ECONOMETRICA IOURV4I DF TIr TCNOMTERIr 54CItTY Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements Author(s): John F. Muth Source: Econometrica, Vol 29, No. 3(JuL, 1961), pp 315-335 Published by: The Econometric Society StableUrl:http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909635 Accessed:197097200806:53 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJstOr'sTermsandConditionsofUseprovidesinpartthatunless may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use al or multiple copies of articles, and you you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a jour Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work, Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showpublisher?publishercode=ecoNosoc Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmIssion JStOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the cholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about jSTOR, please contact support(@jstor. org 图小 ittp://www.jstor.org
Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements Author(s): John F. Muth Source: Econometrica, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Jul., 1961), pp. 315-335 Published by: The Econometric Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909635 Accessed: 19/09/2008 06:53 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=econosoc. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The Econometric Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Econometrica. http://www.jstor.org
Econometrica, Vol, 29, No. 3 (July 1961) RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE THEORY OF PRICE MOVEMENTS BY JOHN F. MUTH In order to explain fairly simply how expectations are formed, we advance the hypothesis that they are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory. In particular, the hypothesis asserts that the economy generally does not waste information, and that expectations depend specifically on the structure of the entire system. Methods of analysis, which hypothesis is illustrated by introducing commodity speculation into the 1. INTRODUCTION THAT EXPECTATIONS of economic variables may be subject to error has for some time, been recognized as an important part of most explanations of changes in the level of business activity. The"ex ante"'analysis of the tockholm School--although it has created its fair share of confusion--is a highly suggestive approach to short-run problems. It has undoubtedly been a major motivation for studies of business expectations and intentions data As a systematic theory of fluctuations in markets or in the economy, he approach is limited, however, because it does not include an explanation of the way expectations are formed. To make dynamic economic models mplete, various expectations formulas have been used. There is, however, little evidence to suggest that the presumed relations bear a resemblance to the way the economy works. 2 What kind of information is used and how it is put together to an estimate of future conditions is important to understand becaus te me character of dynamic processes is typically very sensitive to the way ex- pectations are influenced by the actual course of events. Furthermore it is often necessary to make sensible predictions about the way expectations would change when either the amount of available information or the struc 1 Research undertaken for the project, Planning and Control of Industrial operations under contract with the Office of Naval Research. Contract N-onr-760-(01), Project NR047011. Reproduction of this paper in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the united states Government An earlier version of this paper was presented at the winter Meeting of the E nometric Society, Washington, D. C, December 30, 1959 I am indebted to Z, Griliches, A. G. Hart, M. H. Miller, F. Modigliani, M. Ne and H. White for their comments 2 This comment also applies to dynamic theories in which expectations do not explicitly appear. See, for example, Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz [3, 4
Econometrica, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1961) RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE THEORY OF PRICE MOVEMENTS1 BY JOHN F. MUTH In order to explain fairly simply how expectations are formed, we advance the hypothesis that they are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory. In particular, the hypothesis asserts that the economy generally does not waste information, and that expectations depend specifically on the structure of the entire system. Methods of analysis, which are appropriate under special conditions, are described in the context of an isolated market with a fixed production lag. The interpretative value of the hypothesis is illustrated by introducing commodity speculation into the system. 1. INTRODUCTION THAT EXPECTATIONS ofeconomic variables may be subject to error has, for some time, been recognized as an important part of most explanations of changes in the level of business activity. The "ex ante" analysis of the Stockholm School-although it has created its fair share of confusion-is a highly suggestive approach to short-run problems. It has undoubtedly been a major motivation for studies of business expectations and intentions data. As a systematic theory of fluctuations in markets or in the economy, the approach is limited, however, because it does not include an explanation of the way expectations are formed. To make dynamic economic models complete, various expectations formulas have been used. There is, however, little evidence to suggest that the presumed relations bear a resemblance to the way the economy works.2 What kind of information is used and how it is put together to frame an estimate of future conditions is important to understand because the character of dynamic processes is typically very sensitive to the way expectations are influenced by the actual course of events. Furthermore, it is often necessary to make sensible predictions about the way expectations would change when either the amount of available information or the struc- 1 Research undertaken for the project, Planning and Control of Industrial Operations, under contract with the Office of Naval Research. Contract N-onr-760-(01), Project NR 04701 1. Reproduction of this paper in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Washington, D.C., December 30, 1959. I am indebted to Z. Griliches, A. G. Hart, M. H. Miller, F. Modigliani, M. Nerlove, and H. White for their comments. 2 This comment also applies to dynamic theories in which expectations do not explicitly appear. See, for example, Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz [3, 4]. 315
316 JoHN F. MUTH ture of the system is changed. (This point is similar to the reason we are curious about demand functions, consumption functions, and the like instead of only the reduced form"predictors"in a simultaneous equatio system. )The area is important from a statistical standpoint as well, because parameter estimates are likely to be seriously biased towards zero if the wrong variable is used as the expectation The objective of this paper is to outline a theory of expectations and to show that the implications are-as a first approximation--consistent with the relevant data THE“ RATION AL EXPECTATIONS’ HYPOTHESIS Two major conclusions from studies of expectations data are the following 1. Averages of expectations in an industry are more accurate than naive models and as accurate as elaborate equation systems, although there are considerable cross-sectional differences of opinion 2. Reported expectations generally underestimate the extent of changes that actually take place In order to explain these phenomena, I should like to suggest that expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory. At the risk of confusing this purely descriptive hypothesis with a pronounce- ment as to what firms ought to do, we call such expectations" rational. It is sometimes argued that the assumption of rationality in economics leads to theories inconsistent with, or inadequate to explain, observed phenomena, especially changes over time(e.g, Simon [29]). Our hypothesis is based on exactly the opposite point of view: that dynamic economic models do not assume enough rationality The hypothesis can be rephrased a little more precisely as follows that expectations of firms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory or the"objective probability distributions of outcomes The hypothesis asserts three things:(1)Information is scarce, and the conomic system generally does not waste it.(2) The way expectations are formed depends specifically on the structure of the relevant system describin the economy. (3)A public prediction, 'in the sense of Grunberg and modi gliani [14], will have no substantial effect on the operation of the economic system(unless it is based on inside information). This is not quite the same thing as stating that the marginal revenue product of economics is zero 3 We show in Section 5 that the hypothesis is consistent with these two phenomena
316 JOHN F. MUTH ture of the system is changed. (This point is similar to the reason we are curious about demand functions, consumption functions, and the like, instead of only the reduced form "predictors" in a simultaneous equation system.) The area is important from a statistical standpoint as well, because parameter estimates are likely to be seriously biased towards zero if the wrong variable is used as the expectation. The objective of this paper is to outline a theory of expectations and to show that the implications are-as a first approximation-consistent with the relevant data. 2. THE "RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS" HYPOTHESIS Two major conclusions from studies of expectations data are the following: 1. Averages of expectations in an industry are more accurate than naive models and as accurate as elaborate equation systems, although there are considerable cross-sectional differences of opinion. 2. Reported expectations generally underestimate the extent of changes that actually take place. In order to explain these phenomena, I should like to suggest that expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory.3 At the risk of confusing this purely descriptive hypothesis with a pronouncement as to what firms ought to do, we call such expectations "rational." It is sometimes argued that the assumption of rationality in economics leads to theories inconsistent with, or inadequate to explain, observed phenomena, especially changes over time (e.g., Simon [29]). Our hypothesis is based on exactly the opposite point of view: that dynamic economic models do not assume enough rationality. The hypothesis can be rephrased a little more precisely as follows: that expectations of firms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or the "objective" probability distributions of outcomes). The hypothesis asserts three things: (1) Information is scarce, and the economic system generally does not waste it. (2) The way expectations are formed depends specifically on the structure of the relevant system describing the economy. (3) A "public prediction," in the sense of Grunberg and Modigliani [14], will have no substantial effect on the operation of the economic system (unless it is based on inside information). This is not quite the same thing as stating that the marginal revenue product of economics is zero, 3 We show in Section 5 that the hypothesis is consistent with these two phenomena
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 317 because expectations of a single firm may still be subject to greater error than the theory It does not assert that the scratch work of entrepreneurs resembles the trepreneurs are perfect or that their expectations are all the samg ns of en- system of equations in any way; nor does it state that predictic For purposes of analysis, we shall use a specialized form of the hypothesis In particular, we assume 1. The random disturbances are normally distributed 2. Certainty equivalents exist for the variables to be predicte 3. The equations of the system, including the expectations formulas, are These assumptions are not quite so strong as may appear at first because any one of them virtually implies the other two 3. PRICE FLUCTUATIONS IN AN ISOLATED MARKET We can best explain what the hypothesis is all about by starting the analysis in a rather simple setting: short-period price variations in an isolated market with a fixed production lag of a commodity which cannot be stored. 5 The market equations take the form Ct=-Bpe (Demand) Pt= ypi +u Pe Market equilibrium where: Pt represents the number of units produced in a period lasting as long as the production lag Ct is the amount consumed pt is the market price in the tth period, is the market price expected to prevail during the tth period on the basis of information available through the(t-1)'st period, is an error term--representing, say, variations in yields due to weather Au the variables used are deviations from equilibrium values 4 As long as the variates have a finite variance, a linear regression function exists and only if the variates are normally distributed. (See Allen [2] and Ferguson [12]. The certainty-equivalence property follows from the linearity of the derivative of the appropriate quadratic profit or utility function. (See Simon [28] and Theil [32].) 5 It is possible to allow both short- and long-run supply relations on the basis of dynamic costs. See Holt et al. [17, esp. Chapters 2-4, 19]). More difficult are the supply effects of changes in the number of firms. The relevance of the cost effects has bee emphasized by Buchanan [7] and Akerman [1]. To include them at this point would however, take us away from the main objective of the paper
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 317 because expectations of a single firm may still be subject to greater error than the theory. It does not assert that the scratch work of entrepreneurs resembles the system of equations in any way; nor does it state that predictions of entrepreneurs are perfect or that their expectations are all the same. For purposes of analysis, we shall use a specialized form of the hypothesis. In particular, we assume: 1. The random disturbances are normally distributed. 2. Certainty equivalents exist for the variables to be predicted. 3. The equations of the system, including the expectations formulas, are linear. These assumptions are not quite so strong as may appear at first because any one of them virtually implies the other two.4 3. PRICE FLUCTUATIONS IN AN ISOLATED MARKET We can best explain what the hypothesis is all about by starting the analysis in a rather simple setting: short-period price variations in an isolated market with a fixed production lag of a commodity which cannot be stored.5 The market equations take the form Ct -AfiPt (Demand), (3. 1) P=t -yIP + ut, (Supply), Pt Ct (Market equilibrium), where: Pt represents the number of units produced in a period lasting as long as the production lag, Ct is the amount consumed, Pt is the market price in the tth period, pe is the market price expected to prevail during the tth period on the basis of information available through the (t -1)'st period, ut is an error term-representing, say, variations in yields due to weather. All the variables used are deviations from equilibrisui3 values. 4 As long as the variates have a finite variance, a linear regression function exists if and only if the variates are normally distributed. (See Allen [2] and Ferguson [12].) The certainty-equivalence property follows from the linearity of the derivative of the appropriate quadratic profit or utility function. (See Simon [28] and Theil [32].) 5 It is possible to allow both short- and long-run supply relations on the basis of dynamic costs. (See Holt et al. [17, esp. Chapters 2-4, 19]). More difficult are the supply effects of changes in the number of firms. The relevance of the cost effects has been emphasized by Buchanan [7] and Akerman [1]. To include them at this point would, however, take us away from the main objective of the paper
318 JoHN F.MUT直 The quantity variables may be eliminated from(3. 1)to give (32) =-h The error term is unknown at the time the production decisions are made but it is known-and relevant--at the time the commodity is purchased in th The prediction of the model is found by replacing the error term by its expected value, conditional on past events. If the errors have no serial correlation and Ent=0, we obtain (33) If the prediction of the theory were substantially better than the ex- pectations of the firms, then there would be opportunities for the"insider to profit from the knowledge--by inventory speculation if possible, by operating a firm, or by selling a price forecasting service to the firms. The profit opportunities would no longer exist if the aggregate expectation of the firms is the same as the prediction of the theor (34) Ept= pi Referring to (3. 3)we see that if y/B =-1 the rationality assumption (3. 4) implies that Pt 0, or that the expected price equals the equilibrium price As long as the disturbances occur only in the supply function, price and quantity movements from one period to the next would be entirely along the The problem we have been discussing so far is of little empirical interest because the shocks were assumed to be completely unpredictable. For most markets it is desirable to allow for income effects in demand and alternative costs in supply, with the assumption that part of the shock variable may be predicted on the basis of prior information. By retracing our steps from (3.2), we see that the expected price would be (35) E B+y ervable, then the conditional expected value or its egression estimate may be found directly. If the shock is not observable it must be estimated from the past history of variables that can be measured Expectations weith Serially Correlated Disturbances. We shall write the u's as a linear combination of the past history of normally and independentl
318 JOHN F. MUTH The quantity variables may be eliminated from (3.1) to give (3.2) Pt== - -et The error term is unknown at the time the production decisions are made, but it is known-and relevant-at the time the commodity is purchased in the market. The prediction of the model is found by replacing the error term by its expected value, conditional on past events. If the errors have no serial correlation and Eut = 0. we obtain (3.3) Ept AfptA If the prediction of the theory were substantially better than the expectations of the firms, then there would be opportunities for the "insider" to profit from the knowledge-by inventory speculation if possible, by operating a firm, or by selling a price forecasting service to the firms. The profit opportunities would no longer exist if the aggregate expectation of the firms is the same as the prediction of the theory: (3.4) EPt=Pt . Referring to (3.3) we see that if y//3 - 1 the rationality assumption (3.4) implies that =0, or that the expected price equals the equilibrium price. As long as the disturbances occur only in the supply function, price and quantity movements from one period to the next would be entirely along the demand curve. The problem we have been discussing so far is of little empirical interest, because the shocks were assumed to be completely unpredictable. For most markets it is desirable to allow for income effects in demand and alternative costs in supply, with the assumption that part of the shock variable may be predicted on the basis of prior information. By retracing our steps from (3.2), we see that the expected price would be (3.5) Pt e Eut . If the shock is observable, then the conditional expected value or its regression estimate may be found directly. If the shock is not observable, it must be estimated from the past history of variables that can be measured. Expectations zwith Serially Correlated Distuyrbances. We shall write the u's as a linear combination of the past history of normally and independently