established only by the unlimited authority of a despot.The system of the year VIlI was ruthlessly thorough and heartlessly perfect.It was,besides,in large part,a return to the despotism that had been overthrown. Among those nations.on the other hand,which entered upon a season of constitution-making and popular reform before administration had received the impress of liberal principle, administrative improvement has been tardy and half-done.Once a nation has embarked in the business of manufacturing it finds it exceedingly difficult tocloseout that business and open for the public a bureau of skilled,economical administration.There seems to be no end to the tinkering of constitutions.Your ordinary constitution will last you hardly ten years without Here,of examples are England and our own country.In the days of the Angevin kings,before constitutional life had taken root in the Great Charter,legal and administrative reforms began to proceed with sense and vigor under the impulse of Henry Il's shrewd busy pushing.indomitable spirit and purpos and kingy in England,as elsewhere.to shape governmental growth at its will.But impulsive,errant Richard and weak. despicable John were not the men to carry out such schemes as their father's.Administrative development gave place in their reigns to constitutional struggles,and Parliament became king beforeany English monarch had had the practical genius just and lasting forms for the civil service of the state. The English race,consequently,has long and successfully studied the art of curbing executive power to the constant neglect ofthe art of perfecting executive methods.It has exercis itselfmuch more in cnroling than in energizing government.It has been more concerned to render government just and moderate than to make it facile,well-ordered,and effective.English and American political history has been a history,not of administrative development,but of egislative oversightnot of progress in govermental oranization,but of advance in aw-making and political criticism.Consequenty,we have reached a time when administrative study and creation are imperatively necessary to the well-being ofour goverments saddled with the habits of a long period of constitution-making.That period has practically closed.so far as the establishment of essential principles is conrd,but we cannot shake off its atmosphere.We go on criticizing when we ought to be creating We have reached the third of the periods I have 16
16 established only by the unlimited authority of a despot. The system of the year VIII was ruthlessly thorough and heartlessly perfect. It was, besides, in large part, a return to the despotism that had been overthrown. Among those nations, on the other hand, which entered upon a season of constitution-making and popular reform before administration had received the impress of liberal principle, administrative improvement has been tardy and half-done. Once a nation has embarked in the business of manufacturing constitutions, it finds it exceedingly difficult to close out that business and open for the public a bureau of skilled, economical administration. There seems to be no end to the tinkering of constitutions. Your ordinary constitution will last you hardly ten years without repairs or additions; and the time for administrative detail comes late. Here, of course, our examples are England and our own country. In the days of the Angevin kings, before constitutional life had taken root in the Great Charter, legal and administrative reforms began to proceed with sense and vigor under the impulse of Henry II’s shrewd, busy, pushing, indomitable spirit and purpose; and kingly initiative seemed destined in England, as elsewhere, to shape governmental growth at its will. But impulsive, errant Richard and weak, despicable John were not the men to carry out such schemes as their father’s. Administrative development gave place in their reigns to constitutional struggles; and Parliament became king before any English monarch had had the practical genius or the enlightened conscience to devise just and lasting forms for the civil service of the state. The English race, consequently, has long and successfully studied the art of curbing executive power to the constant neglect of the art of perfecting executive methods. It has exercised itself much more in controlling than in energizing government. It has been more concerned to render government just and moderate than to make it facile, well-ordered, and effective. English and American political history has been a history, not of administrative development, but of legislative oversight,-not of progress in governmental organization, but of advance in law-making and political criticism. Consequently, we have reached a time when administrative study and creation are imperatively necessary to the well-being of our governments saddled with the habits of a long period of constitution-making. That period has practically closed, so far as the establishment of essential principles is concerned, but we cannot shake off its atmosphere. We go on criticizing when we ought to be creating. We have reached the third of the periods I have
mentioned,-the period,namely,when the people have to develop administration in accordance with the constitutions they won for themselves in a previous period of struggle with absolute power,but we are not prepared for the tasks of the new period. Such an explanation seems to afford the ony escape from blank astonishment at the fact that. in spite of our vast advantages in point of political liberty,and above all in point of practical political skill and sagacity,so many nations are ahead of us in administrative organization and administrative skill.Why.for instance.have we but jus begun purifyinga civil srvice which was rotten full fifty years ago?To say that slavery diverted us is but to repeat what I have said-that flaws in our constitution delayed us. Of course all reasonable preference would declare for this English and American course of politics rather than for that of any European country.We should not like to have had Prussia's history for the sake of having Prussia's administrative skill:and Prussia's particular system of administration would quite suffocate us.It is better to be untrained and free than to be servile and systematic.Still there is no denying that it would be better yet to be both free in spirit and proficient in practice.I is this even more reasonable preference which impels us to discover what there may be to hinder or delay us in naturalizing this much-to-be-desired science of administration. What,then,is there toprevent? Well principally,popular sovereignty.It is harder for democracy to ganize administration than for monarchy.The very completeness of our most cherished political successes in the past embarrases us.We it is forbidden us to hope during itsreign for any quick schooling of the sovereign in executive expertness or in the conditions of perfect functional balance in government.The very fact that we have realized popular rule in its fullness has made the task of orning that rule just so much the more difficult.In order to make any advance at all we must instruct and persuade a multitudinous monarch called public opinion-a much less feasible undertaking than to influence a single monarch called a king An individual sovereign will adopt a simple plan and camy it out directly:he will have but one opinion,and he will embody that one opinion in one command.But this other sovereign,the people.will have a score of differing opinions They can agree upon nothing simple:advance must be made through compromise,by a compounding of differences,by a trimming of plans and a suppression of too 17
17 mentioned,-the period, namely, when the people have to develop administration in accordance with the constitutions they won for themselves in a previous period of struggle with absolute power; but we are not prepared for the tasks of the new period. Such an explanation seems to afford the only escape from blank astonishment at the fact that, in spite of our vast advantages in point of political liberty, and above all in point of practical political skill and sagacity, so many nations are ahead of us in administrative organization and administrative skill. Why, for instance, have we but just begun purifying a civil service which was rotten full fifty years ago? To say that slavery diverted us is but to repeat what I have said-that flaws in our constitution delayed us. Of course all reasonable preference would declare for this English and American course of politics rather than for that of any European country. We should not like to have had Prussia’s history for the sake of having Prussia’s administrative skill; and Prussia’s particular system of administration would quite suffocate us. It is better to be untrained and free than to be servile and systematic. Still there is no denying that it would be better yet to be both free in spirit and proficient in practice. It is this even more reasonable preference which impels us to discover what there may be to hinder or delay us in naturalizing this much-to-be-desired science of administration. What, then, is there to prevent? Well, principally, popular sovereignty. It is harder for democracy to organize administration than for monarchy. The very completeness of our most cherished political successes in the past embarrasses us. We have enthroned public opinion; and it is forbidden us to hope during its reign for any quick schooling of the sovereign in executive expertness or in the conditions of perfect functional balance in government. The very fact that we have realized popular rule in its fullness has made the task of organizaing that rule just so much the more difficult. In order to make any advance at all we must instruct and persuade a multitudinous monarch called public opinion,-a much less feasible undertaking than to influence a single monarch called a king. An individual sovereign will adopt a simple plan and carry it out directly: he will have but one opinion, and he will embody that one opinion in one command. But this other sovereign, the people, will have a score of differing opinions. They can agree upon nothing simple: advance must be made through compromise, by a compounding of differences, by a trimming of plans and a suppression of too
straightforward principles.There will be a succession of resolves running through a course of years,a dropping fire of commands running through the whole gamut of modifications. In government,as in virtue,the hardest of things is to make progress.Formerly the reason for this was that the single person who was sovereign was generally either selfish,ignorant,timid or a fool-albeit there was now and again one who was wise.Nowadays the reason is that the many the people.who are sovereign have no single ear which one can approach,and are selfish,ignorant. timid,stubborn,or foolish with the selfishness,the ignorances,the stubbornnesses,the timidities, or the follies of several thousand persons,-albeit there are hundreds who are wise.Once the advantage of the reformer was that the sovereign's mind had a definite locality,that it was contained inone man's head,and that it gotten at;though it was his disadvantage that the mind leared only reluctantlyony in small quantities,was under the influence of some one who let it learn only the wrong things.Now,on the contrary,the reformer is bewildered by the fact that the sovereign's mind has no definite locality,but is contained in a voting majority of several million heads,and embarrassed by the fact that the mind of this sovereign also is under the influence of favorites,who are none the less favorites in a good old-fashioned sense of the word because they are not persons by preconceived opinions,i.e. prejudices with because they are not the hildren Wherever regard for public opinion is a first principle of government practical refom must be slow and all reform must be full of compromises.For wherever public opinion exists it must rule.This is now an axiom half the world over,and will presently come to be believed even in Russia Whoever would effect a change in a goverment must first educate his fellow-citizens to want some change.That done he must persuade them to want the particula change he wants.He must first make public opinion willing to listen and then see to it that it listen to the right things.He must stir it upto search for an opinion and then manage to put the right opinion n itsway The first step is not less difficult than the second.With opinions,possession is more than nine points of the law.It is next to impossible to dislodge them.Institutions which one generation regards as only a makeshift approximation to the realization of a principle,the next generation honorsas the nearest possible approximation to that principle,and the next worships the principle itself.It takes scarcely three generations for the apotheosis.The grandson accepts his 18
18 straightforward principles. There will be a succession of resolves running through a course of years, a dropping fire of commands running through the whole gamut of modifications. In government, as in virtue, the hardest of things is to make progress. Formerly the reason for this was that the single person who was sovereign was generally either selfish, ignorant, timid, or a fool,-albeit there was now and again one who was wise. Nowadays the reason is that the many, the people, who are sovereign have no single ear which one can approach, and are selfish, ignorant, timid, stubborn, or foolish with the selfishness, the ignorances, the stubbornnesses, the timidities, or the follies of several thousand persons,-albeit there are hundreds who are wise. Once the advantage of the reformer was that the sovereign’s mind had a definite locality, that it was contained in one man’s head, and that consequently it could be gotten at; though it was his disadvantage that the mind learned only reluctantly or only in small quantities, or was under the influence of some one who let it learn only the wrong things. Now, on the contrary, the reformer is bewildered by the fact that the sovereign’s mind has no definite locality, but is contained in a voting majority of several million heads; and embarrassed by the fact that the mind of this sovereign also is under the influence of favorites, who are none the less favorites in a good old-fashioned sense of the word because they are not persons by preconceived opinions; i.e., prejudices which are not to be reasoned with because they are not the children of reason. Wherever regard for public opinion is a first principle of government, practical reform must be slow and all reform must be full of compromises. For wherever public opinion exists it must rule. This is now an axiom half the world over, and will presently come to be believed even in Russia. Whoever would effect a change in a modern constitutional government must first educate his fellow-citizens to want some change. That done, he must persuade them to want the particular change he wants. He must first make public opinion willing to listen and then see to it that it listen to the right things. He must stir it up to search for an opinion, and then manage to put the right opinion in its way. The first step is not less difficult than the second. With opinions, possession is more than nine points of the law. It is next to impossible to dislodge them. Institutions which one generation regards as only a makeshift approximation to the realization of a principle, the next generation honors as the nearest possible approximation to that principle, and the next worships the principle itself. It takes scarcely three generations for the apotheosis. The grandson accepts his
grandfather's hesitating experiment as an integral part of the fixed constitution of nature. Even if we had clear insight into all the political past,and could form out of perfectly instructed heads a few steady,infallible,placidly wise maxims of government into which all sound political doctrine would be ultimately resolvable.would?That is the question.The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical,and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.A truth must become not only plain but also commonplace before it will be seen by the people who go to their work very early in the morning.and not to act upon it must involve grea and pinching inconveniences before these same people will make up their minds to act upon it. And where is this unphilosophical bulk of mankind more multifarious in its composition than in the United States?To know the public mind of this country,one must know the mind,not of Americans of the oer stocks ony.butalso of ismen of Germans,of negroes In order to get a footing for new doctrnene must influence mindscast in every mould of race,minds inheriting every bias of environment,warped by the histories of a score of different nations,warmed or chilled,rexpanded by limate of the globe. omuch,then.for the history of the study of administration and the peculiarly difficult conditions under which entering upon it when we do,we must undertake it.What,now,is the subiect-matter of this study.and what are its characteristic obiects? n The field of administration is a field of business.It is removed from the humy and strife of politics,it at most points stands apart even from the debatable ground of constitutional study.It is a part of politicl asthe methods of the counting house are a part of the life of ety. only as machinery is part of the manufactured product.But it is at the same time raised very far above the dull level of mere technical detail by the fact that through its greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political wisdom,the pemmanent truths of political progress The object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundationslaid deep in stable principle. It is for this reason that we must regard civil-service reform in its present stages as but a prelude to a full administrative reform We are now rectifying methods of appointment.wemust go on to adjust executive functions more fitly and to prescribe better methods of executive 19
19 grandfather’s hesitating experiment as an integral part of the fixed constitution of nature. Even if we had clear insight into all the political past, and could form out of perfectly instructed heads a few steady, infallible, placidly wise maxims of government into which all sound political doctrine would be ultimately resolvable, would the country act on them? That is the question. The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes. A truth must become not only plain but also commonplace before it will be seen by the people who go to their work very early in the morning; and not to act upon it must involve great and pinching inconveniences before these same people will make up their minds to act upon it. And where is this unphilosophical bulk of mankind more multifarious in its composition than in the United States? To know the public mind of this country, one must know the mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of Irishmen, of Germans, of negroes. In order to get a footing for new doctrine, one must influence minds cast in every mould of race, minds inheriting every bias of environment, warped by the histories of a score of different nations, warmed or chilled, closed or expanded by almost every climate of the globe. So much, then, for the history of the study of administration, and the peculiarly difficult conditions under which, entering upon it when we do, we must undertake it. What, now, is the subject-matter of this study, and what are its characteristic objects? II. The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; it at most points stands apart even from the debatable ground of constitutional study. It is a part of political life only as the methods of the counting house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product. But it is, at the same time, raised very far above the dull level of mere technical detail by the fact that through its greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress. The object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle. It is for this reason that we must regard civil-service reform in its present stages as but a prelude to a fuller administrative reform. We are now rectifying methods of appointment; we must go on to adjust executive functions more fitly and to prescribe better methods of executive
organization and action.Civil-service reform is thus but a moral preparation for what is to follow. It is clearing the moral atmosphere of official life by establishing the sanctity of public office as a public trust,and,by making service unpartisan,it is opening the way for making it businesslike By sweetening its motives it is rendering it capable of improving its methods of work. Let me expand a little what I have said of the province of administration Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil-service reformers,namely,that administration lies outside the proper sphere of polirics.Administrative questions are not political questions.Although politics sets the tasks for administration,it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. This is distinction of high authority.eminent German writers insist upon it as of cos for nsnce,bids us separate administration alike from politics and from law.Politics. he says,is state activity"in things great and universalwhile"administration,on the other hand" is"the activity of the state in individual and small things.Politics is thus the special province of the statesman,administration of the technical oes nothing without the aid of administration but administration is not therefore politics.But we do no require German authority for this position,this discrimination between administration and politics is now,happily too obvious to need further discussion There is another distinction which must be worked into all our conclusions,which,though but another side of that between administration and politics,is not quiteseasy to keep sight ofI mean the distinction between constintional and administrative questions,between those govermental adjustments which are ssentia to constitutional principle and those which ar merely instrumental to the possibly changing purposesofa wisely adapting convenience. One cannot easily make clear to every one just where administration resides in the various departments of any practicable government without entering upon particularso numerous as to confuse and distinctions so minute as to distract.No lines of demarcation.setting apart administrative fromnon-dministrative functions,can be rn between this and that department of government without being run up hill and down dale.over dizzy heights of distinction and through dense jungles of statutory enactment,hither and thither around"ifs"and"buts,""whens"and "howevers,"until they become altogether lost to the common eye not accustomed to this sort of surveying.and consequently not acquainted with the use of the theodolite of logical discernment. 20
20 organization and action. Civil-service reform is thus but a moral preparation for what is to follow. It is clearing the moral atmosphere of official life by establishing the sanctity of public office as a public trust, and, by making service unpartisan, it is opening the way for making it businesslike. By sweetening its motives it is rendering it capable of improving its methods of work. Let me expand a little what I have said of the province of administration. Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil-service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. This is distinction of high authority; eminent German writers insist upon it as of course. Bluntschli, for instance, bids us separate administration alike from politics and from law. Politics, he says, is state activity "in things great and universal", while "administration, on the other hand," is "the activity of the state in individual and small things. Politics is thus the special province of the statesman, administration of the technical official." "Policy does nothing without the aid of administration"; but administration is not therefore politics. But we do not require German authority for this position; this discrimination between administration and politics is now, happily, too obvious to need further discussion. There is another distinction which must be worked into all our conclusions, which, though but another side of that between administration and politics, is not quite so easy to keep sight of: I mean the distinction between constitutional and administrative questions, between those governmental adjustments which are essential to constitutional principle and those which are merely instrumental to the possibly changing purposes of a wisely adapting convenience. One cannot easily make clear to every one just where administration resides in the various departments of any practicable government without entering upon particulars so numerous as to confuse and distinctions so minute as to distract. No lines of demarcation, setting apart administrative from non-administrative functions, can be run between this and that department of government without being run up hill and down dale, over dizzy heights of distinction and through dense jungles of statutory enactment, hither and thither around "ifs" and "buts," "whens" and "howevers," until they become altogether lost to the common eye not accustomed to this sort of surveying, and consequently not acquainted with the use of the theodolite of logical discernment