24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 19. 2001 Moral relativism The problem of moral relativism begins with the fact of moral diversity: different cultures have different moral codes. Of course, it's not just between different national cultures that moral opinions differ; the same can happen between different subcultures of the same national culture. What does this show? Consider Moral diversity: Different cultures have different moral codes/values. Does it even follow that Moral conflict: Different cultures have conflicting moral codes/values Does moral diversity imply moral disagreement? Not obviously. Consider i) different definitions, e.g., of euthanasia, rape, terrorism, self-defense ii)different factual assumptions Nevertheless, there does seem to be at least some genuine moral disagreement around. The most famous such issue is probably abortion. Some people disagree about abortion because they disagree on whether abortion is killing a person, since they have different views about what counts as a person. Yet sometimes people agree that it is in some sense a person, but disagree about whether it is permissible in such cases to take a life. Cultures disagree about right and wrong in a way that cannot be explained by assigning different meanings to their words or in terms of background factual disagreements. What does this tell us about morality? Moral objectivists hold that there are genuine moral truths, and that some cultures have got ahold uis truth. while others are somehow missing it. This would be to treat moral laws as akin to physical laws. All that diversity shows is how very difficult it can be to get ahold of the right moral laws. So this is one interpretation of moral disagreement moral objectivism tempered by a certain amount of moral skepticism, that is, doubts about our ability to know the objective moral truth. Yet this suggests is that we can' t really rely on our consciences in deciding what to do For our consciences were formed in this culture and it's not clear that this culture has the correct moral views Moral relativists note that different cultures have opposing legal codes; what's legally right or wrong depends on one's heir idea is that we should understand what's morally right or wrong in a way analogous to legal right or wrong In Britain it's legal to drive on the left-hand side of the street; in America it's not legal. This raises no deep philosophical quandaries. No one asks: Which is the truly legal way to drive? For we all realize that what is legal is relative to a setting. Same with etiquette. Why think that moral disagreements are any different? E. g, here is Wm. Graham Sumner (1906 The"right"way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed p The tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification by experience. The notion of right is folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is righi Which moral laws apply in a given part of the world is a function of the way those people have chosen to organize their lives. There is no universal moral truth; the moral code of a particular society determines what is right or wrong for
24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 19, 2001 Moral Relativism The problem of moral relativism begins with the fact of moral diversity: different cultures have different moral codes. Of course, it's not just between different national cultures that moral opinions differ; the same can happen between different subcultures of the same national culture. What does this show? Consider: Moral diversity: Different cultures have different moral codes/values. Does it even follow that: Moral conflict: Different cultures have conflicting moral codes/values. Does moral diversity imply moral disagreement? Not obviously. Consider: i) different definitions, e.g., of euthanasia, rape, terrorism, self-defense. ii) different factual assumptions. Nevertheless, there does seem to be at least some genuine moral disagreement around. The most famous such issue is probably abortion. Some people disagree about abortion because they disagree on whether abortion is killing a person, since they have different views about what counts as a person. Yet sometimes people agree that it is in some sense a person, but disagree about whether it is permissible in such cases to take a life. Cultures disagree about right and wrong in a way that cannot be explained by assigning different meanings to their words or in terms of background factual disagreements. What does this tell us about morality? Moral Objectivists hold that there are genuine moral truths, and that some cultures have got ahold of this truth, while others are somehow missing it. This would be to treat moral laws as akin to physical laws. All that moral diversity shows is how very difficult it can be to get ahold of the right moral laws. So this is one interpretation of moral disagreement: moral objectivism tempered by a certain amount of moral skepticism, that is, doubts about our ability to know the objective moral truth. Yet this suggests is that we can't really rely on our consciences in deciding what to do. For our consciences were formed in this culture and it's not clear that this culture has the correct moral views. Moral relativists note that different cultures have opposing legal codes; what's legally right or wrong depends on one's society. Their idea is that we should understand what's morally right or wrong in a way analogous to legal right or wrong. In Britain it's legal to drive on the left-hand side of the street; in America it's not legal. This raises no deep philosophical quandaries. No one asks: Which is the truly legal way to drive? For we all realize that what is legal is relative to a given setting. Same with etiquette. Why think that moral disagreements are any different? E.g., here is Wm. Graham Sumner (1906): The "right" way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down. The tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification by experience. The notion of right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right... Which moral laws apply in a given part of the world is a function of the way those people have chosen to organize their lives. There is no universal moral truth; the moral code of a particular society determines what is right or wrong for
members of that society. E.g., one version of cultural relativism could be stated this way Action X is morally wrong for agent A, who is a member of society S iff the moral code in S entails that A should not doⅩ So, does it follow from the fact of deep-seated moral disagreements that moral relativism is true? Pretty clearly it doesn 't follow. But even if there is no knock-down argument from moral conflict to moral relativism, the question is, what is the best way to understand widespread moral disagreement? Let's begin with some worrisome consequences of relativism Cross-Cultural Criticism. Often we want to call some foreign custom or practice morally objectionable. But can we, if we are relatioⅤists? Intra-Cultural Criticism. According to the relativist, there's a simple test for deciding what's right and wrong. Just consult the standards of your society; for all"right"and"wrong"mean in your mouth are right and wrong-according-to-those standards. But normally we admit that our moral code is not perfect. On what basis can the relativist say this? Intra-cultural Conflict: In every culture, there are disagreements about what counts as right or wrong. It is misleading to suggest that there is such a thing as"the standards of your society since societies are complex and evolving. At best relativist would have to pick some subset of values that members of the society endorse( which members? The dominant ones?), but why those as opposed to the others? Moral Progress. How can there be moral progress if right means right-according to-our-existing moral code? Moral progress happens when someone says, our existing moral code falls short of the moral truth, hence it needs to be adjusted Again, is this compatible with relativism? Now, interesting as these objections are, a convinced relativist could try to bite the bullet. That is, maybe we shouldn 't engage in moral criticism; and maybe our highly touted moral progress is just so much self-congratulation. But are there deeper problems with relativism? Some suggest that relativism is somehow incoherent, that it undermine itself. Toleration an Absolute/Objective Value? Suppose, as the relativist suggests, that it's arrogant and absurd to criticize another culture's values. This appears to lead the relativist into a contradiction, for it seems that they are offering the rule of toleration as non-relative moral rule. One cannot both say that there are no objective moral values and that toleration is one Disappearance of Disagreement. Suppose we return to the usual relativist idea that we are not to criticize other culture's values; we should"agree to disagree"and leave them to their own perspectives. Problem is, if relativism is true then we don't disagree. Consider a series of conversations: "Im hungry. Well, I disagree. I'm not hungry. Still, I respect your right to your different perspective. "What different perspective? We're not disagreeing at all! Taking Morality Seriously. Remember, what started us off is that there is disagreement and we feel troubled by it. The relativist says, you needn't feel troubled; just treat morality like a different kind of etiquette, albeit a kind people take much more seriously. But that's in a way the problem. How can we take it so seriously if moral ity is just a matter of conventional ules of conduct that we happen to have made up for ourselves? Perhaps we should take a second look at moral objectivism. The worry was that objectivism is going to lead to moral skepticism, and that skepticism is going to lead to paralysis and inaction. But maybe that was too quick. The original impetus for relativism is the dramatic moral disagreement that we seemed to find between various cultures. But perhaps
members of that society. E.g., one version of cultural relativism could be stated this way: Action X is morally wrong for agent A, who is a member of society S iff the moral code in S entails that A should not do X. So, does it follow from the fact of deep-seated moral disagreements that moral relativism is true? Pretty clearly it doesn't follow. But even if there is no knock-down argument from moral conflict to moral relativism, the question is, what is the best way to understand widespread moral disagreement? Let's begin with some worrisome consequences of relativism. Cross-Cultural Criticism. Often we want to call some foreign custom or practice morally objectionable. But can we, if we are relativists? Intra-Cultural Criticism. According to the relativist, there's a simple test for deciding what's right and wrong. Just consult the standards of your society; for all "right" and "wrong" mean in your mouth are right and wrong-according-to-thosestandards. But normally we admit that our moral code is not perfect. On what basis can the relativist say this? Intra-cultural Conflict: In every culture, there are disagreements about what counts as right or wrong. It is misleading to suggest that there is such a thing as "the standards of your society", since societies are complex and evolving. At best a relativist would have to pick some subset of values that members of the society endorse (which members? The dominant ones?), but why those as opposed to the others? Moral Progress. How can there be moral progress if right means right-according to-our-existing moral code? Moral progress happens when someone says, our existing moral code falls short of the moral truth; hence it needs to be adjusted. Again, is this compatible with relativism? Now, interesting as these objections are, a convinced relativist could try to bite the bullet. That is, maybe we shouldn't engage in moral criticism; and maybe our highly touted moral progress is just so much self-congratulation. But are there deeper problems with relativism? Some suggest that relativism is somehow incoherent, that it undermine itself: Toleration an Absolute/Objective Value? Suppose, as the relativist suggests, that it's arrogant and absurd to criticize another culture's values. This appears to lead the relativist into a contradiction, for it seems that they are offering the rule of toleration as non-relative moral rule. One cannot both say that there are no objective moral values and that toleration is one. Disappearance of Disagreement. Suppose we return to the usual relativist idea that we are not to criticize other culture's values; we should "agree to disagree" and leave them to their own perspectives. Problem is, if relativism is true then we don't disagree. Consider a series of conversations: "I'm hungry." "Well, I disagree. I'm not hungry. Still, I respect your right to your different perspective." What different perspective? We're not disagreeing at all! Taking Morality Seriously. Remember, what started us off is that there is disagreement and we feel troubled by it. The relativist says, you needn't feel troubled; just treat morality like a different kind of etiquette, albeit a kind people take much more seriously. But that's in a way the problem. How can we take it so seriously if morality is just a matter of conventional rules of conduct that we happen to have made up for ourselves? Perhaps we should take a second look at moral objectivism. The worry was that objectivism is going to lead to moral skepticism, and that skepticism is going to lead to paralysis and inaction. But maybe that was too quick. The original impetus for relativism is the dramatic moral disagreement that we seemed to find between various cultures. But perhaps
there is less disagreement than might seem Explaining Away. Remember society's customs are a function of more than their values. Their factual and religious beliefs. as well as their circumstances matter too Survival Values: So at least some apparent differences in values can be explained away. But we can also make a positive argument: cultures must have some values in common, namely the ones without which a society would not be able to sustain itself. However: moral objectivism has some of its own problems Moral skepticism: If our own cultural norms may well be deeply misguided, where do we begin to think about morality? How can we ever be sure we are tracking the moral truth? And if we can' t be sure we re tracking the moral truth, on what basis could we begin to criticize others? It might seem that moral objectivism, then, provides no better basis for criticism than moral relatioⅤism "Queerness"of moral"facts " Physical facts are relatively straightforward we know what it is for something to have weight, mass, color, etc. But sorts of things are"moral facts"? How does one detect a moral fact? If we live in a physical universe, is there any room in it for moral facts? So: what can we learn from the fact of moral variation between cultures? First, some of what we call right and wrong laws against murder. But second, this is compatible with there being large areas of our moral lives in which there are an might not be a matter of objective moral truth, but just a matter of local custom, more along the lines of traffic laws th genuine moral laws universal truths about how to conduct ourselves Questions to think about 1)What about the moral disagreements? Aren't there areas of moral life that cannot be understood relativistically (i.e,on the model of etiquette), but in which there is still disagreement? How should we think of, e.g., disagr nts over vegetarianism, religious toleration, sexism, homophobia, abortion? Is there an objective moral truth in these domains or not? How can we determine whether it is an objective domain or not? And if it is, how do we find the answer? 2)Is it possible to draw a clear distinction between facts and values? E.g., in describing something as"beef"or"pork"or even more generally"meat", isn 't one representing it from a particular evaluative viewpoint(e.g, from the point of view of a non-vegetarian)? In saying, " That's beef, " is one making a"purely factual claim? In saying, " That's a slice of dead cow, is one making a"purely"factual claim? What about, "Thats a lie, or"He's a bigot"?
there is less disagreement than might seem. Explaining Away. Remember society's customs are a function of more than their values. Their factual and religious beliefs, as well as their circumstances, matter too. Survival Values: So at least some apparent differences in values can be explained away. But we can also make a positive argument: cultures must have some values in common, namely the ones without which a society would not be able to sustain itself. However: moral objectivism has some of its own problems: Moral skepticism: If our own cultural norms may well be deeply misguided, where do we begin to think about morality? How can we ever be sure we are tracking the moral truth? And if we can't be sure we're tracking the moral truth, on what basis could we begin to criticize others? It might seem that moral objectivism, then, provides no better basis for criticism than moral relativism. "Queerness" of moral "facts": Physical facts are relatively straightforward: we know what it is for something to have weight, mass, color, etc. But sorts of things are "moral facts"? How does one detect a moral fact? If we live in a physical universe, is there any room in it for moral facts? So: what can we learn from the fact of moral variation between cultures? First, some of what we call right and wrong might not be a matter of objective moral truth, but just a matter of local custom, more along the lines of traffic laws than laws against murder. But second, this is compatible with there being large areas of our moral lives in which there are genuine moral laws; universal truths about how to conduct ourselves. Questions to think about: 1) What about the moral disagreements? Aren't there areas of moral life that cannot be understood relativistically (i.e., on the model of etiquette), but in which there is still disagreement? How should we think of, e.g., disagreements over vegetarianism, religious toleration, sexism, homophobia, abortion? Is there an objective moral truth in these domains or not? How can we determine whether it is an objective domain or not? And if it is, how do we find the answer? 2) Is it possible to draw a clear distinction between facts and values? E.g., in describing something as "beef" or "pork" or even more generally "meat", isn't one representing it from a particular evaluative viewpoint (e.g., from the point of view of a non-vegetarian)? In saying, "That's beef," is one making a "purely" factual claim? In saying, "That's a slice of dead cow," is one making a "purely" factual claim? What about, "That's a lie," or "He's a bigot"?