ‘right of granting money’, gave the body more than enough capacity to overwhelm the constitutional order (pp.25-6).6 What, in fact, prevented this destruction of the mixed constitution were precisely those frequently-condemned patronage resources of the crown which created a block of support in the house of commons sufficient to maintain the crown’s authority (p.26). In this manner, Hume concluded, executive influence was revealed as the true savior of the constitutional order: We may … give to this influence what name we please; we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed government. (Hume 1994, p.26) In the decades which followed, constitutional argument and programs of reform routinely adhered to the script set out in these polemics of the early-Hanoverian period. Apologists for the political order emphasized the manner in which ‘executive influence’ had simply replaced ‘prerogative’ as the main source of royal power in the scheme of constitutional balance (see Blackstone 1979, I, pp.322-5). But even the most complacent observers recognized that the scale of British government and its military establishment gave the executive, in Blackstone’s phrase, ‘an influence most amazingly extensive’ (p.324). Accordingly, the conduct of executive government and its impact on parliamentary independence necessarily remained a leading preoccupation (see Hume 1994, pp.26-7; and Burke I, pp.444-50). This was an imperative that framed both moderate and radical projects of constitutional purification (see Cannon 1972, pp.47-97, and Langford 1989, pp.710-9)
Mixed Constitution and Common Law (17 The radical schemes of constitutional reform, developed in the contexts of the Wilkite protests of the 1760s and the american resistance of the following decade, offered increasingly democratic versions of the ' program to block executive corruption by strengthening the mechanism of parliamentary election. The'subversion of the constitution at the hands of parliamentary corruption'received something like its encyclopedic denunciation through the vehicle of Burghs three-volume Political Disquisitions. The British government,, he reported, had long ceased functioning as a mixed constitution, and now was really a juntocracy.. or government by a minister and his crew Burgh 1774-5, I, pp 49-50, and see Ill, p. 267). The recovery of parliamentary independence required, as John Cartwright expressed the radical prescription, making our parliament annual and our representation equal( Cartwright 1776, p. 15) Conservative critics of this approach to parliamentary reform, such as Josiah Tucker and Edmund Burke, returned to analysis furnished by Hume, arguing that such schemes actually threatened to unbalance the constitution by over-strengthening its republican features, and thereby exposed the kingdom with all the vices and instabilities correctly associated with pure democracy(see Hume 1994, pp31-2: Tucker 1781, pp. 257-74; and Burke 1884, VIl, pp71-87). But even the alternative, self-consciously moderated schemes of political reform adhered to much the same logic of constitutional balance. When in 1780 Burke presented to the House of Commons the whig version of the popularly-agitated plan for economical reform,, he duly stressed that economy' itself merely constituted by a secondary goal of this plan for administrative retrenchment. Its primary purpose was to reduce the direct and visible influence of the executive, and to extinguish'secret corruption almost to the possibility of its existence'(Burke 1884, VIl, p. 356) The debates over corruption, influence and constitutional balance formed the common coin of political argument in eighteenth-century Britain, and frequently involved little better than repetitive and even formulaic rehearsals of stock themes. Yet, this material came to attain an intellectual impact far more substantial than the oftentimes narrowly
Mixed Constitution and Common Law (17) The radical schemes of constitutional reform, developed in the contexts of the Wilkite protests of the 1760s and the American resistance of the following decade, offered increasingly democratic versions of the ‘country’ program to block executive corruption by strengthening the mechanism of parliamentary election. The ‘subversion of the constitution’ at the hands of ‘parliamentary corruption’ received something like its encyclopedic denunciation through the vehicle of Burgh’s three-volume Political Disquisitions. The ‘British government’, he reported, had long ceased functioning as a mixed constitution, and now was ‘really a juntocracy … or government by a minister and his crew’ (Burgh 1774-5, I, pp.49-50, and see III, p.267). The recovery of parliamentary independence required, as John Cartwright expressed the radical prescription, ‘making our parliament annual and our representation equal’ (Cartwright 1776, p.15).7 Conservative critics of this approach to parliamentary reform, such as Josiah Tucker and Edmund Burke, returned to analysis furnished by Hume, arguing that such schemes actually threatened to unbalance the constitution by over-strengthening its republican features, and thereby exposed the kingdom with all the vices and instabilities correctly associated with pure democracy (see Hume 1994, pp.31-2; Tucker 1781, pp.257-74; and Burke 1884, VII, pp.71-87). But even the alternative, self-consciously moderated schemes of political reform adhered to much the same logic of constitutional balance. When in 1780 Burke presented to the House of Commons the whig version of the popularly-agitated plan for ‘economical reform’, he duly stressed that ‘economy’ itself merely constituted by a ‘secondary’ goal of this plan for administrative retrenchment. Its primary purpose was to reduce ‘the direct and visible influence’ of the executive, and to extinguish ‘secret corruption almost to the possibility of its existence’ (Burke 1884, VII, p.356).8 The debates over corruption, influence and constitutional balance formed the common coin of political argument in eighteenth-century Britain, and frequently involved little better than repetitive and even formulaic rehearsals of stock themes. Yet, this material came to attain an intellectual impact far more substantial than the oftentimes narrowly-