A great deal of administration goes about incognito to most of the world,being confounded now with political"management"and again with constitutional principle. Perhaps thisease of confusion may explain such utterances as that of Niebuhr's:"Liberty," he says."depends incomparably more upon administration than upon constitution.At first sight this appears to be largely true Apparently facility in the actual exercise of liberty does depend more upon administrative arrangements than upon constitutional guarantees,although constitutional cre of berty.But-uponscnd thought-is even much as this true?Liberty no more consists in easy functional movement than intelligence consists in the ease and vigor with which the limbs of a strong man move.The principles that rule within the man,the constitutionare the vital springs of libertyr servitude.Because independence and subjectionare without lightened by every paterna government,they are not thereby transformed into liberty.Liberty cannot live apart from constitutional principle,and no administration,however perfect and liberal its methods,can give A clear view of the difference between the province of constitutional law and the province of administrative function ought to leave no room for misconception,and it is possible to name some roughly definite riteria upon which such a view can be built Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law.Every particular application of general law is an act of administration.The assessment and raising of taxes,for instance,the hanging of a criminal,the transportation and delivery of the mails,the equipment and recruiting of the army and navy,erc. are all obviously acts of administration but the general laws which direct these things to be don are as obviously outside of and above administration.The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative:the detailedxtion of such plans is administrative.Constitutions,therefore. properlyo themselves ony with those instrumentities of government which are to conro general law.Our federal constitution observes this principle in saying nothing of even the greatest of the purely executive offices,and speaking only of that President of the Union who was to share the legislative and policy-making functions of government,only of those judges of highest jurisdiction who were to interpret and guard its principles,and not of those who were merely to give utterance to them This is not quite the distinction between Will and answering Deed,because the administrator 2
21 A great deal of administration goes about incognito to most of the world, being confounded now with political "management," and again with constitutional principle. Perhaps this ease of confusion may explain such utterances as that of Niebuhr’s: "Liberty," he says, "depends incomparably more upon administration than upon constitution." At first sight this appears to be largely true. Apparently facility in the actual exercise of liberty does depend more upon administrative arrangements than upon constitutional guarantees; although constitutional guarantees alone secure the existence of liberty. But-upon second thought-is even so much as this true? Liberty no more consists in easy functional movement than intelligence consists in the ease and vigor with which the limbs of a strong man move. The principles that rule within the man, or the constitution, are the vital springs of liberty or servitude. Because independence and subjection are without chains, are lightened by every easy-working device of considerate, paternal government, they are not thereby transformed into liberty. Liberty cannot live apart from constitutional principle; and no administration, however perfect and liberal its methods, can give men more than a poor counterfeit of liberty if it rest upon illiberal principles of government. A clear view of the difference between the province of constitutional law and the province of administrative function ought to leave no room for misconception; and it is possible to name some roughly definite criteria upon which such a view can be built. Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law. Every particular application of general law is an act of administration. The assessment and raising of taxes, for instance, the hanging of a criminal, the transportation and delivery of the mails, the equipment and recruiting of the army and navy, etc., are all obviously acts of administration; but the general laws which direct these things to be done are as obviously outside of and above administration. The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative. Constitutions, therefore, properly concern themselves only with those instrumentalities of government which are to control general law. Our federal constitution observes this principle in saying nothing of even the greatest of the purely executive offices, and speaking only of that President of the Union who was to share the legislative and policy-making functions of government, only of those judges of highest jurisdiction who were to interpret and guard its principles, and not of those who were merely to give utterance to them. This is not quite the distinction between Will and answering Deed, because the administrator
should have and does have a will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work He is not and ought not to be a mere passive instrument.The distinction is between general plans and special means There is.indeed,one point at which administrative studies trench on constitutional ground-or at least upon what seems constitutional ground.The study of administration,philosophically viewed,is closely concted with the study of the proper distribution of constitutional authoriy To be efficient it must discover the simplest arrangements by which responsibility can be unmistakably fixed upon officials,the best way of dividing authority without hampering it,and responsibility without obscuring it.And this question of theistribution of authority,when taken into the sphere of the higher,the originating functions of is obviously constitutionl question.If administrative study can discover the best principles upon which to base such distribution,it will have done situtionastudy an invaluable service.Montesquieu did not Iam convinced,say the last word on this head. To discover the best principle for the distribution of authority is of greater importance. possibly,under a democratic system,where officials serve many masters,than under others where they serve but a few.All sovereigns are suspicious of their servants,and the sovereign people is no exception to the rule bu how is its suspicion to be allayed by?If that suspicior aided by the unmistakable placing of responsibility,it would be altogether beneficent.Suspicion in itself is never healthful either in the private or in the public mind.Trust isstrength in all relations of ie and,as it is the office of the toereate conditions of trustfuess,so it is the office of the to fit adminisration with condition of clear-cut responsibility which shall insure trustworthiness And let me say that large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions of responsibility.Public attention must be easily directed,in each case of good bad administration,tojust the man deserving of praise or blame There is no danger in power,if only it be not irresponsible.If it be divided,dealt out in shares to many,it is obscured;and if it be obscured.it is made irresponsible.But if it be centered in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the service,it is easily watched and brought to book.If to keep his office a man must achieve open and honest success,and if at the same time he feels himself entrusted with large 22
22 should have and does have a will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work. He is not and ought not to be a mere passive instrument. The distinction is between general plans and special means. There is, indeed, one point at which administrative studies trench on constitutional ground-or at least upon what seems constitutional ground. The study of administration, philosophically viewed, is closely connected with the study of the proper distribution of constitutional authority. To be efficient it must discover the simplest arrangements by which responsibility can be unmistakably fixed upon officials; the best way of dividing authority without hampering it, and responsibility without obscuring it. And this question of the distribution of authority, when taken into the sphere of the higher, the originating functions of government, it is obviously a central constitutional question. If administrative study can discover the best principles upon which to base such distribution, it will have done constitutional study an invaluable service. Montesquieu did not, I am convinced, say the last word on this head. To discover the best principle for the distribution of authority is of greater importance, possibly, under a democratic system, where officials serve many masters, than under others where they serve but a few. All sovereigns are suspicious of their servants, and the sovereign people is no exception to the rule; but how is its suspicion to be allayed by knowledge? If that suspicion could but be clarified into wise vigilance, it would be altogether salutary; if that vigilance could be aided by the unmistakable placing of responsibility, it would be altogether beneficent. Suspicion in itself is never healthful either in the private or in the public mind. Trust is strength in all relations of life; and, as it is the office of the constitutional reformer to create conditions of trustfulness, so it is the office of the administrative organizer to fit administration with conditions of clear-cut responsibility which shall insure trustworthiness. And let me say that large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions of responsibility. Public attention must be easily directed, in each case of good or bad administration, to just the man deserving of praise or blame. There is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible. If it be divided, dealt out in shares to many, it is obscured; and if it be obscured, it is made irresponsible. But if it be centered in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the service, it is easily watched and brought to book. If to keep his office a man must achieve open and honest success, and if at the same time he feels himself entrusted with large
freedom of discretion,the greater his power the less likely is he to abuse it the more is he nerved and sobered and elevated by it.The less his power,the more safely obscure and unnoticed does he feel his position to be.and the more readily does he relapse into remissness Just here we manifestly emerge upon the field of that still larger question.-the prope relations between publicopinion and administration. To whom is official trustworthiness to be disclosed,and by whom is it to be rewarded?Is the official to look to the public for his meed of praise and his push of to his superior in office?Are the people to be called in to sette administrative discipline as they are called in to sette constitutional principles?These questions evidently find their root in what is undoubtedly the fundamental problem of this whole study.That problem is:What part shall public opinion take in the conduct of administration? The right answer seems tobe,that public opinion shall play the part of authoritativecritic. But the method by which its authority shall be made to tell?Our peculiar American difficulty isot the anger ofosing iberty,but thedanger of beingable willing to separate its essentials from its accidents.Our success is made doubtful by that besetting error of ours,the error of trying to do too much by vote.Self-government does not consist in having a hand in everything any more than housekeeping consists necessarily in cooking dinner with one's own hands The cok must be trusted with a large discretion as to the management of the fires and the ovens. In those countries in which public opinion has yet to be instructed in its privileges,yet to be accustomed to having its own way.to the province of public opinion ismuch more ready soluble than in this country,where public opinion is wide awake and quite intent upon having its own way anyhow.It is pathetic to see a whole book written by a German professor of political sine for the purpose of saying to his counrymenPase trytohavean opinion abou nationl affairs"bu a public which is so modest may expected to be very docile and acquiescent in learning what things it has not a right to think and speak about imperatively.It may be sluggish,but it will not be meddlesome.It will submit to be instructed before it tries to instruct Its political education will come before its political activity.In trying to instruct our own public opinion we are dealing with a pupil apttothink itselfquite sufficiently instructed beforehand. The problem is to make public opinion efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome. 2
23 freedom of discretion, the greater his power the less likely is he to abuse it, the more is he nerved and sobered and elevated by it. The less his power, the more safely obscure and unnoticed does he feel his position to be, and the more readily does he relapse into remissness. Just here we manifestly emerge upon the field of that still larger question,-the proper relations between public opinion and administration. To whom is official trustworthiness to be disclosed, and by whom is it to be rewarded? Is the official to look to the public for his meed of praise and his push of promotion, or only to his superior in office? Are the people to be called in to settle administrative discipline as they are called in to settle constitutional principles? These questions evidently find their root in what is undoubtedly the fundamental problem of this whole study. That problem is: What part shall public opinion take in the conduct of administration? The right answer seems to be, that public opinion shall play the part of authoritative critic. But the method by which its authority shall be made to tell? Our peculiar American difficulty in organizing administration is not the danger of losing liberty, but the danger of not being able or willing to separate its essentials from its accidents. Our success is made doubtful by that besetting error of ours, the error of trying to do too much by vote. Self-government does not consist in having a hand in everything, any more than housekeeping consists necessarily in cooking dinner with one’s own hands. The cook must be trusted with a large discretion as to the management of the fires and the ovens. In those countries in which public opinion has yet to be instructed in its privileges, yet to be accustomed to having its own way, this question as to the province of public opinion is much more ready soluble than in this country, where public opinion is wide awake and quite intent upon having its own way anyhow. It is pathetic to see a whole book written by a German professor of political science for the purpose of saying to his countrymen, "Please try to have an opinion about national affairs"; but a public which is so modest may at least be expected to be very docile and acquiescent in learning what things it has not a right to think and speak about imperatively. It may be sluggish, but it will not be meddlesome. It will submit to be instructed before it tries to instruct. Its political education will come before its political activity. In trying to instruct our own public opinion, we are dealing with a pupil apt to think itself quite sufficiently instructed beforehand. The problem is to make public opinion efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome
Directly exercised,in the oversight of the daily details and in the choice of the daily means of govement.public criticism is of cousacumsyuisancea rustic handling delicate machinery. But as superintending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics and administration public criticism is altogether safe and beneficent altogether indispensab Let administrative study find the best means for giving public criticism this control and for shutting it out from all other interference. But is the whole duty of administrative study done when it has taught the people what sortof administration to desire and demand,and how to get what they demand?Ought it not to go on to drill candidates for the public service? There is an admirable movement towards niversal political education now afoot in this country.The time will soon come when no college of respectability can afford to do without a well-filled chair of political sciene.But the education thus imparted will go but acertain length It will multiply the number of intelligent critics of government.but it will create no component body of administrators It will prepare the way for the developme of the general principles of government,but it will not necessarily foster skill in conducting government.It is an education which will equip legislators,perhaps,but not executive officials.If we are to improve public opinion,which is the mive power of government,we must prepare better officials as the apprs of goverment.If we are to put in new boilers and to mend the fires which drive our governmental machinery.we must not leave the old wheels and joints and valves and bands to creak and buzz and clatter on as best they may at bidding of the new force We must put innew running parts wherever there is the least lack of wil be necessary to organize democracy by sending up to the competitive examinations for the civil service men definitely prepared for standing liberal tests as to technical knowledge.A technically schooled ivil service will presently have become indispensable I know that a corps of civil servants prepared by a special schooling and drilled,after appointmentintoaperfected organtion with approte hierarchy and characteristc discipne seems to a great many very thoughtful persons to contain elements which might combine to make an offensive official assa distinct,semi-corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of a progressive.firee-spirited people.and with hearts narrowed to the meanness of a bigoted officialism.Certainly such a class would be altogether hateful and harmful in the United States 24
24 Directly exercised, in the oversight of the daily details and in the choice of the daily means of government, public criticism is of course a clumsy nuisance, a rustic handling delicate machinery. But as superintending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics and administration, public criticism is altogether safe and beneficent, altogether indispensable. Let administrative study find the best means for giving public criticism this control and for shutting it out from all other interference. But is the whole duty of administrative study done when it has taught the people what sort of administration to desire and demand, and how to get what they demand? Ought it not to go on to drill candidates for the public service? There is an admirable movement towards universal political education now afoot in this country. The time will soon come when no college of respectability can afford to do without a well-filled chair of political science. But the education thus imparted will go but a certain length. It will multiply the number of intelligent critics of government, but it will create no component body of administrators. It will prepare the way for the development of a sure-footed understanding of the general principles of government, but it will not necessarily foster skill in conducting government. It is an education which will equip legislators, perhaps, but not executive officials. If we are to improve public opinion, which is the motive power of government, we must prepare better officials as the apparatus of government. If we are to put in new boilers and to mend the fires which drive our governmental machinery, we must not leave the old wheels and joints and valves and bands to creak and buzz and clatter on as best they may at bidding of the new force. We must put in new running parts wherever there is the least lack of strength or adjustment. It will be necessary to organize democracy by sending up to the competitive examinations for the civil service men definitely prepared for standing liberal tests as to technical knowledge. A technically schooled civil service will presently have become indispensable. I know that a corps of civil servants prepared by a special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline, seems to a great many very thoughtful persons to contain elements which might combine to make an offensive official class,- a distinct, semi-corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of a progressive, free-spirited people, and with hearts narrowed to the meanness of a bigoted officialism. Certainly such a class would be altogether hateful and harmful in the United States
Any measure calculated to produce it would for us be measures of reaction and of folly But to fear the creation of a domineering illiberal officialism as a result of the studies I am here proposing is to miss altogether the principle upon which I wish most to insist.That principle is,that administration in the United States must be aall points sensitive to public opinion.A body of thoroughly trained officials serving during good behavior we must have in any case:that is a plain business necessity.But the apprehension that such a body will be anything unAmerican clears away the moment it is asked.What is to constitute good behavior?For that question obviously carries its own answer on its face.Steady,hearty allegiance to the policy of the government they serve will constitute good behavior.That poliy will have no taint of officialism about it.t will not be the creation of permanent officials,bu of statesmen whose responsibility to be direct and inevitable.Bureaucracy can exist ony where the of the state is removed from thecmmo political life of the people,its chiefs as well as its rank and file.Its motives,its objects,its policy,its standards.must be bureaucratic.It would be difficult topoint out any examples of impudent xclusiveness and arbitrarines on the part of officials doing service under a chief of department who really served the people,as all our chiefs of departments must be made to do.It would be easy,on the other hand,to adduce other instances like that of the influence of Stein in Prussia,where the leadership of one statesman imbued with true public spirit transformed arrogant and perfunctory bureauxinto public-spirited instruments of just government. The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor.and yetso intimately concted with the popular thought,by means of elections and constant public to find arbitrariness of elass spirit quiteou of the question Having thus viewed in some sort the subject-matter and the objects of this study of administration,what are we to conclude as to the methods best suited to it-the points of viewmos advantageous for it? Government is so near us,so much a thing of our daily familiar handling that we can with difficulty se the need of any philosophical study of itor the exact points of such study.should be undertaken.We have been on our feet too long to study now the at of walking.We are a practica people,made so apt,so adept in self-government by centuries of experimental drill that we are 25
25 Any measure calculated to produce it would for us be measures of reaction and of folly. But to fear the creation of a domineering, illiberal officialism as a result of the studies I am here proposing is to miss altogether the principle upon which I wish most to insist. That principle is, that administration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to public opinion. A body of thoroughly trained officials serving during good behavior we must have in any case: that is a plain business necessity. But the apprehension that such a body will be anything un-American clears away the moment it is asked. What is to constitute good behavior? For that question obviously carries its own answer on its face. Steady, hearty allegiance to the policy of the government they serve will constitute good behavior. That policy will have no taint of officialism about it. It will not be the creation of permanent officials, but of statesmen whose responsibility to public opinion will be direct and inevitable. Bureaucracy can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the common political life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rank and file. Its motives, its objects, its policy, its standards, must be bureaucratic. It would be difficult to point out any examples of impudent exclusiveness and arbitrariness on the part of officials doing service under a chief of department who really served the people, as all our chiefs of departments must be made to do. It would be easy, on the other hand, to adduce other instances like that of the influence of Stein in Prussia, where the leadership of one statesman imbued with true public spirit transformed arrogant and perfunctory bureaux into public-spirited instruments of just government. The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of elections and constant public counsel, as to find arbitrariness of class spirit quite out of the question. III. Having thus viewed in some sort the subject-matter and the objects of this study of administration, what are we to conclude as to the methods best suited to it-the points of view most advantageous for it? Government is so near us, so much a thing of our daily familiar handling, that we can with difficulty see the need of any philosophical study of it, or the exact points of such study, should be undertaken. We have been on our feet too long to study now the art of walking. We are a practical people, made so apt, so adept in self-government by centuries of experimental drill that we are