《国际投资》课程教学资源（书籍文献）追溯全球金融危机的源起及冲击 Manias, Panics, and Crashes, A History of Financial Crises（Fifth Edition，Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber）

Manias,Panics,and Crashes A History of Financial Crises Fifth Edition Charles P.Kindleberger and Robert Z.Aliber WILEY John Wiley Sons,Inc

FM JWBK120/Kindleberger February 13, 2008 14:53 Char Count= Manias, Panics, and Crashes A History of Financial Crises Fifth Edition Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber John Wiley & Sons, Inc. iii

Contents Foreword by Robert M.Solow vii 1 Financial Crisis:A Hardy Perennial 1 2 Anatomy of a Typical Crisis 24 3 Speculative Manias 38 4 Fueling the Flames:The Expansion of Credit 64 5 The Critical Stage 90 6 Euphoria and Economic Booms 113 7 International Contagion 123 8 Bubble Contagion:Tokyo to Bangkok to New York 142 9 Frauds,Swindles,and the Credit Cycle 165 10 Policy Responses:Letting It Burn Out,and Other Devices 203 11 The Domestic Lender of Last Resort 225 12 The International Lender of Last Resort 243 13 The Lessons of History and the Most Tumultuous Decades Ever 275 Appendix 294 Notes 304 Index 340

FM JWBK120/Kindleberger February 13, 2008 14:53 Char Count= Contents Foreword by Robert M. Solow vii 1 Financial Crisis: A Hardy Perennial 1 2 Anatomy of a Typical Crisis 24 3 Speculative Manias 38 4 Fueling the Flames: The Expansion of Credit 64 5 The Critical Stage 90 6 Euphoria and Economic Booms 113 7 International Contagion 123 8 Bubble Contagion: Tokyo to Bangkok to New York 142 9 Frauds, Swindles, and the Credit Cycle 165 10 Policy Responses: Letting It Burn Out, and Other Devices 203 11 The Domestic Lender of Last Resort 225 12 The International Lender of Last Resort 243 13 The Lessons of History and the Most Tumultuous Decades Ever 275 Appendix 294 Notes 304 Index 340 v

Foreword Charlie Kindleberger(CPK from now on)was a delightful colleague: perceptive,responsive,curious about everything,full of character,and above all,lively.Those same qualities are everywhere evident in Manias, Panics.and Crashes. I think that CPK began to work on the book in the spirit of writ ing a natural history,rather as Darwin must have done at the stage of the Beagle-collecting,examining and classifying interesting specimens. Manias,panics,and crashes had the advantage over rodents,birds,and beetles that they were accompanied by the rhetoric of contemporaries, sometimes with insight,sometimes just blather.It was CPK's style as an economic historian to hunt for interesting things to learn,not to pursue a systematic agenda. of course,he was an economist by training and experience,and he soon found patterns and regularities,and causes and effects.What caught his eye especially were the irrationalities that seemed so often to enmesh those directly or indirectly enmeshed in the events themselves. By itself that would have been merely entertaining.The story got in- teresting for CPK with the interaction of behavior and institutions.The occurrence of manias,panics,and crashes,and their ultimate scope,also depended very much on the monetary and capital-market institutions of the time. CPK could not have known at the start just how hardy a perennial financial crisis would turn out to be.The quarter-century after the pub- lication of the first edition featured a whole new level of turbulence in national banking systems,exchange-rate volatility and asset-price bub- bles.There was always new material to be digested in successive editions This history cannot have been merely the result of increasing human ir- rationality,though CPK would have been charmed by what a German friend of ours called 'Das Gesetz der Verschlechtigung aller Dinge'(the Law of the Deterioration of Everything).Increasing wealth,faster and cheaper communication,and the evolution of national and interna tional financial systems also played an indispensable role,as sketched in Chapter 13,added to this edition by Robert Aliber.CPK's effort at economic history found a subject that does not appear to be going out of style

FM JWBK120/Kindleberger February 13, 2008 14:53 Char Count= Foreword Charlie Kindleberger (CPK from now on) was a delightful colleague: perceptive, responsive, curious about everything, full of character, and, above all, lively. Those same qualities are everywhere evident in Manias, Panics, and Crashes. I think that CPK began to work on the book in the spirit of writ￾ing a natural history, rather as Darwin must have done at the stage of the Beagle—collecting, examining and classifying interesting specimens. Manias, panics, and crashes had the advantage over rodents, birds, and beetles that they were accompanied by the rhetoric of contemporaries, sometimes with insight, sometimes just blather. It was CPK’s style as an economic historian to hunt for interesting things to learn, not to pursue a systematic agenda. Of course, he was an economist by training and experience, and he soon found patterns and regularities, and causes and effects. What caught his eye especially were the irrationalities that seemed so often to enmesh those directly or indirectly enmeshed in the events themselves. By itself that would have been merely entertaining. The story got in￾teresting for CPK with the interaction of behavior and institutions. The occurrence of manias, panics, and crashes, and their ultimate scope, also depended very much on the monetary and capital-market institutions of the time. CPK could not have known at the start just how hardy a perennial financial crisis would turn out to be. The quarter-century after the pub￾lication of the first edition featured a whole new level of turbulence in national banking systems, exchange-rate volatility and asset-price bub￾bles. There was always new material to be digested in successive editions. This history cannot have been merely the result of increasing human ir￾rationality, though CPK would have been charmed by what a German friend of ours called ‘Das Gesetz der Verschlechtigung aller Dinge’ (the Law of the Deterioration of Everything). Increasing wealth, faster and cheaper communication, and the evolution of national and interna￾tional financial systems also played an indispensable role, as sketched in Chapter 13, added to this edition by Robert Aliber. CPK’s effort at economic history found a subject that does not appear to be going out of style. vii

vii Foreword The shape of a new financial architecture'and the possible utility of a lender of last resort-national and/or internationalalong with th guidelines that ought to govern it were also among CPK's preoccupa- tions.Those who are engaged in reforming (or at least changing)the system would do well to ponder the lessons that emerge from this book. One of those lessons is very general,and is most applicable in contexts where irrationality may trump sober calculation.CPK was a skeptic by nature,just the opposite of doctrinaire.He mistrusted iron-clad intel- lectual systems,whether their proponents were free marketeers or social engineers.In fact,he considered clinging to rigid beliefs in the face of disconcerting evidence to be one of the more dangerous forms of irra- tionality,especially when it is practiced by those in charge.The interna tional economy would be a safer place if CPK's tolerant skepticism were more common among the powers that be.I am thinking,in particular, about current discussions of the so-called 'Washington consensus,'and the pros and cons of both freely floating exchange rates and unfettered capital markets. Any reader of this book will come away with the distinct notion that large quantities of liquid capital sloshing around the world should raise the possibility that they will overflow the container.One issue omitted in the book-because it is well outside its scope-is the other side of the ledger:What are the social benefits of free capital flow in its various forms,the analogue of gains from trade?CPK,whose specialties as an economist included international trade,international finance and eco- nomic development,would have been sensitive to the need for some pragmatic balancing of risks and benefits.One can only hope that the continued,up-to-date availability of this book will help to spread his open-minded habit of thought. It seems to me that the Aliber version preserves this basic Kindleberger orientation but imposes a little more order on CPK's occasionally way- ward path through his specimen cabinets.More manias,panics,and crashes may plague us,but readers of this book will at least have been inoculated. ROBERT M.SOLOW

FM JWBK120/Kindleberger February 13, 2008 14:53 Char Count= viii Foreword The shape of a ‘new financial architecture’ and the possible utility of a lender of last resort—national and/or international—along with the guidelines that ought to govern it were also among CPK’s preoccupa￾tions. Those who are engaged in reforming (or at least changing) the system would do well to ponder the lessons that emerge from this book. One of those lessons is very general, and is most applicable in contexts where irrationality may trump sober calculation. CPK was a skeptic by nature, just the opposite of doctrinaire. He mistrusted iron-clad intel￾lectual systems, whether their proponents were free marketeers or social engineers. In fact, he considered clinging to rigid beliefs in the face of disconcerting evidence to be one of the more dangerous forms of irra￾tionality, especially when it is practiced by those in charge. The interna￾tional economy would be a safer place if CPK’s tolerant skepticism were more common among the powers that be. I am thinking, in particular, about current discussions of the so-called ‘Washington consensus,’ and the pros and cons of both freely floating exchange rates and unfettered capital markets. Any reader of this book will come away with the distinct notion that large quantities of liquid capital sloshing around the world should raise the possibility that they will overflow the container. One issue omitted in the book—because it is well outside its scope—is the other side of the ledger: What are the social benefits of free capital flow in its various forms, the analogue of gains from trade? CPK, whose specialties as an economist included international trade, international finance and eco￾nomic development, would have been sensitive to the need for some pragmatic balancing of risks and benefits. One can only hope that the continued, up-to-date availability of this book will help to spread his open-minded habit of thought. It seems to me that the Aliber version preserves this basic Kindleberger orientation but imposes a little more order on CPK’s occasionally way￾ward path through his specimen cabinets. More manias, panics, and crashes may plague us, but readers of this book will at least have been inoculated. ROBERT M. SOLOW

1 Financial Crisis:A Hardy Perennial The years since the early 1970s are unprecedented in terms of the volatil- ity in the prices of commodities,currencies,real estate and stocks,and the frequency and severity of financial crises.In the second half of the 1980s,Japan experienced a massive bubble in its real estate and in its stock markets.During the same period the prices of real estate and of stocks in Finland,Norway,and Sweden increased even more rapidly than in Japan.In the early 1990s,there was a surge in real estate prices and stock prices in Thailand,Malaysia,Indonesia,and most of the nearby Asian countries;in 1993,stock prices increased by about 100 percent in each of these countries.In the second half of the 1990s,the United States experienced a bubble in the stock market;there was a mania in the prices of the stocks of firms in the new industries like information technology and the dot.coms Bubbles always implode;by definition a bubble involves a non- sustainable pattern of price changes or cash flows.The implosion of the asset price bubble in Japan led to the massive failure of a large num. ber of banks and other types of financial firms and more than a decade of sluggish economic growth.The implosion of the asset price bubble in Thailand triggered the contagion effect and led to sharp declines in stock prices throughout the region.The exception to this pattern is that the implosion of the bubble in U.S.stock prices in 2000 led to declines in stock prices for the next several years but the ensuing recession in 2001 was brief and shallow. The changes in the foreign exchange values of national currencies during this period were often extremely large.At the beginning of the 1970s,the dominant market view was that the foreign exchange value of the U.S.dollar might decline by 10 to 12 percent to compensate for the

c01 JWBK120/Kindleberger February 13, 2008 14:58 Char Count= 1 Financial Crisis: A Hardy Perennial The years since the early 1970s are unprecedented in terms of the volatil￾ity in the prices of commodities, currencies, real estate and stocks, and the frequency and severity of financial crises. In the second half of the 1980s, Japan experienced a massive bubble in its real estate and in its stock markets. During the same period the prices of real estate and of stocks in Finland, Norway, and Sweden increased even more rapidly than in Japan. In the early 1990s, there was a surge in real estate prices and stock prices in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and most of the nearby Asian countries; in 1993, stock prices increased by about 100 percent in each of these countries. In the second half of the 1990s, the United States experienced a bubble in the stock market; there was a mania in the prices of the stocks of firms in the new industries like information technology and the dot.coms. Bubbles always implode; by definition a bubble involves a non￾sustainable pattern of price changes or cash flows. The implosion of the asset price bubble in Japan led to the massive failure of a large num￾ber of banks and other types of financial firms and more than a decade of sluggish economic growth. The implosion of the asset price bubble in Thailand triggered the contagion effect and led to sharp declines in stock prices throughout the region. The exception to this pattern is that the implosion of the bubble in U.S. stock prices in 2000 led to declines in stock prices for the next several years but the ensuing recession in 2001 was brief and shallow. The changes in the foreign exchange values of national currencies during this period were often extremely large. At the beginning of the 1970s, the dominant market view was that the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar might decline by 10 to 12 percent to compensate for the 1