L&P-BOOKPROOFS 09/13/06-11:39PM 2326 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.I19:2311 accountability.Wilson judged the parliamentary system's unification of authority and responsibility in the prime minister and his cabinet to be clearly superior along both of these dimensions. Wilson's parliamentarian critique of presidential government be- came the conventional wisdom of the field he founded and has been reiterated and elaborated by political scientists through the present.52 But political scientists have also appreciated the ironic possibility that political parties could redeem American government from its inher- ently flawed constitutional structure.As the standard argument goes, "the institutions that the framers had so deliberately separated had to be brought together in some degree of unity for the government to function-and the instrument for that purpose was the political party."5s The hope is that,by uniting the interests of government offi- cials across branch lines,parties might defeat the Framers'design and, in practice,fuse the formally separated legislature and Executive into a second-best approximation of Westminster.This view,which has both descriptive and normative components,has been known as the doctrine of"(responsible)party government."54 The party government view is premised on the widespread belief among political scientists that party lines predict political behavior bet- ter than branch ones.If instead the political interests of members of Congress and the President corresponded predominantly to branch membership,then regardless of party we would expect to see competi- tion rather than cooperation between the branches-just as Madison envisioned,Wilson once feared,and courts and constitutional theorists continue to take for granted.This would make parties at best periph- eral features of the political system-which,again,is exactly how they have generally been regarded by constitutional scholars.s5 If par- ties are to link "the executive and legislative branches in a bond of common interest,"56 then party identification must dominate branch identification.Generations of political scientists have proceeded from this well-grounded assumption,putting them precisely at odds with generations of constitutional lawyers. 52 See Steven G.Calabresi,Political Parties as Mediating Institutions,61 U.CHI.L.REV. 1479,153I n.I7o (1994)(describing the view that "there are systematic failures in our constitu- tional system"as "an article of faith in the political science profession for at least forty years"). 53 JAMES L.SUNDQUIST,CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT go (rev.ed.1992). 54 See AUSTIN RANNEY,THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT (1954). 55 Among public law scholars who specialize in the law of democracy and election law,of course,political parties have long occupied a central place in legal scholarship.See SAMUEL IssACHAROFF ET AL,THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 345-448(2d rev.ed.2002)(summarizing case law and scholarship related to political parties). s6 James L.Sundquist,Needed:A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States,1o3 POL.SCI.Q.613,614(1988)
L&P - BOOKPROOFS 09/13/06 – 11:39 PM 2326 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2311 accountability. Wilson judged the parliamentary system’s unification of authority and responsibility in the prime minister and his cabinet to be clearly superior along both of these dimensions. Wilson’s parliamentarian critique of presidential government became the conventional wisdom of the field he founded and has been reiterated and elaborated by political scientists through the present.52 But political scientists have also appreciated the ironic possibility that political parties could redeem American government from its inherently flawed constitutional structure. As the standard argument goes, “the institutions that the framers had so deliberately separated had to be brought together in some degree of unity for the government to function — and the instrument for that purpose was the political party.”53 The hope is that, by uniting the interests of government officials across branch lines, parties might defeat the Framers’ design and, in practice, fuse the formally separated legislature and Executive into a second-best approximation of Westminster. This view, which has both descriptive and normative components, has been known as the doctrine of “(responsible) party government.”54 The party government view is premised on the widespread belief among political scientists that party lines predict political behavior better than branch ones. If instead the political interests of members of Congress and the President corresponded predominantly to branch membership, then regardless of party we would expect to see competition rather than cooperation between the branches — just as Madison envisioned, Wilson once feared, and courts and constitutional theorists continue to take for granted. This would make parties at best peripheral features of the political system — which, again, is exactly how they have generally been regarded by constitutional scholars.55 If parties are to link “the executive and legislative branches in a bond of common interest,”56 then party identification must dominate branch identification. Generations of political scientists have proceeded from this well-grounded assumption, putting them precisely at odds with generations of constitutional lawyers. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 52 See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1531 n.170 (1994) (describing the view that “there are systematic failures in our constitutional system” as “an article of faith in the political science profession for at least forty years”). 53 JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 90 (rev. ed. 1992). 54 See AUSTIN RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT (1954). 55 Among public law scholars who specialize in the law of democracy and election law, of course, political parties have long occupied a central place in legal scholarship. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 345–448 (2d rev. ed. 2002) (summarizing case law and scholarship related to political parties). 56 James L. Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 613, 614 (1988)
2006] SEPARATION OF PARTIES,NOT POWERS 2327 But another necessary condition for successful party government, of course,is that the same party control both the legislative and execu- tive branches.When control is divided between parties,we should expect party competition to be channeled through the branches,result- ing in interbranch political competition resembling the Madisonian dynamic of rivalrous branches (perhaps even fueling more extreme competition than the Framers envisioned).True,the underlying mechanism would be entirely different:branches would continue to lack wills of their own,and politicians would continue to lack any interest in the power of branches qua branches.The branches would simply serve a politically contingent role as vehicles for party competition. Writing in the midst of a quarter century of mostly divided gov- ernment,the early Wilson had witnessed exactly that.His mistake was to overgeneralize features of the political system he was observing at that moment,assuming them to be inevitable features of the Madi- sonian design.57 Later generations of political scientists,writing against the background norm of unified government that had pre- vailed for the first half of the twentieth century,replicated Wilson's mistake in the opposite direction.By the 195os,Wilsonian criticism of the Madisonian design had been displaced by calls for stronger and more programmatic political parties of the European variety.s8 This made perfect sense on the assumption that government would usually be unified:strengthening parties might then be all that stood between Washington and a system of responsible party government that would closely approximate the Westminster ideal.Under conditions of di- vided party control,however,strong parties would only exacerbate the inefficiency and unaccountability of separated powers by making in- terbranch cooperation all the more difficult. As fate would have it,the responsible party government movement coincided with the beginning of a prolonged period of divided gov- ernment.Once again,political scientists rallied around the Wilsonian lamentation that the Madisonian system was living down to its defec- tive design.The peak of despair was marked by the 1987 report of the Committee on the Constitutional System.59 Representing the consen- sus view among political scientists and Washington insiders,the Com- 57 Wilson himself acknowledged this mistake in later editions of his book,written in the af- termath of U.S.expansionism and on the eve of Theodore Roosevelt's presidency.See WILSON, supra note 51,at 19-23 (Preface to Fifteenth Printing,first published in Igoo). 58 See RANNEY,supra note 54,at 8-22;Am.Political Sci.Ass'n,Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System:A Report of the Committee on Political Parties,44 AM.POL.SCI.REV (SUPPLEMENT)I,I-2(195o).Wilson himself had called for stronger parties as part of a package of reforms that would have effectively done away with divided government.See RANNEY,supra note 54,at 25-47(describing Wilson's views). 59 See SUNDQUIST,supra note 53,at 11-12
2006] SEPARATION OF PARTIES, NOT POWERS 2327 But another necessary condition for successful party government, of course, is that the same party control both the legislative and executive branches. When control is divided between parties, we should expect party competition to be channeled through the branches, resulting in interbranch political competition resembling the Madisonian dynamic of rivalrous branches (perhaps even fueling more extreme competition than the Framers envisioned). True, the underlying mechanism would be entirely different: branches would continue to lack wills of their own, and politicians would continue to lack any interest in the power of branches qua branches. The branches would simply serve a politically contingent role as vehicles for party competition. Writing in the midst of a quarter century of mostly divided government, the early Wilson had witnessed exactly that. His mistake was to overgeneralize features of the political system he was observing at that moment, assuming them to be inevitable features of the Madisonian design.57 Later generations of political scientists, writing against the background norm of unified government that had prevailed for the first half of the twentieth century, replicated Wilson’s mistake in the opposite direction. By the 1950s, Wilsonian criticism of the Madisonian design had been displaced by calls for stronger and more programmatic political parties of the European variety.58 This made perfect sense on the assumption that government would usually be unified: strengthening parties might then be all that stood between Washington and a system of responsible party government that would closely approximate the Westminster ideal. Under conditions of divided party control, however, strong parties would only exacerbate the inefficiency and unaccountability of separated powers by making interbranch cooperation all the more difficult. As fate would have it, the responsible party government movement coincided with the beginning of a prolonged period of divided government. Once again, political scientists rallied around the Wilsonian lamentation that the Madisonian system was living down to its defective design. The peak of despair was marked by the 1987 report of the Committee on the Constitutional System.59 Representing the consensus view among political scientists and Washington insiders, the Com- ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 57 Wilson himself acknowledged this mistake in later editions of his book, written in the aftermath of U.S. expansionism and on the eve of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. See WILSON, supra note 51, at 19–23 (Preface to Fifteenth Printing, first published in 1900). 58 See RANNEY, supra note 54, at 8–22; Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. (SUPPLEMENT) 1, 1–2 (1950). Wilson himself had called for stronger parties as part of a package of reforms that would have effectively done away with divided government. See RANNEY, supra note 54, at 25–47 (describing Wilson’s views). 59 See SUNDQUIST, supra note 53, at 11–12
L&P-BOOKPROOFS 09/13/06-11:39PM 2328 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.I19:2311 mittee bemoaned the deleterious consequences of divided party control -precisely the same problems of gridlock and diminished account- ability that Wilson had (mis)identified as essential features of the Madisonian design.Short of rewriting the structural constitution from scratch,the country's best hope,according to the Committee and its fellow travelers,lay in a set of constitutional and statutory reforms de- signed to reunify government(some similar to reforms suggested by Wilson a century earlier).These included requiring or encouraging straight-ticket voting,allowing sitting members of Congress to serve in the President's cabinet,and altering the electoral timing and term lengths for the President and members of Congress.60 Not surpris- ingly,none of these measures has proven politically feasible. Most constitutional lawyers would bid them good riddance.The pseudo-parliamentarian,responsible party government project of fus- ing the branches under the control of a single,strong party takes Wil- son's critique of Madisonian separation of powers as its normative touchstone.Yet each of the features of Madisonian separationism that parliamentarians criticize is,in fact,celebrated in American constitu- tional discourse.Thus,the inefficiency of requiring the agreement of multiple,mutually antagonistic institutions to make laws becomes,in the view of constitutional lawyers,the great virtue of preserving "lib- erty"and preventing "tyranny."61 And while separated powers may blur the lines of political accountability,constitutional lawyers empha- size that creating multiple channels of democratic responsiveness helps keep government accountable to the popular will by encouraging in- terbranch deliberation,defeating demagoguery,and impeding capture by narrow interests.62 From the Madisonian perspective that undergirds much of consti- tutional law and theory,therefore,the primary threat posed by politi- cal parties to the separation of powers comes not from party division of government but from party unification.Far from dreading divided 60 See id.at 124-43(proposing these and many other dramatic reform strategies). 61 See,e.g.,Morrison v.Olson,487 U.S.654.727(198)(Scalia,J.,dissenting)(The purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in general,and of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom."). 62 See,e.g.,Jonathan T.Molot,Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State:A Struc- tural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation,96 NW.U.L. REV.1239,1246(2002)("The Constitution promotes a particular kind of governmental account- ability and a particular kind of democratic deliberation by distributing legislative authority over designated officials in the legislative and executive branches who are accountable to different po- litical constituencies.").On "deliberation,"see Cass R.Sunstein,Interest Groups in American Public Law,38 STAN.L.REV.29,45-48 (1985).On "accountability,"see Rebecca L.Brown,Ac- countability,Liberty,and the Constitution,98 COLUM.L.REV.531(1998);Steven G.Calabresi The Virtues of Presidential Government:Why Professor Ackerman Is Wrong To Prefer the German to the U.S.Constitution,I8 CONST.COMMENT.51,56-59 (2001);and Martin S.Flaherty,The Most Dangerous Branch,105 YALE L.J.1725,1821-25 (1996)
L&P - BOOKPROOFS 09/13/06 – 11:39 PM 2328 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2311 mittee bemoaned the deleterious consequences of divided party control — precisely the same problems of gridlock and diminished accountability that Wilson had (mis)identified as essential features of the Madisonian design. Short of rewriting the structural constitution from scratch, the country’s best hope, according to the Committee and its fellow travelers, lay in a set of constitutional and statutory reforms designed to reunify government (some similar to reforms suggested by Wilson a century earlier). These included requiring or encouraging straight-ticket voting, allowing sitting members of Congress to serve in the President’s cabinet, and altering the electoral timing and term lengths for the President and members of Congress.60 Not surprisingly, none of these measures has proven politically feasible. Most constitutional lawyers would bid them good riddance. The pseudo-parliamentarian, responsible party government project of fusing the branches under the control of a single, strong party takes Wilson’s critique of Madisonian separation of powers as its normative touchstone. Yet each of the features of Madisonian separationism that parliamentarians criticize is, in fact, celebrated in American constitutional discourse. Thus, the inefficiency of requiring the agreement of multiple, mutually antagonistic institutions to make laws becomes, in the view of constitutional lawyers, the great virtue of preserving “liberty” and preventing “tyranny.”61 And while separated powers may blur the lines of political accountability, constitutional lawyers emphasize that creating multiple channels of democratic responsiveness helps keep government accountable to the popular will by encouraging interbranch deliberation, defeating demagoguery, and impeding capture by narrow interests.62 From the Madisonian perspective that undergirds much of constitutional law and theory, therefore, the primary threat posed by political parties to the separation of powers comes not from party division of government but from party unification. Far from dreading divided ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 60 See id. at 124–43 (proposing these and many other dramatic reform strategies). 61 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom.”). 62 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (2002) (“The Constitution promotes a particular kind of governmental accountability and a particular kind of democratic deliberation by distributing legislative authority over designated officials in the legislative and executive branches who are accountable to different political constituencies.”). On “deliberation,” see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 45–48 (1985). On “accountability,” see Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is Wrong To Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 56–59 (2001); and Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1821–25 (1996)
2006] SEPARATION OF PARTIES,NOT POWERS 2329 government,Madisonians in a modern democracy must count on party division to recreate a competitive dynamic between the branches.And far from encouraging unified party control of the House,Senate,and presidency,Madisonians will view the prospect of unchecked and un- balanced governance by a cohesive majority party as cause for consti- tutional alarm. C.Conclusion:Separation of Parties Whether it is party unification or party division of government that is cause for the most concern,any understanding of the American sys- tem of separation of powers should start from the recognition that it encompasses both.Contrary to the foundational assumption of consti- tutional law and theory since Madison,the United States has not one system of separation of powers but (at least)two.63 When government is divided,party lines track branch lines,and we should expect to see party competition channeled through the branches.The resulting in- terbranch political competition will look,for better or worse,some- thing like the Madisonian dynamic of rivalrous branches.On the other hand,when government is unified and the engine of party com- petition is removed from the internal structure of government,we should expect interbranch competition to dissipate.Intraparty coop- eration(as a strategy of interparty competition)smoothes over branch boundaries and suppresses the central dynamic assumed in the Madi- sonian model. The functional differences between these two systems of separation of powers-party separated and party anseparated-are described in more detail in the next Part,but the challenge to the constitutional law and theory of separation of powers should already be clear.The Madisonian model of inherently competitive branches checking and balancing one another,around which the constitutional law of separa- tion of powers has been designed,has existed only in a few passages of Federalist 5r and the imagination of courts and constitutional theorists ever since.To the extent constitutional law is concerned with the real as opposed to the parchment government,it would do well to shift fo- cus from the static existence of separate branches to the dynamic in- teractions of the political parties that animate those branches. 63 If we took into account every factor that bears on intragovernmental political competition at least as heavily as branch affiliation,the number of "systems"might hit double digits.Beyond whether government is unified or divided,the one additional factor emphasized in this Article is the coherence of the two major parties.Another way of multiplying systems,of course,would be to distinguish the different patterns of party division:House and Senate versus President,House and President versus Senate,and so on.This Article attends to these distinctions in the sections in which they make important differences
2006] SEPARATION OF PARTIES, NOT POWERS 2329 government, Madisonians in a modern democracy must count on party division to recreate a competitive dynamic between the branches. And far from encouraging unified party control of the House, Senate, and presidency, Madisonians will view the prospect of unchecked and unbalanced governance by a cohesive majority party as cause for constitutional alarm. C. Conclusion: Separation of Parties Whether it is party unification or party division of government that is cause for the most concern, any understanding of the American system of separation of powers should start from the recognition that it encompasses both. Contrary to the foundational assumption of constitutional law and theory since Madison, the United States has not one system of separation of powers but (at least) two.63 When government is divided, party lines track branch lines, and we should expect to see party competition channeled through the branches. The resulting interbranch political competition will look, for better or worse, something like the Madisonian dynamic of rivalrous branches. On the other hand, when government is unified and the engine of party competition is removed from the internal structure of government, we should expect interbranch competition to dissipate. Intraparty cooperation (as a strategy of interparty competition) smoothes over branch boundaries and suppresses the central dynamic assumed in the Madisonian model. The functional differences between these two systems of separation of powers — party separated and party unseparated — are described in more detail in the next Part, but the challenge to the constitutional law and theory of separation of powers should already be clear. The Madisonian model of inherently competitive branches checking and balancing one another, around which the constitutional law of separation of powers has been designed, has existed only in a few passages of Federalist 51 and the imagination of courts and constitutional theorists ever since. To the extent constitutional law is concerned with the real as opposed to the parchment government, it would do well to shift focus from the static existence of separate branches to the dynamic interactions of the political parties that animate those branches. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 63 If we took into account every factor that bears on intragovernmental political competition at least as heavily as branch affiliation, the number of “systems” might hit double digits. Beyond whether government is unified or divided, the one additional factor emphasized in this Article is the coherence of the two major parties. Another way of multiplying systems, of course, would be to distinguish the different patterns of party division: House and Senate versus President, House and President versus Senate, and so on. This Article attends to these distinctions in the sections in which they make important differences
L&P-BOOKPROOFS 09/13/06-11:39PM 2330 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.1Ig:2311 II.PARTY UNIFICATION AND DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT We have seen that a critical dimension of the way formally sepa- rated political institutions actually work is whether the same political party controls the House,the Senate,and the presidency- that is, whether government is unified or divided.This Part describes the his- tory,causes,and functional consequences of that distinction as they bear on the constitutional separation of powers. A.The Past,Present,and Future of Unified and Divided Government I.Unified and Divided Governments.-If the de facto Madison- ianism of divided party government had prevailed for all or most of American history,the constitutional law and theory of separation of powers might have been right for the wrong reasons.(One is tempted to say,close enough for government work.)But it has not.Since 1832, government has more often been unified.64 From 1832 to 1952,an incoming President assumed office with his party also in control of both the House and Senate in all but three elections.65 Periods of divided government cropped up mostly during the turbulent years leading up to the Civil War(1840-1860)and during the period of fractious politics in the aftermath of Reconstruction (1874-1896).66 Then,during the first half of the twentieth century,di- vided government all but disappeared.In only four midterm elections from Igoo until 1952,two of them at the end of wars,did the Presi- dent's party temporarily lose control of one house of Congress (Igro, I9I8,1930,1946),and in each case unified party control was restored in the next set of elections.67 During that period,twenty-two out of twenty-six national elections (85%)produced unified party control, with the Republicans dominating in the first quarter of the century 64 MORRIS FIORINA,DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 6-14 (2d ed.1996).Fiorina notes that the national government was unified 60%of the time between 1832 and 1992.See id.at 6-7. 65 See id.at II.The three instances of nonunity were the three-way presidential contest of 1848,the disputed presidential election of 1876,and the election of 1884.The 188o election pro- duced a Republican presidency and House,but the Senate initially was deadlocked by a 37-37-2 split.After lengthy internal turmoil,the Republicans eventually gained control of the Senate committee chairs.U.S.Senate,The Great Senate Deadlock of 1881,http//www.senate.gov/artand history/history/common/briefing/Senate_Deadlock_1881.htm (last visited May 13,2006). 66 See FIORINA,supra note 64,at 9 tbl.2-2. 67 See Nat'l Archives and Records Admin.,Historical Election Results:Electoral College Box Scores 17816,http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/scores.html (last vis- ited May 13,2006)(presidential election results);Office of the Clerk,U.S.House of Representa- tives,Political Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present),http://clerk house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/partyDiv.html (last visited May 13,2006)(House of Representatives election results);U.S.Senate,Party Division in the Senate,1789-Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited May 13,2006)(Senate election results)
L&P - BOOKPROOFS 09/13/06 – 11:39 PM 2330 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2311 II. PARTY UNIFICATION AND DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT We have seen that a critical dimension of the way formally separated political institutions actually work is whether the same political party controls the House, the Senate, and the presidency — that is, whether government is unified or divided. This Part describes the history, causes, and functional consequences of that distinction as they bear on the constitutional separation of powers. A. The Past, Present, and Future of Unified and Divided Government 1. Unified and Divided Governments. — If the de facto Madisonianism of divided party government had prevailed for all or most of American history, the constitutional law and theory of separation of powers might have been right for the wrong reasons. (One is tempted to say, close enough for government work.) But it has not. Since 1832, government has more often been unified.64 From 1832 to 1952, an incoming President assumed office with his party also in control of both the House and Senate in all but three elections.65 Periods of divided government cropped up mostly during the turbulent years leading up to the Civil War (1840–1860) and during the period of fractious politics in the aftermath of Reconstruction (1874–1896).66 Then, during the first half of the twentieth century, divided government all but disappeared. In only four midterm elections from 1900 until 1952, two of them at the end of wars, did the President’s party temporarily lose control of one house of Congress (1910, 1918, 1930, 1946), and in each case unified party control was restored in the next set of elections.67 During that period, twenty-two out of twenty-six national elections (85%) produced unified party control, with the Republicans dominating in the first quarter of the century ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 64 MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 6–14 (2d ed. 1996). Fiorina notes that the national government was unified 60% of the time between 1832 and 1992. See id. at 6–7. 65 See id. at 11. The three instances of nonunity were the three-way presidential contest of 1848, the disputed presidential election of 1876, and the election of 1884. The 1880 election produced a Republican presidency and House, but the Senate initially was deadlocked by a 37–37–2 split. After lengthy internal turmoil, the Republicans eventually gained control of the Senate committee chairs. U.S. Senate, The Great Senate Deadlock of 1881, http://www.senate.gov/artand history/history/common/briefing/Senate_Deadlock_1881.htm (last visited May 13, 2006). 66 See FIORINA, supra note 64, at 9 tbl.2-2. 67 See Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., Historical Election Results: Electoral College Box Scores 1789–1996, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/scores.html (last visited May 13, 2006) (presidential election results); Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Political Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present), http://clerk. house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/partyDiv.html (last visited May 13, 2006) (House of Representatives election results); U.S. Senate, Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited May 13, 2006) (Senate election results)