BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 457 of the story.It finally offers some reflections on the implications of the Korean case for our general understanding of international crises. BEIJING AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR New materials coming out of China complicate and marginally clarify our picture of Beijing's role in the origins of the Korean War and its response to the first months of the fighting.They do not set directly in doubt the older impression that the actual outbreak of the war found the Chinese leadership preoccupied with reconstructing the economy,carrying out land reform in newly liberated areas,and in general consolidating the revolution at home.16 There are now,however,some hints that Beijing knew that the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had some military initiative afoot.Several accounts claim that Mao and Stalin discussed the Korean question during their summit meeting in Moscow (December 1949-February 1950)and that Mao exchanged views with Kim during a later meeting in Beijing.7 Whatever may have been said on these occasions,it is clear that Beijing and Pyongyang worked together in the year before the war to repatriate Korean troops who had fought in the Chinese civil war.Those troops had marched into the Northeast with the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army at the end of the Pacific War carrying orders to organize Korean residents of the Northeast and to help the Soviet army in the liberation of Korea.18 In fall 1949 China and North Korea reached an agreement on the return of two divisions of those troops in the Fourth Field Army.While in Moscow in January 1950 Mao received Kim Il Sung's request for the return of additional Korean nationals in the Fourth Field Army;and during the spring, after some additional discussions with the North Koreans,Nie Rongzhen,then acting chief of staff,effected the return of 14,000 with their weapons and equip- ment.Estimates of the total number of troops sent back to Korea by the eve of the war run around 50-70,000 and by the fall exceed 100,000.19 16 The"liberation"of Taiwan was somewhere on the agenda,but (to judge from the evidence now available)an invasion attempt was not imminent because the Communists lacked the requisite naval and air forces.Nie,Nie Rongzhen huiyilu 3:7 Jon W.Huebner,"The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan,"China Quarterly 110 (June 1987):256-75,which surveys U.S.and Nationalist intelligence estimates;and Xu Yan,Jinmen zhi zhan (1949-1959 nian)[The battle for Jinmen (1949-1959)] (Beijing:Zhongguo guangbo dianshi,1992),116-25,142-44,which describes the long-term planning for an invasion and reports that by 11 August 1950 the Military Affairs Committee had decided to put off any decision to 1952 in order to focus on Korea. 17Hao and Zhai,"China's Decision,"100,claim on the basis of"interviews"that Kim Il Sung visited China in April on his way back from Moscow and revealed his intention to unify Korea by force but not the details of his plans. isZhongyang dang'anguan,comp.,Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (hereafter ZYWJ)[A selection of CCP central committee documents],inner-party circulation,14 vols.(Beijing:Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao,1982-87),13:121. Nie,Nie Rongzhen huiyilu,3:744 (which does not reveal if the North Korean requests carried any hints of the uses to which the troops would be put);Bruce Cumings,The Origins of the Korean
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 457 of the story. It finally offers some reflections on the implications of the Korean case for our general understanding of international crises. BEIJING AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR New materials coming out of China complicate and marginally clarify our picture of Beijing's role in the origins of the Korean War and its response to the first months of the fighting. They do not set directly in doubt the older impression that the actual outbreak of the war found the Chinese leadership preoccupied with reconstructing the economy, carrying out land reform in newly liberated areas, and in general consolidating the revolution at home.'6 There are now, however, some hints that Beijing knew that the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had some military initiative afoot. Several accounts claim that Mao and Stalin discussed the Korean question during their summit meeting in Moscow (December 1949-February 1950) and that Mao exchanged views with Kim during a later meeting in Beijing.'7 Whatever may have been said on these occasions, it is clear that Beijing and Pyongyang worked together in the year before the war to repatriate Korean troops who had fought in the Chinese civil war. Those troops had marched into the Northeast with the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army at the end of the Pacific War carrying orders to organize Korean residents of the Northeast and to help the Soviet army in the liberation of Korea.'8 In fall 1949 China and North Korea reached an agreement on the return of two divisions of those troops in the Fourth Field Army. While in Moscow in January 1950 Mao received Kim Il Sung's request for the return of additional Korean nationals in the Fourth Field Army; and during the spring, after some additional discussions with the North Koreans, Nie Rongzhen, then acting chief of staff, effected the return of 14,000 with their weapons and equipment. Estimates of the total number of troops sent back to Korea by the eve of the war run around 50-70,000 and by the fall exceed 1I0,000.'9 16 The "liberation" of Taiwan was somewhere on the agenda, but (to judge from the evidence now available) an invasion attempt was not imminent because the Communists lacked the requisite naval and air forces. Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu 3: 719; Jon W. Huebner, "The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan," China Quarterly 110 (June 1987): 256-75, which surveys U.S. and Nationalist intelligence estimates; and Xu Yan, Jinmen zhi zhan (1949-1959 nian) [The battle for Jinmen (1949-1959)] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi, 1992), 116-25, 142-44, which describes the long-term planning for an invasion and reports that by 11 August 1950 the Military Affairs Committee had decided to put off any decision to 1952 in order to focus on Korea. 17 Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision," 100, claim on the basis of "interviews" that Kim I1 Sung visited China in April on his way back from Moscow and revealed his intention to unify Korea by force but not the details of his plans. 18 Zhongyang dang'anguan, comp., Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (hereafter ZYWJ) [A selection of CCP central committee documents], inner-party circulation, 14 vols. (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1982-87), 13: 121. '9 Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, 3:744 (which does not reveal if the North Korean requests carried any hints of the uses to which the troops would be put); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean
458 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY On 25 June 1950,North Korean forces launched an invasion of South Korea, setting off a string of unpleasant surprises for Beijing.The first of these came on 27 June when President Harry S.Truman announced that the United States would not only defend South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations but also "neutralize"the Taiwan Strait by sending the Seventh Fleet to block any communist invasion attempt.Beijing's earliest public response to the American intervention,published on 28 and 29 June,was notably cautious and vague. While deploring American intervention around the world and especially in Asia, Mao,Premier Zhou Enlai,and a Renmin ribao editorial all nonetheless focused their public fire on the American attempt to deny China control of its province of Taiwan.20 But the Chinese Communist Party(CCP)began almost at once to prepare against untoward developments in Korea.On 30 June Zhou ordered Chinese military observers to North Korea.On 7 and 10 July the Military Affairs Com- mittee met,and in sessions chaired by Zhou and attended by the army command- er-in-chief,Zhu De,and Nie Rongzhen recommended creating a force to defend the border and if necessary cross the Yalu River to help North Korea.Mao at once endorsed the proposal.By early August more than a quarter of a million troops were assembled along the Yalu with Gao Gang,in charge of party and military affairs in the Northeast,bearing responsibility for logistical support. Even so,Beijing's alarm,reflected in public warnings directed against the advance of the United Nations forces,continued to mount.On 5 August Mao personally instructed Gao Gang to have the border forces ready for combat by early Sep- tember.Told by Gao of the difficulties in completing the preparations,Mao agreed on 18 August to extend the deadline to the end of the month.On 17 September,in the immediate aftermath of the successful American landing at Inchon,the Military Affairs Committee dispatched Chinese officers to Korea to lay the groundwork for possible intervention.21 China's growing alarm,reenforced by Soviet and Korean calls for assistance, gave rise to efforts to coordinate policy among the three countries,so at least the War,vol.2:The Roaring of the Cataract,1947-1950(Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press, 1990),362-63;Chen,"The Sino-Soviet Alliance,"13n,22-23. 20 Michael M.Kau and John K.Leung,The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976(Armonk,NY: M.E.Sharpe,1986-),1:118;ZhongHua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi,comps.,Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1990),18-19;and Renmin ribao,29 June 1950. 21 Chai and Zhao Banmendian tanpan,34-36;Zhang Xi,"Peng Dehuai shouming shuaishuai kangMei yuanChao de qianqian houhou"[The full story of Peng Dehuai's appointment to head the resistance to the United States and the assistance to Korea],Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 31(1989):118- 20;Jianguo yilai,1:429,454,469;Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,46-47,51.Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Reflections on some major incidents and decisions] (Beijing:Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao,1991),43,recalls a Political Bureau meeting on 4 August at which Mao contended that China had to help Korea by sending troops,that preparations for their dispatch had to begin at once,and that only the timing of the intervention was a matter for discussion. Bo's account needs confirmation
458 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces launched an invasion of South Korea, setting off a string of unpleasant surprises for Beijing. The first of these came on 27 June when President Harry S. Truman announced that the United States would not only defend South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations but also "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait by sending the Seventh Fleet to block any communist invasion attempt. Beijing's earliest public response to the American intervention, published on 28 and 29 June, was notably cautious and vague. While deploring American intervention around the world and especially in Asia, Mao, Premier Zhou Enlai, and a Renmin ribao editorial all nonetheless focused their public fire on the American attempt to deny China control of its province of Taiwan.20 But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began almost at once to prepare against untoward developments in Korea. On 30 June Zhou ordered Chinese military observers to North Korea. On 7 and 10 July the Military Affairs Committee met, and in sessions chaired by Zhou and attended by the army commander-in-chief, Zhu De, and Nie Rongzhen recommended creating a force to defend the border and if necessary cross the Yalu River to help North Korea. Mao at once endorsed the proposal. By early August more than a quarter of a million troops were assembled along the Yalu with Gao Gang, in charge of party and military affairs in the Northeast, bearing responsibility for logistical support. Even so, Beijing's alarm, reflected in public warnings directed against the advance of the United Nations forces, continued to mount. On 5 August Mao personally instructed Gao Gang to have the border forces ready for combat by early September. Told by Gao of the difficulties in completing the preparations, Mao agreed on 18 August to extend the deadline to the end of the month. On 17 September, in the immediate aftermath of the successful American landing at Inchon, the Military Affairs Committee dispatched Chinese officers to Korea to lay the groundwork for possible intervention.2' China's growing alarm, reenforced by Soviet and Korean calls for assistance, gave rise to efforts to coordinate policy among the three countries, so at least the War, vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 362-63; Chen, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance," 13n, 22-23. 20 Michael M. Kau and John K. Leung, The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986- ), 1: 118; ZhongHua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), 18-19; and Renmin ribao, 29 June 1950. 21 Chai and Zhao Banmendian tanpan, 34-36; Zhang Xi, "Peng Dehuai shouming shuaishuai kangMei yuanChao de qianqian houhou" [The full story of Peng Dehuai's appointment to head the resistance to the United States and the assistance to Korea], Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 31 (1989): 118- 20; Jianguo yilai, 1: 429, 454, 469; Chai and Zhao, KangMei yuanChao jishi, 46-47, 51. Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Reflections on some major incidents and decisions] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1991), 43, recalls a Political Bureau meeting on 4 August at which Mao contended that China had to help Korea by sending troops, that preparations for their dispatch had to begin at once, and that only the timing of the intervention was a matter for discussion. Bo's account needs confirmation
BEUJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 459 new secondary accounts suggest.While some older accounts contend that regular, high-level consultations among the three began in early July,22 the new evidence points to a later date-after the Inchon landing and General Douglas MacAr- thur's rapid push north created panic in Pyongyang and alarm in Beijing and Moscow.These contacts quickly moved to the highest level,bringing the Chinese fully into inner councils of the war.In late September Stalin raised with Beijing the possibility of Kim Il Sung setting up a government in exile in China,and on 1 October with South Korean forces crossing the thirty-eighth parallel Kim personally followed up with a desperate request for China's help in the war.23 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC)had to scramble to create working relations with Kim's regime.A Chinese embassy was hastily set up in early July, nearly a year after diplomatic recognition.The post-Inchon alarm brought the Koreans and Chinese into increasingly frequent military contact.On 8 October Kim sent a liaison to the headquarters of the Chinese forces gathering in the Northeast,and on 4 December,as a result of a Kim-Mao meeting in Beijing,a joint Chinese-Korean command was set up under Peng Dehuai,the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea.At several critical points in the tumultuous first year of the war,Kim Il Sung travelled to Beijing.These visits in early December 1950,late January 1951,and early June 1951 served to coordinate war strategy and to iron out practical difficulties such as friction between the Chinese "volun- teers"and Koreans,differences over policy on the release of prisoners,and inadequate North Korean logistical support.24 THE DECISION TO INTERVENE The new materials offer some new insights on the decisions that led China to intervene militarily in the conflict.These materials,which include a substantial body of documents,reveal Mao's dominant role.Not surprisingly,however, given the complexity of the man,the rapidly developing crisis confronting him, and the size of the stakes for the CCP,those materials raise fresh,knotty ques- tions about precisely when and exactly why Mao resolved to act. To clarify the issue of timing it is useful to think of Mao moving along two sometimes intersecting tracks toward a definitive commitment of his forces. 22 Drawing on a 1968 study by Huang Chenxia,Jurgen Domes,P'eng Te-huai(Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press,1985),60,points to Sino-Soviet military meeting in Beijing in August and the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet general staff in Shenyang in September. 2 Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,55;Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"123;Xu,Diyici jiaoliang,22;for what purports to be the text of Kim's I October appeal for help,see Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian:KangMei yuanChao lishi jishi [Sending troops to Korea:A historical record of the resistance to America and assistance to Korea](Beijing:Beijing shiyue wenyi,1990),39-40. 24 Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,47,50,55,58,61-62,64,65,68,74,76,78,86; Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"143;Jianguo yilai,1:545,2:43-44;Mao junshi wenxuan,685; Qi Dexue,Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu [Inside story of the Korean war decisions](Shenyang: Liaoning daxue,1991),184-85;Du,Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu,127,165,176-77,185
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 459 new secondary accounts suggest. While some older accounts contend that regular, high-level consultations among the three began in early July,22 the new evidence points to a later date - after the Inchon landing and General Douglas MacArthur's rapid push north created panic in Pyongyang and alarm in Beijing and Moscow. These contacts quickly moved to the highest level, bringing the Chinese fully into inner councils of the war. In late September Stalin raised with Beijing the possibility of Kim Il Sung setting up a government in exile in China, and on 1 October with South Korean forces crossing the thirty-eighth parallel Kim personally followed up with a desperate request for China's help in the war.23 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) had to scramble to create working relations with Kim's regime. A Chinese embassy was hastily set up in early July, nearly a year after diplomatic recognition. The post-Inchon alarm brought the Koreans and Chinese into increasingly frequent military contact. On 8 October Kim sent a liaison to the headquarters of the Chinese forces gathering in the Northeast, and on 4 December, as a result of a Kim-Mao meeting in Beijing, a joint Chinese-Korean command was set up under Peng Dehuai, the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea. At several critical points in the tumultuous first year of the war, Kim Il Sung travelled to Beijing. These visits in early December 1950, late January 1951, and early June 1951 served to coordinate war strategy and to iron out practical difficulties such as friction between the Chinese "volunteers" and Koreans, differences over policy on the release of prisoners, and inadequate North Korean logistical support.24 THE DECISION TO INTERVENE The new materials offer some new insights on the decisions that led China to intervene militarily in the conflict. These materials, which include a substantial body of documents, reveal Mao's dominant role. Not surprisingly, however, given the complexity of the man, the rapidly developing crisis confronting him, and the size of the stakes for the CCP, those materials raise fresh, knotty questions about precisely when and exactly why Mao resolved to act. To clarify the issue of timing it is useful to think of Mao moving along two sometimes intersecting tracks toward a definitive commitment of his forces. 22 Drawing on a 1968 study by Huang Chenxia, Jurgen Domes, P'eng Te-huai (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), 60, points to Sino-Soviet military meeting in Beijing in August and the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet general staff in Shenyang in September. 23 Chai and Zhao, KangMeiyuanChao jishi, 55; Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 123; Xu, Diyici jiaoliang, 22; for what purports to be the text of Kim's 1 October appeal for help, see Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian: KangMei yuanChao lishijishi [Sending troops to Korea: A historical record of the resistance to America and assistance to Korea] (Beijing: Beijing shiyue wenyi, 1990), 39-40. 24 Chai and Zhao, KangMei yuanChao jishi, 47, 50, 55, 58, 61-62, 64, 65, 68, 74, 76, 78, 86; Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 143; Jianguo yilai, 1: 545, 2: 43-44; Mao junshi wenxuan, 685; Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu [Inside story of the Korean war decisions] (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue, 1991), 184-85; Du, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, 127, 165, 176-77, 185
460 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Suspiciously,little of either track is evident before Kim's appeal for help on 1 October,even though we know that Mao began to take a hold of strategic plan- ning two months earlier. One of those tracks led to Moscow.Having announced to his colleagues his own view that China should intervene,Mao on 2 October cabled his decision to Stalin.Chinese troops would enter Korea on 15 October,Mao announced,and there they would assume a defensive posture,letting the enemy forces know that they faced a new situation.Once better prepared and equipped with Soviet arms, those troops could if need be take the offensive.Aside from equipment,Mao wanted from Stalin help in fending off possible American naval and air attacks on Chinese cities and industry.Thus,while indicating that China was ready to shoulder the main burden of saving North Korea,Mao also sought to ensure practical military cooperation from a Soviet leader known for his caution and now perhaps growing reluctant to be drawn directly into a protracted or escalating conflict.25 In any case,on 8 October Mao followed up by sending Zhou Enlai to meet with Stalin on Chinese intervention.Zhou,accompanied by Lin Biao (seeking Soviet medical treatment)and perhaps by Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang,travelled to Sochi on the Black Sea for a meeting with Stalin that lasted through the night of 9-10 October.Stalin revealed that he would not provide the air cover Chinese forces operating in Korea would desperately need.The Soviet air force,he ex- plained,needed more time for preparation before being engaged even in the defense of Chinese airspace.Zhou returned to Moscow to cable Mao this disap- pointing news but also to pass on assurances that the Soviets would immediately begin supplying weaponry for twenty Chinese divisions.26 While dealing with Stalin,Mao moved along the second track defined by a string of high-level meetings devoted to discussing the grave crisis facing the new regime.The existing record suggests that Mao's proposal for decisive action elicited doubts that he was not able to dispel either quickly or easily,and indeed that he himself seems at points to have fallen prey to uncertainties.Indeed,as early as 2 October in his cable to Stalin,Mao had identified one set of risks: attacking Chinese troops might fail to destroy American forces in Korea and become entangled in a Sino-American military stand-off that would bring serious collateral damage to China's economic reconstruction and that would deepen the discontent of the Chinese already unsettled by revolution.Mao's colleagues who 25 Mao cable to Stalin,2 October 1950 in Jianguo yilai,1:539-41. 26 Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"147-48.Shi Zhe,who accompanied Zhou as translator,has offered a detailed description of the trip that is often not congruent with other sources and thus has to be used with care.See Shi Zhe with Li Haiwen,Zai lishijuren shenbian:She Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of history:Shi Zhe's memoir](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1991),495-502.For alternative accounts,see Hong,KangMei yuanChao,25-27;and Qi,Chaoxian zhanzheng,62-63(for the recol- lections of Kang Yimin,another member of Zhou's party).For details on the ensuing Soviet aid program that included air support in Korea beginning in January 1951,see Xu,Diyici jigoliang,30- 32;and Hong,KangMei yuanChao,184
460 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Suspiciously, little of either track is evident before Kim's appeal for help on 1 October, even though we know that Mao began to take a hold of strategic planning two months earlier. One of those tracks led to Moscow. Having announced to his colleagues his own view that China should intervene, Mao on 2 October cabled his decision to Stalin. Chinese troops would enter Korea on 15 October, Mao announced, and there they would assume a defensive posture, letting the enemy forces know that they faced a new situation. Once better prepared and equipped with Soviet arms, those troops could if need be take the offensive. Aside from equipment, Mao wanted from Stalin help in fending off possible American naval and air attacks on Chinese cities and industry. Thus, while indicating that China was ready to shoulder the main burden of saving North Korea, Mao also sought to ensure practical military cooperation from a Soviet leader known for his caution and now perhaps growing reluctanto be drawn directly into a protracted or escalating conflict.25 In any case, on 8 October Mao followed up by sending Zhou Enlai to meet with Stalin on Chinese intervention. Zhou, accompanied by Lin Biao (seeking Soviet medical treatment) and perhaps by Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, travelled to Sochi on the Black Sea for a meeting with Stalin that lasted through the night of 9-10 October. Stalin revealed that he would not provide the air cover Chinese forces operating in Korea would desperately need. The Soviet air force, he explained, needed more time for preparation before being engaged even in the defense of Chinese airspace. Zhou returned to Moscow to cable Mao this disappointing news but also to pass on assurances that the Soviets would immediately begin supplying weaponry for twenty Chinese divisions.26 While dealing with Stalin, Mao moved along the second track defined by a string of high-level meetings devoted to discussing the grave crisis facing the new regime. The existing record suggests that Mao's proposal for decisive action elicited doubts that he was not able to dispel either quickly or easily, and indeed that he himself seems at points to have fallen prey to uncertainties. Indeed, as early as 2 October in his cable to Stalin, Mao had identified one set of risks: attacking Chinese troops might fail to destroy American forces in Korea and become entangled in a Sino-American military stand-off that would bring serious collateral damage to China's economic reconstruction and that would deepen the discontent of the Chinese already unsettled by revolution. Mao's colleagues who 25 Mao cable to Stalin, 2 October 1950 in Jianguo yilai, 1: 539-41. 26 Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 147-48. Shi Zhe, who accompanied Zhou as translator, has offered a detailed description of the trip that is often not congruent with other sources and thus has to be used with care. See Shi Zhe with Li Haiwen, Zai lishi juren shenbian: She Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of history: Shi Zhe's memoir] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991), 495-502. For alternative accounts, see Hong, KangMeiyuanChao, 25-27; and Qi, Chaoxian zhanzheng, 62-63 (for the recollections of Kang Yimin, another member of Zhou's party). For details on the ensuing Soviet aid program that included air support in Korea beginning in January 1951, see Xu, Diyici jiaoliang, 30- 32; and Hong, KangMeiyuanChao, 184