knoWing unKnoWing Hames L. Christian EPISTEMIC LONELINESS I At about this point, a feeling of loneliness may begin to overtake usan epistemic loneliness. "For the egocentric predicament is really an epistcmolog ical cond ition: isolation within a world of our own making. We live in a shell, so to speak a private, personal shell inside which takes place an immense variety of experiences, all ours. And when we try to break out of our shells to make contact with the world and other creatures, we only rediscover the depth of our predicament We live in an epistemological shell with no doors. None may enter and none may share 2 Since certain aspects of our epistemological cond ition appear to be inescapable we must learn to live with them (1) The fallacy ofobjectfication is an everpresent danger Our experic ing system conspires to make us think that a variety of private experiences are in some way real that they are events occurring in the real world of objects/events. (The tragic consequences of this fallacy will be felt especially when we try to untangle our value--experiences. (2)Accordingly we have all lived(unwittingly) in a state of confusion regarding the location of the occurrence of events. Our subjective and objective worlds are interwoven: events we thought to be private may turn out to be objective while many supposedly objective events often prove to be experiences only ()We are restless with our evolutionary limitation and deceptions. While we can be grateful that sensory and information processing systems have rendered our physical environment meaningful, we have reached a point in our quest for reality when we want to go beyond our limitations and to know what the world is really like. We want to make whatever corrections are necessary in our universe and its principles of operation 3 From this vantage point, the central problem if Western epistemology may be more intellig ible. if we know only our experiences, how can we be sure that we know anything about the real world? More precisely, if objective physical phenomena are all converted before we can experience them into different kinds of energy, how can we know anything about the original phenomena? Can we even know what those phenomena are? If we experience only the subjective side of our interface with reality, can we ever now anything about the objective side of that interface-boundary? It will be helpful at this point to take time for historical sidetrip. Almost four centuries of epistemological analysis haw engaged some of the greatest minds the West has produced. Without felling any obligation to believe all they say, lets listen to three philosophers, briefly
KNOWING & UNKNOWING Hames L. Christian EPISTEMIC LONELINESS I At about this point, a feeling of loneliness may begin to overtake us__ an "epistemic loneliness." For the egocentric predicament is really an epistcmologica1 condition: isolation within a world of our own making. We live in a shell, so to speak, a private, personal shell inside which takes place an immense variety of experiences, all ours. And when we try to break out of our shells to make contact with the world and other creatures, we only rediscover the depth of our predicament. We 1ive in an epistemological shel1 with no doors. None may enter and none may share. 2 Since certain aspects of our epistemological condition appear to be inescapable, we must learn to live with them. (1 ) The fallacy of objectfication is an everpresent danger. Our expericing system conspires to make us think that a variety of private experiences are in some way real, that they are events occurring in the real world of objects/events. (The tragic consequences of this fallacy will be felt especially when we try to untangle our value--experiences.) (2) Accordingly we have all lived (unwittingly) in a state of confusion regarding the location of the occurrence of events. Our subjective and objective worlds are interwoven: events we thought to be private may turn out to be objective, while many supposedly objective events often prove to be experiences only. (3)We are restless with our evolutionary limitation and deceptions. While we can be grateful that sensory and information _processing systems have rendered our physical environment meaningful, we have reached a point in our quest for reality when we want to go beyond our limitations and to know what the world is really like .We want to make whatever corrections are necessary in our universe and its principles of operation. 3 From this vantage point, the central problem if Western epistemology may be more intelligible. if we know only our experiences, how can we be sure that we know anything about the real world? More precisely, if objective physical phenomena are all converted before we can experience them into different kinds of energy, how can we know anything about the original phenomena? Can we even know what those phenomena are? If we experience only the subjective side of our interface with reality, can we ever know anything about the objective side of that interface--boundary? It will be helpful at this point to take time for historical sidetrip. Almost four centuries of epistemological analysis haw engaged some of the greatest minds the West has produced. Without felling any obligation to believe all they say, let’s listen to three philosophers, briefly.
LOCKE: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 4 John Locke published his ESSAY Concerning Human Understand ing in 1690, and it became a turning point in Western thought Locke made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities, he held, are to be considered as belonging to physical objects themselves, they inhere in the real object. Primary qualities are such thing as solid ity, extension ( that is, volume, the occupation of space), shape, motion/rest, and number. (Today, still thinking in Locke's terms, we might wish to add such qualities as mass, atomic structure, radioactivity, magnetism, etc. If we couldn't perceive objects-or if we perceivers didn't exist-these qualities would still exist in objects Secondary qualities are experiences only, stimu lated in us by the powers residing in real objects, and these qual ities are: colors, sounds, tastes odors, odors, weight, warmth, etc. Secondary qualities are our subjective human responses to the objective primary qualities. Clearly, we could not have our perceptions unless they are caused by real objects But those primary qualities--what do they really belong to? What is, this"object that has shape or is in motion or is solid? Locke had to answer"substance. But what is"substance"? Well, "substance"is what has shape, is in motion, and is solid That didn 't get us very far, so let's put the question d ifferently: how can we know substance"? The only way we can know substance, Locke answered, is to observe the primary qual ities: shape, motion, solidity, etc. But that's where we were before Locke therefore concludes that"substance"cannot be known directly at all, but is rather an assumption which we are forced to make. After all, how can "shape"exist without a"substance"which is"shaped"? Locke had to admit, therefore, that"substance"is merely a concept on which we hang" the primary and secondary qualities, which we can indeed experience. "So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of substances in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not wha support of such qualities This was not a satisfying conclusion, but Locke felt it was both good logic and common sense. After all, who in his right mind could possibly conclude that solid ity and motion and shape might exist but that"substance"might not? The answer to that question is: George Berkeley. BERKELEY. THE LOGOC OF IMMATERIALISM 5 By the time he was twenty-five years old, George Berkeley had publ ished his Principles of Human Knowledge, had stirred up international controversy in philosophical and theological circles(he was an Anglican clergy man, later a bishop), and was regarded as one of the most logical, eloquent, and charming philosophers the English-speaking world had produced As early as the age of twenty, Berkeley developed the habit of jotting down ideas, arguments, and reflections in notebooks. These autobiographical notes were unknown until they were discovered and published in 1871 and given the title of Commonplace Book. In 1706, when Berkeley was twenty-one, he wrote a paragraph in his notebook which pointed the direction his philosophy would take
LOCKE: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 4 John Locke published his ESSAY Concerning Human Understanding in 1690 ,and it became a turning point in Western thought. Locke made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities, he held, are to be considered as belonging to physical objects themselves, they inhere in the real object. Primary qualities are such thing as solidity, extension (that is, volume, the occupation of space), shape, motion/rest, and number. (Today, still thinking in Locke's terms, we might wish to add such qualities as mass, atomic structure, radioactivity, magnetism, etc.) If we couldn't perceive objects--or if we perceivers didn't exist--these qualities would stil1 exist in objects. Secondary qualities are experiences only, stimu1ated in us by the powers residing in real objects, and these qua1ities are: colors, sounds, tastes ,odors, odors, weight, warmth, etc. Secondary qualities are our subjective human responses to the objective primary qualities. Clearly, we could not have our perceptions unless they are caused by real objects. But those primary qualities--what do they really belong to? What is, this "object" that has shape or is in motion or is solid? Locke had to answer "substance." But what is "substance"? Wel1, "substance" is what has shape, is in motion, and is so1id! That didn't get us very far, so let's put the question differently: how can we know "substance"? The on1y way we can know substance, Locke answered, is to observe the primary qua1ities: shape, motion, solidity, etc. But that's where we were before. Locke therefore concludes that "substance" cannot be known directly at all, but is rather an assumption which we are forced to make. After all, how can "shape" exist without a "substance" which is "shaped"? Locke had to admit, therefore, that "substance" is merely a concept on which we "hang" the primary and secondary qualities, which we can indeed experience. "So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of substances in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at a1l, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities...." This was not a satisfying conclusion, but Locke felt it was both good logic and common sense. After all, who in his right mind could possibly conclude that solidity and motion and shape might exist but that "substance" might not? The answer to that question is: George Berkeley. BERKELEY: THE LOGOC OF IMMATERIALISM 5 By the time he was twenty-five years old, George Berkeley had pub1ished his Principles of Human Knowledge, had stirred up international controversy in philosophical and theological circles (he was an Anglican clergyman, later a bishop), and was regarded as one of the most logical, eloquent, and charming philosophers the English-speaking world had produced. As early as the age of twenty, Berkeley developed the habit of jotting down ideas, arguments, and reflections in notebooks. These autobiographical notes were unknown until they were discovered and published in 1871 and given the title of Commonplace Book. In 1706, when Berkeley was twenty-one, he wrote a paragraph in his notebook which pointed the direction his philosophy would take
He wrote that the concept of materialism or substance" had always been " the main pillar and support of skepticism"on which have been founded all the impious schemes of atheism and irrelig ion .. How great a friend material substance hath been to atheists in all ages were needless to relate. when this cornerstone is once removed the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground Berkeley began with Locke's conclusions and went on to prove that substance really doesn't exist! 6 How did the Irish philosopher manage it? He did by agreeing with Locke that the idea of substance(or matter) is merely an assumption on our part; we can never perceive substance directly What we experience and the only things we experience are colors tastes, odors, etc, that But what about the primary qual ities--shape, solid ity, motion/rest, etc.--how do we know about these? We only infer those too, said Berkeley. How do you know the shape of a seashell? You run your fingers over the surface and feel it. Not exactly, Berkeley reminds us; we don't feel it. We only feel our sensations and proceed to assume that matter exists in "seashell"form and that the matter is the cause of our sensations. We further assume that the matter possesses certain (primary )qual ities which we cannot experience directly So far, Berkeley seems to agree with Locke. But where Locke never doubts the xistence of matter(he merely says we can never know it), Berkeley asks: If substance is merely an assumption, then could that assumption be wrong? Suppose the world of material objects doesn't really exist. How could we account for the supposed objects which cause our perceptions? Berkeley concluded that there is an alternative assumption, just as logical as"substance, and far preferable Assume that God exists, and that he places in our minds all the perceptions which we experience. If we are making assumptions about reality to account for our perceptions, why is the assumption of the matter a more reasonable assumption than the existence of God? And if one is a Christian philosopher, doesn't the assumption of a God-source become a more l ikely assumption than a matter-source? This is Berkeley's"immaterial ism"--matter does not exist It is merely a fiction we thought we needed. The universe is composed of interacting minds only, and God is the source of all our perceptions. all the world is merely an interp lay of mental images and images and ideas grandly provided and coordinated by god Therefore, reasoned Berkeley, "to be is to be perceived"--esse est percipi. There are no"real"clouds, rocks, oceans, stars, penguins, or seashells. Such items are but mind-inlages derived from God. Nothing exists, therefore, except when it is being perceive How can we be sure the persistent objects of experience---our homes, friends, the familiar belong ings--will be there"when we want to perceive them? Does the seashell-image flicker off and on, in and out of existence every time we look at it or turn away from it. No, says Berkeley. God is the eternal perceiver, and all images continue to exist in the mind of God. They are always avail able to us for the asking to be experienced as we would. Indeed, comments Will Durant, "no one since Plato
He wrote that the concept of materialism or "substance" had always been "the main pillar and support of skepticism" on which have been founded “all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion ......How great a friend material substance hath been to atheists in all ages were needless to relate....When this cornerstone is once removed .the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground ..." Berkeley began with Locke 's conclusions and went on to prove that substance really doesn't exist! 6 How did the Irish philosopher manage it? He did by agreeing with Locke that the idea of substance (or matter) is merely an assumption on our part; we can never perceive substance directly .What we experience _and the only things we experience _are colors ,tastes ,odors ,etc., that is ,the secondary qualities But what about the primary qua1ities--shape, solidity, motion/rest, etc.--how do we know about these? We only infer those too, said Berkeley. How do you know the shape of a seashell? You run your fingers over the surface and feel it. Not exactly, Berkeley reminds us; we don't feel it. We only feel our sensations and proceed to assume that matter exists in "seashell" form and that the matter is the cause of our sensations. We further assume that the matter possesses certain (primary ) qua1ities which we cannot experience directly. So far, Berkeley seems to agree with Locke. But where Locke never doubts the existence of matter (he merely says we can never know it), Berkeley asks: If substance is merely an assumption, then could that assumption be wrong? Suppose the world of material objects doesn't really exist. How could we account for the supposed objects which cause our perceptions? Berkeley concluded that there is an alternative assumption, just as logical as "substance," and far preferable. Assume that God exists, and that he places in our minds all the perceptions which we experience. lf we are making assumptions about reality to account for our perceptions, why is the assumption of the matter a more reasonable assumption than the existence of God? And if one is a Christian phi1osopher, doesn't the assumption of a God-source become a more 1ike1y assumption than a matter-source? This is Berkeley's "immaterialism"--matter does not exist .It is merely a fiction we thought we needed. The universe is composed of interacting minds only, and God is the source of all our perceptions. All the world is merely an interplay of mental images and images and ideas ,grandly provided and coordinated by God. Therefore, reasoned Berkeley, "to be is to be perceived "--esse est percipi. There are no "real" clouds, rocks, oceans, stars, penguins, or seashells. Such items are but mind-in1ages derived from God. Nothing exists, therefore, except when it is being perceived. How can we be sure the persistent objects of experience---our homes, friends, the familiar belongings--wi11 "be there" when we want to perceive them? Does the seashel1-image flicker off and on, in and out of existence every time we look at it or turn away from it. No, says Berkeley. God is the eternal perceiver, and a1l images continue to exist in the mind of God. They are always avai1able to us for the asking, to be experienced as we would. Indeed, comments Will Durant, "no one since Plato
had written nonsense so charmingly. Everyone discussed Berkeley's log ical attempt to annihilate matter among others, the lexicographer Samuel Johnson rejected the system, as Boswell reports After we came out of church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with a mighty force against a large stone till he rebounded from it. "i refute it thus But what had Johnson really proved by kicking the rock? He had merely illustrated and confirmed Berkeley s argument. For al Johnson"knew"was the sharp pain in his toe, perhaps a numb feeling in his foot, and the sensation of a sudden stop which gave his leg a jar. All he had proven by kicking the rock was that he was capable of feel ing a variety of subjective sensations. all he knew was his own experience, and that, after all, was the point Berkeley was making. So Samuel Johnson had merely added his considerable support to the philosophy of immaterialism 8 What else is this. however. but "charming nonsense"? Most of us are convinced(we think ) that physical matter exists. It seems to us that Berkeley made a simple mistake, a non sequitur: just because we cannot experience physical matter directly, it does not necessarily follow that matter doesn,'t exist But did Berkeley really go wrong? (1) Berkeley emphasizes the fact that we are limited a4solutely to our own perceptions and cannot cannot experience any real"world. On this point he seems to be correct. (2)He is therefore repeating Locke's point that physical matter (or substance) is only a mental assumption which we think to be a logical necessity on this point also, he is correct Whether you will go further with Berkeley and accept that his alternat ive ssumption--God as the source of experience-is a better one will depend somewhat on personal preference and theological belief. Most of us remain convinced that the reality of matter is a better assumption, but perhaps that's only b ecause we have llve uncritically with it most of our lives. We must face honestly, however, Berkeley's singular challenge: Prove, if you can, that any material object exists apart from your perception of it. If you can, then Berkeley is wrong. If you can 't, then you will have to concede berkeley would insist)that the world is merely your idea 9 If you enjoy science fiction, speculate on the following scene(which ay not be from the realm of SF We are alone, each of us, in a small white cubicle, floating restfully in curvolounges fashioned to fit from heliostyrene. Over each of our heads is fitted tantalum--crystal he l met, finely wired with thousands of microelectrodes which have been surgically embedded in the sensory centers of our brains outer layer, the cortex All senseq ("sensory--sequence")programs originate from, and are coordinated by, PROSELEC (Program Central for Sensory-sequence Selection). The electrical impulses which the electrodes generate in the cortex prov ide a variety of real --l ife experiences. Selection keys on the curvolounge's arm allow one to select from
had written nonsense so charmingly." 7 Everyone discussed Berkeley's logica1 attempt to annihilate matter among others, the 1exicographer Samuel Johnson rejected the system, as Boswell reports: “ After we came out of church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berke1ey's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with a mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus!" But what had Johnson really proved by kicking the rock? He had merely illustrated and confirmed Berkeley's argument. For a1lJohnson "knew" was the sharp pain in his toe, perhaps a numb feeling in his foot, and the sensation of a sudden stop which gave his leg a jar. All he had proven by kicking the rock was that he was capable of fee1ing a variety of subjective sensations. All he knew was his own experience, and that, after all, was the point Berkeley was making. So Samuel Johnson had merely added his considerable support to the " philosophy of immaterialism." 8 What e1se is this, however, but "charming nonsense"? Most of us are convinced (we think) that physical matter exists. It seems to us that Berkeley made a simple mistake, a non sequitur: just because we cannot experience physical matter directly, it does not necessarily follow that matter doesn't exist. But did Berkeley really go wrong? (1 ) Berkeley emphasizes the fact that we are 1imited a4soIutely to our own perceptions and cannot cannot experience any "real" world. On this point he seems to be correct. (2)He is therefore repeating Locke's point that physical matter (or substance) is only a mental assumption which we think to be a 1ogical necessity. On this point also, he is correct. Whether you will go further with Berkeley and accept that his alternative assumption--God as the source of experience--is a better one will depend somewhat on personal preference and theological belief. Most of us remain convinced that the reality of matter is a better assumption, but perhaps that's only because we have lived uncritica1ly with it most of our lives. We must face honestly, however, Berkeley's singular challenge: Prove, if you can, that any material object exists apart from your perception of it. If you can, then Berkeley is wrong. If you can't, then you will have to concede (Berkeley would insist) that the wor1d is mere1y your idea. 9 If you enjoy science fiction, speculate on the following scene (which may or may not be from the realm of SF). We are alone, each of us, in a sma1l white cubic1e, floating restfully in curvolounges fashioned to fit from heliostyrene. Over each of our heads is fitted a tantalum--crystal he1met, finely wired with thousands of microelectrodes which have been surgically embedded in the sensory centers of our brain's outer 1ayer, the cortex All senseq ("sensory--sequence") programs originate from, and are coordinated by, PROSELEC (Program Centra1 for Sensory-sequence Selection). The electrical impulses which the electrodes generate in the cortex provide a variety of real--1ife experiences. Selection keys on the curvolounge's arm allow one to select from
mill ions of stored program/experiences There are five categories of sense programs available to the av customer. Real-time senses(r)are identical to living space-time experience strolling along the beach. Special senseqs(S)are plot-programs, like old-fashioned novies or TriV dramas(these are mostly for old-timers, and sent imental ists). Extra senses(E)are specifIc experiences, like visiting a friend or eating abale almandine. Cosmic senseqs (C)are ecstasy-meditations during which one can experience a joyful union with Cosmic Reality. And lastly, dream senses(D) provide REM-sleep and are to be used for rest periods a minimum of four hours during any twenty-hour period of senseq experience There is one other kind of sense. Occasionally Proselec preempts private time to channel what are considered especially beneficial programs. Some educational experience is essential; after all, if left to themselves al most everyone would choose only fun-and-games senses(except for a masochistic 6 percent who persist in selecting self destructive senseqs). It is also to be noted that many senses in the R, s and e classes are rated"X"; if a prohibited senseq is selected by a nonqualified customer. a mild impulse is channeled to the gland--control centers which in turn release chemicals which induce(for a seven-minute period only) strong guilt feelings The sense impulses sent to the brain centers are identical in every way to the electrochemical impulses which the(now-vestigial) body-senses used to send to the cortex. The resulting sense--experiences, therefore, are identical(but superior, of course, in qualit ety) to real-life experiences of the kind known before the advent of PKoselec Question: For anyone tuned in to PROSELEC, does the real world exist? How could he possi4ly know, whether or not it exists? Would this PROSELEC world differ significantly from Berkeley's immaterial cosmos(with the possible exception of the X "ratings; Berkeley's Eternal Perceiver seemed little concerned with censorship)? Question: What would constitute reality for a PROselEC customer? Question: What constitutes reality for you and me? 10 His logic is brill iant and he almost succeeds. His arguments are, strictly speaking, unanswerable, "wrote Lord Chesterfield, and Boswell duly noted that although we are conv inced that his doctrine is false, "it is impossible to refute it David Hume agreed Berkeley's arguments " admit of no answer and produce no Because of George Berkeley, writes Durant, "European philosophy has not quite made up its mind that the external world exists. Until it reconciles itself to the extreme probability of it, and faces the problems of life and death, the world will pass it by 11 Berkeley's system is the most extreme philosophical idealism"the Western world has produced. There is but one epistemological position--solipsism-- which is more extreme If it is a fact that we know nothing of the external world, and if Berkeley could conclude from this that the external world of matter doesn t exist, then the solipsist will take the next step and conclude that only he himself exists. I know only myself, he might say(to himself; of course). The world is the fabrication of my
mi11ions of stored program/experiences. There are five categories of senseq programs available to the average customer. Real--time senseqs (R) are identical to living space-time experiences, like strolling along the beach. Special senseqs (S) are plot-programs, like old--fashioned movies or TriV dramas (these are mostly for old-timers, and sentimenta1ists). Extra senseqs (E) are specif1c experiences, like visiting a friend or eating aba1one almondine. Cosmic senseqs (C) are ecstasy-meditations during which one can experience a joyful union with Cosmic Reality. And last1y, dream senseqs (D) provide REM-sleep and are to be used for rest periods a minimum of four hours during any twenty--hour period of senseq experience. There is one other kind of senseq. Occasionally PROSELEC preempts private time to channel what are considered especially beneficial programs. Some educational experience is essential; after al1, if left to themselves almost everyone would choose on1y fun-and-games senseqs (except for a masochistic 6 percent who persist in selecting self destructive senseqs).It is also to be noted that many senseqs in the R, S, and E classes are rated "X" ;if a prohibited senseq is selected by a nonqualified customer, a mild impulse is channeled to the gland--control centers which in turn release chemicals which induce (for a seven-minute period only) strong guilt feelings. The senseq impulses sent to the brain centers are identica1 in every way to the electrochemical impulses which the (now-vestigial) body-senses used to send to the cortex. The resulting sense--experiences, therefore, are identical (but superior, of course, in quality and variety) to real-life experiences of the kind known before the advent of PKOSELEC. Question: For anyone tuned in to PROSELEC, does the real world exist? How could he possi4ly know, whether or not it exists? Would this PROSELEC world differ significantly from Berkeley's immaterial cosmos (with the possible exception of the "X" ratings; Berkeley's Eternal Perceiver seemed 1ittle concerned with censorship)? Question: What wou1d constitute reality for a PROSELEC customer? Question: What constitutes reality for you and me? 10 His logic is bril1iant and he almost succeeds. "His arguments are, strictly speaking, unanswerable," wrote Lord Chesterfield, and Boswe11 duly noted that although we are convinced that his doctrine is false, "it is impossible to refute it." David Hume agreed' Berke1ey's arguments "admit of no answer and produce no conviction." Because of George Berkeley, writes Durant, "European philosophy has not quite made up its mind that the external world exists. Until it reconciles itself to the extreme probability of it, and faces the problems of life and death, the world will pass it by." 11 Berkeley's system is the most extreme philosophical idealism" the Western world has produced. There is but one epistemological position--solipsism-- which is more extreme. If it is a fact that we know nothing of the external world, and if Berkeley could conclude from this that the external world of matter doesn't exist, then the solipsist will take the next step and conclude that only he himself exists. "I know only myse1f," he might say (to himself; of course). "The wor1d is the fabrication of my