THE JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY IN EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 111 condescending view of Japan's East Asian neighbors.3 In some instances,its authors had tried to whitewash or justify the country's colonial and wartime actions to such a degree that even the conservative textbook examiners at the Ministry of Education,Culture,Sports,Science and Technology (MEXT)had consideration for neighboring countries cademnddspring 2001 afer an unusually hih mum In the eyes of conservatives and right-wingers tectonic shifts in Japanese politics of history were a cause for concern. The third major international textbook controversy was a continuation of old troubles with some new parameters.The academic paradigm had shifted,and the tofcomstructivist/relhti arguments-that histori nation t sm r trea ng ev nts a a agai the prominence of debates on the issue,this time on the domestic front- hat is between the progressive Asahi and the conservative Sankei newspapers(Ducke 2002,12). The greatest change in the course of the textbook controversies,however,can bebthe appopriation ofhistorybyocetctors Inthe these groups experie ed an explosion of numbers in South Korea,considerable th in and an em nce in China.Among these,the Tsukuru-kai well connected to conservative political and edia es,s ld be seen as a conservative citizen group p rath than a schem inflicted by the state on its pacifist people (Oguma anc Ueno 2003).Progressive Japanese citizens'groups,using networks such as Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21,and in some cases linking up with Korean counterparts (Ducke 2002),lobbied local school boards against the selection of the New History Textbook and contributed to its extremely low rate of adoption (0.04 percent of all schools).15 and China,where such histo y-related issues as reconciliatio and co pcen managed ma topme through bottom-up c orts m by democratization in Korea and limited liberalization in China.The two gov. ernments,which had previously shifted toward a more cautious and/or concilia tory policy,were thus put on the defensive by the textbook controversy.South
condescending view of Japan’s East Asian neighbors.13 In some instances, its authors had tried to whitewash or justify the country’s colonial and wartime actions to such a degree that even the conservative textbook examiners at the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) had been compelled to demand more consideration for neighboring countries (Schneider 2008). It was approved in spring 2001 after an unusually high number of officially demanded revisions.14 In the eyes of conservatives and right-wingers . . . tectonic shifts in Japanese politics of history were a cause for concern. The third major international textbook controversy was a continuation of old troubles with some new parameters. The academic paradigm had shifted, and the Tsukuru-kai’s employment of constructivist/relativist arguments—that histories naturally differed from nation to nation—made criticism of treating events as factually “right or wrong” more difficult. A battle in the media again contributed to the prominence of debates on the issue, this time on the domestic front—that is, between the progressive Asahi and the conservative Sankei newspapers (Ducke 2002, 12). The greatest change in the course of the textbook controversies, however, can be attributed to the appropriation of history by “civil society” actors. In the 1990s, these groups experienced an explosion of numbers in South Korea, considerable growth in Japan, and an emergence in China. Among these, the Tsukuru-kai, while doubtlessly well connected to conservative political, economic, and media circles, should be seen as a conservative citizen group rather than a scheme inflicted by the state on its pacifist people (Oguma and Ueno 2003). Progressive Japanese citizens’ groups, using networks such as Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, and in some cases linking up with Korean counterparts (Ducke 2002), lobbied local school boards against the selection of the New History Textbook and contributed to its extremely low rate of adoption (0.04 percent of all schools).15 Korea and China, where such history-related issues as reconciliation and compensation had long been managed in a top-down way by governments, developed their own agendas through bottom-up civil society–based efforts made possible by democratization in Korea and limited liberalization in China. The two governments, which had previously shifted toward a more cautious and/or conciliatory policy, were thus put on the defensive by the textbook controversy. South THE JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY IN EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 111 Downloaded from http://ann.sagepub.com at Beijing Language and Culture University on May 9, 2009
112 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY Korean president Roh Moo-hyun launched diplomatic protests only after pressure from the included the political arena and the public(Soh 2005).The official Chinese reactions oric and some c were taken witl 8-te The controversies were fuelled by popular nationa sms that have been rising vis-a-vis these and other Japanese"attacks."They could now be articulated more openly.Soh(2005,149)has identified an"intensely ethnonationalistic complex of Korean self-image as both victim and victor vis-a-vis Japan"in history-related protests.In Sino-Japanese relations,reactive nationalisms- perceived by the other side as assertiv have been mutually stimulating each other(Chan and Bridges206).For ing of ts hist ory may be seen an grounded inanticoon-merialis (Soh2005 Consequently,when popular outrage is riding high,the respective governments have to be cautious to not appear weak at least rhetorically This even concerns authoritarian China,where the state no longer holds a com plete definitional monopoly on many historical narratives.Apart from relying on anti-Japanese sentiments for itswn it ig ppre will”in histo rela ed affairs, and populist"histo activism nd poten the inner-Chinese discourse,the Chinese Communist Party's forme vIctor narra tive"focusing on heroic anti-Japanese resistance has been superseded by a"victim narrative"emphasizing Chinese suffering and Japanese atrocities(Gries 2004) Thus,when news of Japanese goverment approval for the revised version of the New History Textbook was transmitted in the spring of 2005,it prompted partially oular anti-Japanese demonstrations in a number of Chin cities ks dic ese dis ontent other 1 gain a permaner tseat on the United Nations Secrity Council.The recento troversies also illustrate how new tools of communication have come to play ar important role for all sides involved.Both protesters and Chinese authorities resorted to text messaging to organize their activities-and subsequently to sub due them.Online petitions,for instance against the New History Textbook,have become a wide ad pher non:there 1 and Chinese“c paral ites of Japanese institutio Fiola 2005) In the mear some already see the Tsukuru-kai as having arrived at a dead end (Saaler 2006).If the Net History Tertbook continues to exist,it will most likely like its 1986"predecessor in spirit"-remain a marginal presence on the textbook market.But given the currently rather conservative atmosphere in Japan,it could soon be replaced by a similar undertaking even if it disappeared
Korean president Roh Moo-hyun launched diplomatic protests only after pressure from the political arena and the public (Soh 2005). The official Chinese reactions included the usual accusatory rhetoric and some cancelled visits, but no measures were taken with potentially negative long-term effects on other, particularly economic, aspects of its bilateral relationship with Japan (Rose 2005, 63-65). The controversies were fuelled by popular nationalisms that have been rising vis-à-vis these and other Japanese “attacks.” They could now be articulated more openly. Soh (2005, 149) has identified an “intensely ethnonationalistic complex of Korean self-image as both victim and victor vis-à-vis Japan” in history-related protests. In Sino-Japanese relations, reactive nationalisms—perceived by the other side as assertive—have been mutually stimulating each other (Chan and Bridges 2006). For citizens of both countries, activities against Japan’s perceived whitewashing of its history may be seen and justified as a “patriotic duty,” grounded in anticolonial/anti-imperialist traditions (Soh 2005; Klein 2005). Consequently, when popular outrage is riding high, the respective governments have to be cautious to not appear weak—at least rhetorically. This even concerns authoritarian China, where the state no longer holds a complete definitional monopoly on many historical narratives. Apart from relying on anti-Japanese sentiments for its own legitimization, it cannot entirely ignore—or suppress—“popular will” in history-related affairs, and populist “history activism” has turned into a force that can mobilize popular resentments and potentially exacerbate bilateral relations (Reilly 2006). Moreover, in an untimely coincidence, in the inner-Chinese discourse, the Chinese Communist Party’s former “victor narrative” focusing on heroic anti-Japanese resistance has been superseded by a “victim narrative” emphasizing Chinese suffering and Japanese atrocities (Gries 2004). Thus, when news of Japanese government approval for the revised version of the New History Textbook was transmitted in the spring of 2005, it prompted partially violent popular anti-Japanese demonstrations in a number of Chinese cities— which ended up considerably embarrassing Beijing’s pre-Olympics posturing. Again, the furor over textbooks did not stand in isolation—Chinese discontent had been building up on a number of other issues, such as Japanese efforts to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The recent controversies also illustrate how new tools of communication have come to play an important role for all sides involved. Both protesters and Chinese authorities resorted to text messaging to organize their activities—and subsequently to subdue them. Online petitions, for instance against the New History Textbook, have become a widespread phenomenon; there have been blogs voicing anti-Japanese outrage (and hate) and reports of Korean and Chinese “cyber attacks” paralyzing Web sites of Japanese institutions (cf., for instance, Fiola 2005). In the meantime, some already see the Tsukuru-kai as having arrived at a dead end (Saaler 2006). If the New History Textbook continues to exist, it will most likely—like its 1986 “predecessor in spirit”—remain a marginal presence on the textbook market. But given the currently rather conservative atmosphere in Japan, it could soon be replaced by a similar undertaking even if it disappeared completely.16 112 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY Downloaded from http://ann.sagepub.com at Beijing Language and Culture University on May 9, 2009