第一节发展中国家的概念 发展中国家(Developing Countries)指原 来经济落后,正处在由传统的经济向现代 化经济过渡的发展过程中的国家。这些国 家大多数过去都是受帝国主义直接统治或 控制的殖民地或附属国,在第二次世界大 战后,先后获得政治上的独立,当前正在 为实现经济的独立自主发展,实现经济的 现代化而努力

发达国家是指世界上经济发展水平高,市场经 济机制成熟的西方主要资本主义国家(包括日 本),一般指经济合作与发展组织(OECD)成 员。二战后发达国家经济得到巨大发展,它们的人 口只占世界人口的1/5,但其经济圈在世界经济中占 有明显的主导地位。经济全球化的发展使世界各国 经济相互依赖性增强,发达国家相互间及与其他各 国间分工的扩大和深化,推动了世界经济的发展。 这一章主要以美国、法国和日本为代表来探讨发达 国家经济

第一节 全球性问题的出现及其认识 第二节 环境问题 第三节 资源问题 第四节 人口问题 第五节 世界经济的可持续发展

随着社会生产力的迅速发展和资本主义基本矛盾的深化,国家垄断资本主义获得了空前的发展。 在国家垄断资本主义阶段,国家加强对了经济生活 的干预,以保证垄断资产阶级能够获得高额垄断利 润;同时,它也大力支持本国垄断组织加快对外扩张,在海外获取高额垄断利润。在扩张的过程中, 各资本主义国家的垄断组织之间难免会产生一些矛 盾,这就需要国家出面进行协调,从而出现了国际 经济协调

第一节 世界经济的内涵和形成 第二节 第二次世界大战后世界经济的发展和新特点 第三节 世界经济学科的研究对象和方法 第四节 世界经济学科的内容体系和学习意义

第一章 聚焦新经济 1、新经济的内涵与实质 2、新经济的特征 3、信息技术产业对传统产业改造的表现 4、新经济动力之源一高科技的发展 5、新经济的核心——创新 6、新经济成长的国际环境—经济全球化 第二章 认识企业文化特色的三大规律性特征

This lecture, as well as the next, exemplify applications of the framework and techniques developed so far to problems of economic interest. Neither lecture attempts to cover the example applications in any generality, of course; you may however find these topics of sufficient interest to warrant further study

This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter

Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash equilibrium. This lecture deals with the technical details of equilibrium analysis, but also with these interpretational issues. However, a more precise appraisal of the situation must

One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter. mine equilibrium behavior. For instance, consider the simple two-stage entry deter- rence game in which potential entrant decides whether to enter a market or stay out, and the incumbent decides whether to fight or acquiesce after the entrant's move