2000 THE CHINESE FAMINE OF 1959-61 14l price of grain to other commodities had limited power in explaining starvation in China because grain was rationed in urban areas and the grain market in rural areas during a famine was too thin to be meaningful. Third, because interprovincial grain trade by private traders was prohibited and the central verne nt did not have the capacity to deliver relief to rural areas during the period of a sharp decline in grain output nationwide, the subsistence of farmers in a province during that period depended on the food production in that province. These specific institutional arrangements provide a convenient way to tes he validity of FAD or entitlement as an appropriate approach for under standing famines. The per capita grain output in a province can be used as the proxy for food availability in that province. If FAD is the appropriate approach food availability would be the only variable responsible for the famine deaths In the Chinese setting, a persons entitlement to food was legally determined by his/her residence status. The proportion of rural population in a province represented the proportion of population in that province who did not h legally protected rights to food. It is a proxy for the degree of urban bias in that province. If Sens entitlement approach is the right framework to under- stand the causes of a famine, the urban bias might also be a significant variable in determining famine deaths in addition to food availability To be specific, the hypothesis we seek to test in the regression analysis can be summarised as follows In a famine in China, the death rate in a province is positively related to the proportion of rural population in that province (urban bias hypo- thesis) and negatively related to per capita grain output in that province (food availability hypothesis) We will use the serious famine that occurred in 1959-61 in china as our ase study. In the next section, we document grain production declines, issues of procurement, and the resulting famine. In Section 3, we conduct a statistical assessment of the relative effects of food availability and urban bias on the observed deaths from this human disaster 2. Collectivisation and Demographic Crisis: 1959-61 Chinas agricultural collectivisation started in 1952. The farming institution was changed from household farms to mutual aid teams, to elementary operatives and then to advanced cooperatives that consisted of about 150 households. The advanced cooperative was the major farming institution by 1957. Agricultural output increased continuously in the period 1952-7 with an average annual growth rate of 4.6%. Encouraged by this success, the Commu- nist party decided to adopt a bolder approach to mobilise surplus labour to re a household's property and exchange c Royal Economic Society 2000
price of grain to other commodities had limited power in explaining starvation in China because grain was rationed in urban areas and the grain market in rural areas during a famine was too thin to be meaningful. Third, because interprovincial grain trade by private traders was prohibited and the central government did not have the capacity to deliver relief to rural areas during the period of a sharp decline in grain output nationwide, the subsistence of farmers in a province during that period depended on the food production in that province. These speci®c institutional arrangements provide a convenient way to test the validity of FAD or entitlement as an appropriate approach for understanding famines. The per capita grain output in a province can be used as the proxy for food availability in that province. If FAD is the appropriate approach, food availability would be the only variable responsible for the famine deaths. In the Chinese setting, a person's entitlement to food was legally determined by his/her residence status.15 The proportion of rural population in a province represented the proportion of population in that province who did not have legally protected rights to food. It is a proxy for the degree of urban bias in that province. If Sen's entitlement approach is the right framework to understand the causes of a famine, the urban bias might also be a signi®cant variable in determining famine deaths in addition to food availability. To be speci®c, the hypothesis we seek to test in the regression analysis can be summarised as follows: In a famine in China, the death rate in a province is positively related to the proportion of rural population in that province (urban bias hypothesis) and negatively related to per capita grain output in that province (food availability hypothesis). We will use the serious famine that occurred in 1959±61 in China as our case study. In the next section, we document grain production declines, issues of procurement, and the resulting famine. In Section 3, we conduct a statistical assessment of the relative effects of food availability and urban bias on the observed deaths from this human disaster. 2. Collectivisation and Demographic Crisis: 1959±61 China's agricultural collectivisation started in 1952. The farming institution was changed from household farms to mutual aid teams, to elementary cooperatives and then to advanced cooperatives that consisted of about 150 households. The advanced cooperative was the major farming institution by 1957. Agricultural output increased continuously in the period 1952±7 with an average annual growth rate of 4.6%. Encouraged by this success, the Communist party decided to adopt a bolder approach to mobilise surplus labour to 15 We do not need to worry about how to measure a household's property and exchange entitlements as these two variables were not important determinants of the rights to food in the speci®c socialist setting in China. 2000] 141 THE CHINESE FAMINE OF 1959±61 # Royal Economic Society 2000
142 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL LJANUARY sA art of a apital formation. 6 In 1958, large-scale communes were formed as nationwide Great Leap Forward movement.Contrary to expecta- ions, however, agricultural production plunged dramatically for three succes- sive years and widespread famine ensued. During 1959-61, the death rate per thousand people increased dramatically while the crude birth rate per thou- sand people declined equally precipitously(see Fig. 1). 8 Economists have attempted to explain the causes of the sudden reduction in agricultural output. Conventional hypotheses include three successive years of bad weather, bad policies and bad management in the communes, and incentive problems due to the unwieldy, large size of the communes(Eckstein 1966: Chinn, 1980: Ashton et al., 1984 and Perkins and Yusuf, 1984). Lin 1/1000 Birth Rate Death Rate 5H+++++++++++++++++++ 194919541959196419691974197919841989 Fig. l. Birth Rate and Death rate in China, 1949-1989. Source: State Statistical Bureau(1990, p. 2) Ib Projects of capital formation include constructing irrigation systems, such as dams and reservoirs, building infrastructure, or the like Mechanisation was also used as a rationale for increasing the size of a 11 The principal characteristics of the Great Leap Forward may be summarised by policies related to technology, management and planning, and industries and ideology. See Riskin (1987) for additional As shown in Fig. 1, the changes in population trends started in 1958. However, the increase in the eath rate and the decline in the birth rate were likely to have been the result of massive mobilisation over China in 1958 as one of the most mportant compo g furnaces, which were set up in backyards for producing steel by m of the traditional iron- mponents of the Great Leap Forward movement Since the technique was extremely labour-intensive, people did not have time or did not give enough attention to health care and reproduction C Royal Economic Society 2000
increase capital formation.16 In 1958, large-scale communes were formed as part of a nationwide Great Leap Forward movement.17 Contrary to expectations, however, agricultural production plunged dramatically for three successive years and widespread famine ensued. During 1959±61, the death rate per thousand people increased dramatically while the crude birth rate per thousand people declined equally precipitously (see Fig. 1).18 Economists have attempted to explain the causes of the sudden reduction in agricultural output. Conventional hypotheses include three successive years of bad weather, bad policies and bad management in the communes, and incentive problems due to the unwieldy, large size of the communes (Eckstein, 1966; Chinn, 1980; Ashton et al., 1984 and Perkins and Yusuf, 1984). Lin 16 Projects of capital formation include constructing irrigation systems, such as dams and reservoirs, building infrastructure, or the like. Mechanisation was also used as a rationale for increasing the size of a collective. 17 The principal characteristics of the Great Leap Forward may be summarised by policies related to technology, management and planning, and industries and ideology. See Riskin (1987) for additional descriptions. 18 As shown in Fig. 1, the changes in population trends started in 1958. However, the increase in the death rate and the decline in the birth rate were likely to have been the result of massive mobilisation for producing steel by means of the traditional iron-casting furnaces, which were set up in backyards all over China in 1958 as one of the most important components of the Great Leap Forward movement. Since the technique was extremely labour-intensive, people did not have time or did not give enough attention to health care and reproduction. Fig. 1. Birth Rate and Death Rate in China, 1949±1989. Source: State Statistical Bureau (1990, p. 2). 142 [ THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL JANUARY # Royal Economic Society 2000
2000 THE CHINESE FAMINE OF 1959-61 143 (1990) proposed a game theory explanation that the main cause of the agricultural collapse was the deprivation of the peasants right to withdraw from the collectives. This switch in the form of organisation changed the incentive structure for the peasants and consequently undermined agricultural productivity. In this paper, we do not investigate the determinants of the sudden drop in output; instead, we focus on the consequences of the supply shock. More specifically, we analyse the relative importance of food availability and legal entitlement to food in causing the subsequent famine Statistical figures in Table I reveal that there were sharp reductions in grain availability for the period 1959-61. Prior to the collapse, the total grai output continued to increase, reaching a record high in 1958 with 200 million tons. In 1959, total supply suddenly dropped by 15% and, in the following two years(1960 and 1961), it was even worse, reaching only about 70% of the 1958 level. There was slow recovery from the slump in the subsequent years. The 1958 grain production level was not regained until 1966 During the food crisis, grain availability per person declined even more severely because, in the first two years, grain exports reached historical heights As shown in Table l, net grain export increased from 2.7 million tons in 1958 to 4.2 million tons in 1959. When combined with the decline in output, this resulted in a 17% and a further 13% reduction in per capita food supply in two consecutive years. Pressured by the food emergencies, China imported 4.5 Table 1 Grain Output, Procurement and International Trade QuotayOutput Per ca (million tons)(million tons) (%) (million tons) grain(kg/year) 169.52 47. 25.87 19275 40.22 20.87 195.05 1958 200.00 25.92 4.2 1961 160.00 32.42 9 21. 4.5 252.3 187.50 4.7 194.53 20.16 4.0 273.7 214.00 19.35 Source: State Statistical Bureau,(1990, P. 12, P. 26). Ministry of Agriculture, Planing Bureau(1984, 434) i9 Here and in the subsequent analysis, we use data between 1934 and 1966. This specific period is taken for consideration because important de c statistics such as death rate. are ome provinces prior to 1954. The period ends in 1966, the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, when the nation entered a distinctly different historical era c Royal Economic Society 2000
(1990) proposed a game theory explanation that the main cause of the agricultural collapse was the deprivation of the peasants' right to withdraw from the collectives. This switch in the form of organisation changed the incentive structure for the peasants and consequently undermined agricultural productivity. In this paper, we do not investigate the determinants of the sudden drop in output; instead, we focus on the consequences of the supply shock. More speci®cally, we analyse the relative importance of food availability and legal entitlement to food in causing the subsequent famine. Statistical ®gures in Table 1 reveal that there were sharp reductions in grain availability for the period 1959±61.19 Prior to the collapse, the total grain output continued to increase, reaching a record high in 1958 with 200 million tons. In 1959, total supply suddenly dropped by 15% and, in the following two years (1960 and 1961), it was even worse, reaching only about 70% of the 1958 level. There was slow recovery from the slump in the subsequent years. The 1958 grain production level was not regained until 1966. During the food crisis, grain availability per person declined even more severely because, in the ®rst two years, grain exports reached historical heights. As shown in Table 1, net grain export increased from 2.7 million tons in 1958 to 4.2 million tons in 1959. When combined with the decline in output, this resulted in a 17% and a further 13% reduction in per capita food supply in two consecutive years. Pressured by the food emergencies, China imported 4.5 19 Here and in the subsequent analysis, we use data between 1954 and 1966. This speci®c period is taken for consideration because important demographic statistics, such as death rate, are missing for some provinces prior to 1954. The period ends in 1966, the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, when the nation entered a distinctly different historical era. Table 1. Grain Output, Procurement and International Trade Year Output (million tons) Quota (million tons) Quota/Output (%) Net export (million tons) Per capita grain (kg=year) 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 169.52 183.74 192.75 195.05 200.00 50.89 47.54 40.22 45.97 51.83 30.02 25.87 20.87 23.57 25.92 1.7 2.1 2.5 1.9 2.7 278.5 295.5 302.8 298.7 299.0 1959 1960 1961 170.00 143.50 147.50 64.12 46.54 36.55 37.71 32.43 24.78 4.2 2.7 ÿ4.5 246.7 212.7 230.8 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 160.00 170.00 187.50 194.53 214.00 32.42 36.99 40.14 39.22 41.42 20.26 21.76 21.41 20.16 19.35 ÿ3.9 ÿ4.5 ÿ4.7 ÿ4.0 ÿ3.6 243.6 252.3 272.6 273.7 291.9 Source : State Statistical Bureau, (1990, p. 12, p. 26). Ministry of Agriculture, Planing Bureau (1984, p. 434). 2000] 143 THE CHINESE FAMINE OF 1959±61 # Royal Economic Society 2000