The Market for Corporate Law 第七组： 车心怡 PART I,PARTIN 刘玉涛 PART III 李天虹PARTIV 627r20 azienka cesdwe
Page 1 第七组： 车心怡 PART I, PART II 刘玉涛 PART III 李天虹 PART IV
PART I An Interest-Group Analysis of Delaware Corporate Law 车心怡 Page 2
Page 2 车心怡
The Economic Theory of Regulation legal rules: Welcome to demanded and supplied as DELAWARE commodities demanders: SMALL WONDER individuals:insufficient THE FIRST STATE incentives Home of Tax-Free Shopping interest-groups:strong Buckle Up,It's The Law! incentives suppliers: legislatures (judiciaries) 0 the contours of a given law: a competitive equilibrium Page 3
Page 3 • legal rules: demanded and supplied as commodities • demanders: individuals: insufficient incentives interest-groups: strong incentives • suppliers: legislatures (judiciaries) • the contours of a given law: a competitive equilibrium
Contentions the behavior of legislatures: highly responsive to pressures from organized political groups the Delaware judiciary: 1.Professor Cary: extremely responsive to the interests of the Delaware bar 2.Jonatha R.Macey Geoffrey P.Miller: partially responsive to interest-group pressures safeguards: split the judicial appointments among political parties,e.g.appointment and removal of judges Page 4
Page 4 • the behavior of legislatures: • highly responsive to pressures from organized political groups • the Delaware judiciary: 1. Professor Cary: • extremely responsive to the interests of the Delaware bar 2. Jonatha R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller： • partially responsive to interest-group pressures • safeguards: • split the judicial appointments among political parties, e.g. appointment and removal of judges
Q:Does an independent judiciary increase the costs of interest-group legislation? legislature:ex ante,establish procedural rules that make repeal difficult Special interest legislation needs independent enforcement mechanism. exception:a subsequent legislative enactment overruling the decision interest-group the independent judiciary activities facilitate interpreted as the original bargain impede not interpreted as the original bargain Page 5
Page 5 Q: Does an independent judiciary increase the costs of interest-group legislation? • legislature: ex ante, establish procedural rules that make repeal difficult • Special interest legislation needs independent enforcement mechanism. • exception: a subsequent legislative enactment overruling the decision interest-group activities the independent judiciary facilitate interpreted as the original bargain impede not interpreted as the original bargain