Cardozo law school Jacob burns institute for Advanced Legal studies Working Paper 010 April 2000 Privatization and Self-Regulation as Tropes of Global Media Restructuring Monroe Price This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=222112
Cardozo Law School Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies Working Paper 010 April 2000 Privatization and Self-Regulation as Tropes of Global Media Restructuring Monroe Price This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=222112
Privatization and self-Regulation as Tropes of Global Media Restructuring There is a power to language itself in affecting media reform around the world. The field of media regulation is filled with examples of strong ideas, encapsulated in words and phrases, that have an enormous impact on legislative transformation, and the export of which seems a characteristic of globalization. Just think of the ideology-laden tropes that form the vocabulary of reform: the marketplace of ideas, "free and independent media, ""public service broadcasting, " "communication and development, "" strengthening national identity, " assuring pluralism. The invocation of each of these phrases has, behind it, a freight train of implications. The adoption or embrace of one of these concepts virtually commands various media structures behind it. For that reason, there is a contest to instate in the public consciousness some first principles of media reform goals, and, further, to raise some concepts to a position of superiority. The very course or structure of reasoning can be determined by affecting which building block is to be the cornerstone. Because the modification of discourse alters the process of law making we must pay attention to the discourse itself Of course, there is much else in the combination of forces that influences the way legislation and media structuring take place. Economic forces, the ability of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank to condition loans on conforming actions by receiving states, and the internal balance of power within states have significant impact on the restructuring process. But language and the ideas that language collects cannot be underestimated. All missionaries know the power of a concept, or a oncept joined with an image. In the struggle to shape media structures, this school of concepts is particularly important and is the subject of efforts by competing states to alter modes of thinking around the world. One of the highest of high concepts is the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Accept he First Amendment, and so much else follows. Similarly, accept a model in which the state's role is to assure information, education, and entertainment, and another set of consequences ensues. These grand models have been much discussed I want to discuss two additional themes that are escalating as part of the central vocabulary of media reform. These themes are privatization and self-regulation. Once local to the developed countries as a category or mode of discourse, these terms are now found in the idealized toolkit of change everywhere. These concepts have advanced or are advancing from being a mere descriptor of a technique to something closer to a point of advocacy, a measure of satisfaction in terms of a Western template. Of course, privatization and self-regulation are specifically part of the armament to lessen dependence of the media on government. Greater privatization and an emphasis on self-regulation generally reduce the capacity of authoritarian entities to exercise control. Simultaneously, they are spects of a global discourse that is central to a specific restructuring process, one in which multinational corporations advance a model in which, in most destination states, terrestrial distribution is by autonomous private media entities I focus here on these concepts not only because of their timeliness and implications for shaping legislation, but also because of the differences between them. Privatization has already had a substantial operational history in the construction of media reform throughout the West including in the transition societies of Central and Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent the former Soviet Union. 2 Privatization is a doctrine with sharp edges; there is a clear process for implementing it, and a network of experts, from investment bankers to development specialists, who bring a methodology to bear in its implementation. Self-regulation is fuzzier; the bundle of motives behind it is sometimes more complex, and its formal introduction in transition societies is more doubtful. It has had however a more significant impact in advertising and content standards in the United States and in Europe and is extending itself to the Internet L. Privatization One of the hallmarks of the global restructuring of the media has been the shift in control of much of the sector from the public to the private. This is true for channels of distribution, and, as wel for the programming that streams through those channels. What makes public broadcasting public, is, in large part, a matter of ownership or control of the filter through which programming is selected for
Privatization and Self-Regulation as Tropes of Global Media Restructuring There is a power to language itself in affecting media reform around the world. The field of media regulation is filled with examples of strong ideas, encapsulated in words and phrases, that have an enormous impact on legislative transformation, and the export of which seems a characteristic of globalization. Just think of the ideology-laden tropes that form the vocabulary of reform: “the marketplace of ideas,” “free and independent media,” “public service broadcasting,” “communication and development,” “strengthening national identity,” “assuring pluralism.” The invocation of each of these phrases has, behind it, a freight train of implications. The adoption or embrace of one of these concepts virtually commands various media structures behind it. For that reason, there is a contest to instate in the public consciousness some first principles of media reform goals, and, further, to raise some concepts to a position of superiority. The very course or structure of reasoning can be determined by affecting which building block is to be the cornerstone. Because the modification of discourse alters the process of law making, we must pay attention to the discourse itself. Of course, there is much else in the combination of forces that influences the way legislation and media structuring take place. Economic forces, the ability of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank to condition loans on conforming actions by receiving states, and the internal balance of power within states have significant impact on the restructuring process.1 But language and the ideas that language collects cannot be underestimated. All missionaries know the power of a concept, or a concept joined with an image. In the struggle to shape media structures, this school of concepts is particularly important and is the subject of efforts by competing states to alter modes of thinking around the world. One of the highest of high concepts is the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Accept the First Amendment, and so much else follows. Similarly, accept a model in which the state’s role is to assure information, education, and entertainment, and another set of consequences ensues. These grand models have been much discussed. I want to discuss two additional themes that are escalating as part of the central vocabulary of media reform. These themes are privatization and self-regulation. Once local to the developed countries as a category or mode of discourse, these terms are now found in the idealized toolkit of change everywhere. These concepts have advanced or are advancing from being a mere descriptor of a technique to something closer to a point of advocacy, a measure of satisfaction in terms of a Western template. Of course, privatization and self-regulation are specifically part of the armament to lessen dependence of the media on government. Greater privatization and an emphasis on self-regulation generally reduce the capacity of authoritarian entities to exercise control. Simultaneously, they are aspects of a global discourse that is central to a specific restructuring process, one in which multinational corporations advance a model in which, in most destination states, terrestrial distribution is by autonomous private media entities. I focus here on these concepts not only because of their timeliness and implications for shaping legislation, but also because of the differences between them. Privatization has already had a substantial operational history in the construction of media reform throughout the West including in the transition societies of Central and Eastern Europe and, to a lesser extent, the former Soviet Union.2 Privatization is a doctrine with sharp edges; there is a clear process for implementing it, and a network of experts, from investment bankers to development specialists, who bring a methodology to bear in its implementation. Self-regulation is fuzzier; the bundle of motives behind it is sometimes more complex, and its formal introduction in transition societies is more doubtful. It has had, however, a more significant impact in advertising and content standards in the United States and in Europe and is extending itself to the Internet. I. Privatization One of the hallmarks of the global restructuring of the media has been the shift in control of much of the sector from the public to the private. This is true for channels of distribution, and, as well, for the programming that streams through those channels. What makes public broadcasting public, is, in large part, a matter of ownership or control of the filter through which programming is selected for
distribution. A related aspect of what renders public broadcasting categorically distinct is control of production of the programming itself. To be sure, there are still many societies where the media, as a whole, are in the hands or control of the government, but the tendency, fairly constant over regions of the world and even across forms of government, has been toward widely expanding the role of the private sector. What is commonly thought of as globalism is, automatically, one of the great contributors to this process. By turning toward audiences abroad, the great multinationals, world-straddling, many-homed and of diffuse allegiances, have massively reoriented the relative distribution of content around the world from the public to the private. This new and permanent cloud of private programming can find its profit only if it ties to distribution mechanisms that yield audiences. Its very existence, hovering omnipresence and accessibility inevitably alters information flow, inducing innovation in its redistribution. More than that, in many of the post-Soviet societies of Eastern and Central Europe, and many other places besides the partial or entire privatization of government channels was part of the landscape of democratisation In this Essay, I wish to put into context this remarkable shift from the public to the private in many parts of the world partly by exploring different meanings of moving toward the private and the implications of this move for accountability. Both advocates and opponents of privatization contend that it encourages investment, often foreign, and with new levels of investment come new program strategies, including, in many areas, increased non- indigenous programming. At least the opponents argue that all of this leads to the intensification of a tendency toward the culture of the modern, part of a cosmopolitan globalization, one that detracts from sovereignty of the state and the strength of civil society. On the other hand, proponents of privatization argue that the move in that direction can mean the opening to many more outlets of expression, much more in the way of incentives to production, and a flowering of creativity. Privatization can be by degrees, and it is easy to imagine a society that undertakes a comprehensive system of privatization, but government, for reasons of power and identity. retains substantial control of the broadcasting sector But what is privatization? For those relatively remote from the process, implied in that drama is a uniformity of transformation. The term, however, has many meanings, but most simply it refers to the sale of a formerly government-operated enterprise to a buyer in the private sector, as in the denationalization in many sectors in the 1970s and 1980s. In broadcasting a core instance of privatization in Russia was the decision to turn one of the television channels over which the state had total control during the Soviet period into a stock company with substantial private ownership. A different form of privatization in broadcasting may take place when a"public service broadcaster, " like non- commercial channels in the United States, are turned over to private enterprise in whole or in part. This is not strictly a move from state control, not the wholesale recasting of a national system, but it shares important similarities from the point of view of the public sphere. The significant distinction is that privatization takes place when ownership patterns change to remove or substantially diminish state or public control of decisions concerning media space and increase that of private entities that are usually but not always, commercial Privatization, in this broad sense, also encompasses a government decision to make available to commercial broadcasting entities frequencies that were previously reserved for state purposes. Such privatization of frequencies occurred in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The former monopoly state broadcaster remained in existence(though itself, transformed), but private national or regional channels were licensed to compete with it and rapidly attracted audiences. Privatization can be a matter of moving step-by-step, or be part of a systemic change, consciously undertaken, in which the relationship of the state or the public sector to information space is calibrated and consciously reduced Privatization was put forward as a goal, in most of the transition societies, as means of part of the shock treatment of the movement toward capitalism. Radically altering the ownership of the light bulb industry in Hungary or the automobile industry in East Germany had democratic implications, but the significant aspect was tied to a particular theory of efficiency and of reducing the power of the state Privatization of newspapers and broadcasting shared certain of these efficiency-related goals, but the mandate was fa pressing and seemingly far more central to the democratic project. Th for most privatizations are usually presented as economic, in terms of efficiency, and social, in terms of reducing the power of the state. Thus, the impetus to privatize broadcasting channels has a strong motivation in terms of its free speech implications. It is the singular step that superficially, but literally, removes the broadcasting or press entity from the direct control of government. The 1990s was a drama, acted out transition state by transition state, to determine whether the central engine of broadcasting would be altered in ownership or subjected to competition. One defining characteristic of
distribution. A related aspect of what renders public broadcasting categorically distinct is control of production of the programming itself. To be sure, there are still many societies where the media, as a whole, are in the hands or control of the government, but the tendency, fairly constant over regions of the world and even across forms of government, has been toward widely expanding the role of the private sector. What is commonly thought of as globalism is, automatically, one of the great contributors to this process. By turning toward audiences abroad, the great multinationals, world-straddling, many-homed and of diffuse allegiances, have massively reoriented the relative distribution of content around the world from the public to the private. This new and permanent cloud of private programming can find its profit only if it ties to distribution mechanisms that yield audiences. Its very existence, hovering omnipresence, and accessibility inevitably alters information flow, inducing innovation in its redistribution. More than that, in many of the post-Soviet societies of Eastern and Central Europe, and many other places besides, the partial or entire privatization of government channels was part of the landscape of democratisation. In this Essay, I wish to put into context this remarkable shift from the public to the private in many parts of the world partly by exploring different meanings of moving toward the private and the implications of this move for accountability. Both advocates and opponents of privatization contend that it encourages investment, often foreign, and with new levels of investment come new program strategies, including, in many areas, increased non-indigenous programming.3 At least the opponents argue that all of this leads to the intensification of a tendency toward the culture of the modern, part of a cosmopolitan globalization, one that detracts from sovereignty of the state and the strength of civil society. On the other hand, proponents of privatization argue that the move in that direction can mean the opening to many more outlets of expression, much more in the way of incentives to production, and a flowering of creativity. Privatization can be by degrees, and it is easy to imagine a society that undertakes a comprehensive system of privatization, but government, for reasons of power and identity, retains substantial control of the broadcasting sector. But what is privatization? For those relatively remote from the process, implied in that drama is a uniformity of transformation. The term, however, has many meanings, but most simply it refers to the sale of a formerly government-operated enterprise to a buyer in the private sector, as in the denationalizations in many sectors in the 1970s and 1980s. In broadcasting, a core instance of privatization in Russia was the decision to turn one of the television channels over which the state had total control during the Soviet period into a stock company with substantial private ownership. A different form of privatization in broadcasting may take place when a “public service broadcaster,” like noncommercial channels in the United States, are turned over to private enterprise in whole or in part. This is not strictly a move from state control, not the wholesale recasting of a national system, but it shares important similarities from the point of view of the public sphere. The significant distinction is that privatization takes place when ownership patterns change to remove or substantially diminish state or public control of decisions concerning media space and increase that of private entities that are usually, but not always, commercial. Privatization, in this broad sense, also encompasses a government decision to make available to commercial broadcasting entities frequencies that were previously reserved for state purposes. Such privatization of frequencies occurred in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.4 The former monopoly state broadcaster remained in existence (though itself, transformed), but private national or regional channels were licensed to compete with it and rapidly attracted audiences. Privatization can be a matter of moving step-by-step, or be part of a systemic change, consciously undertaken, in which the relationship of the state or the public sector to information space is calibrated and consciously reduced. Privatization was put forward as a goal, in most of the transition societies, as means of part of the shock treatment of the movement toward capitalism. Radically altering the ownership of the light bulb industry in Hungary or the automobile industry in East Germany had democratic implications, but the significant aspect was tied to a particular theory of efficiency and of reducing the power of the state. Privatization of newspapers and broadcasting shared certain of these efficiency-related goals, but the mandate was far more pressing and seemingly far more central to the democratic project. The reasons for most privatizations are usually presented as economic, in terms of efficiency, and social, in terms of reducing the power of the state. Thus, the impetus to privatize broadcasting channels has a strong motivation in terms of its free speech implications. It is the singular step that superficially, but literally, removes the broadcasting or press entity from the direct control of government. The 1990s was a drama, acted out transition state by transition state, to determine whether the central engine of broadcasting would be altered in ownership or subjected to competition. One defining characteristic of
these transition states was the dramatic though never total shift in the production of images from public to private hands. So much of change in the structure and delivery of information has been associated with the reordering of ownership in this particular sense Privatization of the media is advanced for reasons that mix efficiency with speech and discourse principles. Privatization not only increases the operating efficiency of companies currently managed by government institutions, but also makes the operator more sensitive, it is often said, to demands of the audience. As to media, it is less clear how efficiency ought to be measured especially if the media are supposed to serve information-related functions, pluralism and national identity. While profit maximization is usually the central goal of a private sector firm, the government, when it operates the media, often commits to other goals, such as helping to create an informed electorate, protecting the sanctity of the local language, and ensuring access for minority groups Privatization is an example of the use of conditionality. For example, Poland, on October 18 of meeting the requirements of European Union membership The draft law would allow foreig Arocess 1999, approved a bill to liberalize ownership of the country's television companies as part of the process investors to hold up to 49 percent of shares in television firms with terrestrial broadcast licences. Prior to the effort to comply with EU standards, investors were limited to owning stakes of no more than 33 rcent. " Full liberalisation(majority foreign ownership)will take place at the time of our entry to the European Union, Krzysztof Marcinkiewicz, chief adviser to the prime minister commented. Those EU officials who had monitored Poland's compliance, criticized the existing law and claimed that it permitted the two channels of public television and the domestically controlled private station, Polsat, to dominate ne market. Foreign firms were free to invest in cable and satellite television firms operating from abroad, but, as was true in so many places, terrestrial broadcast stations, still watched by the majority of Polish households, remained subject to ownership restrictions. Interestingly, liberalization had its limits Under the draft law, coded pay television services, such as French Canal Plus and Dutch-owned Wizja TV, could not buy exclusive rights for important social, cultural, and sporting events Too much can be made of the principled arguments for privatization, important as they are. The act of changing ownership patterns may merely be the occasion for shifts in terms of power and control and the opportunity for redistribution of wealth. In some instances, privatization meant the transfer of wnership from the state to the journalists(Izvestia), in some cases from the central government to the regions(or oblasti in Russia), and in other cases from a nomenklatura that had been in charge of government to one that now saw itself as private entrepreneurs. And while democracy-related goals may have been involved, government sale of frequencies or channels also had deep fiscal motivations, stemming from powerful pressures to reduce government expenditures and debt. As with other aspects of the economy, privatization had to be considered if the state wished to qualify for certain international money sources. An important impetus for privatization was the claim that it provided incentives for great investment. Privatization is said to be a condition for increased equity that will be a spur ogy, modernization and innovation both of which require, in a time of expensive and changing technol investment, and investment in a way that cannot, under then-existing circumstances, be otherwise obtained by government. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund often conditioned economic aid to its government borrowers on the design and implementation of a privatization plan, and exerted great pressure on transition societies and developing countries to privatize, though this was much more the case with in the area of telecommunications than in the area of broadcasting have already suggested that privatization of the media has been radically different in different contexts. Insufficient attention has been paid to various types of transformation. If what we are concerned with are problems of democratization, problems of strengthening the public sphere, then movements to the private sphere must be analysed with that in mind. Some privatizations increase the number of voices, others do not. Some lead to an increase in critical coverage of the government, but others do not. Some privatizations, probably most, reduce the extent of state control of the media space To understand the relationship of privatization to these questions there needs to be something approximating a taxonomy, one that enables the analyst to distinguish among the various kinds of actions that might fall within that rubric Presl or example, one can speak of the partial privatization of central state television in Russia where Yeltsin decided to sell 49 per cent of the first channel to industrial groups he selected. This was a partial privatization, designed to strengthen, not weaken, the role of the president in his capacity to shape programming. Privatization includes the opening of the FM frequencies in India to commercial channels, originally on the condition that they broadcast anything but news and information. Each of
these transition states was the dramatic though never total shift in the production of images from public to private hands. So much of change in the structure and delivery of information has been associated with the reordering of ownership in this particular sense. Privatization of the media is advanced for reasons that mix efficiency with speech and discourse principles. Privatization not only increases the operating efficiency of companies currently managed by government institutions, but also makes the operator more sensitive, it is often said, to demands of the audience. As to media, it is less clear how efficiency ought to be measured, especially if the media are supposed to serve information-related functions, pluralism and national identity. While profit maximization is usually the central goal of a private sector firm, the government, when it operates the media, often commits to other goals, such as helping to create an informed electorate, protecting the sanctity of the local language, and ensuring access for minority groups. Privatization is an example of the use of conditionality. For example, Poland, on October 18, 1999, approved a bill to liberalize ownership of the country’s television companies as part of the process of meeting the requirements of European Union membership. The draft law would allow foreign investors to hold up to 49 percent of shares in television firms with terrestrial broadcast licences. Prior to the effort to comply with EU standards, investors were limited to owning stakes of no more than 33 percent. “Full liberalisation (majority foreign ownership) will take place at the time of our entry to the European Union,”' Krzysztof Marcinkiewicz, chief adviser to the prime minister commented. Those EU officials who had monitored Poland’s compliance, criticized the existing law and claimed that it permitted the two channels of public television and the domestically controlled private station, Polsat, to dominate the market. Foreign firms were free to invest in cable and satellite television firms operating from abroad, but, as was true in so many places, terrestrial broadcast stations, still watched by the majority of Polish households, remained subject to ownership restrictions. Interestingly, liberalization had its limits. Under the draft law, coded pay television services, such as French Canal Plus and Dutch-owned Wizja TV, could not buy exclusive rights for important social, cultural, and sporting events. Too much can be made of the principled arguments for privatization, important as they are. The act of changing ownership patterns may merely be the occasion for shifts in terms of power and control and the opportunity for redistribution of wealth. In some instances, privatization meant the transfer of ownership from the state to the journalists (Izvestia), in some cases from the central government to the regions (or oblasti in Russia), and in other cases from a nomenklatura that had been in charge of government to one that now saw itself as private entrepreneurs. And while democracy-related goals may have been involved, government sale of frequencies or channels also had deep fiscal motivations, stemming from powerful pressures to reduce government expenditures and debt. As with other aspects of the economy, privatization had to be considered if the state wished to qualify for certain international money sources.5 An important impetus for privatization was the claim that it provided incentives for modernization and innovation both of which require, in a time of expensive and changing technology, great investment. Privatization is said to be a condition for increased equity that will be a spur to investment, and investment in a way that cannot, under then-existing circumstances, be otherwise obtained by government. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund often conditioned economic aid to its government borrowers on the design and implementation of a privatization plan, and exerted great pressure on transition societies and developing countries to privatize, though this was much more the case with in the area of telecommunications than in the area of broadcasting. I have already suggested that privatization of the media has been radically different in different contexts. Insufficient attention has been paid to various types of transformation. If what we are concerned with are problems of democratization, problems of strengthening the public sphere, then movements to the private sphere must be analysed with that in mind. Some privatizations increase the number of voices, others do not. Some lead to an increase in critical coverage of the government, but others do not. Some privatizations, probably most, reduce the extent of state control of the media space. To understand the relationship of privatization to these questions, there needs to be something approximating a taxonomy, one that enables the analyst to distinguish among the various kinds of actions that might fall within that rubric. For example, one can speak of the partial privatization of central state television in Russia where President Yeltsin decided to sell 49 per cent of the first channel to industrial groups he selected. This was a partial privatization, designed to strengthen, not weaken, the role of the president in his capacity to shape programming. Privatization includes the opening of the FM frequencies in India to commercial channels, originally on the condition that they broadcast anything but news and information. Each of
these kinds of private is vastly different from others. Privatization took place earlier in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, and that timing may have consequences for how television evolves and how the public broadcasters react. Neither in Hungary, nor Poland, nor elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe did privatization mean a complete absence of public service television. The establishment of Tv Nova with the first channel remaining in public hands in the Czech Republic is more the norm than the exception. In Russia, in 1998, existing state broadcasting entities were regrouped and reorganized better to compete with the now strenuous private sector. Privatization in some transition states was a onsequence of auction, and, in some instances, foreign investors were free to invest up to full facilities remain in public hands. Similarly, while newspapers are generally free and private, theLon ownership of the broadcaster. In some states, the license to broadcast is private but the transmiss distribution facility(and, often, the equivalent of the news agencies Reuters or Associated Press)is still owned by the state Each form of privatization makes its own contribution to the public sphere. It matters whether the"private" is a mere surrogate or alter ego of the state-as is often the case-or whether it suggests independence of the state. The state is unlikely to shed voluntarily its control over information space in a manner that would lead to significant weakening of the government itself. Because President Yeltsin elected who would be the new private"owners"of central television, ORT, what percentage they would own, and what payment or liability they would have, the relationship between ownership and pluralism was significant. Corporate governance is also telling. In the case of ORT, the specific outcome meant that 51 percent of the ownership lay in state hands, though distributed among three agencies. Under the presidents direction, a mode for the voting of the disparate elements of state ownership was determined In Malaysia, MEASAT, the monopoly over satellite broadcasting and the cable industry, was lodged in the hands of industrial or financial entities with extremely close ties to the government. This form of rendering the information space into private hands allowed flexibility for complex financial transactions dering and relatively autonomous decisions concerning what program channels would be carried. It also assured that such decisions would be made in a manner consistent with mohammed mattathir's emphasis on"Asian values" and his approach to information space in Malaysia Because frequencies are made available for private television or radio use through a process of licensing, it is important to examine how the process operates. The institution that effectively licenses broadcasters, which is not always the agency nominally assigned this task, may be so arbitrary in its awards that the licensees become beholden to government in exchange for the benefit. The nature of the licensing process as maintaining a link to the state becomes even clearer if the license is subject to renewal and the process of renewal is problematic and subjective. The form of regulation may be such as to make the regulator and the licensee, in the final analysis, virtual partners. In Russia, NTV, the extraordinary channel and then network developed by igor Malashenko, received its start through the assignment of an unused portion of the Russian Educational Television Channel spectrum, not through the established licensing process. This complex birth meant that the channel, for many years, had a special tie to President Yeltsin because it was he personally who decided that private broadcasting should have its origins in this way. On the other hand, a regulator may be confined to a limited role or may have, as an operative mandate, the assurance of a pluralistic or objective and impartial broadcasting system. The Polish regulatory agency seemed to strive for this result. All of these elements are relevant in determining the quality of"privateness"that characterizes the licensee Even these few details suggest that it is useful to think of privatization as more than the conversion of a previously public or state entity into one that is in private ownership. If one thinks of the general problem more broadly and considers issues of public control over production and distribution of content and, within those issues, direct state control as compared to autonomous public then the the private can refer to the increasing reliance on advertising revenues of entities that remain pub/is ard circumstances and factors appropriate for analysis can be expanded. For example, the tendency to service broadcasting, without any private ownership. That tendency is characteristic of public broadcasting in the United States as non-commercial stations become increasingly reliant on sponsorship and underwriting, and even openly begin to accept direct advertising There are many state broadcasters for whom advertising is a major source of revenue. This kind of privatization has been an important factor in the transformation of Russian television, of Doordarshan in India, and the former state television in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In some transition societies. in fact, public service broadcasters used discounted access for advertisers as a way of competing against independent competitors and were accused of unfairness as a result. There were moments when
these kinds of private is vastly different from others. Privatization took place earlier in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, and that timing may have consequences for how television evolves and how the public broadcasters react. Neither in Hungary, nor Poland, nor elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe did privatization mean a complete absence of public service television. The establishment of TV Nova with the first channel remaining in public hands in the Czech Republic is more the norm than the exception. In Russia, in 1998, existing state broadcasting entities were regrouped and reorganized better to compete with the now strenuous private sector. Privatization in some transition states was a consequence of auction, and, in some instances, foreign investors were free to invest up to full ownership of the broadcaster. In some states, the license to broadcast is private, but the transmission facilities remain in public hands. Similarly, while newspapers are generally free and private, the distribution facility (and, often, the equivalent of the news agencies Reuters or Associated Press) is still owned by the state. Each form of privatization makes its own contribution to the public sphere. It matters whether the “private” is a mere surrogate or alter ego of the state—as is often the case—or whether it suggests independence of the state. The state is unlikely to shed voluntarily its control over information space in a manner that would lead to significant weakening of the government itself. Because President Yeltsin selected who would be the new private “owners” of central television, ORT, what percentage they would own, and what payment or liability they would have, the relationship between ownership and pluralism was significant. Corporate governance is also telling. In the case of ORT, the specific outcome meant that 51 percent of the ownership lay in state hands, though distributed among three agencies. Under the president’s direction, a mode for the voting of the disparate elements of state ownership was determined. In Malaysia, MEASAT, the monopoly over satellite broadcasting and the cable industry, was lodged in the hands of industrial or financial entities with extremely close ties to the government. This form of rendering the information space into private hands allowed flexibility for complex financial transactions and relatively autonomous decisions concerning what program channels would be carried. It also assured that such decisions would be made in a manner consistent with Mohammed Mattathir’s emphasis on “Asian values” and his approach to information space in Malaysia. Because frequencies are made available for private television or radio use through a process of licensing, it is important to examine how the process operates. The institution that effectively licenses broadcasters, which is not always the agency nominally assigned this task, may be so arbitrary in its awards that the licensees become beholden to government in exchange for the benefit. The nature of the licensing process as maintaining a link to the state becomes even clearer if the license is subject to renewal and the process of renewal is problematic and subjective.6 The form of regulation may be such as to make the regulator and the licensee, in the final analysis, virtual partners. In Russia, NTV, the extraordinary channel and then network developed by Igor Malashenko, received its start through the assignment of an unused portion of the Russian Educational Television Channel spectrum, not through the established licensing process. This complex birth meant that the channel, for many years, had a special tie to President Yeltsin because it was he personally who decided that private broadcasting should have its origins in this way. On the other hand, a regulator may be confined to a limited role or may have, as an operative mandate, the assurance of a pluralistic or objective and impartial broadcasting system. The Polish regulatory agency seemed to strive for this result. All of these elements are relevant in determining the quality of “privateness” that characterizes the licensee. Even these few details suggest that it is useful to think of privatization as more than the conversion of a previously public or state entity into one that is in private ownership. If one thinks of the general problem more broadly and considers issues of public control over production and distribution of content and, within those issues, direct state control as compared to autonomous public sway, then the circumstances and factors appropriate for analysis can be expanded. For example, the tendency toward the private can refer to the increasing reliance on advertising revenues of entities that remain public service broadcasting, without any private ownership. That tendency is characteristic of public broadcasting in the United States as non-commercial stations become increasingly reliant on sponsorship and underwriting, and even openly begin to accept direct advertising. There are many state broadcasters for whom advertising is a major source of revenue. This kind of privatization has been an important factor in the transformation of Russian television, of Doordarshan in India, and the former state television in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In some transition societies, in fact, public service broadcasters used discounted access for advertisers as a way of competing against independent competitors and were accused of unfairness as a result. There were moments when