By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium
文件格式: PDF大小: 141.77KB页数: 6
复旦大学:《宏观经济学》课程教学讲义(初、中、高级篇)03 高级宏观:经济增长理论
文件格式: PDF大小: 1.95MB页数: 11
复旦大学:《宏观经济学》课程教学讲义(初、中、高级篇)02 高级宏观:迭代模型
文件格式: PDF大小: 84.04KB页数: 9
复旦大学:《宏观经济学》课程教学讲义(初、中、高级篇)01 高级宏观:拉姆齐模型
文件格式: PDF大小: 375.66KB页数: 19






