political themes. Chapter Two, Orientalist Structures and Re-structures, "attempts to trace the development of dem Oriental-ism by a broadly chronological description, and also by the description of a set of devices common to the work of important poets, artists, and scholars. Chapter Three, Orientalism Now, "begins where its predecessor left off, at around 1870. This is the period of great colonial expansion into the Orient, and it culminates in World War IL. The very last section of Chapter Three characterizes the shift from British and French to American hegemony; I attempt there finally to sketch the present intellectual and social realities of Orientalism in the United States 3. The personal dimension. In the Prison Notebooks gramsci says:"The starting- point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is knowing thyself as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory. The only available English translation inexplicably leaves Gramscis comment at that, whereas in fact Mn,s Italian text concludes by adding, "therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory Much of the personal investment in this study derives from my awareness of being an "Oriental"as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of my education, in those colonies(Palestine and Egypt) and in the United States, has been Western, and yet that deep early awareness has persisted. In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination ha been so powerful a factor in the life of all Orientals This is why for me the (26) Islamic Orient has had to be the center of attention. Whether what I have achieved is the inventory prescribed is not for me to judge, although I have felt it important to be conscious of trying to produce one. along the way d as rationally as I have been able, I have tried to maintain a critical consciousness, as well as empl instruments of historical, humanistic, and cultural research of which my education has made me the fortunate beneficiary In none of that, however, have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement in having been constituted as, "an Oriental. The historical circumstances making such a study possible are fairly complex, and I can only list them schematically ere. Anyone resident in the West since the 1950s, particularly in the United States, will have lived through ra of xtraordinary turbulence in the relations of East and West. No one will have failed to note how"East"has al ways signified anger and threat during this period, even as it has meant the traditional Orient as well as Russia. In the universities a growing establishment of area-studies programs and institutes has made the scholarly study of the Orient a branch of national policy. Public affairs in this country include a healthy interest in the Orient, as much for its strategic and economic portance as for its traditional exoticism. If the world has become immediately accessible to a Western citizen living in the electronic age, the Orient too has drawn nearer to him, and is now less a myth perhaps than a place crisscrossed by Western, specially American, interests One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the medias resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds. So far as the Orient is concerned, standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of he nineteenth-century academic and imaginative demonology of"the mysterious Orient. This is nowhere more true than in yeays by which the Near East is grasped. Three things have contributed to making even the simplest perception of the rabs and islam into a highly politicized, almost raucous matter: one, the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic rejudice in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism, two, the struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism, and its effects upon American Jews as well as upon both the liberal culture and the population at large, three. the almost total absence of any cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or
political themes. Chapter Two, "Orientalist Structures and Re-structures," attempts to trace the development of modem Oriental-ism by a broadly chronological description, and also by the description of a set of devices common to the work of important poets, artists, and scholars. Chapter Three, "Orientalism Now," begins where its predecessor left off, at around 1870. This is the period of great colonial expansion into the Orient, and it culminates in World War II. The very last section of Chapter Three characterizes the shift from British and French to American hegemony; I attempt there finally to sketch the present intellectual and social realities of Orientalism in the United States. 3. The personal dimension. In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci says: "The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is `knowing thyself' as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory." The only available English translation inexplicably leaves Gramsci's comment at that, whereas in fact Gramsci's Italian text concludes by adding, "therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.'" Much of the personal investment in this study derives from my awareness of being an "Oriental" as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of my education, in those colonies (Palestine and Egypt) and in the United States, has been Western, and yet that deep early awareness has persisted. In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life of all Orientals. This is why for me the ((26)) Islamic Orient has had to be the center of attention. Whether what I have achieved is the inventory prescribed by Gramsci is not for me to judge, although I have felt it important to be conscious of trying to produce one. Along the way, as severely and as rationally as I have been able, I have tried to maintain a critical consciousness, as well as employing those instruments of historical, humanistic, and cultural research of which my education has made me the fortunate beneficiary. In none of that, however, have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement in having been constituted as, "an Oriental." The historical circumstances making such a study possible are fairly complex, and I can only list them schematically here. Anyone resident in the West since the 1950s, particularly in the United States, will have lived through an era of extraordinary turbulence in the relations of East and West. No one will have failed to note how "East" has always signified danger and threat during this period, even as it has meant the traditional Orient as well as Russia. In the universities a growing establishment of area-studies programs and institutes has made the scholarly study of the Orient a branch of national policy. Public affairs in this country include a healthy interest in the Orient, as much for its strategic and economic importance as for its traditional exoticism. If the world has become immediately accessible to a Western citizen living in the electronic age, the Orient too has drawn nearer to him, and is now less a myth perhaps than a place crisscrossed by Western, especially American, interests. One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media's resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds. So far as the Orient is concerned, standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the nineteenth-century academic and imaginative demonology of "the mysterious Orient." This is nowhere more true than in theays by which the Near East is grasped. Three things have contributed to making even the simplest perception of the Arabs and Islam into a highly politicized, almost raucous matter: one, the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism; two, the struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism, and its effects upon American Jews as well as upon both the liberal culture and the population at large; three, the almost ((27)) total absence of any cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or
Islam. Furthermore it eeds saying that because the Middle East is now so identified with great Power politics, oil economics. and the sim ded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs. the chances of like a clear view of what one talks about in talking about the Near East are depressingly My own experiences of these matters are in part what made me write this book. The life of an Arab Palestinian in the ding in the Arab or the Muslim is very stron which every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny. It has made matters worse for him to remark that no person academic-ally involved with the Near East--no Orientalist, that is-has ever in the United States culturally and politically identified himself wholeheartedly with the Arabs; certainly there have been identifications on some level, but they have never taken an" acceptable"form as has liberal American identification with Zionism, and all too frequently they have been radically flawed by their association either with discredited political and economic interests(oil-company and State Department Arabists, for example)or with religion The nexus of knowledge and power creating "the Oriental"and in a sense obliterating him as a human being is therefore not for me an exclusively academic matter. Yet it is an intellectual matter of some very obvious importance. I have been able to put to use my humanistic and political concerns for the analysis and description of a very worldly matter, the rise, development, and consolidation of Orientalism. Too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even I hope will convince my literary colleagues) that society and literary culture can only be understood and studied together. In addition, and by an almost inescapable logic, I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as i have discussed (28) it in its Islamic branch. o and political truth that eds only to be mentioned to an arab But what I should like also to have contributed here is a better understanding of the way has operated. If this stimulates a new kind of dealing with the Orient, indeed if it elimina ient"and Occident"altogether then we shall have advanced a little in the process of what Raymond williams has called theunlearning"of the inherent dominative mode?
Islam. Furthermore, it hardly needs saying that because the Middle East is now so identified with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the simple-minded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs, the chances of anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking about the Near East are depressingly small. My own experiences of these matters are in part what made me write this book. The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly in America, is disheartening. There exists here an almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist, and when it is allowed that he does, it is either as a nuisance or as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny. It has made matters worse for him to remark that no person academic-ally involved with the Near East— no Orientalist, that is— has ever in the United States culturally and politically identified himself wholeheartedly with the Arabs; certainly there have been identifications on some level, but they have never taken an "acceptable" form as has liberal American identification with Zionism, and all too frequently they have been radically flawed by their association either with discredited political and economic interests (oil-company and State Department Arabists, for example) or with religion. The nexus of knowledge and power creating "the Oriental" and in a sense obliterating him as a human being is therefore not for me an exclusively academic matter. Yet it is an intellectual matter of some very obvious importance. I have been able to put to use my humanistic and political concerns for the analysis and description of a very worldly matter, the rise, development, and consolidation of Orientalism. Too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent; it has regularly seemed otherwise to me, and certainly my study of Orientalism has convinced me (and I hope will convince my literary colleagues) that society and literary culture can only be understood and studied together. In addition, and by an almost inescapable logic, I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as I have discussed ((28)) it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism resemble each other very closely is a historical, cultural, and political truth that needs only to be mentioned to an Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood. But what I should like also to have contributed here is a better understanding of the way cultural domination has operated. If this stimulates a new kind of dealing with the Orient, indeed if it eliminates the "Orient" and "Occident" altogether, then we shall have advanced a little in the process of what Raymond Williams has called the "unlearning" of "the inherent dominative mode?
(31) Chapter 1. a The Scope of orientalism . le genie unquiet et ambitieux de Europeens. impatient d'employer les nouveaux instruments de leur puissance Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, Fri/ace historique(1809), Description de l'Egypte i Knowing the Oriental On June 13, 1910, Arthur James Balfour lectured the House of Commons on"the problems with which we have to deal in Egypt. " These, he said, " belong to a wholly different category"than those"affecting the Isle of Wight or the West Riding of Yorkshire. He spoke with the authority of a long-time member of Parliament, former private secretary to Lord Salisbury, former chief secretary for Ireland, former secretary for Scotland, former prime minister veteran of numerous overseas crises, achievements, and changes. During his involvement in imperial affairs Balfour served a monarch who in 1876 had been declared Empress of India; he had been especially well placed in positions of uncommon influence to follow the Afghan and Zulu wars, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the death of General Gordon in the Sudan, the Fashoda Incident, the battle of Omdurman, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War. In addition his remarkable social eminence, the breadth of his learning and wit-he could write on such varied subjects as Bergson, Handel, theism, and golf--his education at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, and his apparent command over im-perial affairs all gave considerable authority to what he told the Commons in June 1910. But there was still more to Balfour's speech, or at least to his need for giving it so didactically and moral- istically. Some members were questioning the necessity for"Eng-land in Egypt, "the subject of Alfred MiIner's enthusiastic book of 1892, but here designating a once-profitable occupation that had become a source of trouble now that Egyptian nationalism was on the rise and the continuing British presence in Egypt no longer so easy to defend. Balfour, then, to inform and explain. Recalling the challenge of ]. M. Robertson, the member of Tyneside, Balfour himself put Robertson's question again:"What right have you to take up these airs of superiority with regard to people whom you choose to call Oriental? "The choice of " Oriental"was canonical; it had been employed by Chaucer and Mandeville, by Shakespeare, Dryden, Pope, and Byron. It designated Asia or the East, geographically, morally, culturally. One could
((31)) Chapter 1. The Scope of Orientalism ... le genie inquiet et ambitieux de Europeens ... impatient d'employer les nouveaux instruments de leur puissance .. . — Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, Fri/ace historique (1809), Description de I'Egypte I Knowing the Oriental On June 13, 1910, Arthur James Balfour lectured the House of Commons on "the problems with which we have to deal in Egypt." These, he said, "belong to a wholly different category" than those "affecting the Isle of Wight or the West Riding of Yorkshire." He spoke with the authority of a long-time member of Parliament, former private secretary to Lord Salisbury, former chief secretary for Ireland, former secretary for Scotland, former prime minister, veteran of numerous overseas crises, achievements, and changes. During his involvement in imperial affairs Balfour served a monarch who in 1876 had been declared Empress of India; he had been especially well placed in positions of uncommon influence to follow the Afghan and Zulu wars, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the death of General Gordon in the Sudan, the Fashoda Incident, the battle of Omdurman, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War. In addition his remarkable social eminence, the breadth of his learning and wit— he could write on such varied subjects as Bergson, Handel, theism, and golf— his education at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, and his apparent command over im-perial affairs all gave considerable authority to what he told the Commons in June 1910. But there was still more to Balfour's speech, or at least to his need for giving it so didactically and moralistically. Some members were questioning the necessity for "Eng-land in Egypt," the subject of Alfred Milner's enthusiastic book of 1892, but here designating a once-profitable occupation that had become a source of trouble now that Egyptian nationalism was on the rise and the continuing British presence in Egypt no longer so easy to defend. Balfour, then, to inform and explain. Recalling the challenge of J. M. Robertson, the member of Tyneside, Balfour himself put Robertson's question again: "What right have you to take up these airs of superiority with regard to people whom you choose to call Oriental?" The choice of "Oriental" was canonical; it had been employed by Chaucer and Mandeville, by Shakespeare, Dryden, Pope, and Byron. It designated Asia or the East, geographically, morally, culturally. One could
speak in Europe of an Oriental personality, an Oriental (32) atmosphere, an Oriental tale, Oriental despotism, or an Oriental mode of production, and be understood. Marx had used the word, and now Balfour was using it; his choice was understandable and called for no comment whatever. take up no attitude of superiority. But I ask [Robertson and anyone else., who has even the most superficial knowledge of history, if they will look in the face the facts with which a British statesman has to deal when he is put in a position of supremacy over great races like the inhabitants of Egypt and co the east We know the civilization of egypt better than we know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately, we know more about it. It goes far beyond the petty span of the history of our race, which is lost in the prehistoric period at a time when the Egyptian civilisation had already passed its prime. Look at all the Oriental Two great themes dominate his remarks here and in what will follow: knowledge and power, the Baconian themes. As Balfour justifies the necessity for British occupation of Egypt, supremacy in his mind is associated with"our"knowledge of Egypt and not principally with military or economic power. Knowledge to Balfour means surveying a civilization from its origins to its prime to its decline-and of course, it means being able to do that. Knowledge means rising above immediacy beyond self, into the foreign and distant. The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is a fact"which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it And authority here means for"us"to deny autonomy to it -the Oriental country-since we know it and it exists, in a sense as we know it. British knowledge of Egypt is Egypt for Balfour, and the burdens of knowledge make such questions as inferiority and superiority seem petty ones. Balfour no-where denies British superiority and Egyptian inferiority; he takes nem for granted as he describes the consequences of knowledge First of all, look at the facts of the case. Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities for self-government iving merits of their own... You may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self- (3) government. All their great centuries-and they have been very great-have been passed under despotisms inder absolute govern-ment. All their great contributions to civilisation-and they have been great- made under that form of government. Conqueror has succeeded conqueror; one domination ha another; but never in all the revolutions of fate and fortune have you seen one of those nations of its establish what we, from a Western point of view, call self-government. That is the fact. It is not a superiority and inferiority. I suppose a true Eastern sage would say that the working government wh taken upon ourselves in Egypt and elsewhere is not a work worthy of a philosopher--that it is the dirty work, the inferior work, of carrying on the necessary labour. Since these facts are facts, Balfour must then go on to the next part of his argument Is it a good thing for these great nations-l admit their greatness -that this exercised by us?I think it is a good thing. I think that experience shows that government than in the whole history of the world they ever had before, and wl but is undoubtedly a benefit to the whole of the civilised west. We are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the
speak in Europe of an Oriental personality, an Oriental ((32)) atmosphere, an Oriental tale, Oriental despotism, or an Oriental mode of production, and be understood. Marx had used the word, and now Balfour was using it; his choice was understandable and called for no comment whatever. I take up no attitude of superiority. But I ask [Robertson and anyone else] . . . who has even the most superficial knowledge of history, if they will look in the face the facts with which a British statesman has to deal when he is put in a position of supremacy over great races like the inhabitants of Egypt and countries in the East. We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it. It goes far beyond the petty span of the history of our race, which is lost in the prehistoric period at a time when the Egyptian civilisation had already passed its prime. Look at all the Oriental countries. Do not talk about superiority or inferiority. Two great themes dominate his remarks here and in what will follow: knowledge and power, the Baconian themes. As Balfour justifies the necessity for British occupation of Egypt, supremacy in his mind is associated with "our" knowledge of Egypt and not principally with military or economic power. Knowledge to Balfour means surveying a civilization from its origins to its prime to its decline— and of course, it means being able to do that. Knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant. The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is a "fact" which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for "us" to deny autonomy to " it" — the Oriental country— since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it. British knowledge of Egypt is Egypt for Balfour, and the burdens of knowledge make such questions as inferiority and superiority seem petty ones. Balfour no-where denies British superiority and Egyptian inferiority; he takes them for granted as he describes the consequences of knowledge. First of all, look at the facts of the case. Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities for self-government . . . having merits of their own. . . . You may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self- ((33)) government. All their great centuries— and they have been very great— have been passed under despotisms, under absolute govern-ment. All their great contributions to civilisation— and they have been great— have been made under that form of government. Conqueror has succeeded conqueror; one domination has followed another; but never in all the revolutions of fate and fortune have you seen one of those nations of its own motion establish what we, from a Western point of view, call self-government. That is the fact. It is not a question of superiority and inferiority. I suppose a true Eastern sage would say that the working government which we have taken upon ourselves in Egypt and elsewhere is not a work worthy of a philosopher— that it is the dirty work, the inferior work, of carrying on the necessary labour. Since these facts are facts, Balfour must then go on to the next part of his argument. Is it a good thing for these great nations— I admit their greatness — that this absolute government should be exercised by us? I think it is a good thing. I think that experience shows that they have got under it far better government than in the whole history of the world they ever had before, and which not only is a benefit to them, but is undoubtedly a benefit to the whole of the civilised West.... We are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the
Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large. the good that is being done them by colonial occupation. It does not occur to Balfour, however, to let the egrnend Balfour produces no evidence that egyptians and"the races with whom we deal "appreciate or even unders speak for himself, since presumably any Egyptian who would speak out is more likely to be"the agitator who wishes to raise difficulties"than the good native who overlooks the difficulties"of foreign domination. And so, having settled the ethical problems, Balfour turns at last to the practical ones. " If it is our business to govern, with or without gratitude with or without the real and genuine memory of all the loss of which we have relieved the population [Balfour by no means implies, as part of that loss, the loss or at least the indefinite postponement of egyptian independence and no vivid imagination of all the benefits which we have given to them; if that is our duty, how is it to be performed: England exports our very best to these countries. "These selfless administrators do their work amidst tens of thousands of persons belonging to a different creed, a differ- (34) ent race, a different discipline, different conditions of life. "What makes their work of governing possible is their sense of being sup-ported at home by a government that endorses what they do. Yet directly the native populations have that instinctive feeling that those with whom they have got to deal have not behind them the might, the authority, the sympathy, the full and ungrudging sup-port of the country which sent them there, those populations lose all that sense of order which is the very basis of their civilisation, just as our officers lose all that sense of power and authority, which is the very basis of everything they can do for the benefit of those among whom they have been sent Balfour's logic here is interesting, not least for being completely consistent with the premises of his entire speech England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes the very basis"of contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, British occupation. But if the special intimacy between governor and governed in Egypt is disturbed by Parliament's doubts at home, then"the authority of what... is the dominant race-and as I think ought to remain the dominant race--has been under-mined. Not only does English prestige suffer; "it is vain for a handful of British officials--endow them how you like, give them all the qualities of character and genius you can imagine--it is impossible for them to carry out the great task which in Egypt, not we only, but the civilised world have imposed upon them. As a rhetorical performance Balfour's speech is significant for the way in which he plays the part of, and represents, a variety of characters. There are of course"the English, "for whom the pro-noun"we"is used with the full weight of a distinguished, powerful man who feels himself to be representative of all that is best in his nation's history. Balfour can also speak for the civilized world, the West, and the relatively small corps of colonial officials in Egypt. If he does not speak directly for the Orientals, it is because they after all speak another language; yet he knows how they feel since he knows their history, their reliance upon such as he, and their expectati Still, he does speak for them in the sense that what they might have to say, were they to be asked and mi they be able to answer, would somewhat uselessly confirm what is already evident: that they are a subject race, dominated by a race that knows them and what is good for them better than hey could possibly know themselves. Their great moments were in the past; they are useful in the modern world only because the powerful and up-to-date empires have effectively brought them out of the wretchedness of their decline and turned them into rehabilitated residents of productive colonies. Egypt in particular was an excellent case in point, and Balfour was perfectly aware of how much right he had to ak as a member of his countrys parliament on behalf of England, the West, Western civilization, about modern Egypt. For Egypt was not just another colony: it was the vindication of Western imperialism; it was, until its annexation by England, an almost academic example of Oriental backwardness; it was to become the triumph of
Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large. Balfour produces no evidence that Egyptians and "the races with whom we deal" appreciate or even understand the good that is being done them by colonial occupation. It does not occur to Balfour, however, to let the Egyptian speak for himself, since presumably any Egyptian who would speak out is more likely to be "the agitator [who] wishes to raise difficulties" than the good native who overlooks the "difficulties" of foreign domination. And so, having settled the ethical problems, Balfour turns at last to the practical ones. "If it is our business to govern, with or without gratitude, with or without the real and genuine memory of all the loss of which we have relieved the population [Balfour by no means implies, as part of that loss, the loss or at least the indefinite postponement of Egyptian independence] and no vivid imagination of all the benefits which we have given to them; if that is our duty, how is it to be performed?" England exports "our very best to these countries." These selfless administrators do their work "amidst tens of thousands of persons belonging to a different creed, a differ- ((34)) ent race, a different discipline, different conditions of life." What makes their work of governing possible is their sense of being sup-ported at home by a government that endorses what they do. Yet directly the native populations have that instinctive feeling that those with whom they have got to deal have not behind them the might, the authority, the sympathy, the full and ungrudging sup-port of the country which sent them there, those populations lose all that sense of order which is the very basis of their civilisation, just as our officers lose all that sense of power and authority, which is the very basis of everything they can do for the benefit of those among whom they have been sent. Balfour's logic here is interesting, not least for being completely consistent with the premises of his entire speech. England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes "the very basis" of contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, British occupation. But if the special intimacy between governor and governed in Egypt is disturbed by Parliament's doubts at home, then "the authority of what . . . is the dominant race— and as I think ought to remain the dominant race— has been under-mined." Not only does English prestige suffer; "it is vain for a handful of British officials— endow them how you like, give them all the qualities of character and genius you can imagine— it is impossible for them to carry out the great task which in Egypt, not we only, but the civilised world have imposed upon them."' As a rhetorical performance Balfour's speech is significant for the way in which he plays the part of, and represents, a variety of characters. There are of course "the English," for whom the pro-noun "we" is used with the full weight of a distinguished, powerful man who feels himself to be representative of all that is best in his nation's history. Balfour can also speak for the civilized world, the West, and the relatively small corps of colonial officials in Egypt. If he does not speak directly for the Orientals, it is because they after all speak another language; yet he knows how they feel since he knows their history, their reliance upon such as he, and their expectations. Still, he does speak for them in the sense that what they might have to say, were they to be asked and might they be able to answer, would somewhat uselessly confirm what is already ((35)) evident: that they are a subject race, dominated by a race that knows them and what is good for them better than they could possibly know themselves. Their great moments were in the past; they are useful in the modern world only because the powerful and up-to-date empires have effectively brought them out of the wretchedness of their decline and turned them into rehabilitated residents of productive colonies. Egypt in particular was an excellent case in point, and Balfour was perfectly aware of how much right he had to speak as a member of his country's parliament on behalf of England, the West, Western civilization, about modern Egypt. For Egypt was not just another colony: it was the vindication of Western imperialism; it was, until its annexation by England, an almost academic example of Oriental backwardness; it was to become the triumph of