No Dominant Strategy for Both The battle of sexes 小红 c(2,1)(0,0) 小东 s(0,0)(,2)
No Dominant Strategy for Both The Battle of Sexes 小红 小东 C S C S (2,1) (0,0) (0,0) (1,2)
Nash equilibrium a play of the game where each strategy is a best reply to the other is a Nash equilibrium. a dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium In the"strength is weakness"example, W, P)is a Nash equilibrium. In the“ battle of sexes” example, there are two Nash equilibria
Nash Equilibrium A play of the game where each strategy is a best reply to the other is a Nash equilibrium. A dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium; In the “strength is weakness” example, (W,P) is a Nash equilibrium. In the “battle of sexes” example, there are two Nash equilibria
The Prisoner's dilemma A Nash equilibrium may not be Pareto optimallefficient. Consider a famous second example of a two-player game called the Prisoners dilemma(囚徒困境)
The Prisoner’s Dilemma A Nash equilibrium may not be Pareto optimal/efficient. Consider a famous second example of a two-player game called the Prisoner’s Dilemma （囚徒困境）
The Prisoner's dilemma Clyde s s(-5,-5)(-301) Bonnie c(-1,30)(-10,10) What plays are we likely to see for this game
The Prisoner’s Dilemma What plays are we likely to see for this game? Clyde Bonnie (-5,-5) (-30,-1) (-1,-30) (-10,-10) S C S C
The prisoner's dilemma Clyde s s(-5,-5)(30,1) Bonnie c(-1,30)(-10,10) If Bonnie plays Silence then Clyde's best reply is Confess
The Prisoner’s Dilemma If Bonnie plays Silence then Clyde’s best reply is Confess. Clyde Bonnie (-5,-5) (-30,-1) (-1,-30) (-10,-10) S C S C