structure of SPH is characterized by complex cross holdings, with three major groups of shareholders evident in the data. First, the Lee family controls a total of 47. 23% of votes through 4 companies. Second, the state holds a total of 27. 23% of votes through various intermediary institutions. Third, there are a number of minority shareholdings held in nominee accounts at widely held financial institutions. Ownership of nominee accounts is not disclosed. It is possible that they are owned by families or the state in which case our estimate of their control is conservative. We classify the Lee family as the ultimate owner of SPH. Yet by law, the government must approve the owners of management shares of SPH, and can require owners to sell shares. We say that sph is family owned and note that this is a conservative measure of the true influence of the state over SPh We use similar approaches in other cases of structural government influence of media firms In Saudi arabia, the government approves the appointment of editors-in-chief of newspapers, and also has the right to dismiss them. Although clearly this increases the influence of the state on press content, we apply a conservative definition of state ownership and classify these newspapers as family owned. In Malaysia, newspapers are required to renew their licenses annually. Editors of newspapers that publish critical views of government have been pressured to resign. In this environment, self-censorship becomes the norm. In all these instances, we nonetheless rely on ownership in constructing our measures, thus underestimating state influence State subsidies and state advertisement revenues enable governments to influence media content. Such subsidies are common in transition and African countries. In Cameroon for 9 In particular, Raffles Nominees Pre Ltd holds 7.74% in SPH, 10. 11% in Overseas Union Bank Ltd, and 19.44% in United Overseas Bank Ltd. GSBC Nominees Pte Ltd controls 3.98% of SPH, 5.88% of the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation, 3. 42%of Overseas Union Bank, and 4.31% of United Overseas Bank. Finally, Citibank Nominees Ltd controls 1.63% of SPH, 3.82% of the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation, 4.08% of Overseas Union Bank, and 2.77% of United Overseas Bank 10 Report of United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and the Protection of the right to Freedom of Opinion nd Expression, mission to Malaysia, 23 December 1998 13
13 structure of SPH is characterized by complex cross holdings, with three major groups of shareholders evident in the data. First, the Lee family controls a total of 47.23% of votes through 4 companies. Second, the state holds a total of 27.23% of votes through various intermediary institutions. Third, there are a number of minority shareholdings held in nominee accounts at widely held financial institutions.9 Ownership of nominee accounts is not disclosed. It is possible that they are owned by families or the state, in which case our estimate of their control is conservative. We classify the Lee family as the ultimate owner of SPH. Yet by law, the government must approve the owners of management shares of SPH, and can require owners to sell shares. We say that SPH is family owned, and note that this is a conservative measure of the true influence of the state over SPH. We use similar approaches in other cases of structural government influence of media firms. In Saudi Arabia, the government approves the appointment of editors-in-chief of newspapers, and also has the right to dismiss them. Although clearly this increases the influence of the state on press content, we apply a conservative definition of state ownership and classify these newspapers as family owned. In Malaysia, newspapers are required to renew their licenses annually. Editors of newspapers that publish critical views of government have been pressured to resign.10 In this environment, self-censorship becomes the norm. In all these instances, we nonetheless rely on ownership in constructing our measures, thus underestimating state influence. State subsidies and state advertisement revenues enable governments to influence media content. Such subsidies are common in transition and African countries. In Cameroon, for 9 In particular, Raffles Nominees Pre Ltd holds 7.74% in SPH, 10.11% in Overseas Union Bank Ltd, and 19.44% in United Overseas Bank Ltd. GSBC Nominees Pte Ltd controls 3.98% of SPH, 5.88% of the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation, 3.42% of Overseas Union Bank, and 4.31% of United Overseas Bank. Finally, Citibank Nominees Ltd controls 1.63% of SPH, 3.82% of the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation, 4.08% of Overseas Union Bank, and 2.77% of United Overseas Bank. 10 Report of United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and the Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, mission to Malaysia, 23 December 1998
example, the state refused to advertise in privately owned press after critical coverage of government. Defamation laws also influence content by repressing investigative journalism Direct regulations of content may interact with ownership. The North Korean Constitution states that the role of the press is to "serve the aims of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, bolstering the political unity and ideological conformity of the people and rallying them solidly behind the Party and the great Leader in the cause of revolution. In the Netherlands, the content of public service programming must be at least 25% news, 20% culture and 5% education. Italy requires that 50% of broadcasting be of European origin. Because of these extensive regulations, our ownership classification is a conservative estimate of the true influence of the state over content Variable construction We construct two ownership variables from these data. First, we compute the percentage of firms in each category -state or private. For example, two out of the top five newspaper enterprises in the Philippines are classified as state owned, as are three out of the top five television stations. We record Philippine newspaper market ownership as 40% state owned when measured by count, and television market ownership as 60% when measured by count. Second we weight the ownership variable by market share. In the Philippines, the two state owned newspapers account for 22. 2% and 2 1.3% of circulation for the top 5 newspapers respectively, so the newspapers are 43.5% state owned when measured by market share. In television, the three state owned Philippine stations account for only 17. 5% of the share of viewing for the top 5 television stations, so the television market is 17.5% state owned as measured by market share The market share variables, while more precise as a metric of state control, have the
14 example, the state refused to advertise in privately owned press after critical coverage of government. Defamation laws also influence content by repressing investigative journalism. Direct regulations of content may interact with ownership. The North Korean Constitution states that the role of the press is to “serve the aims of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, bolstering the political unity and ideological conformity of the people and rallying them solidly behind the Party and the Great Leader in the cause of revolution.”11 In the Netherlands, the content of public service programming must be at least 25% news, 20% culture, and 5% education. Italy requires that 50% of broadcasting be of European origin. Because of these extensive regulations, our ownership classification is a conservative estimate of the true influence of the state over content. Variable Construction We construct two ownership variables from these data. First, we compute the percentage of firms in each category – state or private. For example, two out of the top five newspaper enterprises in the Philippines are classified as state owned, as are three out of the top five television stations. We record Philippine newspaper market ownership as 40% state owned when measured by count, and television market ownership as 60% when measured by count. Second, we weight the ownership variable by market share. In the Philippines, the two state owned newspapers account for 22.2% and 21.3% of circulation for the top 5 newspapers respectively, so the newspapers are 43.5% state owned when measured by market share. In television, the three state owned Philippine stations account for only 17.5% of the share of viewing for the top 5 television stations, so the television market is 17.5% state owned as measured by market share. The market share variables, while more precise as a metric of state control, have the
disadvantage that, in the countries with regional newspapers, such as the United States, the market share of any single firm is small. As a consequence, the variables we define are not properly compared to those in countries with national newspapers. This criticism, of course, is less compelling for television firms, which are typically national. The regressions presented below use market share variables, but our results are virtually identical using the counts For the radio market, we create a dummy equal to l if the top radio station is state owned and o otherw Il. Patterns in Media Ownership Descriptive statistics Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the ownership of newspaper and television markets in 97 countries. Countries are organized first by region and then sorted in alphabetical order. Several patterns emerge from the data Our first significant finding is that families and the state own the media throughout the world(Figure 4). In the sample of 97 countries, only 4% of media enterprises are widely held Less than 2% have other ownership structures, and a mere 2% are employee owned. On average, family controlled newspapers account for 57% of the total, and family controlled television stations for 34% of the total. State ownership is also vast. On average, the state controls approximately 29% of newspapers and 60% of television stations. The state owns a huge share 72%-of the top radio stations. Based on these findings, for the remaining analysis we classify ownership into 3 categories: state, private(which is the sum of family, widely held and employee categories), and other The nearly total absence of firms with dispersed ownership in the media industry is 111975, Article 53 Chapter 4 of the Constitution
15 disadvantage that, in the countries with regional newspapers, such as the United States, the market share of any single firm is small. As a consequence, the variables we define are not properly compared to those in countries with national newspapers. This criticism, of course, is less compelling for television firms, which are typically national. The regressions presented below use market share variables, but our results are virtually identical using the counts. For the radio market, we create a dummy equal to 1 if the top radio station is state owned, and 0 otherwise. III. Patterns in Media Ownership Descriptive Statistics Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the ownership of newspaper and television markets in 97 countries. Countries are organized first by region and then sorted in alphabetical order. Several patterns emerge from the data. Our first significant finding is that families and the state own the media throughout the world (Figure 4). In the sample of 97 countries, only 4% of media enterprises are widely held. Less than 2% have other ownership structures, and a mere 2% are employee owned. On average, family controlled newspapers account for 57% of the total, and family controlled television stations for 34% of the total. State ownership is also vast. On average, the state controls approximately 29% of newspapers and 60% of television stations. The state owns a huge share – 72% - of the top radio stations. Based on these findings, for the remaining analysis we classify ownership into 3 categories: state, private (which is the sum of family, widely held and employee categories), and other. The nearly total absence of firms with dispersed ownership in the media industry is 11 1975, Article 53 Chapter 4 of the Constitution