《国际金融》课程教学资源（参考资料）Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2017.pdf_P16-P20

ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 2017 International Monetary Fund | October 2017 9 Table 4. Changes and Resulting Reclassifi cations of Exchange Rate Arrangements, May 1, 2016–April 30, 2017 De Facto Arrangement Country De Jure Arrangement Previous Arrangement¹ Current (2017 AREAER) Eff ective Date of Reclassifi cation Angola Floating Other managed Stabilized April 15, 2016 Burundi Floating Stabilized Crawl-like June 22, 2016 China² Managed fl oating Other managed Crawl-like November 11, 2015 China³ Managed fl oating Stabilized August 24, 2016 Congo, Democratic Republic of the Floating Stabilized Other managed June 21, 2016 Costa Rica Managed fl oating Stabilized Crawl-like April 26, 2016 Croatia Managed fl oating Crawl-like Stabilized April 14, 2016 Egypt Floating Other managed Floating November 3, 2016 Kenya² Free fl oating Floating Stabilized November 4, 2015 Malawi Floating Floating Stabilized August 3, 2016 Malaysia Managed fl oating Other managed Floating September 26, 2016 Nigeria Other managed Stabilized Other managed June 21,2016 Nigeria³ Other managed Stabilized August 26, 2016 Pakistan² Floating Other managed Stabilized March 4, 2015 Papua New Guinea Floating Crawl-like Stabilized May 18, 2016 Rwanda² Floating Other managed Crawl-like March 4, 2015 Serbia Floating Floating Stabilized January 28, 2016 Sierra Leone² Floating Floating Other managed August 10, 2015 Suriname Floating Stabilized Other managed March 30, 2016 Tajikistan Managed fl oating Other managed Stabilized February 1, 2016 Tanzania Free fl oating Floating Stabilized January 8, 2016 Trinidad and Tobago² Floating Stabilized Crawl-like December 21, 2015 Trinidad and Tobago³ Stabilized July 19,2016 Tunisia Floating Crawl-like fl oating May 12, 2016 Venezuela Conventional peg Conventional peg Other managed March 7, 2016 Zimbabwe No separate legal tender No separate legal tender Other managed October 31, 2016 Source: AREAER database. ¹ 1This column refers to the arrangements as reported in the 2016 AREAER, except when a reclassification took place during January 1–April 30, 2016, in which case it refers to the arrangement preceding such a reclassification. ² The exchange rate arrangement was reclassified retroactively, overriding a previously published classification for the entire reporting period or part of the period. ³ Cells in the column “Previous Arrangement” are blank if there was a subsequent reclassification during the reporting period. Monetary Anchors13 The exchange rate remained the anchor for monetary policy for fewer than half of member countries— 42.7 percent (Table 5). There were two changes in announced monetary anchors compared with four in the previous reporting period: one country (Venezuela) left the group of countries anchored to the US dollar (39), and one country (Angola) anchored to the US dollar. There were no changes in other groups of members anchored to the euro (25), to a composite (9), or to another single currency (9) (see Table 2). ¹³ Monetary anchors are defined as the main intermediate target the authorities pursue to achieve their policy goals (which, overwhelmingly, is price stability). The inventory of monetary anchors is based mainly on members’ declarations in the context of the yearly AREAER update or Article IV consultations and may differ from the anchor implemented in practice as a result of the characteristics of the de facto exchange rate arrangement. ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 2017 10 International Monetary Fund | October 2017 Table 5. Monetary Policy Frameworks and Exchange Rate Anchors, 2009–17 (Percent of IMF members as of April 30)1 US Dollar Euro Composite Other Currency Monetary Aggregate Infl ation Targeting Other² 2009³ 28.7 14.4 7.4 4.3 13.3 15.4 16.5 20104 26.5 14.8 7.9 3.7 13.2 16.4 17.5 20115 25.3 14.2 7.4 4.2 15.3 16.3 17.4 20125 22.6 14.2 6.8 4.2 15.3 16.8 20.0 2013 23.0 14.1 6.8 4.2 13.6 17.8 20.4 2014 22.5 13.6 6.3 4.2 13.1 17.8 22.5 2015 22.0 13.1 6.3 4.2 13.1 18.8 22.5 20166 20.3 13.0 4.7 4.7 12.5 19.8 25.0 2017 20.3 13.0 4.7 4.7 12.5 20.8 24.0 Source: AREAER database. ¹ Includes 189 member countries and three territories: Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten (both in the Kingdom of the Netherlands), and Hong Kong SAR (China). ² Includes countries that have no explicitly stated nominal anchor but instead monitor various indicators in conducting monetary policy. ³ Does not include Kosovo, Tuvalu, and South Sudan, which became IMF members on June 29, 2009; June 24, 2010; and April 18, 2012, respectively. 4 Does not include Tuvalu and South Sudan, which became IMF members on June 24, 2010, and April 18, 2012, respectively. 5 Does not include South Sudan, which became an IMF member on April 18, 2012. 6 Includes Nauru, which became an IMF member on April 12, 2016. Fifty-four member countries have an officially announced fixed exchange rate policy—either a currency board or a conventional peg—which implies the use of the exchange rate as the unique monetary anchor, with two exceptions. Although the official (de jure) exchange rate regime of Samoa and the Solomon Islands is a peg against a basket of currencies, the monetary policy framework was reported to comprise a mix of anchors, including the exchange rate. Among the 69 countries with de facto floating exchange rate arrangements— floating or free floating—the monetary anchor varies among monetary aggregates (3), inflation targeting (37), and other (29, including the 19 European Economic and Monetary Union [EMU] countries). Twenty-one countries implementing soft pegs and other managed arrangements target monetary aggregates. Countries with either stabilized or crawl-like arrangements (24) report reliance on a variety of monetary frameworks, including monetary aggregates and inflation-targeting frameworks. Other managed arrangements are split between exchange rate anchors (4), monetary aggregate targets (8), and other monetary policy frameworks (6). • The share of IMF members with the exchange rate as the main policy target remained unchanged at 42.7 percent. Countries with hard pegs and soft pegs make up 96.2 percent of this group. Three currency unions—the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU), and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)—have exchange rate anchors for their respective common currency. Exchange rate anchors are by far the first choice of small, open economies. • Although the US dollar maintained its position as the dominant exchange rate anchor, the share of countries using it as an exchange rate anchor has been steadily decreasing, from 33 percent in 2008 to 20.3 percent in 2017. From April 2016 to April 2017, one country abandoned the anchor to the US dollar and reported a change in the monetary policy framework to “other” (Venezuela) in the context of adopting a more flexible exchange rate arrangement. Countries that continue to anchor to the dollar also include those with moderate trade relations with the United States. • The share or composition of countries using an exchange rate anchor to the euro remained unchanged at 13.0 percent. Countries whose currencies are anchored to the euro generally have historical ties with European countries, for example, the Communauté Financière d’Afrique (CFA) franc area countries; are part of the European Union (EU); or have strong trade relations with western Europe, including central and eastern European countries—for example, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and San Marino. ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 2017 International Monetary Fund | October 2017 11 • Nine countries anchor their exchange rate to a currency composite. Three track the special drawing right (SDR) as the sole currency basket or as a component of a broader reference basket (Botswana, Libya, Syria). Morocco tracks a euro and US dollar basket, and the remaining five countries do not disclose the composition of their reference currency baskets (Fiji, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Singapore, Vietnam). • Nine countries maintain an exchange rate anchor to another single currency. Three of these countries (Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu) use the Australian dollar as their legal tender, and one (Brunei Darussalam) has a currency board arrangement with the Singapore dollar. The remaining five have conventional pegged arrangements: three (Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland) with the South African rand and two (Bhutan, Nepal) with the Indian rupee. Half the countries in this group are landlocked, bordering either partially or exclusively the country whose currency they use as their exchange rate anchor. The anchor currency is typically freely usable in the country and is often legal tender. Most IMF member countries, representing the overwhelming share of global output, are split among monetary aggregate targeting, inflation targeting, and “other” (which includes monetary policy not committed to a specific target). • The number of countries targeting a monetary aggregate remained unchanged at 24, compared with the previous reporting period. However, there were two changes: one country switched from monetary aggregate targeting to “other monetary framework” (Mozambique), and one adopted a monetary aggregate target (Papua New Guinea—previously “other monetary framework”). This category does not include any country with a free-floating exchange rate arrangement. In fact, monetary aggregates are often the choice of economies with less-developed financial markets and managed exchange rates. The objective of the arrangement is to influence consumer prices and, eventually, asset prices through the control of monetary aggregates. Reserve money is often used as the operational target to control credit growth through the credit multiplier. • The number of countries that directly target inflation increased by 2, to 40. Argentina formally adopted an inflation-targeting regime in September 2016 (previously classified as other monetary framework). Ukraine also described its monetary policy framework as inflation targeting during this reporting period. The countries in this group are mostly middle income but include some advanced economies as well. Of these, 37 have either floating or free-floating exchange rate arrangements, a policy framework that requires considerable monetary policy credibility to make up for the loss of transparent intermediate targets.¹4 A few countries refer to their monetary framework as “inflation targeting lite,” suggesting that they also consider indicators other than inflation. Costa Rica, Jamaica, Kenya, Mongolia, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia have taken preliminary steps toward a transition to an inflation-targeting framework. The central bank is responsible for setting the inflation target in 19 of the 40 countries in this category, and in 16 countries the central bank and the government jointly set the targets. More than half of the countries (24) have a target with a tolerance band, with only one country targeting core inflation. Most of the countries are in line with the inflation-targeting regime’s commitments to transparency and accountability, 34 and 37 countries, respectively. • The “other monetary policy framework” category diminished by 2, to 46. The number of countries that are not committed to a specific target (the “other” column in Table 2) was affected by six changes during the reporting period. Two countries (Mozambique, Venezuela) reported the use of a multiple-indicator approach to monetary policy, and four countries left this group (Angola, Argentina, Papua New Guinea, Ukraine); of these, two switched to inflation targeting (Argentina, Ukraine), one anchored to the US dollar (Angola), and one targeted a monetary aggregate (Papua New Guinea). This category includes many of the largest economies, such as the euro area and the United States, where the monetary authorities have sufficient credibility to implement monetary policy without a specific monetary anchor. It is also used as a residual classification for countries for which no relevant information is available and for those with alternative monetary policy frameworks not categorized in this report. ¹4 Inflation targeting aims to address the problem of exchange rates and monetary aggregates that do not have a stable relationship with prices, making intermediate targets less suitable for inflation control. ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 2017 Foreign Exchange Interventions The IMF staff regularly assesses whether the frequency of foreign exchange intervention is consistent with de rmmon mmi thatuiynfomo goiecafvohceogkatpo,ndothcrourcen ing intorm ation obtaine Intervention Purpose As discussed in the iMe's april 2017 Warld outlook si most notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo.Egypt,Me nt,Angola,Argent ng th Guinea.Mexico,Mozambique,Mongolia).of improved exchange rate dynamics,therea a move toward less exchange rate flexibility and increased interve ention in some members,with the aim of increasing foreign exchange reserve accumulation or resuming tightly managed exchange rate arrangements. Intervention Techniques IMF members typically conduct foreign exchange interventions in the spot foreign exchange market,either ma et participants(al mple,market makers)or thr How r foreign exchar e interventions are in the forward o options markets or through verbal interventions. exchang intervention in.with the the marketp typically are counted as one orices the new information on the announ cement day of the program.In February 2017.Russias Mi anism of foreign ases an hance the s lity and pre ca℃ and public.Intervention volume depends on the amount of oil and gas revenue in the federal budge As long as the actual Urals price exceeds US$40 a barrel,the Ministry of Finance purchases foreign exchange amount of additional oil and gas reven If actual prices c level,the inistry o inanc gn excr the )ount o the res gas re .Th purchase volumes.The size of these op rations is announced at the beginning of every month,and purchase ogram is preannounced,predict An increasing number of countries are using derivatives as an alternative instrument to intervene in the for ging program.I ank may offer up to US the central bank of colombia can intervene in the fo throug auction sales of putr cll optionsat market rates and through spot sales of foreign xhange under oreign exchange swap conracts.at rates set by the bank through auctions or over the counter.The Banko n a intervene in the The the ge E of Su market through swaps under a rule-based mechanism that if the exchange rate xceds a is Prean unced programs of purchases and/or sales of foreign exchang 12 nterational Monetary Fund October 2017 OInternational Monetary Fund.Not for Redistribution

ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 2017 12 International Monetary Fund | October 2017 Foreign Exchange Interventions The IMF staff regularly assesses whether the frequency of foreign exchange intervention is consistent with de facto free-floating arrangements or determines whether a classification as a soft peg is appropriate (see the Compilation Guide).¹5 These assessments draw on information that is publicly available, information reported to the IMF by member countries, market reports, and other sources, including information obtained during official staff visits to member countries. Intervention Purpose As discussed in the IMF’s April 2017 World Economic Outlook, since the summer of 2016, global financial conditions have been improving modestly for emerging market and developing economies, but commodity exporters continue to struggle. In 2016 some countries saw their currencies depreciate substantially—most notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and Venezuela, and to a lesser extent, Angola, Argentina, Haiti, Guinea, Mexico, Mongolia, and Turkey. Among these countries, a few saw their currencies reverse direction with modest appreciation until April 2017 (Argentina, Egypt, Guinea, Mexico, Mozambique, Mongolia). As a consequence of improved exchange rate dynamics, there was a move toward less exchange rate flexibility and increased intervention in some members, with the aim of increasing foreign exchange reserve accumulation or resuming tightly managed exchange rate arrangements. Intervention Techniques IMF members typically conduct foreign exchange interventions in the spot foreign exchange market, either by directly contacting market participants (all or only a selection—for example, market makers) or through foreign exchange auctions (for more information on auctions see the foreign exchange markets section of this report). However, foreign exchange interventions are occasionally also conducted in the forward or options markets or through verbal interventions. Preannounced programs of future purchases and/or sales of foreign exchange typically are counted as one intervention in the foreign exchange market, with the assumption that the market prices the new information on the announcement day of the program. In February 2017, Russia’s Ministry of Finance implemented a new mechanism of foreign exchange purchases and sales to enhance the stability and predictability of local economic conditions and to reduce the impact of price volatility in the global energy market on Russia’s economy and public finances. Intervention volume depends on the amount of oil and gas revenue in the federal budget. As long as the actual Urals price exceeds US$40 a barrel, the Ministry of Finance purchases foreign exchange equal to the amount of additional oil and gas revenue. If actual prices drop below this level, the Ministry of Finance sells foreign exchange equal to the amount of the resulting shortfall of oil and gas revenue. The cumulative (from the beginning of operations) foreign exchange sales volumes should not exceed the cumulative purchase volumes. The size of these operations is announced at the beginning of every month, and purchases are evenly distributed within the month. The foreign exchange purchase program is preannounced, predictable, involves small daily amounts, and is not triggered by an exchange rate level. An increasing number of countries are using derivatives as an alternative instrument to intervene in the foreign exchange market. In February 2017, Mexico’s Foreign Exchange Commission announced a new foreign exchange hedging program. The Central Bank of Mexico may offer up to US$20 billion in nondeliverable forwards with maturity of up to 12 months and settled in pesos. A first auction of US$1 billion was completed March 6, 2017. Similarly, the Central Bank of Colombia can intervene in the foreign exchange market through auction sales of put or call options at market rates and through spot sales of foreign exchange under foreign exchange swap contracts, at rates set by the bank through auctions or over the counter. The Bank of Korea can also intervene in the market with its funds and funds from the Foreign Exchange Equalization Fund when it is deemed necessary for the stability of the market. The Central Bank of Sudan participates in the market through swaps under a rule-based mechanism that triggers intervention if the exchange rate exceeds a ¹5 Preannounced programs of purchases and/or sales of foreign exchange typically do not qualify as interventions because the design of these programs minimizes the impact on the exchange rate. Very small, retail-type transactions are also disregarded. ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 2017 International Monetary Fund | October 2017 13 band of ±4 percent around the previous day’s closing rate. The Central Reserve Bank of Peru may intervene through dollar-indexed bonds, foreign exchange swaps, and repurchase agreements. Other countries, including Albania, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Russia, have also reported the use of foreign exchange swaps as an indirect intervention channel. Official Exchange Rates The vast majority (167) of IMF member countries report that they publish official exchange rates. This includes not only countries that have officially determined and/or enforced exchange rates; by definition, it also refers to any reference or indicative exchange rate that is computed and/or published by the central bank (see the Compilation Guide). The calculation of these exchange rates is often based on market exchange rates, such as those used in interbank market transactions or in a combination of interbank and bank-client transactions in a specified observation period. The published exchange rate is used as a guide for market participants in their foreign exchange transactions, for accounting and customs valuation purposes, in exchange transactions with the government, and sometimes mandatorily in specific exchange transactions. During the 2016–17 reporting period, several countries adopted new methods for calculating their official exchange rates (Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guinea, India, Kazakhstan, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Ukraine, Venezuela). Countries from all income levels and various geographic regions are represented among the 25 members that report no official or reference exchange rates; about half (12) are countries with no separate legal tender, 3 are soft pegs, 8 are floating or free floating, and 2 have the residual de facto exchange rate arrangement. Among the countries that do not compute an official exchange rate, some, including Japan, Peru, and Singapore, publish the market-determined rates on their monetary authority’s website to promote information transparency. Foreign Exchange Markets The devel opment of foreign exchange markets continued during 2016 and through June 2017, as countries responded to the challenges in domestic and international markets. Changes in the structure and operation of members’ foreign exchange markets are summarized in Table 6. There were 91 changes on the foreign exchange markets reported by member countries, of which easing measures (39) were almost twice those of tightening ones (20). Table 6. Foreign Exchange Market Structure, 2014–17 (Number of IMF members as of April 30)1 2014 2015 2016 2017 Spot exchange market 188 189 189 189 Operated by the central bank 118 118 119 118 Foreign exchange standing facility 75 74 72 71 Allocation 27 27 27 27 Auction 32 35 38 38 Fixing 6655 Interbank market 161 162 170 171 Over the counter 127 132 137 138 Brokerage 50 50 51 51 Market making 75 74 73 72 Forward exchange market 127 131 139 140 Source: AREAER database. ¹ Includes 189 member countries and three territories: Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten (both in the Kingdom of the Netherlands), and Hong Kong SAR (China). ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution