Topic 1: What is Corporate Finance?(cont 1 2 Financing Decisions In the previous section the focus was on investment decisions. It was assumed throughout that the firm was financed with equity. In this section we discuss financing decisions. As a prelude to this we will briefly discuss the notion of efficient

Franklin Allen and Douglas gale Topic 1: What is Corporate Finance? Readings A Ph. D. textbook that provides basic coverage of some of the main topics is J. A. de Matos. Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Finance, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) There are many MBa textbooks. A very good one is R.A. Brealey and S.C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 7th edition(New York

This paper is an updated version of a previous working paper, Capital Budgeting in the Presence of Managerial Overconfidence and Optimism, by the same authors. Financial support by the Rodney L. white Center for Financial Research is gratefully acknowledged. The authors would like to thank Andrew Abel, Jonathan Berk, Domenico Cuoco, David Denis, Janice Eberly, Robert Goldstein, Peter Swan, and seminar

Bayesian Learning in Social Networks Douglas Gale(Corresponding Author) Department of Economics. New York University

the standard theory of co.apters 1 and 2 when we covered Modigliani-Miller As we discussed in the Ch apital structure that has been the mainstay of text- books is the trade-off theory This argues that the benefit of debt is the tax shield and the cost is the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. The tradi tional view was that these deadweight

The agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932)has been a major focus of the literature on corporate finance and the theory of the firm over the last twenty years. Various insti- tutional arrangements exist to deal with this agency problem and one that has attracted a lot of attention is the market for corporate control. Manne

The term adverse selection comes originally from insurance applications. An insurance contract may attract high-risk individuals, with the result that the pool of insured customers may be riskier than the population at large Adverse selection is now used generically to describe situations of asymmet ric information, particularly market settings in which some individuals have private information about their characteristics and where the individuals

Chapter 5 Dynamic Contracting 5.1 Incomplete contracts In our earlier treatment of contracting problems, we assumed that the in- centive problem was generated by asymmetric information, either a problem of moral hazard(hidden actions)or adverse selection(hidden information) The incomplete contracts approach eschews asymmetric information because of its intractability and instead focuses on environments in which informa- tion is observable but not verifiable

Chapter 2 The Modigliani-Miller theorem \When capital markets are perfect and complete, corporate decisions are trivial.\ 2.1 Arrow-Debreu model with assets 2.1.1 Primitives

9.1 Critique of existing procedures (i) Auctions. The problem with auctions is that assets sold off piecemeal may be sold at a substantial discount The financing problem. It takes too long to raise money from a large number of investors. A small number of investors may be risk averse and unwilling to pay the expected value of the assets