Three Player Majority Vote:Allocating S1 ·Solution:(.5,.5,0),(0,.5,.5)(.5,0,.5) Consider any other allocation of the dollar There is always one of these that two people prefer So every other allocation is dominated by one of these Solution:(.1,x,.9-x)for all values of 0>x>.9 Also a solution,but one that includes An infinite number of allocations Try to find an allocation that isn't dominated by one member of either the first or the second set of allocations
Three Player Majority Vote: Allocating $1 • Solution: (.5,.5,0), (0,.5,.5) (.5,0,.5) • Consider any other allocation of the dollar • There is always one of these that two people prefer • So every other allocation is dominated by one of these • Solution: (.1, x, .9-x) for all values of 0>x>.9 • Also a solution, but one that includes • An infinite number of allocations • Try to find an allocation that isn’t dominated by one member of either the first or the second set of allocations
Bilateral Monopoly .Selling an apple ·Putting a child to bed •A Doomsday Machine
Bilateral Monopoly •Selling an apple •Putting a child to bed •A Doomsday Machine
The Human Doomsday Machine Defer to me or I beat you up .A fight hurts both of us,but... You don't want to be hurt,so I don't have to beat you up Hawk/Dove game Equilibrium number of hawks Why crimes of passion can be deterred
The Human Doomsday Machine •Defer to me or I beat you up • A fight hurts both of us, but … • You don’t want to be hurt, so I don’t have to beat you up •Hawk/Dove game • Equilibrium number of hawks • Why crimes of passion can be deterred
Economics of Vice and Virtue Economics of vice:The bully strategy ·Economics of virtue Why are there people who won't steal Even if they are sure nobody is looking? What if your utility function was written on your forehead? The cost to me of hiring someone who will steal from me Is greater than the benefit to him of stealing from me So I will pay the honest man more than enough more so that honesty pays Your utility function is written on your forehead ·Vith a fuzzy pencil ·So honesty pays Unless you are a very talented con man
Economics of Vice and Virtue • Economics of vice: The bully strategy • Economics of virtue • Why are there people who won’t steal • Even if they are sure nobody is looking? • What if your utility function was written on your forehead? • The cost to me of hiring someone who will steal from me • Is greater than the benefit to him of stealing from me • So I will pay the honest man more than enough more so that honesty pays • Your utility function is written on your forehead • With a fuzzy pencil • So honesty pays • Unless you are a very talented con man
Implication of the economics The bully strategy only works for involuntary interactions If you announce at the employment interview that you beat people up if they don't do what you want ·You don't get the job The virtue strategy only works for voluntary interactions So a society where more interaction is voluntary will have less vice and more virtue. ·Nicer people
Implication of the economics • The bully strategy only works for involuntary interactions • If you announce at the employment interview that you beat people up if they don’t do what you want • You don’t get the job • The virtue strategy only works for voluntary interactions • So a society where more interaction is voluntary will have less vice and more virtue. • Nicer people