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《宏观经济学 Macroeconomics》课外读物：Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria

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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS We begin the tour in Section ii with a description of the empirical regularities to be explained, and review in Sections III and iv the major insights of implicit contract theory-from the older, public information literature, as well as from more recent work on asym metric information. The newer literature makes heavy use of som concepts common to many self-selection problems; we discuss these lrb epts in Section V Section VI covers macroeconomic aspects of implicit contracts-in particular, their relation to the fixed price literature. The concluding section is concerned with a survey of un- resolved issues II Over a typical business cycle average wages fluctuate less vig orously than does labor's marginal revenue product or, for that matter, the total volume of employment(see Hall 1980 ). The great De pression is a sad illustration: from 1929 to 1933 U.S. employment fell precipitously, while real wages managed to creep upward At a less aggregative level, it is standard collective bargaining procedure to predetermine money wage rates for two or three years in advance, even though wage rigidity does not promote employment in recessions. 2 The sluggishness of money wage rates, notably in periods of relatively stable inflation, and the strong contribution of layoffs to yclical unemployment in north america have long been two of the best-documented stylized facts in economics. Wage and price rigidity are also among the key assumptions of Keynesian macroeconomics, both in the Hicksian IS/LM framework(see Hicks [1937 )and in the very interesting concept of quantity-constrained equilibrium origi nally developed by Patinkin [1956, Clower [1965], Hansen [1974] Solow-Stiglitz[1968, Younes[1970, and Barro-Grossman [1971 and formalized by European economists in the 1970s. 4 Keynes's own explanation of wage rigidity [1936, p. 13-15] was a sophisticated form of money illusion; workers resist cuts in money rates because they do not know how widespread these cuts will to be, each worker fearing a fall in his own wage relative to s Relative wage arguments suggest that "fairness "in the wage 2. However, as the recer nce in the United States indicates, if too large the contract. Cousineau and Lacroix [1981] ar an interesting set of ning agreements and Malinvaud 1977] relopmeats appear in Benassy [1975 Dreze[1975], Younes( 1975)

2 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS We begin the tour in Section I1 with a description of the empirical regularities to be explained, and review in Sections I11 and IV the major insights of implicit contract theory-from the older, publicinformation literature, as well as from more recent work on asymmetric information. The newer literature makes heavy use of some concepts common to many self-selection problems; we discuss these concepts in Section V. Section VI covers macroeconomic aspects of implicit contracts-in particular, their relation to the fixed price literature. The concluding section is concerned with a survey of unresolved issues. Over a typical business cycle, average wages fluctuate less vigorously than does labor's marginal revenue product or, for that matter, the total volume of employment (see Hall [1980]). The Great Depression is a sad illustration: from 1929 to 1933 U.S. employment fell precipitously, while real wages managed to creep upward. At a less aggregative level, it is standard collective bargaining procedure to predetermine money wage rates for two or three years in advance, even though wage rigidity does not promote employment in recession^.^ The sluggishness of money wage rates, notably in periods of relatively stable inflation, and the strong contribution of layoffs to cyclical unemployment in North America have long been two of the best-documented stylized facts in economic^.^ Wage and price rigidity are also among the key assumptions of Keynesian macroeconomics, both in the Hicksian ISILM framework (see Hicks [1937]) and in the very interesting concept of quantity-constrained equilibrium originally developed by Patinkin [1956], Clower [1965], Hansen [1974], Solow-Stiglitz [1968], Youn6s [1970], and Barro-Grossman [1971], and formalized by European economists in the 1970~.~ Keynes's own explanation of wage rigidity [1936, p. 13-15] was a sophisticated form of money illusion; workers resist cuts in money wage rates because they do not know how widespread these cuts will prove to be, each worker fearing a fall in his own wage relative to others. Relative wage arguments suggest that "fairness" in the wage 2. However, as the recent experience in the United States indicates, if too large a level of unemployment is caused by wage rigidity, both sides may agree to renegotiate the terms of the contract. Cousineau and Lacroix [I9811 analyze an interesting set of data collected from Canadian collective bargainin 3. An example is the work of Feldstein [I976 4. The main developme.~ts appear in Nnassy YounGs [1975], and Malinvaud [1977]

IMPLICIT CONTRACTS AND FIXED PRICE EQUILIBRIA structure is a factor to be reckoned with in labor supply decisions,5 but do not develop an operational definition of "fairness. 6 This is perhaps one reason why the relative wage argument did not gain ground in economics Students of human capital8 have provided another theory of layoffs, namely, that the accumulation of job-specific skills requires the sinking of certain expenses for hiring and training. This is an in- vestment the employer makes in anticipation that the worker will remain attached to his job, and one he amortizes over time by paying a wage rate lower than the trained employee's marginal contribution to the firm. If the firm should need to reduce employment in periods of slack demand, it will naturally choose to lay off first the least trained members of its labor force, those who represent the smallest undepreciated investment in training. This story is a satisfactory explanation of the incidence of layoffs g not of their existence; it tells us why layoffs fall on the least skilled workers but leaves open the question why they occur in the first place which is our concern here Furthermore the technical heterogeneity of labor that is crucial for this argument is itself an unnecessary complication in traditional macroeconomic models that are built on the simpler assumptions of homogeneous inputs and zero transaction The innovation in the early literature on implicit contracts Baily 1974; Gordon, 1974; Azariadis, 1975]was to view the employment relation not simply as a sequential spot exchange of labor services for money, but as a more complicated long-term attachment; labor ser- vices are traded for an insurance contract that protects workers from random, publicly observed fluctuations in their marginal revenue product. The idea, shown in Figure I, is that workers can purchase insurance only from their employers, not from third parties. Risk-averse workers deal with risk-neutral entrepreneurs whose firms consist of three departments: a production department that purchases labor services and credits each worker with his marginal See Akerlof (1980) for a recent attempt at a theory of wage rigidity based on 8. The standard refere e is Becker[ 1964]; our argument is due to Oi [1962]. odel of layoff incidence, see Azariadis [1976

IMPLICIT CONTRACTS AND FIXED PRICE EQUILIBRIA 3 structure is a factor to be reckoned with in labor supply decisions,5 but do not develop an operational definition of "fairness."6 This is perhaps one reason why the relative wage argument did not gain ground in economics.7 Students of human capital8 have provided another theory of layoffs, namely, that the accumulation of job-specific skills requires the sinking of certain expenses for hiring and training. This is an investment the employer makes in anticipation that the worker will remain attached to his job, and one he amortizes over time by paying a wage rate lower than the trained employee's marginal contribution to the firm. If the firm should need to reduce employment in periods of slack demand, it will naturally choose to lay off first the least trained members of its labor force, those who represent the smallest undepreciated investment in training. This story is a satisfactory explanation of the incidence of layoffsg not of their existence; it tells us why layoffs fall on the least skilled workers but leaves open the question why they occur in the first place, which is our concern here. Furthermore, the technical heterogeneity of labor that is crucial for this argument is itself an unnecessary complication in traditional macroeconomic models that are built on the simpler assumptions of homogeneous inputs and zero transaction costs. The innovation in the early literature on implicit contracts [Baily, 1974; Gordon, 1974; Azariadis, 19751 was to view the employment relation not simply as a sequential spot exchange of labor services for money, but as a more complicated long-term attachment; labor services are traded for an insurance contract that protects workers from random, publicly observed fluctuations in their marginal revenue product. The idea, shown in Figure I, is that workers can purchase insurance only from their employers, not from third parties. Risk-averse workers deal with risk-neutral entrepreneurs whose firms consist of three departments: a production department that purchases labor services and credits each worker with his marginal 5. This is apparent in Okun's posthumous book [1981], pp. 93-97. 6. Such a definition was later developed in welfare economics; see Varian [1974], Schmeidler and Yaari [1971]. 7. See Akerlof 119801 for a recent attempt at a theory of wage rigidity based on "norms." 8. The standard reference is Becker [1964]; our argument is due to Oi [1962]. 9. For a contractual model of layoff incidence, see Azariadis i19761

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