China's Changing Constitution 799 sessions of the parent body.The State Council,like the U.S.S.R.Council of Ministers,functioned under the legislature as the highest state executive organ.Although the U.S.S.R.is a federal state while China is not,the latter's local people's congresses and people's councils were modelled on the local soviets and their executive committees in the union republics of the U.S.S.R. In addition,the judicial system and the procuracy,a prosecutorial institution that was also supposed to have the power to investigate and protest against violations of law by government agencies as well as by others,followed the Soviet system.So too did the 1954 Constitution's long list of fundamental rights and duties of citizens,and,as in the Soviet-bloc countries,China's courts were not granted the power to invalidate legislation on grounds of constitutional violation. Thus we can understand why,in his "Report on the draft constitution,"'Liu Shao-ch'i,who later succeeded Mao as president of the People's Republic,declared that the document was not only the epitome of the historical experience of Chinese constitutionalism" but also a"product of the international socialist movement."4 The constitutions of the U.S.S.R.and the other socialist states had been widely drawn upon as Mao himself conceded,even while contending that the document "sums up [China's]experience in constitution-making since the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty...."s Moreover,as we have seen,that experience itself had involved the assimilation of western principles and institutions. Few were surprised when the 1954 Constitution was promulgated. Once the initial years of political upheaval,economic reconstruction and consolidation of Party control had passed,it had been anticipated that a formal constitution would replace the temporary documents of 194916 and symbolize the new era of stability and economic growth.As in other communist states and as in Republican China under the Nationalists, although the Party remained the effective power behind the government, a government constitution was seen to be a useful creature of Party convenience.It established the basis for a strong,unifying national government and allocated responsibilities among different agencies, bringing greater clarity and order to a people who have always dreaded, and frequently experienced,political confusion.It also confirmed,both at home and abroad,the legitimacy of a regime that felt understandably insecure about its prestige. 14.Liu Shao-ch'i,Report on the draft constitution of the People's Republic of China,"15 September 1954,in Documents of the First NPC,pp.9,20,28. 15.Mao,"On the draft constitution,"p.142. 16.The first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference adopted on 27 September 1949"The organic law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."Two days later the same body adopted"The common programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference."For English translations of these documents,see Albert P.Blaustein (ed.),Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China (South Hackensack,N.J.:Rothman Co.,1962), pp.104-114 and 34-53,respectively
China's Changing Constitution 799 sessions of the parent body. The State Council, like the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, functioned under the legislature as the highest state executive organ. Although the U.S.S.R. is a federal state while China is not, the latter's local people's congresses and people's councils were modelled on the local soviets and their executive committees in the union republics of the U.S.S.R. In addition, the judicial system and the procuracy, a prosecutorial institution that was also supposed to have the power to investigate and protest against violations of law by government agencies as well as by others, followed the Soviet system. So too did the 1954 Constitution's long list of fundamental rights and duties of citizens, and, as in the Soviet-bloc countries, China's courts were not granted the power to invalidate legislation on grounds of constitutional violation. Thus we can understand why, in his " Report on the draft constitution," Liu Shao-ch'i, who later succeeded Mao as president of the People's Republic, declared that the document was not only the " epitome of the historical experience of Chinese constitutionalism " but also a " product of the international socialist movement." 14 The constitutions of the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist states had been widely drawn upon as Mao himself conceded, even while contending that the document " sums up [China's] experience in constitution-making since the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty...."15 Moreover, as we have seen, that experience itself had involved the assimilation of western principles and institutions. Few were surprised when the 1954 Constitution was promulgated. Once the initial years of political upheaval, economic reconstruction and consolidation of Party control had passed, it had been anticipated that a formal constitution would replace the temporary documents of 194916 and symbolize the new era of stability and economic growth. As in other communist states and as in Republican China under the Nationalists, although the Party remained the effective power behind the government, a government constitution was seen to be a useful creature of Party convenience. It established the basis for a strong, unifying national government and allocated responsibilities among different agencies, bringing greater clarity and order to a people who have always dreaded, and frequently experienced, political confusion. It also confirmed, both at home and abroad, the legitimacy of a regime that felt understandably insecure about its prestige. 14. Liu Shao-ch'i, " Report on the draft constitution of the People's Republic of Ch ina, " 15 September 1954, in Documents of the First NPC, pp . 9 , 20, 28 . 15. Mao, " On the draft constitution, " p . 142. 16. The first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference adopted on 27 September 1949 " The organic law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China." Two days later the same body adopted " The common programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference." For English translations of these documents, see Albert P. Blaustein (ed.), Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China (South Hackensack, N. J .: Rothman & Co., 1962), pp.104-114and34-53,respectively
800 The China Quarterly This constitution,plainly a transitional document,set forth the goals of a state that was advancing from'people's democracy ''to "socialist transformation'of industry,commerce and agriculture.As Mao emphasized,it was designed to heighten the enthusiasm of and unite the people by prescribing"a clear,definite and correct path to follow."7 Indeed,one of its major uses was as an instrument of indoctrination. Thus,in draft form,it was said to have been discussed by over 150 million people and,following its promulgation,there was a vigorous campaign to further disseminate and explain it to the masses.Pamphlets, law reviews,popular magazines,newspaper and radio commentaries all elaborated upon the tasks prescribed and the terms employed in the document.s Of particular interest were discussions of provisions that were ambiguous and appeared to reflect a political compromise that left the job of defining their meaning to the future.A leading example was Article 78,which stated that "[i]n administering justice,the people's courts are independent,subject only to the law.' The transitional nature of the 1954 Constitution made it evident that, once socialist transformation of the economy had been attained,the document would be in need of revision.Yet socialist transformation came much sooner than many expected;it was substantially completed in agriculture shortly afterwards and in industry and commerce by the end of the 1950s.Late in 1958 Chairman Mao himself noted this problem of constitutional obsolescence with specific reference to the structural changes wrought by the people's communes.He asked: Has the [establishment of the rural]people's commune violated the constitution? The issue of integrating politics and the commune,for example,was not passed by the People's Congress,nor is it in the constitution.Many parts of the constitution are obsolete....? The "anti-rightist"'movement that began in mid-1957 had already virtually ended attempts to implement Chapter VI of the Constitution, which dealt with the courts and the procuracy.As a result,it was no 17.Mao,"On the draft constitution,"p.145. 18.For translations of and commentary on selected excerpts from this literature,see generally J.A.Cohen,The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China: 1949-1963:An Introduction(Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1968).For an English language bibliography of relevant materials,see Fu-shun Lin (ed.),Chinese Law, Past and Present (New York:Columbia University,1966),especially pp.49-55;for a list of relevant Chinese language periodical literature,see Tao-tai Hsia,Guide to Selected Legal Sources of Mainland China(Washington:Library of Congress,1967),esp.pp.261-65.For western analysis of the 1954 Constitution,see H.Arthur Steiner,"Constitutionalism in Communist China,"The American Political Science Review,Vol.XLIV,No.1 (March 1955),pp.1-21;and Franklin W.Houn,"Communist China's new constitution,"The Western Political Quarterly (1955),pp.199-233. 19.For analysis of this provision and the struggle over its application,see J.A.Cohen, The Party and the courts:1949-1959,"CQ,No.38 (April-June 1969),p.120. 20.Quoted in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949-1968)(Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui(1967,1969),Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS).No.61269-1 (20 February1974),p.138
800 The China Quarterly This constitution, plainly a transitional document, set forth the goals of a state that was advancing from " people's democracy " to " socialist transformation" of industry, commerce and agriculture. As Mao emphasized, it was designed to heighten the enthusiasm of and unite the people by prescribing " a clear, definite and correct path to follow." 17 Indeed, one of its major uses was as an instrument of indoctrination. Thus, in draft form, it was said to have been discussed by over 150 million people and, following its promulgation, there was a vigorous campaign to further disseminate and explain it to the masses. Pamphlets, law reviews, popular magazines, newspaper and radio commentaries all elaborated upon the tasks prescribed and the terms employed in the document.l8 Of particular interest were discussions of provisions that were ambiguous and appeared to reflect a political compromise that left the job of defining their meaning to the future. A leading example was Article 78, which stated that " [i]n administering justice, the people's courts are independent, subject only to the law. " 19 The transitional nature of the 1954 Constitution made it evident that, once socialist transformation of the economy had been attained, the document would be in need of revision. Yet socialist transformation came much sooner than many expected; it was substantially completed in agriculture shortly afterwards and in industry and commerce by the end of the l950s. Late in 1958 Chairman Mao himself noted this problem of constitutional obsolescence with specific reference to the structural changes wrought by the people's communes. He asked: Has the [establishment of the rural] people's commune violated the constitution? The issue c)f integrating politics and the commune, for example, was not passed by the People's Congress, nor is it in the constitution. Many parts of the constitution are obsolete. . . 2 0 The " anti-rightist " movement that began in mid-1957 had already virtually ended attempts to implement Chapter VI of the Constitution, which dealt with the courts and the procuracy. As a result, it was no 17. Mao, " On the draft constitution, " p. 145. 18. For translations of and commentary on selected excerpts from this literature see generally J. A. Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China: 1949-1963: An Introduction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). For an English language bibliography of relevant materials, see Fu-shun Lin (ed.) Chinese Law, Past and Presenf (New York: Columbia University, 1966), especially pp. 49-55; for a list of relevant Chinese language periodical literature, see Tao-tai Hsia, Guide to Selected Legal Sources of Mainland China (Washington: Library of Congress, 1967), esp. pp. 261-65. For western analysis of the 1954 Constitution, see H. Arthur Steiner, " Constitutionalism in Communist China,a' The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (March 1955), pp. 1-21; and Franklin W. Houn, " Communist China's new constitution," The Western Political QuarSrly ( 1955), pp. 199-233. 19. For analysis of this provision and the struggle over its application, see J. A. Cohen, " The Party and the courts: 1949-1959," CQ, No. 38 (April-June 1969), p. 120. 20. Quoted in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tang Thought (1949-1968) (Mao Tse-tung ssu-^siang wan-sui) (1967, 1969), Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), No. 61269-1 (20 February 1974), p. 138
China's Changing Constitution 801 longer feasible to argue against Party interference in the determination of concrete cases,as some courageous officials had done.Nor was there further talk of implementing the rights enshrined in Articles 75 and 76: that an accused is entitled to make a defence,in a public trial,before a tribunal that includes representatives of the people called assessors as well as a professional judge. Of course,little effort had ever been made to implement some provisions of the constitution.For example,during the spring of 1957, during that brief,heady period when it was Party policy to "Let a hundred flowers bloom,''a well-known Shanghai lawyer and journalist, Ku Chih-chung,was one of many who assailed the Party for disregarding the constitutional guaranties of equality before the law,freedom from arrest except with the approval of a court or procuracy,and freedom of speech,press,assembly and association.Actually,some legislative and administrative steps had been taken to protect citizens against arbitrary arrest,but these had only proven partially successful.22 The Hundred Flowers period itself might be regarded as a limited experiment with free speech,but it was soon ended by the"anti-rightist "campaign that was launched shortly after Ku Chih-chung's speech.The Party struck back at its critics.As one Party authority put it: Ku Chih-chung made a shameless attack on the constitution.He will learn that the constitution protects the freedom of the people;but he will be disappointed if he hopes that the constitution will protect the freedom of speech,press and assembly of traitors,counter-revolutionaries and rightist elements.? Ku and his ilk were plainly not considered to be among"the people." The Cultural Revolution of 1966-69,which was nothing less than a disabling attack by Party Chairman Mao upon both the Party and government organizations,left the remaining vestiges of the constitution inoperative.This became evident when the president of the People's Republic,Liu Shao-ch'i,was stripped of his office even though the National People's Congress (NPC),the only organ authorized to take this action,had not met.Indeed,the failure to convene the NPC year after year throughout the entire decade 1965-75,despite the constitutional requirement of annual sessions,was a glaring embarrassment.As the terror of the Red Guards receded and the People's Liberation Army restored order,pressures grew in many quarters for a new constitution.Some groups hoped thereby to introduce a new era of stability,civilian government and greater protection for individual rights.Others,particularly those that had improved their status during the power shifts of the Cultural Revolution,wanted a document that would take account of the vast changes that had occurred 21.See Ten years of the Chinese people's constitution,''Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists,Vol.1,No.20(1964),pp.22,28. 22.See,e.g.,Cohen,The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, pp.11-18,25-35,354-64. 23.Quoted inTen years of the Chinese people's constitution,"p.28
China's Changing Constitution 801 longer feasible to argue against Party interference in the determination of concrete cases, as some courageous officials had done. Nor was there further talk of implementing the rights enshrined in Articles 75 and 76: that an accused is entitled to make a defence, in a public trial, before a tribunal that includes representatives of the people called " assessors " as well as a professional judge. Of course, little effort had ever been made to implement some provisions of the constitution. For example, during the spring of 1957, during that brief, heady period when it was Party policy to " Let a hundred Rowers bloom," a well-known Shanghai lawyer and journalist, Ku Chih-chung, was one of many who assailed the Party for disregarding the constitutional guaranties of equality before the law, freedom from arrest except with the approval of a court or procuracy, and freedom of speech, press, assembly and association. 21 Actually, some legislative and administrative steps had been taken to protect citizens against arbitrary arrest, but these had only proven partially successful.22 The Hundred Flowers period itself might be regarded as a limited experiment with free speech, but it was soon ended by the " anti-rightist " campaign that was launched shortly after Ku Chih-chung's speech. The Party struck back at its critics. As one Party authority put it: Ku Chih-chung made a shameless attack on the constitution. He will learn that the constitution protects the freedom of the people; but he will be disappointed if he hopes that the constitution will protect the freedom of speech, press and assembly of traitors, counter-revolutionaries and rightist elements. 2 3 Ku and his ilk were plainly not considered to be among " the people." The Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, which was nothing less than a disabling attack by Party Chairman Mao upon both the Party alid government organizations, left the remaining vestiges of the constitution inoperative. This became evident when the president of the People's Republic, Liu Shao-ch'i, was stripped of his office even though the National People's Congress (NPC), the only organ authorized to take this action, had not met. Indeed, the failure to convene the NPC year after year throughout the entire decade 1965-75, despite the constitutional requirement of annual sessions, was a glaring embarrassment. As the terror of the Red Guards receded and the People's Liberation Army restored order, pressures grew in many quarters for a new constitution. Some groups hoped thereby to introduce a new era of stability, civilian government and greater protection for individual rights. Others, particularly those that had improved their status during the power shifts of the Cultural Revolution, wanted a document that would take account of the vast changes that had occurred 21. See " Ten years of the Chinese people's constitution," Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists, Vol. 1, No. 20 (1964), pp. 22, 28. 22. See, e.g., Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, pp. 11-18,25-35,354-64. 2 3. Quoted in " Ten years of the Chinese people's constitution," p. 28
802 The China Quarterly since 1954 and formally confirm the altered political situation.Party Vice-chairman Lin Piao and his followers were,of course,eager to use the occasion to assure Lin's designation as Mao's successor and promote Lin's policies. Constitution-making in the 1970s The draft of a revised constitution that was approved by the Party Central Committee in 1970,but was not officially adopted,was a document radically different from the 1954 Constitution.It consisted of a mere 30 articles and 2,000 words,instead of the 106 articles and 15,000 words of its predecessor.24 Major internal changes occurred in China between 1970 and 1975, especially the death of Lin Piao,the purge of his followers,the rebuilding of Party,government and mass organizations under the increasingly powerful leadership of Premier Chou En-lai,and the rehabilitation of many veteran leaders,including Teng Hsiao-p'ing,who had been dismissed during the Cultural Revolution.Vast changes also occurred in China's foreign policy and international standing during that period.Yet the revised constitution that was finally adopted in January 1975 in many respects followed the 1970 draft.25 To be sure,a number of significant changes had been made.It is enough to note here,however,that the 1975 revised Constitution eliminated the 1970 draft's repeated references to "the great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung"'and dropped any mention of the dead Lin Piao,whom the draft had identified as "Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor.''26 It also replaced Mao Tse-tung Thought "with "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought"as the nation's theoretical guide.It added to the emphasis upon the leadership of the Communist Party of China over the state.And,most important,it inserted the crucial and unique provision that the chairman of the Party Central Committee"commands the country's armed forces,''including the people's militia.27 24.For an English translation of the"Revised draft of the constitution of the PRC," approved by the Party Central Committee 6 September 1970,see Michael Lindsay (ed.), The New Constitution of Communist China:Comparative Analyses (Taipei:Institute of International Relations,1976),pp.312-20. 25.Some observers have stated that there was also a second revised draft adopted by the Party Central Committee in 1973.See,e.g.,Leonid Gudoshnikov,"Two constitutions of the People's Republic of China,"'Far Eastern Affairs,No.3 (Moscow,1975),p.72. Indeed,the Republic of China on Taiwan published an English translation of what purported to be such a document;see Background on China,B.74-13(New York:Chinese Information Service,26 September 1974)and also Lindsay,The New Constitution of Communist China,pp.321-27.Yet two knowledgeable commentators have questioned the authenticity of this document,which will not be discussed here.See Tao-tai Hsia and Kathryn A.Haun,The 1975 Revised Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Washington:Library of Congress,1975),p.2. 26.Article 2,p.314,Lindsay,The New Constitution of Communist China. 27.Article 15 (1975 Constitution)
802 The China Quarterly since 1954 and formally confirm the altered political situation. Party Vice-chairman Lin Piao and his followers were, of course, eager to use the occasion to assure Lin's designation as Mao's successor and promote Lin's policies. Constitution-making in the 1970s The draft of a revised constitution that was approved by the Party Central Committee in 1970, but was not officially adopted, was a document radically different from the 1954 Constitution. It consisted of a mere 30 articles and 2,000 words, instead of the 106 articles and lS,000 words of its predecessor. 24 Major internal changes occurred in China between 1970 and 1975, especially the death of Lin Piao, the purge of his followers, the rebuilding of Party, government and mass organizations under the increasingly powerful leadership of Premier Chou En-lai, and the rehabilitation of many veteran leaders, including Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had been dismissed during the Cultural Revolution. Vast changes also occurred in China's foreign policy and international standing during that period. Yet the revised constitution that was finally adopted in January 1975 in many respects followed the 1970 draft. 2 5 To be sure, a number of significant changes had been made. It is enough to note here, however, that the 1975 revised Constitution eliminated the 1970 draft's repeated references to " the great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung " and dropped any mention of the dead Lin Piao, whom the draft had identified as " Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor."26 It also replaced " Mao Tse-tung Thought " with " Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought " as the nation's theoretical guide. It added to the emphasis upon the leadership of the Communist Party of China over the state. And, most important, it inserted the crucial and unique provision that the chairman of the Party Central Committee " commands the country's armed forces," including the people's militia. 2 7 24. For an English translation of the " Revised draft of the constitution of the PRC," approved by the Party Central Committee 6 September 1970, see Michael Lindsay (ed.), The New Constitution of Communist China: Comparative Analyses (Taipei: Institule of International Relations, 1976), pp. 312-20. 25. Some observers hae stated that there was also a second revised draft adopted by the Party Central Committee in 1973. See, e.g., Leonid Gudoshnikov, " Two constitutions of the People's Republic of China," Far Eastern Affairs, No. 3 (Moscow, 1975), p. 72. Indeed, the Republic of China on Taiwan published an English translation of what purported to be such a document; see Background on China, B.74-13 (New York: Chinese Information Service, 26 September 1974) and also Lindsay, The New Constitution of Communist China, pp. 321-27. Yet two knowledgeable commentators have questioned the authenticity of this document, which will not be discussed here. See Tao-tai Hsia and Kathryn A. Haun, The 1975 Revised Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Washington: Library of Congress, 1975), p. 2. 26. Article 2, p. 314, Lindsay, The New Constitution of Communist China. 27. Article 15 (1975 Constitution)
China's Changing Constitution 803 A few months after the 1975 Constitution's promulgation,a Chinese diplomat asked me,in a tone that affected hurt,why the western press had paid so little attention to this important event.In truth,the western media had not given it the broad coverage that so long-awaited a document might have inspired.Perhaps this reflected the widespread belief that in China,as well as in other communist states,constitutions tend to be worthless pieces of paper drafted by hypocrites.Moreover,the brevity of the new constitution and its high slogan content,minimal statement of goals and vague allocations of power only encouraged the cynical to believe that especially in this case the mountain had laboured and brought forth a mouse.Only the Soviet propaganda mill-no stranger to hypocrisy devoted extensive coverage to the 1975 Constitution,castigating it ad nauseam for its alleged violation of the principles of Marxist-Leninist socialist legality.2 What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that,apart from a nationwide campaign to explain why the 1975 Constitution proclaimed China to be a "dictatorship of the proletariat"rather than the "people's democratic dictatorship"'that the People's Republic had originally established,the media in China devoted even less attention to the new document than did the western press.There was virtually none of the detailed exegesis of many constitutional provisions that had appeared in books,magazines and newspapers and on the radio when the 1954 Constitution had been adopted.Indeed,the exclusive emphasis on the "dictatorship of the proletariat suggested that at least those who then commanded China's propaganda organs were not enthusiastic about other aspects of the constitution.And Chairman Mao's highly- publicized absence from the meetings of both the Party Central Committee and the National People's Congress that produced the constitution,and his failure to endorse it,raised further questions about its political support. When compared to its predecessor and to the fundamental charters of other communist states,the 1975 Constitution seemed a radical instrument,despite the claim of then Vice-premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao- later discredited as one of the 'gang of four"-that it was "the 28.For an example of more scholarly Soviet analysis of the 1975 Constitution,see Gudoshnikov,"Two constitutions of the People's Republic of China."And for an interesting commentary on a similar Soviet work,by an American expert on Soviet law,see John N.Hazard,"A Soviet model for Marxian socialist constitutions,"Cornell Law Quarterly,Vol.60,No.6(1975),pp.985-1004.For the range of western analyses of the 1975 Constitution,in addition to works cited elsewhere in this article,see e.g.,David N. Rowe,PRC's constitutions and the philosophy of constitutionalism"Issues and Studies (Taipei),July 1975,pp.2-23;Chun-tu Hsueh,"The new constitution,"Problems of Communism,Vol.XXIV (May-June 1975),pp.11-19:Tsien Tche-hao,"Les traits particuliers de la nouvelle constitution chinoise,"Revue internationale de droit compare, April-June 1975,pp.349-73;and Frank Munzel,"Eine Verfassung der Proletarischen Diktatur,"WGO-Monatshefte fur Osteuropaisches Recht,Vol.4(1974),pp.243-53
China's Changing Constitution 803 A few months after the 1975 Constitution's promulgation, a Chinese diplomat asked me, in a tone that affected hurt, why the western press had paid so little attention to this important event. In truth, the western media had not given it the broad coverage that so long-awaited a document might have inspired. Perhaps this reflected the widespread belief that in China, as well as in other communist states, constitutions tend to be worthless pieces of paper drafted by hypocrites. Moreover, the brevity of the new constitution and its high slogan content, minimal statement of goals and vague allocations of power only encouraged the cynical to believe that especially in this case the mountain had laboured and brought forth a mouse. Only the Soviet propaganda mill - no stranger to hypocrisy - devoted extensive coverage to the 1975 Constitution, castigating it ad nauseam for its alleged violation of the principles of Marxist-Leninist socialist legality. 2 8 What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that, apart from a nationwide campaign to explain why the 1975 Constitution proclaimed China to be a " dictatorship of the proletariat " rather than the " people's democratic dictatorship " that the People's Republic had originally established, the media in China devoted even less attention to the new document than did the western press. There was virtually none of the detailed exegesis of many constitutional provisions that had appeared in books, magazines and newspapers and on the radio when the 1954 Constitution had been adopted. Indeed, the exclusive emphasis on the " dictatorship of the proletariat " suggested that at least those who then commanded China's propaganda organs were not enthusiastic about other aspects of the constitution. And Chairman Mao's highlypublicized absence from the meetings of both the Party Central Committee and the National People' s Congress that produced the constitution, and his failure to endorse it, raised further questions about its political support. When compared to its predecessor and to the fundamental charters of other communist states, the 1975 Constitution seemed a radical instrument, despite the claim of then Vice-premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao - later discredited as one of the " gang of four " - that it was " the 28. For an example of more scholarly Soviet analysis of the 1975 Constitution, see Gudoshnikov, " Two constitutions of the People's Republic of China." And for an interesting commentary on a similar Soviet work, by an American expert on Soviet law, see John N. Hazard, " A Soviet model for Marxian socialist constitutions," Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 6 (1975), pp. 985-1004. For the range of western analyses of the 1975 Constitution, in addition to works cited elsewhere in this article, see e.g., David N. Rowe, " PRC's constitutions and the philosophy of constitutionalism " Issues and Studies (Taipei), July 1975, pp. 2-23; Chun-tu Hsueh, " The new constitution," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIV (May-June 1975), pp. 11-19; Tsien Tche-hao, " Les traits particuliers de la nouvelle constitution chinoise," Revue internationale de droit compare, April-June 1975, pp. 349-73; and Frank Munzel, " Eine Verfassung der Proletarischen Diktatur," WGO-Monatsheftefur OsteuropaischesRecht, Vol. 4 (1974), pp. 243-53