United Nations CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION United Nations action against CORRUPTION BRIBERY
United Nations CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION United Nations action against CORRUPTION and BRIBERY
September 1997 CONTENTS Aspects of corruption: its roots and consequences p. 3 Corruption and typology of illicit activities associated with it p. 6 United Nations action against corruption and bribery p. 10
September 1997 CONTENTS Aspects of corruption: its roots and consequences p. 3 Corruption and typology of illicit activities associated with it p. 6 United Nations action against corruption and bribery p. 10
Activities of the crime prevention and Criminal Justice Division: Technical Cooperation p. 19 clusion Annex 1 General Assembly- Resolution 51/59 Action against corruption and International Code of Conduct for Public Officials Annex 2 General Assembly -Resolution 51/191 United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial transactions Economic and social Council-Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Sixth session -Promotion and maintenance of the rule of law and good governance. Action against corruption and bribery -Vienna, 28 April-9 May 1997 Annex 4 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice- Sixth session draft resolution Iv International cooperation against corruption and
Activities of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division: Technical Cooperation p. 19 Conclusion P. 22 Annex 1 General Assembly - Resolution 51/59 Action against corruption and International Code of Conduct for Public Officials Annex 2 General Assembly - Resolution 51/191 United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions Annex 3 Economic and Social Council - Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice - Sixth session - Promotion and maintenance of the rule of law and good governance. Action against corruption and bribery - Vienna, 28 April - 9 May 1997 Annex 4 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice - Sixth session - draft resolution IV International cooperation against corruption and
bribery in international commercial transactions Aspects of corruption: its roots and consequences Several questions arise in connection with the increased interest in action against corruption at both the national and international levels. n such interest due to the higher occurrence of corrupt practices, higher detection rates or lower levels of (public, official and business) tolerance? The available evidence suggests that the answer may lie in a combination of these explanations. If each of them is examined separately, it will be easier to understand not only the eruption of scandals, but also the explosion of anti-corruption sentiments and how the two can be mutually reinforcing. There are good reasons to believe that in a world of relative turmoil produced by radical changes in the post-cold-war era, there are new opportunities and incentives to engage in corrupt practices. Although characteristics of particular people can be found that make them more prone to misconduct than others, the problem of corruption is a probler of systems and institutions rather than one of individuals. The structural roots of corruption may be examined under four interrelated
bribery in international commercial transactions Aspects of corruption: its roots and consequences Several questions arise in connection with the increased interest in action against corruption at both the national and international levels. In such interest due to the higher occurrence of corrupt practices, higher detection rates or lower levels of (public, official and business) tolerance? The available evidence suggests that the answer may lie in a combination of these explanations. If each of them is examined separately, it will be easier to understand not only the eruption of scandals, but also the explosion of anti-corruption sentiments and how the two can be mutually reinforcing. There are good reasons to believe that in a world of relative turmoil produced by radical changes in the post-cold-war era, there are new opportunities and incentives to engage in corrupt practices. Although characteristics of particular people can be found that make them more prone to misconduct than others, the problem of corruption is a problem of systems and institutions rather than one of individuals. The structural roots of corruption may be examined under four interrelated categories
First, there may be monopolistic or oligopolistic situations, in which one or a handful of companies control a given market. The State may wish to engage private companies to perform specific tasks or public works or provide services. To the extent that only a very small number of companies can practically carry out the work, the ground is fertile for corrupt practices (such as overcharging, providing low-quality work or delivering the work late). Such a condition obtains, for example, in the field of defence pro jects. Indeed, with regard to defence projects oligopolistic conditions may be desired: no one wishes to see the proliferation of certain types of weaponry or technology that affect both national and international security. In this field, then, it is warranted to devote special attention to transactions and to have special bodies overseeing them. In other cases, oligopolies may be created by rules requiring specific conditions that companies must meet for eligibility or may be introduced by rules dictating preferential treatment for some companies (for example, domestic versus foreign. Analytically the same type of situation arises when a party or regime monopolizes power and decision-making for very long periods. Secondly, very wide discretionary powers in the hands of individuals or organizations can generate temptations and motives for corrupt practices. Whenever there are few or no mechanisms of checks and balances, people will have plenty of opportunities to take undue advantage of their power. Examples of this corrupt -inducing situation are found in authoritarian regimes where powers are concentrated in the hands of very few persons. Another example is the power conferred to people with extremely specialized skills and knowledge. By definition, there are not too many of them, and therefore their powers are to a large extent unchecked. Again, the defence industry may be a concrete illustration of this situation. Additional examples of such a risk can be found in the field of physics, medicine. etc Thirdly, lack of transparency reduces the ability to control those in positions of authority. The lack of transparency may be caused by factors ranging from the banking secrecy to dictatorial regimes disallowing the questioning of authority. The same problem arises as a result of rare and specialized skills and knowledge If a given public work or special warship entails such complex and incomprehensible details that only a few individuals can understand the whole pro ject, transparency i effectively lacking. Whenever regulations of a particular sector are unclear, ambiguous and technically complicated, reporters, the public and lay persons may be completely unable to exercise effective control
First, there may be monopolistic or oligopolistic situations, in which one or a handful of companies control a given market. The State may wish to engage private companies to perform specific tasks or public works or provide services. To the extent that only a very small number of companies can practically carry out the work, the ground is fertile for corrupt practices (such as overcharging, providing low-quality work or delivering the work late). Such a condition obtains, for example, in the field of defence projects. Indeed, with regard to defence projects, oligopolistic conditions may be desired: no one wishes to see the proliferation of certain types of weaponry or technology that affect both national and international security. In this field, then, it is warranted to devote special attention to transactions and to have special bodies overseeing them. In other cases, oligopolies may be created by rules requiring specific conditions that companies must meet for eligibility, or may be introduced by rules dictating preferential treatment for some companies (for example, domestic versus foreign). Analytically, the same type of situation arises when a party or regime monopolizes power and decision-making for very long periods. Secondly, very wide discretionary powers in the hands of individuals or organizations can generate temptations and motives for corrupt practices. Whenever there are few or no mechanisms of checks and balances, people will have plenty of opportunities to take undue advantage of their power. Examples of this corrupt-inducing situation are found in authoritarian regimes where powers are concentrated in the hands of very few persons. Another example is the power conferred to people with extremely specialized skills and knowledge. By definition, there are not too many of them, and therefore their powers are to a large extent unchecked. Again, the defence industry may be a concrete illustration of this situation. Additional examples of such a risk can be found in the field of physics, medicine, etc. Thirdly, lack of transparency reduces the ability to control those in positions of authority. The lack of transparency may be caused by factors ranging from the banking secrecy to dictatorial regimes disallowing the questioning of authority. The same problem arises as a result of rare and specialized skills and knowledge. If a given public work or special warship entails such complex and incomprehensible details that only a few individuals can understand the whole project, transparency is effectively lacking. Whenever regulations of a particular sector are unclear, ambiguous and technically complicated, reporters, the public and lay persons may be completely unable to exercise effective control