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Table 1 continued Authors Conceptual/empirical Illustrative observations Type of determinant Kanter (1994) Conceptual ‘‘Many relationships die an early death when they are scrutinized for quick returns. COMCO’s alliance with Martech for environmental cleanup services in Eastern Europe dissolved in less than two years because of disputes over slower-than-expected results and the need for new investment, even though the market potential was still great.’’ (p. 102) Temporal Lee (1998) Empirical (105 Australian exporters; alliances with Korean importers) ‘‘Exporters’ perceptions of decision making uncertainty will be positive related to their degree of opportunism.’’ (p. 337) Economic ‘‘Exporters’ cultural distance towards the importing country will be positively related to their degree of opportunism.’’ (p. 337) Relational ‘‘Exporters’ economic ethnocentrism will be positively related to their degree of opportunism.’’ (p. 338) Relational Provan and Skinner (1989) Empirical (226 farm and power equipment dealers) ‘‘A low level of dependence on a supplier may well lead to high levels of opportunism among dealers; if caught, these dealers can more easily shift to other suppliers or provide critical services on their own than can their highly dependent counterparts.’’ (p. 205) Economic ‘‘Opportunistic behavior by dealers in relations with their primary supplier will be positively related to supplier control over dealer decisions.’’ (p. 205) Economic Sako and Helper (1998) Empirical (675 U.S. and 472 Japanese first-tier automotive suppliers) ‘‘The more a supplier is asked to provide information to its customer without the customer reciprocating by giving information to the supplier, the greater the supplier’s perception of customer opportunism.’’ (p. 393) Economic ‘‘The more uncertain the market and technology environments, and the higher the degree of asset specificity, the greater the level of customer opportunism.’’ (p. 394) Economic Wathne and Heide (2000) Conceptual ‘‘In general, information asymmetry means that one party’s ability to detect opportunism is limited … [which] gives the exchange partner the opportunity to pursue opportunistic actions without being caught.’’ (p. 42) Economic ‘‘Lock-in, in contrast, represents vulnerability because a party cannot leave a given relationship without incurring economic losses. As a consequence, a lock-in situation may require a party to tolerate opportunistic behavior.’’ (p. 42) Economic Williamson (1975) Conceptual ‘‘Opportunism refers to a lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile.’’ (p. 9) Economic ‘‘Responsible parties who would otherwise be prepared to self-enforce promises to take efficient loss-mitigating actions may find that such behavior is not competitively viable and will consequently be induced to imitate opportunistic types by underinvesting in loss mitigation.’’ (p. 15) Economic 60 J Bus Psychol (2010) 25:55–74 123
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Table 2 Selected studies of the determinants of opportunism Authors Hypotheses Study sample Findings Remarks Equity involvement Deeds and Hill (1999) ‘‘An equity investment by the partner firm will decrease perceived opportunism.’’ (p. 145) 52 biotechnology firms b = -0.126 (ns) While partner’s equity involvement leads to focal firm perceiving less partner opportunism, the effect is not substantial. Nevertheless, it is possible that equity involvement has a substantial effect on decreasing the likelihood of actual partner opportunism. Gulati (1995) ‘‘Alliances are more likely to be equity based if they have a shared R&D component.’’ (p. 91) 2,417 alliances b = 0.90 It is assumed that alliances with a shared R&D component will have a higher likelihood of partner opportunism. Findings suggest that a firm apprehending partner opportunism will prefer equity structure for its alliance. (p \.01) Asymmetric alliance-specific investments Brown et al. (2000) ‘‘The hotel’s opportunism will be reduced the more the hotel has invested in TSAs of its own.’’ (p. 53) 395 general managers of hotels t = 2.29 Results are significant in the opposite direction from the hypothesized relationship. The findings suggest that more alliance-specific investments can lead to higher potential for opportunism as well. This supports the notion of paranoid concerns about making asymmetric resource commitments, which increases the potential for opportunism. (p \.05) Joshi and Stump (1999) ‘‘A manufacturer’s investment of specific assets in a supplier is positively related to the manufacturer’s dependence on the supplier.’’ (p. 338) 168 purchasing managers t = 12.16 Alliance-specific investments directly affect asymmetry in resource commitment. It increases dependence, which in effect reduces the dependent firm’s potential for opportunism. Conversely, the less dependent partner has a higher potential for opportunism. (p \.001) ‘‘A manufacturer’s dependence on a supplier is negatively related to that manufacturer’s opportunism against the supplier.’’ (p. 340) t = -2.10 (p \.05) Ross et al. (1997) ‘‘Perceived asymmetry of commitment rises as actual asymmetry of commitment rises.’’ (p. 683) 510 focal actors from 255 dyads (insurer and agent) b = 0.116 Resource commitment is the most objective form of commitment. Actual asymmetry in resource commitment will increase the perceived asymmetry in resource commitment. (p \.01) b = 0.279 (p \.01) ‘‘The greater the commitment a focal party attributes to its counterpart, relative to its own, P1a: The less conflict the focal party will perceive in the relationship [and] P1b: The more profit (current and expected) the focal party will derive from the relationship.’’ (p. 684) Perceived asymmetry in commitment increases perceived conflict. It is argued that perceived conflict leads to fears of opportunism. Mutual hostages Dyer and Singh (1998) ‘‘hostages may be financial (e.g., equity) or symmetric investments in specialized or cospecialized assets, which constitute a visible collateral bond that aligns the economic incentives of exchange partners.’’ (p. 669) – – Mutual hostages pave the way for credible commitments, strengthening interfirm relational bonds. Also, by acting opportunistically a partner would lose the assets that are held hostage by the focal firm. Hence, mutual hostages decrease the potential for partner opportunism. Luo (2007b) ‘‘A minority party’s opportunism is negatively associated with equity captiveness, ceteris paribus.’’ (p. 861) 192 international joint ventures (163 IJVs used to test this hypothesis) b = -0.29 Equity captiveness in this paper is akin to a mutual hostage situation. Whereas a local party is more opportunistic when equity captiveness is less, a foreign party is consistently less opportunistic regardless of its equity captiveness. (p \ 0.001 when minority party is local; not significant when minority party is foreign) J Bus Psychol (2010) 25:55–74 61 123