Thesis Scope Game Theoretic formulation Cryptographic Routing Protocol Non-cooperative Monetary Incentive Scheme Game Model Key Management Scheme Security Selfishness Part lll Issues Issues Intrusion Detection Reputation System Incentive scheme Cooperative Game Model Part I Trusted Routing Part i Protocol 6 May 29, 2009 CSE CUHK
6 May 29, 2009 CSE CUHK Thesis Scope Selfishness Issues Security Issues Game Theoretic Formulation Cooperative Game Model Monetary Incentive Scheme Non-cooperative Game Model Trusted Routing Protocol Key Management Scheme Intrusion Detection System Cryptographic Routing Protocol Reputation Incentive Scheme Cooperative Game Model Part I Part III Part II
Objectives and Assumptions ◆ Objectives a Aself-organized, cost-effective, trusted routing protocol a Coalitional game models with security and throughput characteristic functions a An incentive routing scheme with a stable coalitional game solution ◆ Assumptions: Watchdog mechanism or an intrusion detection system in each node Pre-distributed cryptographic scheme as an assistance EXisting payment method 7 May 29, 2009 CSE CUHK
7 May 29, 2009 CSE CUHK Objectives and Assumptions ◆ Objectives: ◼ A self-organized, cost-effective, trusted routing protocol ◼ Coalitional game models with security and throughput characteristic functions ◼ An incentive routing scheme with a stable coalitional game solution ◆ Assumptions: ◼ Watchdog mechanism or an intrusion detection system in each node ◼ Pre-distributed cryptographic scheme as an assistance ◼ Existing payment method
Part f Trusted Routing Protocol for Security Issues of MANET
Part I: Trusted Routing Protocol for Security Issues of MANET
Related work and motivations Two categories of security solutions u Secure routing protocols a Key management mechanisms Most of the two categories of solutions require u a trusted authority to issue certificates aA centralized server to monitor the networks A secret association between certain nodes Cryptographic authentication at each routing packet Disadvantages a Destroy the self-organization nature of manet Introduce huge performance overhead Single point of failure Less of efficiency and availability 9 May 29, 2009 CSE CUHK
9 May 29, 2009 CSE CUHK Related Work and Motivations ◆ Two categories of security solutions ◼ Secure routing protocols ◼ Key management mechanisms ◆ Most of the two categories of solutions require: ◼ A trusted authority to issue certificates ◼ A centralized server to monitor the networks ◼ A secret association between certain nodes ◼ Cryptographic authentication at each routing packet ◆ Disadvantages ◼ Destroy the self-organization nature of MANET ◼ Introduce huge performance overhead ◼ Single point of failure ◼ Less of efficiency and availability
Contributions of part We for the first time, introduce the idea of trust and trust model" into the design of secure routing protocols for MANET o We novelly derive our trust model based on subjective logic which can fully represent the properties of the trust relationships in MANET. We design a trusted routing protocol (TAODV) based on our trust model which is both secure and cost effective o We also enhance the subjective logic to obtain a better trust evaluation 10 May 29, 2009 CSE CUHK
10 May 29, 2009 CSE CUHK Contributions of Part I ◆ We, for the first time, introduce the idea of “trust” and “trust model” into the design of secure routing protocols for MANET. ◆ We novelly derive our trust model based on subjective logic which can fully represent the properties of the trust relationships in MANET. ◆ We design a trusted routing protocol (TAODV) based on our trust model, which is both secure and cost effective. ◆ We also enhance the subjective logic to obtain a better trust evaluation